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With the help of spies, technological innovation, and evolutionary design, the Soviets’ scandalous tryst with double-hull nuclear-powered submarines has turned out not to be the engineering faux pas the West has clucked about for 30 ^ years. If the relationship continues, the a Soviets’ SSNs of the mid-1990s could be better than the XS. U. S. Seawolf (SSN-21).
nearly’"
tlOO-
combatant submarines were of double-hull constru ^ the pressure hull is externally framed and comple^ cased by a lightly stiffened outer hull (see Figure ' j6flt standoff distance between the hulls provides su flf volume for diesel fuel, ballast tankage, and sto
Soviet nuclear-powered submarine designs have come a long way in the past 30 years. Unlike Western submarine development, the Soviets have chosen to remain with double-hull submarines and to emphasize combat survivability rather than stealth and safety. These decisions penalized the Soviets by increasing their susceptibility to detection and attack.
In recent years, the Soviets have begun to field an impressive “third generation” of nuclear-powered submarines with significantly improved combat survivability, quieting, submerged speed, dive depth, and combat support systems. The introduction of these submarines was expected, but the quality of these submarines is reportedly better than U. S. intelligence forecasts.1
Though the bottom line still favors the United States in terms of the number of high-quality submarines, improvements in newer Soviet submarines have eroded important U. S. advantages. The Soviets have been able to close crucial technology gaps by ferreting out critical intelligence information from the U. S. Navy by way of several espionage agents, by using mature technologies and novel innovations, and by using an evolutionary 10-12-year submarine design cycle.
Most experts agree that the United States has less than a ten-year lead in submarine quieting and passive sonar technologies/performance, while the Soviet Union leads in most other submarine technologies/performance areas (see Table l).2 The Soviets are rapidly closing remaining technological gaps by investing huge sums of money in basic submarine research, hoping to bypass Western submarine designs by the turn of the century.
Today, debates center on the narrow lead the United States has over the Soviet Union in some submarine technologies. However, by the late 1990s, debates may focus on how much more, advanced Soviet submarine designs are than U. S. submarine designs. If current design trends continue, the Soviets’ mid-1990s fourth-generation nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) could be equal to
or better than the U. S. Seawolf (SSN-21), which is a ^ scheduled for introduction at that time. Soviet succes 0Ii: closing the gap in the next 10-15 years will depen ^ Soviet submarine design philosophy, Soviet succe achieving their submarine design goals, and new features that are introduced into future Soviet subman
Soviet Submarine Design Philosophy _ .—"
Soviet submarine design history is very different fr the West’s. Their submarine designs have been dnve different military strategies, technological constraints^^ geographical factors. Being less concerned about constraints or nuclear reactor safety, it is not surp that Soviet submarine designs emphasize features deemed important to the West at the expense of other tures valued by the West. . jgf-
The Soviets’ 10-12-year submarine design cycle i ^ initely tied into the five-year state planning systet'O-^^ nation’s top scientific and engineering talent is inV0 jjn- submarine research programs, and is supported by a^ pressive national infrastructure of research institu > ,
sign bureaus, and shipyards. Billions of rubles are^r ^ each year on basic submarine research in areas s advanced-pressure hull design, noise reduction, an ^eD ular construction techniques. Soviet designers ^VteezeS very pragmatic, preferring to make technological ^^3- in designs, construct technology demonstration c, rines, modify existing designs, and have shorter P tion runs. This evolutionary philosophy allows technologies to be gradually incorporated without technological risks.
Before the introduction of nuclear power
2000
Technology
Table 1 Estimated U. S.-Soviet Submarine Technologies (1960-2000)
I960 1970 1980 1990
Hull Materials | = | 0 | O | O |
Hull Design | X | X | 0 | 0 |
Dive Depth | X | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Maximum Speed | X | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Maneuvering | X | X | x . | X |
Noise Reduction | X | X | X | X |
Reactor Power Density | O | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Reactor Safety | X | X | == | = |
Weapon Systems | X | X | ■ = | = |
Passive Sonar | X | X | X | X |
Communications | X | X | X | = |
Manning Quality | X | X | X | X |
Automation Systems | X | = | 0 | 0 |
Post-attack Survivability O Key: U. S. advantage (x); Soviet advantage (O); Equality (=) | O | O | 0 |
O
0
0
0
0
0
%
X
0
0
given
Pressure-hull volume. This means less wetted
sUrf;
ace
high-n
niar'nes tSUre a'r bottles- Because nuclear-powered subrequire ° 001 re9u're large inter-hull volume for fuel, the In ^or double-hull construction ceased to exist. d°neci ate 1950s, Western submarine designers aban- sitigjg , i, designs in favor of internally framed,
face 0j- , designs: the pressure hull forms the outer sur- designs^ su^,rnarine over most of its length. Single-hull StrUcturalWere ^avored because of their minimum total for a . ■ Weight, as well as smaller outside dimensions for a g. area and, therefore, improved underwater speed face of 6n nuclear power plant. The smoother outer sur- flow nSln§le-hull designs also minimizes hydrodynamic 'nvolvPaSe' however, the transition to single-hull designs
► Res d trade'offs:
'3% (^rVe buoyancy was reduced from 25-35% to 9- Hoodin SUr^aced displacement, which limits the amount of ^ The ° 3 submarine can overcome. e^fects ^ressure hull no longer had the collision or weapon lWeen Pr°tection provided by the standoff distance be- ^ In ]atf inner and outer hulls.
