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organization. The “system” can be a combination of strategy, an informal associa-
°eaten by
rap resP°ns'ble “diplomat” can keep a ail(jS nest °t systemic misunderstandings ha | c°st'y delays from tangling up an over-
hic can muster a little help
nis fnends.
egular overhauls performed by naval and commer- Claj shipyards eat up some 60% of all Navy ship mae Navy, these costs have been rising steadily for the g ’rCars' Much of the increase has been attributed to and th°Wln^ tec^n'cal complexity of modern naval ships tensiveir.lnstaNed systems, which virtually all require ex- the cq0’ lntc2rated overhaul.1 To get better control over to ^ S S’ Navy has been paying much more attention a(J<Jed •Wa^■ overhauls are planned. Unfortunately, the Parin' aljtCntlon has bloated the organization that does the ti°n 'j1^ to *he point that it has evolved into a loose coali- ovgrj many semiautonomous Navy offices with often- °f thenv8 p,annin8 tasks. They now include the office Comm "lef of Naval Operations, the Naval Sea Systems (NavA3^ ^NavSea), the Naval Air Systems Command c0nimlr|j lhe Naval Supply Systems Command, the fleet or the „nders’ the type commanders, the naval shipyards the p] uPervisor °f Shipbuilding Conversion and Repair, 0ffiCeanninS and Engineering for Repairs and Alterations htisbu' aS We" as l^e S^*P and her unit commander.2 In ess an |Caucratic maze, few understand the complete proc- Uct: a , no one 1S fully responsible for the ultimate prod- haul 0roughly planned and successfully executed over-
To
Cessfupe CrCt^'t °f those involved, many overhauls are suc- shortc ^ Planned and executed—in spite of the inherent bp-.,„ 0.min§s of the organization. The “svstem” can be tion within the bureaucracy, and an appreciation for human motivation.3
The following overhaul planning strategy coalesced over many years, many trials, and not a few errors. Its point of view reflects that of the naval industrial activity responsible for performing the overhaul (a naval shipyard or the office of a supervisor of shipbuilding and repair), but the strategy can be useful to anyone involved in this or similar processes.
The strategy itself is active—even preemptive—and very personal. It stresses personal responsibility, initiative, timing, and a pervasive attention to detail. Its effective execution requires constant attention to the course ahead and frequent checks on the progress of those in its wake. It is utterly dependent on the success of otherwise isolated individuals in working together as a team. It rests on two fundamental assumptions: first, that people, not organizations, do the planning and, second, that these individuals already have their basic needs fulfilled and must be motivated by higher incentives.
Depending on the complexity of any given task, the people to be so motivated may be legion—which does not help much. In overhaul planning, however, only two individuals in each agency need to be singled out. One is the line manager, who has decision-making authority over his agency’s role in the overhaul. The other is the one worker who must do (or get done) the bulk of the project tasks assigned to his agency. Examples include:
- A ship’s commanding officer and his chief engineer
- NavSea’s ship logistics manager for the ship type involved and the project engineer that manager assigns to the specific overhaul
These individuals are all managers, professionals, or both. They are military officers, public servants, or employees of established commercial firms who are adequately paid and relatively secure. They have some status in their own agencies. Their basic needs are already fulfilled by their parent organizations. To motivate these peo-
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pie, one must satisfy their higher cravings: personal relationships, recognition, self-esteem, professional growth, and achievement.4
With these ideas in mind, the following 11 rules will help ensure successful overhaul planning.
- Start Early:
- Look over the horizon
- Understand and get involved in the budget process
- Don’t wait on “them” to get organized
- Develop an “old boy” network
An overhaul has a long gestation period. Decisions crucial to its success are made five years before the ship enters a yard. If a planner waits for the system’s governing instructions to tell his agency to take its first official action, he will be presented with a rigid framework of prefabricated decisions. Nothing is more difficult in a bureaucracy than reversing a published decision. He may well be forced to merely do the best he can with a program he knows is flawed, one in which success may already be precluded by such overriding constraints as budget, time, and manpower.
