This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
Comment and Discussion
ENTER THE FORUM We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, maritime, or military interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. The Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings.
Contents:
July Cover
Terrorism & Friends
EXTRA: Terrorists Attack USN Ship
Defeating Terrorism
Scratch
Reading the Code of Conduct
The Inevitable Attack on Libya
“Self-Reliance” and Force Development in the RAN
Navy Medicine: A Second Opinion The Soviet Navy: Nuclear War at Sea The Walker Espionage Case Rickover and Proceedings I am a . . . Convoy Commodore The Deep Submergence Vehicle Fleet Blue-out and Nuclear Sea States Silently, In Darkness and Fog Exploiting Shipboard Talents
July Cover
(See July 1986 Proceedings)
Kyle Thompson, former U. S. Navy quartermaster!signalman—I have to comment on Tom Freeman’s painting on the July cover. It is an excellent rendering depicting two long-standing symbols of freedom and strength. I noted Mr. Freeman’s special touch—having the flag hoist flying from the yardarm of the Iowa (BB-61) spell out “LIBERTY.” Very well done!
“Terrorism & Friends”
(See N. R. Fenton, p. 18, June 1986
Proceedings)
Commander A. Y. Norris, Royal Navy— Lately, on both sides of the Atlantic, there seems to be some debate in both public and private on the apparent obligation placed on some nations by the so- called “good turns” of other nations. Some argue* that the British owe the United States a good turn over the latter’s support for Britain in the Falklands Conflict. Others say that British support of the United States during the Libyan raids was a fulfillment of the British obligation to the United States. Mr. Fenton’s comment suggests that he feels that France should be obligated to the United States.
On serious analysis, it seems a fact of international relations that altruism in relation to national interests has not been at all marked in this century, to say the least. In essence, no nation is motivated to do something which is not in support of its national policy and particularly not in relation to the vital national interest concerning sovereignty. The several and combined aspirations of Germany, Italy, Austria, Turkey, and Japan in the period from 1916-1945 were seen to be in conflict with the vital national interests of the United States by its government. Hence Americans fought marvelously throughout the world in their own defense. Surely it is in defense of a vital national interest on the part of the United States to have some of its armed forces permanently stationed in the European theater, and not altruism toward the Europeans.
Surely the government of the United States would not have supported Britain in the Falklands Conflict if it believed that there was nothing to be gained for its own policy in Latin America. Did not the U. S. Government deduce that the Argentinian actions in April 1982 represented a threat to the peace and stability of the Western Hemisphere, circumstances which are not conducive to the perceived, vital national interest of the security of the United States and to 4s way of life, quite apart from the need to have a system of international order.
I imagine that both Britain and the United States took the view that Libyan state terrorism constituted a threat of vita significance to their respective national interests and therefore were able to act in concert. France did not. Is France to be condemned for that on any basis including some imagined obligation? The French perception was different.
It is a shame that Mr. Fenton cast an aspersion on the French educational system. Does he know what is taught m terms of history? It is a fact that France, more than most nations in Western Europe, has many military cemeteries—- containing the remains of thousands or war dead of all nationalities—within its borders. There are many other graves elsewhere, which are tended with reverence and gratitude by the French and, for that matter, other European people as the D-Day commemorations in 1984 and many other acts of remembrance have shown. History is taught. The evidence of the events in that history is painfully obvious to the inhabitants of this continent and to those who travel in those countries scourged by war. The French and other former Allies cannot forget the sacrifices of all those men, women, and children. Our problem, like that in North America, is that we may forget the lesson of that history.
Many of us on this side of the Atlantic recently enjoyed this year’s Fourth ot July celebrations, including the rededication of the refurbished Statue of Liberty. 1 believe the events America celebrated had—in their inception—something 1° do with a critical and strong involvement of the French in America’s history.
^tenant James K. Gruetzner, U. S. avy Commander Staszak’s essay ad- resses what should be a serious concern or all who serve in the Navy. I found his ^commendations for increasing the P ysical security on board naval vessels y more effectively arming the duty sec- |°n most interesting. His recommenda- ons closely parallel actions taken by my se--. commanding officer while I rved in a submarine tender a few years ago. 3
EXTRA: Terrorists Attack USN Ship”
Wee C. Staszak, pp. 33-39, June 1986;
1Q ' Bowen and P. O. Gammage, pp.
’ August 1986 Proceedings)
th S ^ reca^’ during normal conditions wePe«y officer of the watch was armed I 1 a ^-gauge shotgun (we had no al- wance for a Heckler & Koch MP5!), d 1 e tke officer of the deck, command w ^ officer (CDO), and several other chstanders and duty officers or chiefs ro^re armed with .45 caliber pistols. The lng patrol and shotgun-armed sentry
brid W°re Jackets- At night, the e §e was manned by a watchstander „XPPed with image-intensifier (“star- 8 ) binoculars. An M-60 machine
wunhteam was also on call. And, to deal p unarmed demonstrations, we also inct,ced the rigging and use of fire hoses ar> anti-protester capacity, thesUr*nf= heightened security conditions, acj ,.e. Precautions were supplemented by an M°na* armeti Personnel (armed with Priat or 12-gauge shotgun as appro- tea 6 aS We^ as a stationed machine gun m, l-infortunately, some of the more c, 8Htech’’ equipment (radios and p,jea'c|rcuit televisions) was unavaila- sim ir °Se' "^he rule of engagement was to h*3 6 y°u feel yourself or the ship a„,,e ln danger, the use of deadly force is
authorized.”
tpTjaining remained a sticky point, as one * We" hnagined. Although every- Nav WaS aPProPriately “qualified” per qui ^ lnstmctions, the expertise that re- tes is marginal at best.
Wa Ut most difficult problem of all th„S c°nvincing the mid-level leadership— pr Junior officers and chiefs—of the ina^.jcalhy °f these actions. I found the (“n' C,T some to perceive a threat Weli° °ne s ever g°’ng t0 attack w.v! ”) as to thaS aPParent willingness of others has t the towel (“If the CDO ever han ° Use a ^5, you might as well just jp. ? d UP ”) to be definite barriers to pja ^mentation of a plan such as Coming0 Staszak’s. Even more disconcert- and taCSe dhdudes belie the imagination resourcefulness which we declare to be our main advantage over our supposedly strict and unimaginative enemy. Truly, every naval leader, from admiral to petty officer, needs to think beyond the bounds of the expected—that is exactly what the enemy is trying to do. And, when the unexpected occurs, we must counter it as best we can with whatever force and courage we can muster. That is the way to victory—whether it be over a Soviet battle group or over a Soviet- proxy terrorist group.