smgle-hull designs, the number of watertight cludes11161118 was reduced from six to three, which pre- Pr0m,i SUrvival for most serious flooding casualties when
Cris
(beir n. °v»ets chose to retain the double-hull design for bally) 16 ear~Powered submarines, apparently willing (ini- ties to 1 accept structural weight, speed, and noise penal- Pi‘otec.rnaintain large reserve buoyancy and pressure-hull cal 0j- (see Table 2). Soviet designers have been criti- reSerYe L6Stem single-hull submarines because their low Su^nt uoyancy and limited compartmentation does not SUrfa^66 unsinkability”—the ability of a submarine to °peratj Ulto a stable condition, or to continue submerged °f the ”ns above depths that do not threaten the stability uikheads while maintaining speed after one or more compartments and their adjacent main ballast tanks have been flooded.3
Soviet designers also do not believe that single-hull submarine designs are necessarily superior in terms of structural, propulsive performance, and combat fighting. They believe that the benefits gained from single-hull designs do not justify what has to be given up in double-hull designs.4 Soviet writings indicate that the decision to remain with double-hull designs was made principally to retain the peacetime safety and post-attack combat survivability features inherent in these designs (see Table 3). Soviet designers felt that evolutionary development would eventually allow them to merge the combat survivability features of double-hull submarines with the quieting and speed characteristics of single-hull submarines. In short, Soviet designers have sought a balance of combat survivability and performance.
Soviet Submarine Design Achievements
In the mid-1960s, while U. S submarine designs were emphasizing quieting, sophisticated passive sonar, and greater dive depth, Soviet designs were emphasizing combat survivability and beginning to incorporate propulsion, structural, and quieting technologies to overcome penalties associated with double-hull designs. For example, Soviet designers felt that:
- Powerful propulsion systems could overcome the inherently higher hydrodynamic resistance of the double hull.
- By sacrificing crew habitability, miniaturizing engineering components, and externally mounting pressure- hull frames, smaller-diameter pressure hulls could be used to accommodate powerful propulsion systems.
- Dive depth could be increased, compartmentation maintained, and overall structural weight held down by using high-strength steel and lightweight aluminum, composite,
e-hull
Table 2 Double-hull Submarine Designs Advantages
- Better outer hull fairing possible; decreased drag
- Pressure-hull protection; ASW weapon effect survivability; frames tear from pressure-hull, allowing shell membrane strength to develop
- Increased hull protection during torpedo exercises, grounding, or surfaced collisions
- Superior main ballast tank survivability
- Easier and less costly fabrication costs of externally framed pressure hulls
- Use of inner-hull standoff distance for: degaussing coils, remotely operated vehicles, communication buoys, air bottles, ASW weapons and countermeasures, hull coatings (anechoic and weapons protection)
- Increased flexibility during design stage and later modifications
- Better use of pressure-hull volume if pressure-hull is externally framed
Disadvantages
- Increased weight for a given pressure-hull volume, unless high-strength and/or lightweight materials are used
- More corrosion and maintenance problems with steel double-hull submarines
- Equipment stowed outside pressure-hull must be designed with high pressure casings
- Improperly designed MBT vent shutters can cause outer-hull flow-induced resonances and vibration
- Increased maintenance and possibly overall higher construction costs
- Poor crew habitability in smaller hulls
Table 3 Soviet Submarine Combat Survivability Features
- Deep diving
- Hydrostatically strong hulls
- Seven or more watertight compartments separated by strength bulkheads
- One meter or greater between hulls
- High reserve buoyancy—20-35% of surfaced displacement
- Multiple sets of main ballast tanks arranged adjacent to each compartment and running the length of the pressure-hull
- Large supply of high-pressure air
- Emergency main ballast tank system and reserve tanks
- Good transverse and longitudinal stability
- High-capacity pumps
- Main propulsion systems redundancy to ensure regular and forced speeds after flooding casualty
- Secondary propulsion systems
- Shock mounting and redundancy of mission-critical machinery and combat support systems
and titanium alloys in pressure-hull and non-pressure- structures.5 ,
- Submarine quieting could be achieved (albeit belate ) by improved outer-hull design, resilient mounting equipment, and locating noisy propulsion systems soundproof compartments.6
By the mid-1970s, U. S. submarine designs were e phasizing improved quieting, more-sophisticated PaS^_ sonar, and higher submerged speed to support carrier tie group operations. However, U. S. submarine des'g had become “weight-critical” because of reactor sy weights and a decision not to use higher-strength, 100/HY-130 steel in submarine structures.7 The Pena for these decisions are reported to be: -qq
- A reduction in test depth from 400 meters to meters8
- A reduction in pressure-hull explosion resistance ^
- A reduction of compartmentation from six to three
tertight compartments9 w 0f
- A reduction in reserve buoyancy from 13% to 9-1 surfaced displacement
- Little weight or volume margin for future growt ^ In contrast, by the mid-1970s, Soviet submarine^
signs were just beginning to emphasize quieting an ^ bat support systems common to Western submarines ^ the mid-1960s. But, more important, the Soviets ha p 0 pleted a massive 15-year research effort on technolog improve combat survivability, submerged speed, ^ t
j CQfllh'
reactor power output, dive depth, quieting, ana ^.^jr
support systems. The Soviets began construction third generation of nuclear-powered submafl ^ Typhoon ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), guided missile submarines (SSGNs), and Mike, ^ and Akula SSNs—and started conceptual studies i°r
marines to be launched in the mid-1990s.