A far better approach is to introduce ideas when the project is just being formulated and constraints are still gelatinous. This course demands active participation in the Navy’s long-range budgeting process. The process establishes initial figures for an overhaul’s most important resource constraints five years in advance. Planners should attend or at the very least be actively represented at the annual conferences that develop and later interpret these budget decisions. The “they” who come to these meetings from Washington, D. C., and from fleet headquarters have their own problems to be solved and their own theories about what should be done—all of which may differ significantly from the prerequisites a planner needs to successfully plan and execute his overhaul. These individuals are well versed in the arts of compromise and conciliation, however, and will yield on points that are crucial to you and less important to them, if you get to them before their positions harden (and if you are equally willing to compromise on issues they consider crucial).
A valuable byproduct of a planner’s involvement in these early stages is the opportunity to establish solid working relationships with the people who will be responsible for the project. Forming gratifying personal relationships is one of the higher human needs that motivate professionals. Such contacts are especially important to a coalition of people who work in separate agencies. The only chance an individual has of developing any sense of community in his project is through this association of “old boys,” if they can get to know and trust one another.5
■ Yet
lines of authority through the participating agencies. ’ a project manager must deal with just such a systenn At any given time, there are at least four agencies nom^ nally in charge or responsible for the end product, resulting problem does not surface in jurisdictional [1] ^ putes. Navy maintenance professionals are too adep1 constructive compromise for that. The danger is that so many responsible, no one is accountable; that each in vidual will depend on all of the other players to do t e> jobs properly, thoroughly, and on time—spontaneous )■ That is too much to ask of human nature, especially w e
many of the players are assigned to more than one pr°Je.e at a time. When faced with conflicting demands, pe°f' will resolve the conflict to best suit their own respect1 situations, and not necessarily in the best interests of a one project. But, if at least one person in one agency [2] [3]* sumes full responsibility and accountability for the °3 come of the whole project—and acts accordingly-' bureaucratic maze unravels, revealing a clear sense ot rection. That responsible individual, however, can ^ simply presume that the people in each agency will P form their tasks satisfactorily. He will have to active^ monitor, guide, elicit, cajole, beg, or extort the destf® results. Two likely candidates for this role would be planning project manager in the naval shipyard or the 5 pervisor of Shipbuilding. But should individuals v more than one agency step forward, so much the bet Mutual good faith and professional relationships (w'e nurtured) can accommodate extra leadership.
Dr
Bushel:
-inning Needs Planning, Too:
► NStablish realistic plans and milestones \ p^ate milestones with key players jjU Ish plans and milestones °u ,'s taken for granted that a ship overhaul must be thor- Pants^ P*annec* and the plan well documented. Partici- tj^t toust be able to refer to readily available documents OYg.6 t*lem when and where they are to perform their Thouh tasks and with whom they are to coordinate. c0m ^ not so obvious, the planning itself consists of a that 6X Ser'es both sequential and concurrent actions P|Cannot succeed unless they are planned. calen7ersmust develop a well-defined road map, a set of t*on tar mi'estones that move them from program incep- Aboye° St3rt °b overkaul (a two-to-five-year process). be ,Ve a**’ the milestones must be realistic. Planners may theti ntedt0 str’ng required events together into an aes- Plan th ^ f^eas'ng Plan of action and milestones. But any start 7 's.1101 dearly achievable is doomed from the shi ' bUS’ ^ t*le type commander’s staff cannot make the PreovaVu''ab'e during the period normally set aside for fact- f au* tests, the plan must be shaped to reflect that it is-1 a c°ntract cannot be solicited in less than 45 days, fits tLense^ess to base a plan on 30 days, just because that f0r7 time available in the schedule. To do so is to plan
exCgs'S. equally counterproductive to pad a schedule with N[aVajSlVe contingency time for unpredictable delays. phy>s Pr°fessionals are well aware of the ubiquitous Mur- Wr0n ,!taw (“Anything that can go wrong, will go ^turnh ^ and can accePt reasonable allowances for ’Pq y"~~hut the operative word is “reasonable.” ate<j C reahstic, planning milestones should be negoti- overWltb lkc players involved. These professionals can the int"116 'ncre(t‘hle obstacles if they have confidence in they hC§rity the plan. They will gain that confidence if Qnave a hand in its formulation.7 lish 7 P*ann'n§ milestones have been negotiated, pub- the ro.C,m before anyone can have a change of heart; put a Sma maP 'n everyone’s hands. Not only will it serve as lished ITIOnument to the cooperation that has been estab- b|e . ’11 w'h also serve as a common base for the inevita- anges that must be made as the project progresses. l
- Give documents wide distribution
- Establish credibility (play to the audience)
- Strike first
Organizational isolation can be prevented by emphasizing widely shared communications. Since the planning team will be dispersed both geographically and organizationally, every effort must be made to keep all of the players informed of what transpires between and within participating agencies. Even two-person communications should be copied and sent to everyone concerned. They will stimulate constructive thought and foster a sense of belonging.