Commander John L. Sams, U. S. Navy, Stuttgart, Germany—The scenario Commander Staszak depicts is certainly possible and would succeed on 90% of the ships I have served in. However, terrorists, like water, tend to follow the course of least resistance. By placing an underwater mine on the hull of a ship, terrorists could achieve equal notoriety with less personal risk to themselves. Should they want to increase the number of American casualties in their attacks, much more grisly results could be achieved by car bombing U. S. dependent housing near overseas military installations. Many housing areas, especially in Germany, are neither fenced nor provided with any perimeter defense. Nightly news footage of dozens of American women and children casualties would likely have a far greater influence on U. S. foreign policy than would an equal number of sailors killed on a U. S. warship. The corrective measures Commander Staszak recommends are necessary everywhere U. S. forces are present, but past experience indicates our response will continue to be reactive instead of preventative.
“Defeating Terrorism”
(See R. B. Helle, pp. 49-54, July 1986
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander John Albers, U. S. Naval Reserve—Major Helle’s article was outstanding. I’m glad to read that the Marine Corps is considering alternate means of fighting terrorism by using new techniques such as the Weaver Stance and new equipment such as the 9-mm. personal defense weapon. However, the photo depicting the Weaver Stance differs from the stance I was taught.
The Weaver Stance, as I know it, reduces your silhouette as seen from the target, improves your aim and accuracy by providing a more stable shooting platform as required for the larger calibers, reduces the probability of having your weapon knocked from your hands, is
The Weaver Stance
faster to enter from a draw or a readied position, has faster reload capability without removing your aim and firepower from the target, is easier to exit to a prone, kneeling, ready, or relaxed position, and works well with auxiliary equipment such as a flashlight.
The photo in Major Helle’s article shows what I call the old model “A” Frame Stance. It works fine on a range where there is no time limit for putting a bullet through a bull. But, what if the target shoots back as in the FBI’s recent drug smuggling gun battles? Which stance were the dead and wounded FBI agents using—the Weaver, the “A” Frame, or no stance at all?
America’s only Swordmaker.
Official* U.S. Naval Officers’ Swords and Accessories.
Inquire today for brochure and prices.
We also offer complete refurbishing and repairs.
•USN CERTIFICATION NO. E27N
-(Ames fflo.
Since 1831
840 Union St., Salem, VA24153 Phone (703) 387-0000
__________ ... - ____________________ .
sir*"-
(P TST 1986/87 CATALOG TST
r \
i
IEHU3I
NAVAL, MARITIME MILITARY & AVIATION BOOKS
Our quarterly catalogs contain 40pp. and over 1300 entries of mostly out- of-print books.
Our reasonable prices and excellent service are enjoyed by people like you who use and enjoy books. Judge for yourself. Send only $3 for the next 4 issues.
ANTHEIL
BOOKSELLERS
2177P Isabelle Court No. Bellmore, NY 11710
J
YES our catalog of 1:1250 Ship Models is available with f a larger selection and more lines of models. !
WHAT can you find there? CAST METAL RECOGNI- i TION SHIP MODELS, AIRCRAFT MODELS and • 1:200 TANK MODELS ranging from B.C. to the pres- i ent. Listed are warships of all nations, majestic liners of • the past, freighters, tankers and other ships used by Col- 1 lectors and War-Gamers, and even the Navy! As an ex- ; ample of size, the 1944 New Jersey measures 8'/>". Also i listed is a large selection of 1:2400 Ship Models in metal • and resin. l
A U. S. Company with old-world efficiency, we regard 2 our customers as friends. If you also want to become one ^ of our friends send $2.00 for our 28 page catalog. 2 NEW . . . due to increased demand we now accept or- \ ders charged to VISA. Send your account number and f expiration date. Billing is in dollars and orders are proc- J essed and shipped airmail within 24 hours. ALSO avail- ? able are Continental Model Railroad Supplies; ask for our j Train Price List when ordering the Ship Catalog. ^
Leo J. Winkler and Crew at •
PRESTON HOBBY MODELS )
P.O. Box 2280 i
8600 Bamberg, W. Germany ; Phone 0951-1 2222 \
(Your friendly Hobby Shop across the Ocean) 2
“Scratch”
(See M. Badham, pp. 55-63, July 1986
Proceedings)
Chief Warrant Officer C. L. Money, U. S. Army (Retired)—My objection to “Scratch” is that it is too short and too shallow. Is it short because it is too shallow? Or: Is it too shallow because it is too short? In the space of too few pages we are subjected to a technical, tactical, and emotional overload. Adequate treatment of the material could only be achieved by a narrative of greater length.
Perhaps fiction does have a place in Proceedings. If so, it should be of the caliber of The Hunt for Red October or Sand Pebbles. Would serialization of a longer offering be acceptable? Such material may provide a human character to an otherwise technical publication, which might attract a wider and more general readership.
“Reading the Code of Conduct”
(See J. H. McGrath, pp. 100-104, June 1986;
R. A. Stratton, p. 12, August 1986
Proceedings)
Raymond Lech, author of Sacred Honor: Americans in Captivity (Stein & Day, 1986)—If I were a prisoner of war, I certainly would not want to be restricted to giving only my name, rank, serial number, and date of birth to a ruthless enemy who has total disregard for human life, as Mr. McGrath proposes. My dog tags contain more information than that, as does my wallet and any other personal belongings I may have in my possession when captured. On the other hand, I do not advocate giving the enemy sensitive information, but a prudent man can best survive the horrors of a prisoner of war (POW) camp by using common sense, and not being restricted to a rule framed by someone who was probably never a POW.
The major flaw in Mr. McGrath’s article is that he looks only at one side of the coin and does not bother flipping it. As a traditionalist, he advocates giving the enemy only the “Big Four,” but he does not address the issue of what happens to a POW when he returns home after giving more than that, except mentioning a “legal sanction.” The bottom line to the Code of Conduct is that for all practical purposes it cannot be enforced. This is a historical fact. And, if you cannot enforce a rule, it is silly to have it. The Code of Conduct should remain only as a guide, not a mandate.
During the Korean War, the Chinese and North Koreans captured 7,000 U.S. servicemen. During the first six months of 1951, 3,000 of these men died from starvation while their comrades watched helplessly. After those first six months, only a few more died. Why? Because the survivors had given more than name, rank, and serial number. The Code was drafted after (and because of) the Korean War, but at that time it was still required that POWs furnish only name, rank, date of birth, and serial number. Of the 4,000 officers and men who were repatriated during Operation Big Switch in late August and early September 1953, the majority of them had “collaborated” 0 e-’ given more than the Big Four) with the enemy.