By the mid-1980s, the Soviets had largely ac
hievel
A
exah1'
their submarine design goals of the late 1950s. For ^ ap-
ple, all modem Soviet nuclear-powered submarine^
pear to have double-hull construction, multiple
th«
compartments, multiple main ballast tanks run.nl^cess length of the pressure hull, and reserve buoyancy M of 25% of surfaced displacement. Dive depths are n s edly 400-500 meters for modem steel-hull subma io and 800-1,000 meters for titanium-hull submaO^.^
Compared to earlier submarines, Soviet third-gen .
yasuy
nuclear-powered submarines reportedly have
proved combat support systems and more powe
rful
na'
clear reactors. Soviet third-generation nuclear Tr vvitF submarines are the most combat-survivable ev . ’ greater hull strength, dive depth, and standoff d*s
givuivi nun ouvugui, uivu u^ui, aiiu ow- &
These submarines are the first to seriously chalie b
id
pressure-hull rupture effectiveness of lightweight, gyf) some cases heavyweight, antisubmarine warfare
torpedoes. . are
Most worrisome is that newer Soviet submarines c^jet
■ example’ ,
quiet as some Western submarines.11 For exampw, Akula-class SSNs may be as quiet as U. S. aid
(SSN-688)-class submarines built in the late 19^.^
such Soviet submarines as the Oscar, Typhoon, ^ Mike, and the Victor-Ill SSN may be as quiet as
S-
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i
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tii
at
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ie
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capai)!., 5 Soviets’ third generation SSNs, the Mike is may he ° .P*us knots and 800-1,000-foot depths, and fifth 2(.aS <**Vet as S. Sturgeon (SSN-637)-class subs, hulls 4sTation ^ov'et subs with armor-plated composite the vvat n?! sPeec*s’ antl Star Trek sensors could be in cr while inferior U. S. designs are still on paper.
"637)-class submarines built in the early U.s se'fer Soviet submarines are so quiet that the eulty t“U?d SUrveiHance system (SOSUS) may have diffi- quieti«.aC^!n^ ^em. Most analysts believe tl
CortlPon acbievfments are evolutionary, related to better n°'syeaent des*§n> machinery rafting, and isolation of 'ndicati Ul^ment *n soundPro°f compartments. There is no ‘Metinin ^at tbe ^oviets Mve made a breakthrough in technol echnolo8y’ father they are simply using quieting 25 year°^les tbat ^ave been used in the West for more than
fine tepu6d^’ Soviets have introduced several subma-
^ Most sn0,°^es not c°mmonly used in the West. coatin„ °V'et ^marines reportedly have thick anechoic acoiRt;S °f1 outer hull, which reduce acoustic and non-
- Newe Slgnatures-12
ftieter t* ^0viet submarines have both 53- and 65-centi- strategj^6^0 tubes, capable of launching the SS-N-21 antishi^ . cru*se missile and long-range, wake-seeking,
- HighP 0rpedoes-13
bUcleaj. ^°Wer density liquid-metal and pressurized-water '°'ving rfactors power Soviet double-hull submarines, al- achieveAlfa SSNs, Mike SSNs, and Papa SSGNs to nUc]earsPeeds in excess of 35 knots, and all other modem j^ots H^°Wered submarines to achieve speeds of 30-35
°f Alfa strength, lightweight titanium is used in the hulls titles^ Dand ^*^e SSNs, and perhaps other Soviet subma- and sign pibly allowing test depths of 800-1,000 meters ^ 4lfasVCantly reducin§ magnetic signatures.15 cateci and perhaps other submarines have sophisti-
^ Typhj11100131*011 systems and smaller crews.16 desjgn °°n SSBNs have a unique “quad-pressure hull ^ard W*tb longitudinal twin-pressure hulls, a separate lly, and ^ressure‘hull housing the torpedo launching facii- ^ath tu 3 SeParate “command center” pressure hull be-
- tvjjsbe sail.17 H
0,1 ^har|C *auncllers are installed outside the pressure hull Ph0on ^ Papa, Oscar, and Yankee SSGNs, and on Ty- Sach a “Ns, possibly allowing easier weapon retrofits, rn°dified Oscar SSGNs capable of firing the SS- ReCeStrategic cmise missile.18 Pfyths , ^oviet submarine designs explode many of the jj'ese Su,0ut .double-hull submarines, in particular that He 0j. marines are weight-critical, slower, and incapa- ^0Wn [Llet 0Peration. Soviet submarine designers have c°rnpart Ut tbe combat survivability features of multiple Can be high-reserve buoyancy, double-hull designs ar>d higu161^^ successfully with the advanced quieting Sabipar- 'sPeed features common to Western single-hull 'trated designs. In short, the Soviets have demondesignat >t is possible to have a balanced submarine ’ 0r to “have it both ways.”