Though it may occasionally violate good Navy communication doctrine, using naval messages in lieu of letters whenever possible is a good idea. A letter to a bureaucratic office is painfully slow, apt to be misrouted, and gets limited (if any) distribution around the agency. A message is delivered anywhere in a matter of hours or days and it is read by all managers worthy of the title (and their bosses).
Consider, for example, the commanding officer of a deployed ship who gets an information copy of a shipyard’s message to NavSea. The message confirms a telephoned agreement that NavSea will procure and furnish an important turbine repair part for the ship’s upcoming overhaul. Though the overhaul is still eight months off and the ship’s commanding officer is occupied now with operational matters, he is pleased to see that people are working on his behalf. The yard and NavSea gain a little professional credibility. When the ship’s engineer officer reads the same message, he realizes that the standard part being ordered will not fit his turbine because of an alteration made during recent emergency repairs. He drafts a message to the shipyard (info NavSea) advising the yard of the modifications they will have to make to the repair part. At this stage in overhaul planning, the modification can be easily accommodated. Should the discovery occur later on the job, it might cause a serious delay.
Timing is also vital to effective communication. To influence the decision-making process, it is smart to strike first. In any case involving more than one position, the advantage goes to the argument first espoused. If it is effectively presented, it creates a mindset against which all others are measured. Later arguments must not only present their own cases but must also refute the initial position.
5. Surprise No One:
- Telegraph your punches
- Wire every plan in advance
- Mention telephone contacts in your correspondence
It can be very satisfying to beat competitors to the punch. It can also be very destructive if the competitors are also colleagues whose support will later be needed. You can have it both ways if you are honest and consider-
7. Follow Up:
- Follow up
- Follow up
- Follow up
- Light up the dark comers
A corollary to Murphy’s Law warns that things lett themselves tend to go from bad to worse. Likewise, Pe° pie left to themselves rarely do their best. Overhaul plj*11
_ - « Up,
ners are particularly susceptible to Murphy’s malaise
ji<!
A good plan alone cannot ensure a good overhaul. Seeing it through until the finishing touches are added keeps both the crew and the yard on the job and the plan on track.
cause they lack close contact with their project team a because their ultimate goal is far removed from 111 everyday activities. Procrastination is a definite occup3 tional hazard. For them, follow-up is essential. Their me perception of concerned observation can produce a Ha 8 thome effect of greater proportion to the effort investe
Contact them regularly and often, note their progress,
ai^
praise their contribution to the common goal. The
bes'
(and probably cheapest) way to ensure success m
tin5
ate. Before going public with a proposal, take the time to brief personally in advance the people who are most likely to object. If anyone must be criticized, directly or indirectly, have the courtesy to inform him first. Doing so serves three purposes. First, by disclosing controversial ideas, an individual has a chance to proof them before their toughest critics. Second, sometimes the simple assurance of being ready to go public will prod capitulation or compromise enough to forego the need. Third, telegraphing potentially damaging information may later elicit the same courtesy from colleagues when the shoe is on the other foot.
Wiring every plan in advance by telephone or through personal contacts prevents embarrassing errors or misinterpretations and smooths the proposal’s acceptance when it arrives in print at the parent agency. Mentioning those contacts in writing reassures everyone that the principles have talked and reached agreement before the document hit the street.
realm is to mention progress toward intermediate
uiik'
stones in regular messages. The public spotlight cast by
message provides both recognition and deterrence, pending only on the degree of progress reported.