Each service had a different policy °n what to do with these men. Since there were few naval personnel captured, I Win describe the policies of the other services.
Air Force—Of the 220 repatriated Air Force personnel, 83 were suspected ot collaboration, with half that number giv" ing germ warfare confessions. On 8 February 1954, an Air Force Board of Re” view convened in Washington, D. C. A1* 83 men were brought in front of this board of five generals to explain their actions. Some of the conclusions that the board came up with are absolutely startling. For example, they said, “Voluminous military and personal information was disclosed to the enemy by POWs ot all ranks during interrogation.” The report further stated that “there was complete abandonment of the Name-Rank' Serial Number policy even in the absence of severe duress.” Of course—the Air Force, during pre-flight briefings, told their pilots to abandon the policy. In conclusion, the board said:
“In the cases examined, disclosure of military information to the enemy by USAF prisoners of war does not warrant further action. The act of making a false confession to germ warfare while under continued intimidation will not be considered a traitorous act [and] the fact that these men signed or made false statements regarding! germ warfare will not influence future assignments.”
The Air Force simply wanted its pilots to forget the whole thing and go back to flying. According to the board: “If the Air Force stands behind its men and recognizes that we did not mentally prepare them for situations of this nature, then the men will possess an undying faith in their service and their leaders.”
The traditionalists would have court martialed all 83 men, and allowed a jury of their peers to determine guilt or innocence—but the court-martial method doesn’t work.
Marines—There is a myth that the
MEDAL OF HONOR
The Names, The Deeds
★ "I am proud to have this volume for my library," Pres. Ronald Reagan 1863 ★ COMPLETE ★ 1984
it f 'i h
UP TO DATE AND COMPLETE - EVERY NAME AND OFFICIAL DESCRIPTION OF THE ACTIONS THAT EARNED THE HIGHEST OF ALL MILITARY HONORS - FROM THE CIVIL WAR THROUGH VIETNAM *1,105 PAGES, INDEXED, WITH HISTORICAL BACKGROUND, TABLES, AND COLOR PHOTO OF MEDALS - $27.50 Library of Congress Cat. No. 84-51095 ISBN 0-918495-01-6
To Order: Enclose $27.50 for each book. California Residents add 6% Tax. 4th Class Postage Paid.
Q'Sharp &• Dunnigan box 6606 forest ranch, ca 95942
UPS SECX5ND DAY (Where Available?) ADI) q)0
Marine Corps did not collaborate with the enemy during the Korean War, despite the fact that practically all repatriated POWs collaborated. When the war ended, the Marines held a court of inquiry in February 1954, for only one man, Colonel Frank Schwable, former Chief of Staff of the First Marine Aircraft Wing. Colonel Schwable had signed and broadcasted a germ warfare confession. In the inquiry, Colonel Schwable said:
“I want to emphasize, I did not undergo physical torture in the sense of brutality. Perhaps I would have been more fortunate if I had because people nowadays seem to understand physical brutality. I didn’t have that. Mine was the more subtle kind of torment. That kind is a little bit harder, I am afraid, for people to understand.”
This seasoned Marine officer admitted to collaboration with the enemy, but the court found that “Colonel Schwable resisted this torture to the limit of his ability to resist [and he had] reasonable justification for entering into such acts.” It was recommended that no court-martial proceedings take place.
Army—The majority (more than 6,000) of repatriates were Army personnel, and the majority collaborated. Yet, only 14 were court-martialed, and one of
THE NATION'S HIGHEST HONOR
2 DAY AIR
those was for murder, not collaboration. The convening authority for a general court-martial is a general officer, and some of the general officers with repatriated POWs under their command simply refused to court-martial the men, collaborator or not.
Many Army collaborators returned and were discharged from the service. Since the services cannot court-martial a civilian, the men were free. Another option would be to turn their names into the civil authorities and bring them to federal court on the charge of treason. A military court cannot charge a defendant with treason; hence, collaboration, which can carry the death penalty.
If the Army did court-martial the 3,000 of their men who admitted to collaboration, they would need 3,000 trial counsels, 3,000 law officers, 3,000 defense counsels, and, with eight-member juries, 24,000 jurors.
Another enforcement problem is illustrated by the 13 soldiers, who, with practically identical collaboration charges against them, when examined, admitted furnishing the Chinese with more than the Big Four. They did not all receive the same punishment. In fact, a few were found not guilty after admitting to wrongdoing on the stand. The officers and men who were found guilty received punish
FOR HEROISM UNDER FIRE
, ............................................
A GIFT OF THE HIGHEST ORDER
ments ranging from a letter of reprimand to life in prison.
Each general court-martial has its own “jury” who could easily obtain different impressions from the same testimony- Also involved are the trial counsel, law officer, and most important, the defense counsel. The lucky men who, during the Army collaboration trials, had competent defense attorneys got off; others, with less experienced defenders, went to jail-
Major General William Dean, Commanding Officer of the 24th Infantry Division and the highest ranking officer captured during the Korean War, freely admitted that he gave to the enemy more than name, rank, and serial number. He won the Medal of Flonor. A Marine officer who admitted to collaboration at Camp 5 (Pyoktong) in 1951 returned to receive the Legion of Merit. Various Army officers, also admitted collaborators, were decorated upon their return. Major Ronald Alley, a convicted collaborator (and in my opinion, a scapegoat), got ten years in Fort Leavenworth.
I would support the traditionalist view of the Code of Conduct if a uniform enforcement policy was developed for all the armed forces. Until that time, the Code can be used only as a guide, because if we do not have equal justice for all, we have justice for no one.
“The Inevitable Attack on Libya”
(See D. Evans, pp. 31-32, June 1986, E.
Olson, pp. 12-13, August 1986, Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander W. F. Readdy. U. S. Navy, Strike Operations, USS Coral Sea (CV-43)—For someone who was not there, Colonel Evans displays a surprising sensitivity to many of the subtleties involved in the 15 April simultaneous U. S. Navy and Air Force attacks on Libyan terrorists and military facilities. The success of the attacks did, indeed, stem from detailed planning, precision execution, and superb airmanship.
He uses the attacks to point out “the fallacy of ‘deep strike’ and ‘follow-on force attack’ envisioned in a NATO war because “twenty percent of the strike force was unable to fix and drop bomb® on large, fixed, high-visibility targets. Notwithstanding the extremely l°nS flight time required by the U. S. An Force F-lll aircraft to circumnavigate allied airspace (overflight would presumably be granted in the case of NATO involvement in a central European conflict), it was the stringency of the rules of engagement that forced that 20% not to drop their ordnance on the enemy.