Soviet submarine design achievements are impressive, but one must ask what they cost the Soviets. First, by Western standards, the Soviets have paid an unacceptable price in terms of peacetime safety and maintainability. The pitiful peacetime safety record of Soviet submarines suggests serious design flaws, inattention to safety, lack of crew/shipyard maintenance of on-board equipment, and poor seamanship. Given the propensity of Soviet submarines to collide with submerged and surface objects, it was probably a wise decision to continue building more surviv- able double-hull submarines. In addition, if Western submarines had one-tenth of the nuclear reactor casualties and engineering breakdowns that the Soviets have, there would probably be no Western nuclear submarines. No responsible nation would risk operating such dangerous submarines near population centers. Second, the ease with which Western underwater sensors detected earlier Soviet submarines indicates gross inattention to quieting and/or a failure by Soviet naval leaders to understand the importance of stealth and the capabilities of Western acoustic detection systems. Third, the Soviets have not placed enough emphasis on passive sonar performance, which significantly limits their ability to detect quieter Western submarines at extreme ranges. Fourth, many Soviet submarines are “volume-limited,” which decreases maintainability and results in poor crew habitability (by Western standards). Finally, the Soviets have had to invest many times the resources that the West has to produce submarines with performance characteristics barely on par with the best Western submarines.
If the West has anything to leam from Soviet submarine design experience, it is the importance of continuous basic submarine research, innovation, and follow-through on mature technologies. For example, the Soviets always have a submarine design ready to go into production, and never have a design-cycle gap. The Soviets emphasize technology demonstration submarines for proof-of- concept testing, and have been willing to take calculated risks with nuclear reactor and structural materials technologies. In addition, the Soviets have shown that design
bulk'
costs. Extensive use of composites in Soviet corn^ ^
of 30'
Soviet submarines will achieve top speeds
of
40-45 knot burst speeds.22 Tactically quiet speeds'
emphasized over burst speeds. Most Soviet submart ^
will continue to have pressurized-water and liquid n ^ reactors, but gas-cooled reactor, magneto-hydrody _4WV
equal to the best Western submarines by the early ^ Techniques and technologies used to reduce inter ^ chinery and structurebome noise might include- re ^
seven or more watertight compartments, nig*1' |Q-
allow the entire crew to escape in an emergency •
compromises (i.e., double-hull vs. single-hull) do not always have to be made as long as technologies and funds exist to overcome the factors forcing the compromise, and as long as decision makers are willing to incorporate new technologies into submarines.
Future Soviet Submarine Designs
Soviet submarine designers are concentrating their research efforts on technologies in which the West maintains a lead and is concentrating its efforts (i.e., Seawolf), and on technologies the Soviets have that are superior or unique. The following are technologically feasible characteristics we may see in Soviet fourth-generation (1995— 2000) and fifth-generation (2005-2010) nuclear-powered submarines (see Figure 2).
Single- vx. Double Hull, and Submarine Size: The Soviets have been constructing double-hull submarines for more than 30 years and have never shown any interest in single-hull designs. Double-hull submarines will continue to be built primarily for their combat survivability and flexibility for future growth. If the Soviets were to abandon double-hull submarines, it would signify a major alteration in design philosophy and would be tantamount to admitting that double-hull submarines are not capable of matching the characteristics of single-hull submarines or of incorporating important future technologies. Future Soviet SSGNs and SSBNs probably will be smaller than the huge Typhoon SSBN and Oscar SSGN, and future SSNs will probably be 10% larger than the Akula.
Dive Depth and Structural Materials: Steel pressure- hull material technology will allow only incremental increases in test depths over the next 15-20 years. Steels with yield strengths greater than F1Y-130 (i.e., 100 kilograms per square millimeter) are not likely to be used in submarine pressure hulls because of fracture and welding problems, and poor performance under explosive loading.19 At best, Soviet steel-hull combatant submarines will achieve test depths of 500-600 meters.
Given the Soviet Navy’s 30-year investment in titanium submarine technologies, it is likely that at least one class of titanium-hull SSN will continue to be produced. However, it is unclear how long Soviet leaders will support the Navy’s huge financial expenditures to produce a handful of titanium-hull submarines, when monies could better be spent producing twice the number of steel-hull submarines. Titanium submarines will be built for their great hull strength/weapon survivability, low magnetic signatures, and potential for great test depths.20 Titanium submarines may achieve test depths of 1,000 meters, if pressure hull penetration design problems can be overcome. In addition, the Soviets could use the lightweight, high-strength characteristics of titanium to construct shallow 400500-meter test depth titanium SSNs and use some of the weight savings to increase propulsion plant size and bulkhead strength.
The construction of advanced Soviet composite-hull (outer-hull and/or pressure-hull) submarines may be one of the major submarine technology breakthroughs of the late 1990s or early 2000s.21 The light weight, high strength, and manufacturing flexibility of composite rna^ rials could be used in submarines to increase test dept weapon resistance, save structural weight, improve head strength, drastically decrease platform noise, crease magnetic signatures, and reduce some pro ^
submarines would have a significantly greater impa^ ^ titanium has had, and would profoundly affect ASW strategy and weapon system design.