8. Devote Management Time to Each Project:
Small problems unsolved become big crises Review status frequently Maintain personal contact with key people Hit the road
&e-
Managers have often claimed that they are too busy
bother with small problems or to waste precious minu looking over the status of individual projects. Just. . often, many of these same people spend hours manag'3- an avoidable crisis or controlling damage they have
lowed to occur. Solving little problems in not glamoui
irou5
but it is efficient. Preempting problems is even more
eff1'
ient-
cient. Time so spent must be considered an investor Cultivating personal contacts is also an investment' takes time, but most of the time is pleasantly spent. Ita
6. Implicate Everyone:
- Gain commitment through shared authorship
- Share credit
- Dig deeply
To succeed in planning an overhaul, first make a clear choice: Is the objective ensuring a successful overhaul or taking credit for the plan? If an individual wants a successful overhaul, he must not only accept but actively promote full participation in the formulation of ideas and in the decision-making process. Even if a sparkling idea is entirely one’s own, it is best to subtly insinuate it to a group so that it emerges as a commonly held opinion. Joint authorship and shared credit will enhance personal (and thus agency) commitment. When inevitable problems arise, people and agencies that have had a visible hand in the formulation of a plan will be much more likely to pitch in and solve the problem than to sit on the sidelines and criticize the rest of the players. It is also wise to dig deeply into a participating agency to ensure that authorship and credit are shared with the individuals who will actually have to do the work, and not just with their bosses.
takes effort. The surest way to make friends is to si people you like them. You can say so, of course, b much more effective approach is to do them a favor
ally
requires no return. On a professional level, that usua*^ means easing their workload with a little extra person^ effort. Going out of the way to give them recognition another favor that is invariably well received. Whatov the investment, the result is a network of professi°° friends on whom you can count. j
To this maxim is added the admonition that travel an face-to-face contact are essential to the health of the n work. The miracles of modem electronic communicat' and conferencing notwithstanding, there are no substitu^
for a handshake, some small talk, dinner, or perhaps
j.
evening at home with a colleague and his family- S° .
pleasant pursuits do have a hint of boondoggle ab°
ill!
them, especially when travel and accommodations publicly funded. But given one vital prerequisite—that ^ project itself is in the public interest—such travel sa money by promoting effective coordination and avoid' costly misunderstanding. Care must be exercised, n°
ever, to ensure that the travel is worth the expense and
A
suits[4] [5] [6] [7]^’ n0t do”ars are sPent on personal pur
?' Have Fun:
Stay positive . ake it fun for others innovate sparingly ompromise effectively “eware the zealot!
as. ra^am Lincoln once remarked that “most folks are overh*^ 3S they maLe up their minds to be.” Planning an t° au *s indeed a challenge—but it is also a great way per3 ® a jiving. If you succeed, you will know it— 0gna sat'sfaction is there for the taking. The technol- Lgenf f,SC'nat'n8 and the people are interesting and intel-
Paycheck°W Can ^°U n0t en^0^ 3 j°b w'’h a” and a
Win ii0SitiVe Z6St ^or tbe J°b at Land is infectious. Others lion [8] [9] [10]° SCe an<^ aPPreciate a job that offers self actualiza- ensurS °Wn reward' il is perhaps more appropriate to them f Pe0pie are not turned off. Do not try to push fine a T ^r°m ’jam‘har> comfortable ground. Innovation is c°nfus °w aS *S done sparingly and does not threaten or miSe p wnen solid resistance is hit in any issue, compro- of iitt]e0rnP.rornise effectively by yielding on small points on t|lelntnnsic importance in order to gain concessions miSee, ar8er> more vital issues. Remember that compro- vidualS a ^undamental Part of shared authorship. An indi- mittej1111181 n0t afi°w himself or his people to get so com- the p 3ny one 'ssue Ihat they cannot compromise for Who m° l^e wh°le project. Such people are zealots ay have a place in heaven but not in a bureaucracy.
>0Rzcepthe Wdl Full:
- MaC°^n*Ze contributions (in print and in public) Ass*012111 Persona’ contact with key people (once again)
c°ntrib>ClateS Wb° bave been weR rewarded for their last eff0rtUtl?ns wih he all the more willing to exert extra live 0fa8r ^eco8nition is perhaps the most cost effec- the enf)a rewards- Stop frequently, during as well as at Player. a ProJect> t0 note the contributions of each f°r ^ . ’° ensure that these people are publicly praised
letter,Clr *r^orts- Remember to give wide distribution to ’he pr • rnessa8es of praise. They are great publicity for ’he va?6Ct aS We” as fi°r ’he praisee. And do not overlook fiiend 'UC Persona’ notes and telephone calls to the Corp0S Wbo bave made success possible. The Hallmark apprera’10n created an entire industry out of a civilized tiote13tlon h)r those who care enough to send a personal
- ^°" 1 Stop at Turnover:
- Do>ni’°r actively and continuously V Ext S°methin8 with feedback
Th raP°’ale and apply to current projects Ptiforti^ [11]’ 'n ’be sb‘P overhaul planning business, an and tu nate ’endency t0 exhale once the plan is completed is, (jj rned °ver to the folks who will execute it. The truth
’his n m°St 'rnPortant Part of good planning remains at Point unfinished. Good planners have an obligation
Ceedinjis / August 1987
both to themselves and to the poor guys in the trenches to stay on the job and ensure the overhaul itself succeeds. To be sure, the planners no longer have any authority over the conduct of the overhaul, but they are still responsible for its outcome. If they choose, they can influence both. By keeping visibly close to the overhaul, continually monitoring its progress, and offering assistance to the executing team, planners can ease interpretation problems, provide continuity and historical perspective, and serve as a link to the network of sources upon which the plan is based. Their very presence strengthens the plan and makes it less likely that it will be denigrated or misused.