His closing remark belies the fact that
Setting the standard for shipboard electronic enclosures
For over two decades, A & J Manufacturing Company has specialized in providing the Navy with electronic racks and cabinets. In that time, our versatile, modular design has made enclosure standardization a reality. This proprietary design and method of construction provides the highest strength to weight ratio cabinets available that meet the most stringent shock and vibration specifications and EMI/RFI shielding requirements.
A & J standard and custom enclosures are environmentally qualified for all types of Navy vessels.
A& J Manufacturing Company
14131 Franklin Avenue, Tustin, California 92680, (714) 544-9570 Manufactured and distributed in Canada by the Devtek Corporation.
bold, incisive use of tactical air power, accomplished at minimal losses what could never have been attempted by infantry due to geography, and the implicit probability of staggering losses.
The efforts of the military personnel who made the 15 April missions successful reenforced the premise that use of tactical, carrier-based air power remains a viable means to project power at great distances in this era of “violent peace.”
“‘Self-Reliance’ and Force Development in the RAN”
(See T. D. Young, pp. 157-162, March 1986 Proceedings)
“Standing Naval Force Pacific?”
(»See S. K. Jessen, pp. 84-87, March 1986 Proceedings)
Leading Seaman E. M. Moore, Royal Australian Navy—I congratulate Mr. Young on his article. Professor Paul Dibb recently reviewed Australia’s defense forces for the Australian Government. Mr. Young’s article strengthens my belief that Paul Dibb is the only person suffering from the misconception that future regional aggressors will provide Australia with at least ten years warning before launching an invasion, and that Australia could build up its defense forces in time to counter such an attack. Mr. Dibb assumes that any regional force likely to attack Australia would take this long to accumulate the necessary force to do so, and in the meantime, Australia, being aware of this build-up, would expand its forces to prepare.
Mr. Dibb’s report leans heavily toward self-reliance, commonly referred to as the “Fortress Australia” philosophy. To support his idea, he has recommended several new frigates for the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), of approximately 2,500 tons, and equipped with weapon systems compatible with our allies’. However, given the RAN’s current practice of deploying new frigates and existing River-class destroyer escorts (which the new class will replace) as they would destroyers, one should question the recommended tonnage of this future ship. Furthermore, in light of the present tight economic situation in Australia and the long track of industrial disputes at the only two dockyards with the experience to build this type of ship, one can ask: Where will they be built, and who is going to pay for them?
Another matter of concern to Australia was Captain Jessen’s concept of the Standing Naval Force Pacific (StaNav-
ForPac)—a credible idea that makes me wonder why it has never been implemented. Australia’s defense budget would be strained to provide a ship on a full-time basis for such a force, but the benefits of participation in StaNavForPac would outweigh the costs.
“Navy Medicine: A Second
Opinion”
(See D. L. Sturtz, pp. 127-129, December
1985, Proceedings)
Lieutenant Richard D. Tobey, V. S- Navy—I must disagree with Captain Sturtz. As a line officer, I have had many encounters with the Navy Medical Corps, especially since my wife is a Navy nurse.
I took particular offense at the comments stating that physicians should stay in one or two locations throughout their careers. Yes, it is important that line officers change commands frequently for a variety of experiences,” but the same is true for the medical profession. Doctors, too, would learn multiple skills by transferring frequently. The opportunity t0 learn from other skilled professionals, pick up new techniques, meet new challenges, and increase ability, while discarding poor practices, would be greatly enhanced by spending tours of duty at different locations and transferring aS often as line officers. The arguments to stay in one location for non-military oriented purposes really upset me. Line officers would also relish a chance to spend time in the civilian sector to participate in local professional societies, enjoy an established reputation, and become an active member of the community. The trade-off, however, is stagnation, and that makes moving more important. The Medical Corps is no different.
Also offensive is the notion that commissioned members of the medical department are doctors, dentists, nurses and Medical Service Corps staff first, and perhaps naval officers second. There is much more to being a naval officer than merely wearing the uniform with pride and practicing proper respect for authority. I have spent lots of time, socially and professionally, with medical personne who had absolutely no idea of naval missions, developments, procedures, or policies. Few of my wife’s acquaintances
have ever heard of a MilPersMan (Military Personnel Manual), much less how to use it to advise personnel. I believe “naval officers first, specialists second for all naval communities—aviation, submarine, surface warfare, supply- legal, and, yes, medical. Otherwise, hire civilians. (Continued on page 90)
when sited on surface platforms credible is our deterrence against
ho"' Soviet at any
evident that considerable research ^ into the article and the result is aa plete and illuminating presentation ^ comprehensive and interesting nl3 Mr. Bamford may be assured that h18 tide will hold its own with any sU quent articles on the same subject- With his article in mind I would h
tfiis ng*y
“The Soviet Navy: Nuclear War
At Sea”
(See N. Polmar, pp. 111-113, July 1986
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Curtis L. Orchard, U. S. Naval Reserve—The distinguished Mr. Polmar hit the nail right on the head with his comments on naval nuclear warfare, particularly when he noted that the maritime strategy fails to enlighten this dark subject.
The concept of U. S. Navy use of tactical nuclear weapons at sea remains obfuscated by:
- U. S. nuclear strategy and policy
- Nuclear politics
- Naval vulnerabilities
U. S. nuclear strategy and policy evolved toward limited employment of nuclear weapons (e.g., limited nuclear options, limited nuclear war) in the 1960s. Current U. S. strategic policy was founded basically by the Carter Administration’s “countervailing strategy,” which allowed for escalation control and flexible employment of nuclear weapons. The first Reagan Administration pursued a similar line in doctrinal development in assuring that U. S. forces had the ability to deny the achievement of Soviet objectives at every level of conflict. The key elements of this doctrine are: escalation control, flexible employment, and a secure strategic reserve to end a war short of massive exchanges.
U. S. policy consistently holds deterrence first and foremost. The notion of an actual nuclear exchange between the superpowers seems confined to the theory of a limited nuclear war, and not embraced as politic or policy. The distinctions between deterrence and war are significant, but not always evident. Frequently, the ability to wage war is credited as a deterrent in itself. This seems to elevate the single integrated operational plan to the level of policy, rather than a plan derived from policy. For “tactical” nuclear war to have meaning, it must devolve from broader strategic policies and doctrines. This is beyond the initial reach of the maritime strategy.