Maneuverability, Propulsion Systems, and Spec ■ ^
marine maneuverability will become more import ^ platform noise is further reduced, detection/eng&S ^ ranges decrease to a few thousand meters, and ^ fighting becomes more probable. Soviet submarine ^ signers will continue to be challenged to develop sa ^ reliable high-power nuclear reactors capable of pr°P their double-hull submarines as fast as 45 knots.^ ^5
knots, with a few special-purpose submarines caP^ ^
me<al
be intr0'
and super-conducting propulsion systems may u ^jj) duced into some submarines.23 Soviet submarine gf probably continue using conventional propellers ^ than propulsors, because propulsors may not meet
combat survivability requirements. . e to
Platform Noise: Soviet submarines will c°ntl jeVels show improvements in quieting and may achieve „os.
__ i . _ , ^ ____ ■_ i__ f>3rlv
mounts, machinery rafting, structural dampening^^. posite-plastic foundations/structures, active sound ^
lation, special balancing techniques, and sound a coatings.24 Active sound cancellation and balanci 8 and niques may allow submarines to operate in peace wartime quieting modes.25 The Soviets may turt , res- prove their outer-hull form to reduce the flow-induc . UU onance problems that reportedly plague many d°u submarines.26 . ^
Combat Survivability: Future Soviet submann^^ have: reserve buoyancy 25-35% of surface displaC gth
watertight bulkheads, a standoff distance averag* ^ afe 15% of maximum beam (greater, if missile launc c ^jgb' mounted externally), great system redundancy, ^gat capacity pumps, waterproofed vital components, ^ high-pressure air capacity, and high-strength hulls. Soviet submarine survivability philosophy fe&' come more balanced as the post-attack survival tures of past designs are merged with pre-attack -ng, bility features of new designs, such as advanced closed-loop degaussing systems, and improved
coatings. -ne£j re5'
Future Soviet submarines may carry self-contai j t0 cue systems between their pressure hull and outer^
ever, introducing rescue systems may complicate
ae
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6clu'Pm and CrCW tra‘n*n8 to counter fire, flooding, and 'tig tec^nt shock damage. Advanced pressure-hull patch- entergen,clUes> automatic fire extinguishers, hydrazine Capacityma'n ballast tank blow systems, and high- "'ill be • PUmPs may be introduced. Bulkhead strength steeb ,'Hcrcased by constructing them of high-strength tiate^i^b'Strength/lightweight titanium, or composite StrUctur ’ and/,°r by shifting weight from other submarine C°m^ 'nto bulkhead structures, bat Suat Support, Weapon, and Sensor Systems: Corniest11 ar*d sensor system improvements will be the Sof^wth area in Soviet submarine designs. Acquisi- matuestern electronic and computer technologies, and 8ies W|nrin" °f homegrown Soviet automation technolo-
syst, '
f0l
'steri)s *sult in better passive sonar and fire control Tip „ Censor performance will also improve as plat-
to fight C°ntro* eff°rts because crews may be less inclined plecj subrna38113'^ W^en 3 means exists to escape a crip-
may 5gr *1U" armor plating or shock dampening coatings rrtents f lnstaded on submarines to protect vital compart- ASW J°m sf|aped-charge jet and advanced bulk-charge sh°ekh e,^°nS' 8 Greater attention will be placed on the Sovar fn'n§ because equipment shock damage will be ^proved*S pr'nc'Pid vulnerability to ASW weapons. eff0rt ? ecluiPment shock-mounting may coincide with gm ,0 re(luce platform noise.
3S1S wiH also be placed on damage control auto-
Drag Reduction Conformal Sonar Array Active Degaussing Variable Depth/High Resolution Sonar
Puturg^ 1S further reduced- at)c| “°viet submarines will have eight bow-mounted, v .~Cendmeter torpedo tubes capable of launching ec5Use r'et^ op weaPons> sensors, and countermeasures, ^sttre SU^mar'ne engagements will occur in a counter- °f self, r'C^ cnvironment, the number and sophistication ^°Untc Pr°Pehed/sinking countermeasures will increase. ^ exteeasures» mines, and torpedoes may be mount- aUnC|le ^naHy on double-hull submarines. Submarine- Sa*I sUn ant'a'rcraft missiles will be incorporated into the AdvaerStructure °f many Soviet submarines.29 Sl,cbasCed acoustic and non-acoustic sensor systems, beC°,d°rmal arrays, towed arrays, and wake sensors, ^hficelntroduced- Soviet designers may be willing to c®paCjts°tne reserve buoyancy and high-pressure air to install sensor systems and remotely operated
vehicles (ROVs) between the inner and outer hulls. Tethered and untethered ROVs could be used as force multipliers, providing a submarine with: increased sensor range, early warning of mine fields or enemy activity, special reconnaissance capability, and a torpedo countermeasure or decoy system.30
Manning and Automation: Personnel quality must improve if the Soviets hope to operate their high technology submarines effectively. Greater emphasis will be placed on the career officer corps and senior enlisted men, rather than conscripts. Better equipment maintenance will be observed as the Soviets attempt to minimize peacetime casualties and strive to keep their submarines in top running order. Automation systems, similar to those reportedly used on Alfa SSNs, will be used in all Soviet submarines to solve manning problems and to better manage operations. Advanced automation systems will reduce crew size by 20-30%, though at the expense of degrading damage control efficiency and possibly limiting patrol endurance.