Close association with the overhaul also yields a wealth of first hand information that can improve follow-on planning projects. Rarely, however, is an individual afforded the luxury of seeing one overhaul completed before he must begin planning the next. Lessons, therefore, must be discerned quickly and their results projected ahead so that corrections can be applied to current planning projects.
These rules can work and work well in planning overhauls, and selected restricted availabilities, planned maintenance availabilities, and restricted availabilities—repair periods of shorter duration—as well as other major industrial projects. But, like most management axioms, the ideas are less remarkable than their successful day-to-day- prosecution.
'U. S. General Accounting Office, “The Navy Overhaul Policy—A Costly Means of Insuring Readiness for Support Ships,” Washington, DC, December 1978. 2This list is not all-inclusive and, to complicate matters further, several organizational subdivisions of some agencies may be separately involved (with varying degrees of coordination and control).
3W. Newman, E. Warren, & J. Schnee, The Process of Management (Englewood, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1982), provide excellent coverage of each of these topics. ■^These topics are discussed in A. Maslow, Motivation and Personality (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954); F. Herzberg, Work and the Nature of Man (New York: World Publishing, 1966); E. R. Hammer & D. Van Tassell, “On the Issue of Public vs Private Sector Motivation: Have the Stereotypes been Debunked?” Public Personnel Management, Fall 1983, pp. 282-289.
5W. Kiechel in “Care and Feeding of Contacts,” Fortune, 8 February 1982, pp. 119-124, notes the enduring importance of the traditional school-tie, old-boy network that has been updated and sanitized as a new, deliberate, and relatively open pattern of contacts, restyled by feminists and others as “networking.”
6The NavSea ship’s logistics manager, the type commander, the Planning and Engineering for Repairs and Alterations Office, the supervisor of Shipbuilding Conversion and Repair, and naval shipyard commanders can produce documentation showing that they are in charge of a significant portion (if not all) of overhaul planning.
7Newman et al, p. 392.
8The positive effect of observable management attention on worker production was established in an experiment conducted at the Hawthorne Western Electric Plant in Cicero, Illinois, in 1927. The Encyclopedia of Management, edited by Carl Heyed, Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., New York, 1982, discusses the experiment at some length in “The Hawthorne Experiment,” by W. J. Dickson and in “Human Relations in Industry: An Overview,” by Carl Heyed.
[1] °n t Hide Planning Under a i 7d messages
°cument decisions, agreements, and hand-offs
[2] Assume Full Responsibility for Planning Success (or Failure):
- Don’t presume that everyone else will come through
- Elicit (or force) results from other responsible parties
It is hard to imagine an organization charged with something as complex as planning a ship overhaul that does not place a single entity in charge and does not establish clear
Captain Klein graduated from the U. S. Naval Academy in 1964 and
later received masters of science and professional degrees in engineering
from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He has served in a vari
ety of sea and shore tours devoted to fleet maintenance and moderniza
tion. Captain Klein has been deeply involved in Navy non-traditional ship maintenance initiatives, including the incremental overseas maintenance of the USS Oklahoma City (CLG-5) and the USS Midway (CV- 41), the Combat Stores Ship Phased Maintenance Plan, and the progres
sive maintenance programs for the Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class
frigate and the Pegasus (PHM-l)-class hydrofoil missile patrol combatant. A registered professional engineer, he is currently the director of the Division of Engineering and Weapons, U. S. Naval Academy.
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