Nuclear politics, domestic and international, prevent serious discussion of nuclear war-fighting capabilities. Forward based systems (those nuclear weapons capable of hitting the Soviet homeland from our carriers and NATO bases and launchers) remain a major obstacle in superpower arms limitation discussions. An open review of plans for sustaining tactical nuclear war at sea would be grist for the mill of international propaganda. Domestically, there are many who would consider serious discussion of tactical nuclear war at sea as:
- Making the use of nuclear weapons more viable and therefore more likely
- Making the billions spent on carrier battle groups and the 600-ship Navy a sham, since serious consideration of nuclear warfare at sea makes all surface platforms vulnerable.
The concern for vulnerabilities in a nuclear conflict cuts right to the heart of U. S. nuclear doctrine, which emphasizes survivability of a reserve force and of command, control, and communications in order to control escalation and end the war. In theory, the alternatives to escalation control force decision makers into a “use them or lose them” scenario. It is apparent that the concept of nuclear war at sea must rely equally upon some tactical nuclear forces that can endure the enemy’s strike. Otherwise, deterrence will fall back upon strategic forces and the limited nuclear conflict at sea will not be contained.
Only submarine-based weapons are secure enough to be regarded as a tactical nuclear reserve. Most of our surface Navy would not be mission-capable after a nuclear battle at sea. Additionally, surface forces are increasingly detectable by satellite reconnaisance, and as Mr. Polmar points out, we can tolerate no “leakers” when defending against nuclear cruise missiles. If our admirals really believe the Soviet Union will use nuclear weapons against our task forces, preemption may be the only way for surface forces to survive. This is not controlling escalation; and it seems to contradict our strategic nuclear doctrines.
The debate on the utility and survivability of carriers develops more ominous rhetoric in the tactical nuclear area. If naval nuclear weapons are vulnerable
use of nuclear weapons at sea, or i other level of nuclear violence? ^ The maritime strategy must be c ^ lenged for its lack of definition in how are to deter nuclear war at sea.
Commander Lyle W. Eads, U• (Retired)—I consider the article on ^ Walker espionage case one of the 1 -s
articles I have read in Proceedings-
say that a crime of mind-boggl*nS portions has been perpetrated agallj . country and all its citizens. Surpns' there have been no expressions ° rage, no letters to editors, or edito ^ Have we become so blase that we aC such acts against the United States as tine happenings? Although the trait0 acts of the Rosenbergs were despi^u . they pale in comparison to the Wa revelations—the damage to this c is in all probability irreparable. -ne Mr. Bamford cites 17 Navy-*''13^ Corps espionage cases in the 1980s- not only appalled at the number °t 0 .
but I am equally appalled at the hg ^ of the sentences given. We shot* ^ rest until the death penalty is re‘nSje no for all persons convicted of espi0113? .,ul matter who they are, military or clV'veor Any cases in which servicemen, ac e retired, are charged with esP'° ,jal, should be tried by a general court111 jeat(i and upon conviction, be given the g penalty—no exceptions. There sh no plea bargaining, for how can ^g
who would betray his own coun.|ajng. trusted to tell the truth about any t. Even his cooperation should be su P
kickover
all c^!:Md 116 stormed back, “They’re I wouldn’t have one on my
staff;-
retUm ,^av'n§ made himself clear, he contin? .1° subject of the article and
c°ntinued
°ccasion stands out
'ions'aSlced bim if he had any sugges- °r improving the Proceedings and
and Proceedings
^ Barrow, Jr., Editor of Pro- nj, "J®? (1973-1985); Naval Institute Se- Z*dlt°r (1985-1986)-Ever since, nese ^°rCan mountaintop in 1951, a Chi- 0f me°ncussion grenade blew away most telenh ear’n8’ * have hated to talk on the edito oriR a usually fatal flaw f°r an kicko °Ut ^ '°vcd to talk to Hyman What h6r -^e cahed regularly to tell me Ceedie dldn’t like in the current Pro- l0n„ ^e calls were always quite Sa>d he^kj6’^6 never hkcd anything—or
years^h^ °ne d’s earl'er calls, some about 3C'S’ •lle was particularly irate a NavS?met^'n§ 'hat had been written by him th* uCademy graduate. I reminded
alurr,„ 31 de’t00’ was a Naval Academy aiUtnnus, an''
clowns!
He a t0 tear d t0 shreds. tain ^ended’ “And I’m not alone. Cap- rne j,°'and'S0 on my staff agrees with ^ m puting him on the extension.” ThtTri v°ice asked, “Mr. Barrow?” before6Vd made me say, “Captain, AcaH„ ^°U begin, you’re not a Naval adepmy graduate, are you?”
1 said *<am’ Why do you ask?” rrtirai d-’ , ^ou d better not ever let Ad- The1C^over find out about it.” ral dicjCakta'n didn’t laugh, but the admi-
hearinp'ra* kickover became aware of my When ky°hlem and often restated things actly ! became clear that I had not exsUch „ ndersto°d what he’d said. One in my memory.
he quickly rattled off a string of them, all beginning with “What do you think of . . . ?” I responded to each and then he paused. He said (I now know) “What do you think about sex?” (He later made it clear that he was not talking about pinups or dirty jokes soiling our pristine pages—just “wholesome stuff.”)
But I missed the “What,” and I thought he had changed the subject of improvement and was asking “Do you think about sex?”
I truthfully replied, “All the damn time, admiral.”
During the ensuing pause, something told me that was not what he had asked. But, instead of repeating the question, he said (a bit wistfully, 1 thought) “Yeah, me, too.”
My respect for Admiral Rickover grew over the years, mostly because of my hastily scribbled notes of our conversations. As I read them afterward, minus the hyperbole and the salty language, it was difficult to disagree with most of what he said.
He was from and of another time, and historians are likely to be much kinder to him than his obituary writers were. During the 1920s and 30s, his professionally formative years, the acceptance of “gifts” from industrialists by Navy— and, presumably, Army, Marine, Air Corps, and Coast Guard—procurement or “liaison” officers was commonplace. Examples of the practice recur in unpublished oral history transcripts wherein, for example, pioneer aviators admit receiving valuable “tokens” before or after performing test-pilot duties. One officer recounted that he was the recipient of a watch worth “conservatively, $5,000.”
“Didn’t the Navy object?” his incredulous interviewer asked (superimposing
1980s’ morality over 1930s’ events).
“They might have,” he said, “but I never got around to telling them about it.”
Who would have blamed Admiral Rickover if, as lesser men would have, he had said, “Others did it ... I saw nothing wrong with it.” But, outspoken in almost everything else, he remained mute in his own defense—endorsing the saying, “Don’t complain and don’t explain.”
Finally, lest anyone assume that the acceptance of gilts by persons in authority is a decadent American custom, the Chinese (as, presumably, the ancient Greeks) have a word for it— “cumshaw”—that Lieutenant Rickover may first have heard during his tour as a surface line officer in the Pacific in the early 1920s.