It has taken the Soviet Navy 30 years to merge the combat survivability features of their deep-diving, multiple- compartment, double-hull submarines with speed and acoustic features typical of Western submarines. Recent Soviet submarine accomplishments are impressive, especially in light of the supposed penalties associated with double-hull submarines. However, the Soviets have had to pay a price for their submarine accomplishments, specifically in capital outlays, acoustic vulnerability, and platform safety.
The Soviets achieved their submarine design goals by using off-the-shelf and advanced technologies, and have rarely required Western technologies. They have, however, benefited immeasurably from war-winning information provided to them by spies about Western submarine programs and intelligence gathering against the Soviet Union. In addition, the Soviets are benefiting by the large amount of publicly available Seawolf design data. The Soviet Union has nearly a 15-year tip-off on the Seawolf’s basic technical characteristics, which will greatly aid Soviet designers in developing submarines to counter the Seawolf.
Though the United States will maintain a comfortable lead in the number of high-quality submarines for another 15 years, U. S. and Soviet submarine designs are today nearly on par in several important areas, and the Soviets are the undisputed leaders in other areas. Therefore, future U. S. and Soviet submarine developments will depend on their respective long-term strategies.
To maintain its lead, the United States must:
- Carefully plan future submarine acquisitions to match the Soviet submarine design cycle.
- Compress the current submarine design cycle so that a new class of submarine is built every ten years (i.e., shorter production runs).
- Begin planning for two generations of submarines beyond the Seawolf design.
- Increase funding and basic research to support the infrastructure required to support more innovative submarine design programs.
Arms and Armour Press, Ltd., 1986), p. 72; “Typhoon at Sea, Navy tional, April 1985, p. 196; and Dr. M. Vego, Soviet Navy Today, P- ' I8Ibid. . Pressure
19M. A. Krenzke and T. E. Reynolds, “Structural Research on Subm ^57, pp. Hulls at the David Taylor Model Basin,” Journal of Hydronautics, u Y
27-35. andisbuilt
20It is possible that the Alfa SSN has a test depth of 400 -600 meters . _„i with a very strong pressure hull in order to survive nuclear an 1
Pri
stationary Acoustic Wave on a Cylindrical Orthotropic Shell,’
Thr^'
hanika, October 1981, pp. 61-66; Yu. N. Bablich and Sh. U. a Tb^
Dimensional Stress State Occurring in the Neighborhood of the * ” Problem- Walled Composite Cylinder Under the Effect of Hydraulic Impac , prochnosti. No. 11, 1979, pp. 62-66; H. E. Perkinson, Jr., and R- yCornp0sitt less, Identification of Benefits and Technology Gaps Related to Use oj Materials in Pressure Hulls, Atlantic Research Corporation, Con r gPcS for N00167-82-C-0132, 22 December 1982; J. A. Kies, “Glass Reinforce'V Marine Applications,” Society for Naval Architects, Chesapeake jjenges. March 1965; R. H. Wehrenberg II, “Composites: Solving Materia ef (Re' Mechanical Engineering, April 1983, pp. 18-22; Capt. 1st Rank- n qq^s^0' serves) A. M. Breyev, “Application of Reinforced Plastics in Subman ^p^ieA15, tion,” Morskoy Sbornik, No. 6, 1964, pp. 69-71; V. T. Tomashevs n* p^un1 of Mechanics in the Technology of Composite Materials,” Translate ^ay„Jufle Publishing Corporation from Mekhanika Kompozitnykh Materialov,• . pesffl
1982, pp. 486-503; A. M. Vaganov, A. P. Kalmychkov, and M. A. st^0yeniyc of Hull Structures Using Glass Reinforced Plastics (Leningrad. u Publishing House, 1972). nnerat*°n i
- B " — - “--Victor Class: OP^Aprll
Maritime Def^’^a.
:fip‘
TesV
onal
October 10, 1984, p. 348; RAdm. J. L. Butts, USN, “Congressioi- Ql Excerpts,” Aerospace Daily, 14 March 1984, p. 89 for discussion search efforts on two SLAM systems. ^ ^
^S. E. Lowery, “Tracking Soviet Submarines Under the Arctic ’^ercd
ceedings, June 1986, pp. 105-106; R. Robinson, “Unmanned, n jnSon, ^ mersibles,” Submarine Review, April 1986, pp. 45-51; R- C- ,?jggp J°Uter* tional Defense Applications of Autonomous Underwater Vehicles, la ^
of Ocean Engineering, October 1986, pp. 462-467; R. Finkelstem, pp. 451" view,” Undersea Equipment & Technology /fev/ew,May/June 19 »
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August 1987 Proceedings, Mr. Englehardt is a naval arcm tv/.. by the U. S. Navy and involved in submarine design and^ payid-v'
ible1
researcn. ne uas also wuircu as a suuciuiai ciigM.v.-- ■ onSlv1 Taylor Naval Ship Research and Development Center, resp ^cejyeJ ^ ASW weapon effects and submarine vulnerability studies. j 311“ . B.S. degree in engineering from Vanderbilt University in —a Program at w
If we fail to act, the Soviets may be able to substantially close both the numbers and remaining technology gaps that exist, creating the possibility that Soviet fifth-generation nuclear-powered submarine designs (2005-2010) will be superior to the best U. S. submarine designs still on the drawing board.