If the Proceedings was always on the admiral’s “hit list,” I took pride in the fact that we were in good company with the Naval Academy, the Naval War College, and higher education, to name but three of his pet peeves. I once said to him, “I give up. I’m reconciled to the fact that you hate both the Proceedings and the Naval Academy.”
His voice softened, “Hate?”
“I’ll bet I’m the only reader you’ve got who has read every issue of the Proceedings from cover to cover since I entered the Navy in 1923. I first wrote for you when I was a lieutenant in 1930. Hate? Do you think a parent hates a child because the parent criticizes the child? Parents want children to be as good as they can be. That’s what I want from the Proceedings and the Naval Academy and the Navy ... to be the best they can be.”
And that, I suppose, is what Hyman Rickover also wanted of himself.
An Impatient Outpatient
In the summer of 1985, the international news media devoted much ink and ether to Bethesda Naval Hospital where President Reagan and Admiral Hyman Rickover recovered quickly from, respectively, a malignant polyp and a stroke. I was a patient there long before both arrived and long after they left, and felt a little churlish that most of the world didn't know a thing about it.
As I was wheeled into the Physical Therapy room at Bethesda Naval Hospital, my eyes were drawn to a table in the center where a frail figure was stretched out on his back. Astride him was a Navy physical therapist poking and prodding, alternately challenging and encouraging him to resist.
Outpatient Hyman Rickover looked like he was running out of patience.
Would he, I wondered, have been so impatient if the young woman—here so clearly in command-had assumed a more sedate position at his side out of respect for his age and honors? Probably—Hyman Rickover was bom impatient.
Mrs. Rickover was only an arms-length away from her husband and, after debating a moment, I rolled my chair over to her side. She took my hand as I said, “I've never met the admiral, but we have talked many times on the telephone. Will you tell the admiral that I am the editor of the Proceedings?” .
The old man’s hooded eyes took me in and, smiling faintly, he said, “You can t help that, Barrow.” clay Barrow
CERTIFICATES OF THE SEA
Have you crossed the equator . . . gone around the world . . . served in Iceland ... or commissioned a ship? Then you deserve one of the Naval Institute’s elegant Certificates of the Sea.
Each certificate features
- Full-color illustrations
- Gold seal and ribbon
- Matching wallet card
- Optional custom personalization
Unlettered certificates are $3.00 each, and custom-lettered certificates are $6.50 each. Write and ask about our special discounts offered on orders of 25 or more.
0 Check the commemorative certificate(s) you wish to order. When ordering custom-lettered certificates, please fill in requested information.
- Neptune — 11" x 14", for crossing the equator
Ship _______________________________________________ Date __________________ Longitude _____________
- Neptune Subpoena — 8V2" x 71/2"
- Arctic Circle (“Blue Nose”) — 11" x 14", for crossing the Arctic Circle
Ship _______________________________________________ Date_____________________ Longitude ____________
- Golden Dragon — 11" x 14", for crossing the 180th Meridian
Ship_________________________________________________ Date___________________ Latitude________________
- Recommissioning — 16" x 20", commemorating the recommissioning of a ship
Ship_________________________________________________ Date Recommissioned _________________________
- Plank Owner — 11" x 14", commemorating the commissioning of a ship, installation, or squadron
Ship_________________________________________________ Date Commissioned ___________________________
- Golden Shellback — 11" x 14", for crossing the equator at the 180th Meridian
Ship _______________________________________________ Date____________________ Longitude _____________
- Round the World — 16" x 20", for going around the world
Ship_______________________________________________ Start Date ________________ Finish Date ___________
- Icelandic Domain (“Bless”) — 11" x 14", for service in Iceland
Ship_______________________________________________ From ____________________ To __________________
Please send me: Quantity
Unlettered certificates, _______________________ @ $3.00 =
Custom-lettered certificates,___________________ @ $6.50 =
Neptune subpoenas, ________________________ @ .50 =
Subtotal
□ Check here if earned during Coast residents add 5% tax
Guard service Postage and handling
TOTAL ENCLOSED
Print clearly:
Total
$1.00
“I am a . . . Convoy Commodore”
(See S. D. Landersman, pp. 56-63. June G. Erikson, Jr., p. 26, August 1986, Proceedings)
Commander P. L. Schaefer, U. S- Reserve—After reading Captain ^ dersman’s article I must question hoW
Lan-
why after an active duty career spa1
30 years—which includes 18 years
irinioS
of sea
duty, command of a frigate, a destroyed
and a destroyer squadron—no eXPoS' or training in convoy protection or °rjj ization occurred. A Navy organic , permit such a gap in officer training ^ experience is a Navy that forfeits its tegic sealift capability before the ^ shot is fired. A first step to diminish training gap would include naval con ^ of shipping and convoy training as ^ the U. S. Naval Academy and NR , (Naval Reserve Officer Training curriculum, with follow-up instruct1 Surface Warfare School and prosper ^ commanding officer or executive o schools. when
If Captain Landersman is correct j stating that only 20 of approximately ^ convoy commodores have training beyond the two-week schoo ^ attend, perhaps now is the time to r . rect a variation of the virtually oe “running mate” program cosponsore the Navy and Maritime Administra (MARAD). The running mate Pr0ljcer was a Navy-Merchant Marine 00f exchange program in which the mas a U. S.-flag ship and the comman^.^ officer of a naval vessel made coast- to transits on board each other’s smP ^ learn the capabilities and limitatmn ^ each. Convoy commodores could ^ quired to make several transits on flag merchant ships and thus learn ^ about the ships’ sea-keeping manuevering limitations. 0jnts
Captain Landersman correctly P n out that there is a vast difference be ^ Navy and merchant vessels. Civil,annt cers on board typical U. S.-flag r*1®1 ^li- vessels are unfamiliar with tactical P^e
Name to appear on certificate (if custom-lettered)
Name for shipping, if different
Address
City State Zip
Please allow 4-6 weeks for delivery.
Mail this form (or facsimile) with check or money order to: Certificate Service, U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, MD 21402
cations or doctrine and have no PeaC^aVal need nor opportunity to learn about communications. ,^er-
Although he did not mention the ^ ^ chant Marine Reserve, U. S. Navse serve (MMR, USNR) officers, “he„ naval reservists bear mentioning ^ discussing convoys or naval contr he protection of shipping. Presumab does not mention MMR, USNR 0 because there were probably none of convoy commodore two-week c°l gafari on board his ship during the Ocean 1985 exercise. rVjSts
The majority of these naval rese
94
Proceedings / St'P11’111^
from .. m™ss'oned following graduation emy ore ' S- Merchant Marine Acad- roies u,'0,|,C state maritime acade- there a * 10 MMR, USNR program, holdinsre approximately 2,200 officers (16X5) Th restr'cte(f line designator
framing' nHSe officers have a unique as mpmk a service agreement obligation muSerS °f the Naval R^erve. They rnum of fn *^e mercf|ant marine a mini- sary Ve °Ur months each two anniver- active h ^ 3nc* must Perf°rm two weeks anniver«;U ^ *°r tra'n'n8 (AcDuTra) each t'°nS ca3r^ 8ear' R<)lh of these obligate Nay11 r wa'vec* administratively by dition of ?CCause °f the depressed con-
wide_ , ,, maritime industry world-
r>ne in33 S.-flag merchant ma
kersP3rticular —many MMR, USNR to the 1 ITIiJSt request sailing waivers due also forc^H sea8°'n8 jobs. Many are because 6 ft0 recpJest an AcDuTra waiver vessels f° unavailability of naval quotas ,°r Underway training, lack of straints ahools> AcDuTra funding con- hav-e rec;J0 ConP'cts> etc. Many officers that of mVe<^ or no training beyond they d0e 61r civilian counterparts, but offiCers0rn) a pool of merchant marine serve p available to man our Ready Reserve r? fRRp) or National Defense national , Cet f^f^RP) in time of war or c°nvoy.re,|T'er8ency- Providing sufficient tfould ^ 3tC^ training during peacetime "'Orklnoj386 'ho convoy commodore MMR C°asiderably.
e,T1Plovpa ^NR offict . Proyed o ,
officers not currently
RRF _ , °n hoard ship or in excess of _ and Nnon • •
m°bi|iz requirements remain a
any ot, 10n asset on the same basis as (IRR) er individual Ready Reserve the Read^'p'116* (®R is that portion of Pled drilpt °eserve not attending sched- ted t0 d officers are not permit-
°f the fa* m a pay status in recognition more valCt e^3t ^avy considers them than pip ab*e on board a merchant vessel billet ek"1^ 3 Preassigned mobilization carries ,re- Drill pay automatically billet lt3 8 a Preassigned mobilization
Captai .
attend|n t-andersman mentioned his s°red co 3 0ne weeh MARAD-spon- tcrs. yp Ul^e f°r merchant marine mas- c0Ursea dVy bas never validated this f°r V|V|n 3 v'ahle AcDuTra opportunity eause (,r •’ DSNR officers, possibly be-
CapS'l^hort'ength. ficuhy . t-andersman points out the dif- v°ice/ra,r Crent *n very-high frequency m c0nte10 c°ntrol of a far-flung convoy a^eqaateS] EC* Waters- The Navy has not 3'Cation ^ pursued the requisite commu- to solve C,^.u'Pnlent or trained personnel (ectedrg. 's pr°hlem. Establishing se- Serve unit communication teams,
similar to the naval embarked advisory teams currently dedicated for use on board merchant ships supporting amphibious operations, is a possible solution.
A quick scan of Captain Landersman’s article would give the impression that convoy commodore assignments are reserved exclusively for retired Navy line officers. The Naval Control of Shipping textbook (NAVEDTRA 10830-B, 1983 edition) clarifies convoy commodore assignments:
“The Convoy Commodore is usually a naval officer, normally a retired officer, preselected ... if a suitable officer is not available ... the NCSO [Navy Control of Shipping Office] is directed to select a Convoy Commodore from among the masters of the ships constituting the convoy. Responsibilities of a Convoy Commodore require that only experienced naval officers or merchant masters be selected.
“In the case of a NCSO designated master, since the master’s primary responsibility is making his ship ready for sea, he would be unable, due to time constraints, to perform all of the duties of the Convoy Commodore prior to sailing. Pre-sailing functions of the Convoy Commodore must then be performed by the Convoy Commodore’s staff, if Assigned, or by the NCSO.
“The Vice Commodore may be a naval officer specially assigned, or he may be the master of a ship in the convoy.”
When assigning a master as convoy commodore or vice commodore duties, it would be better to train him during peacetime rather than make him dependent on the competency of the convoy commodore’s staff as he has never worked with these personnel before. As the Navy increases the size of the RRF, more trained masters will be required. A 5-to-20 day breakout period simply will not afford a master sufficient time to both prepare his ship for sea and to learn convoy operations. Attention should also be directed toward training those officers currently sailing as chief mate who may be promoted to master, if and when the RRF and the NDRF are activated.
Naval liaison officers (NLOs) for RRF, NDRF, and allied ships in convoys would be an ideal mission for retired line officers or as a Naval Reserve mission. Since we have a vessel pooling arrangement with both South Korea and the NATO countries, fluency in or some knowledge of Korean should be considered a prerequisite for NLOs.
SUBDUTY
&
V
- -tx -tx
-tx
-tx
-tx
-tx
-tx
-tx
-tx
-tx
-li
-tx
■ts
-ts
-ts
-t!
by Grover S. McLeod
torpedoman's story of sailing subs in World War IL.from Spritz's navy to silent running ff
ORDER FROM: MANCHESTER PRESS Post Office Box 550102 Birmingham, Alabama 35205 (205) 251-5652
-ts
-ts
-CJ Name -ti K Address |
|
-i* -fc City | XP |
State Zip | — Sj* |
| jp |
StBsCS-— L -yisf |
|
|
|
THE NAVY'S LIGHTEST AND STRONGEST JOINER DOORS - IN STOCK AND AVAILABLE IMMEDIATELY I
JOINER DOORS
1
Steel Honeycomb
PE 4 DOUBLE DOOR
ADVANCED STRUCTURES CORP.
235 WEST INDUSTRY COURT DEER PARK , NEW YORK 11729 (516) 667-5000
NOMEX^ARAMID 18 A TRADEMARK OF DUPONT
1 roc,
stratepv T , orward deployed maritime donefn ° successful> more must be icy 0f r strate8*c sealift. Our current pol- nionevS^enCl*n® a 'arge amount °f Navy
spenHir, PUrcbas'ng RRF vessels and requirerf tVlrtU,aIly nothin§ on the training Wav m ta^e t^lese vessels in harm’s y mus< be changed.