*N. Polmar, The Future Mix of Subs & Strategy, Symposium transcript (New London: U. S. Naval Institute, 25 September 1986), p. 8.
2N. Polmar, Guide to the Soviet Navy (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1986), p. i.
3Capt. 1st Rank-Engineer V. Droblenkov and Capt. 1st Rank-Engineer Yu. Yakhnenko, “The Survivability of Ships from the First Ironclads to Our Day,” Morskoy Sbornik, No. 2, 1977, pp. 93-97; Rear Admiral-Engineer V. Droblenkov and Capt. 1st Rank-Engineer Yu. Yakhnenko, “Has the Damage Control Problem Been Solved?” Morskoy Sbornik, No. 5, 1978, pp. 79-84; and Capt. 1st Rank- Engineer (Ret) N. N. Yefim’yev, “Statics and Dynamics of the Submarine,” Morskoy Sbornik, No. 10, 1978, pp. 97-98.
4V. M. Bukalov and A. A. Narusbayev, Atomic-Powered Submarine Design (Leningrad: Sudostroyeniye Publishing House, 1964), chapters 2 and 3; N. N. Yefim’yev, Fundamentals of Submarine Theory (Moscow: Military Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, 1965), chapters 6 and 7; and V.M. Bukalov and A.A. Narusbayev, Design of Nuclear Submarines (Leningrad: Sudostroyeniye Publishing House, 1968), chapters 2 and 5.
5Bukalov and Narusbayev, op. cit. (1968), pp. 140-160.
6V. F. Droblenkov and V. N. Gerasinov, Threat From the Deep (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1966), pp. 170-177.
7HY means high yield; HY-100 is the designator for steel with a minimum yield strength of 100,000 pounds per square inch.
8Capt. J. Moore, RN (Ret.), Editor, Jane’s Fighting Ships 1986-87 (London: Jane’s Publishing Co., Ltd, 1986), pp. 634-639; Patrick Tyler, Running Critical: The Silent War, Rickover, and General Dynamics (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1986), p. 66; and David Miller, An Illustrated Guide to Modern Submarines (New York: Arco Publishing, Inc., 1982), pp. 27 and 77.
9N. Friedman, Submarine Design and Development (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1984), pp. 84-85.
10Dr. M. Vego, “Their SSs & SSNs,” Proceedings, December 1986, p. 49; Capt. J. Moore (Ret.), Editor, Jane’s Fighting Ships 1985-86 (London: Jane’s Publishing Co., Ltd. 1986), pp. 512-525; and Dr. M. Vego, “Soviet Cruise Missile Armed Submarines,” Navy International, August 1983, pp. 456-458. nP. Bedard, “Soviets Making Huge Strides in Sub Quieting,” Defense Week, 16 June 1986, pp. 1, 14-15; Jim Mikelevshvski, “Sub Hunters,” NBC Nightly News, 24 November 1986; N. Friedman, Submarine Design and Developments, p. 95; N. Friedman, “A Survey of Western ASW in 1985,” International Defense Review, October 1985, pp. 1588; and F. Elliot, “Navy Searches for New Ways to Hunt Subs,” Defense Week, 24 November 1986, p. 16.
,2Dr. M. Vego, “Soviet Navy—Combat Support of Submarines Part II: Defence and Logistics Support,” Navy International, September 1985, p. 564; Capt. 1st Rank Yu. Bol’shakov and Capt. 1st Rank M. Chuprikov, “Submarines Against Major Surface Combatants at Sea,” Morskoy Sbornik, No. 6, 1972, pp. 30-35; D. Miller, An Illustrated Guide to Modern Submarine Hunters (New York: Arco Publishing, Inc., 1984), pp. 74-75; M. W. Brown, “Slippery Skins for Speedier Subs,” Discover, April 1984, pp. 67-71; and Dr. M. Vego, “Soviet Alfa-Class SSN,” Navy International, March 1984, p. 140.
13R. Corlett, “The Soviet Type 65 Torpedo: A New Threat to Surface Forces,” Maritime Defense, September 1985, pp. 354-356, Dr. M. Vego, “Their Torpedoes,” Proceedings, July 1984, pp. 139-141, and Dr. M. Vego, Soviet Navy Today (London: Arms and Armour Press, Ltd., 1986), p. 21. l4Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power—1985 (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1985), pp. 95-96; Capt. J. Moore, Editor, op. cit., 512-525; and N. Polmar, Guide to the Soviet Navy, p. 140.
1 department of Defense, Soviet Military Power—1983 (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1983), p. 23; Capt. J. Moore, Editor, op. cit., pp. 518-525; Capt. J. Moore (Ret.) and Cdr. R. Compton-Hall (Ret.), Submarine Warfare—Today and Tomorrow (Bethesda: Alder & Alder Publishing, Inc., 1987), p. 70; and J. Berg, The Soviet Submarine Fleet: A Photographic Survey (London: Jane’s Publishing Co., Ltd., 1985), p. 40, 45, 56. Alfa and Mike SSNs are the only Soviet submarines officially cited as titanium-hulled. The Papa SSGN (Berg, p. 40; Jane’s, p. 518; Moore and Compton-Hall, p. 70), Akula SSNs (Polmar, p. 139; Moore and Compton-Hall, p. 70) and Sierra SSNs (Polmar, p. 141) are often cited as titanium-hulled.
16N. Friedman, Submarine Design and Development, p. 105; and N. Childs, “New View of Soviet ‘Alfa’ Attack Submarine,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 8 September 1984, p. 384 for discussion of Alfa SSN automation.
17N. Polmar, op. cit., pp. 114, 127-128; J. Jordan, “Oscar: A Change in Soviet Naval Policy,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 24 May 1986, pp. 942—947; J. Jordan, “Leviathan of the Deep,” Jane's Defence Weekly, 1 March 1986, pp. 376-381; A. Wetterhahn, “The Typhoon-Class SSBN—A Preliminary Assessment,” International Defense Review, April 1984, pp. 417-422; N. Friedman, Submarine Design and Developments, p. 112; P. Beaver, Nuclear Powered Submarines (London:
20It is possible that the Alfa SSN has a test depth of 400 -600 meters onventi°n^ with a very strong pressure hull in order to survive nuclear an ( -knotAlfai5 weapon effects. In addition, it is possible that the test depth of the gourCe
only 600 -700 meters, rather than the 800-1,000 meters cited m depth t0 literature. The Soviets may need the additional 200-300-meter u recover from a violent flank speed (40+-knot) maneuver.
21Krenzke and Reynolds, op. cit., p. 32; Department of Defense, ^ 1984). P'
Power—1984 (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Offic ’ f a ^jon* 105; V. G. Kurbakov, V. D. Kubenko, and N. N. Panasyuk, Mek' :2M. W. Brown, op. cit., pp. 67-71; R. Corlett, “The Victor Class- ^ Aprl Test Beds for New Generations of Soviet Submarines,” Maritime 'V spceds 1985, p. 155 for discussion of using polymer ejection systems for .Qn in^ 23R. Corlett, op. cit., pp. 154-157; D. Brady and J. Edyvane, ‘
Pod—Fact or Fiction?” Submarine Review, April 1986, pp. 16-2 ‘ compel 24V. A. Tikhonov and V. V. Yablonskiy, “Certain Problems in Vibra1 \^"'c
sation of Elastic Systems,” Moscow: Izd-vo Nauka, No. 127, 19 » “MtlV M. D. Genkin, V. G. Yelezov, M. A. Pronina, and V. V. YablonsK^^^oO Vibration Protection System with Low-Frequency and Vibrationa Control,” Moscow: Izd-vo Nauka, No. 126, pp. 12-18. .w( ed-
25R. J. Steer, Review of U. S. Military Research and Development pub*1 Tsipis and P. Janeway (McLean: Pergamon-Brassey’s International e cations, 1984), p. 153. •,lmtraIlSC,
26RAdm. V. L. Hill, USN, Future Mix of Subs & Strategy, Symposia (New London: U. S. Naval Institute, 25 September 1986), p- pebfU ,
27N. Friedman, “India Receives First Type 1500 Subs,” Proceeding^ <jub# 1987, p. 123; C. Heilscher, “The Rescue Sphere—A Rescue Sys^.^ for * lines,” Naval Forces, No. IV, 1986, pp. 33-35; P. Andino, Is 1 Onboard Survival Chamber?” Submarine Review, October 1984, PP\^ p. , Gabler, Submarine Design (Koblenz: Bernard & Graefe Verlag,^ jnter^°cj. 28“T-64 and T-800—The Soviet Army’s Real Main Battle Tanks, y. r Defense Review, No. 2, 1987, pp. 133-134; M. Mayseless, Y. r.^ gesistl covitz, and G. Rosenberg, “Interaction of Shaped Charge Jets ^
Armor,” Tel Aviv: full citation unknown. . p. l73i
29A. Preston, Submarines (New York: St. Martins Press, Inc., 19 ’ j So°r\
Kvitnitskiy, “Nuclear Submarines’ Means of Self-Defense, TeSl>A^\;v, heniye, July 1984, pp. 8-9 for a discussion of the British Blow yfgfi ’
Lucas, “Soviet Nuclear Carrier: ‘Sea Trials in 1988’,” Jane s Dej ^oCHirt° -
v"pr°' Ice Pack’d su^
Author of “The Implications of Sub-kiloton Nuclear Torpedo®
----- - ------- .naval architectemP tfol
and aflns^jd tf.
research. He has also worked as a structural engineer for the ,ul0 for
master’s degree in the National Security Studies Program University in 1984.
1987