Fleet^66^ ^u*)mer8ence Vehicle
SiiSr-pp- ii9-i2°-june 1986
Jack A- Vaughan, U. S. With th el\re^—Having been associated sinCe ]y eeP submergence vehicle fleet tiop oft ’ ^ can testify that the recogni- due. HrlS accornPbshments is long over- the one WeVer’ Mr. Polmar indicates that gence ratln§ depth of the deep submerge! Th Cf£ vehicles (DSRVs) is 3,500 The a,'US flgure is m reality 5,000 feet. hfiedTlV^p-1) was originally cer- s°ns. Th°n ^ feet f°r technical rea- •tally cr-^rValon (DSRV-2) was origi- Vehicle<; h'l6C* t0 ^’®d0 feet, and both ever sin • aVC been certified to that depth the ex,rCe' dhe certification depth is not operateCPlc depth that the vehicles can ing doi. *s ihe continual safe operat- 8 deP‘h for them.
In the case of the underwater detonation at Operation Crossroads, the situation was quite different. The explosion ejected approximately 1,000,000 tons of water into the air in the form of a hollow, cylindrically shaped column. The initial shock wave and the subsequent void beneath the sea surface produced a series of wave motions. A relatively large wave was reported, as Mr. Brown noted. However, most of the reports fail to note that the large-amplitude wave was observed only by remote-control photography. Its location was very close to the ejected column of water, and its amplitude dissipated very rapidly as it radiated outward from the region of detonation so that it was only a few feet in height by the time it reached any of the islands of the Bikini lagoon. This rapid reduction in wave amplitude is predicted by hydrodynamic theory. By the time the wave reached the distance at which Chief Bratton would have viewed it, it would have almost diminished completely.
Later pictures in the remote-control photography sequence show a base surge, considerably more than 90 feet in height, flowing out to cover the target fleet. However, that base surge was a far cry from being a 90-foot wave. It was more a dense wall of mist that ultimately enveloped the target fleet in the form of a circular cloud about three miles in diameter.
The water motion, whether it be the ejected column or the waves, created only extremely localized damage. The account from a Defense Nuclear Agency report (DNA 6032F, p. 101) of the event following Test Baker states: “. . .Figure 29 shows the BAKER detonation wave as it lifted the stern of the Saratoga some 43 feet . . . ships beyond 1,500 yards (1.37 km.) were undamaged. Those between 1,100 and 1,500 yards (1.01 and 1.37 km.) sustained only slight damage. Those between 900 and 1,100 yards (0.82 and 1.01 km.) suffered moderate damage. Those inside 900 yards (823 meters) were seriously damaged or were sunk . . . . ” The ejected column of water was about 500 yards in radius so, to sustain severe damage, a ship had to be extremely close to the edge of this column.
When Mr. Brown writes about the generation of VHSS by an underwater nuclear explosion, I assume he is thinking of a phenomenon similar to an earthquake-induced tsunami. Such a tsunami requires an event which has a magnitude of about 8 or greater on the Richter scale, which means an energy release comparable to or greater than a nuclear explosion with a yield of a few tens of megatons,
"Blue-o States
Wee P j r,
E. L. Bra.rr0Wn' pp- • 04-106, January 1986; p J °n, p. 92, April 1986 Proceedings)
J°fessor r o>
cmeritu ' ^harP Cooke, Professor
at Cl pS Physics, University of Texas the eff* can assure Mr. Brown that at OpcCtS tbe underwater detonation quite (.ratlon ^rossroads were studied results °rou"hly, and the investigation chivesCH1St s°mewhere in the Navy ar- th°Se ’ °wever, I am not sure where cal DefC°rds are- If the Naval Radiologi- isted th"56 Laboratory (NRDL) still exfiles 'at MpeC0rds w°uld be there, but the her of , b Werc distributed to a num-
States’^ and Nuc,ear Sea
PRIDE & CRAFTSMANSHIP
Timeless values which have been firmly in place at Langley for 48 years.
Langley’s manufacturing team knows the name of the system and the type of ship in which our Navy cabinets and consoles will be installed. Relating fabricated parts and assemblies to the total system brings an added dimension of pride and craftsmanship to the work of each employee.
LANGLEY
LANGLEY
ELECTRONIC ENCLOSURES • Design • Fabrication • Assembly
P.O. Box 2911, San Diego, California 92112 (619) 264-3181
of
'Sure
°'her locations at the time of its
Mr.B? 1969- .
Navy u. 0Wn s article suggests that the
CreatinpaS overl°°ked the possibility of using u8 very high sea states (VHSS) 'Pc. a VlK WatCr nuclear detonations. To Atlantic ^ creates the image of a North upi°Unt- 8torm, which expends huge bet\ye °f energy. The height difference Wave sv- £ crests and troughs of the can be^Stern Pr°duced by such a storm Ui°st disa 'arge tbat a destroyer can alu tr0UghaPPear from view when it sits in
clo:
101
d‘nss / September 1986
diiction of '00 k'l0t0n range' The pro" nami 3 potentlal*y damaging tsu- °ccur in ,requires die earthquake be f0cil. a, ocat'on where the waves can ab]v ,lr,S?- so that they travel in a reason- sipateH ldlre^tional Pattern and not be dis- s°urce vr t le^' spread out from a point iration ' r ^rown ta*ces some °f this sit- staterne'1?0 account when he makes the depth "■ I*131 ''Pactors such as sea tour. th cond‘tions, ocean floor con- Wave f6 Season’ and other influences on shape °rmut'°n, wave force, and the
distancesWUVeS as they travel over lon§
GVHss . mUSt, considered in a claborate311^^ However, he does not
damage^1! produce essentially no
re8ions wher?;,traVerSe the deeper °Cean and amniif ■ . eir wavelength is longer the case rde ‘S sma|ler. However, as in 1964 ne ° a earthquake of 24 March niotj0n% ^nchorage, Alaska, the wave 'ength ° i U tsunaiT>i shortens in wave- approach1 'ncreases in amplitude as it the AlasVCS & s^adow region. As a result, erable h an earthquake produced consid- nia, but3*111186 at Crescent City, Califor- Qcean h ,n° adverse effects on the open
The effWCen ‘he tW0 points-
detomt; CCts °f a shallow underwater Hn of 100 kilotons, such as Mr.
Brown suggests, would not even be noticed 100 miles away, especially on the open ocean. Even if the detonation were to take place at a location such that the resulting surface waves could be focused, it most probably would be noticed only when it reached shallow water, as with the Alaskan earthquake tsunami, and not on the open ocean.
Most of Mr. Brown’s suggestions are remotely possible under very special circumstances, but they would be much more costly and much more difficult to attain than his discussion implies. The really serious problem for the target fleet following the underwater test at Operation Crossroads was radioactive contamination in and on ships, generally a much more severe problem than physically observable damage. The radioactive products of the explosion contaminated the ships as rainout, entering unprotected areas and chemically interacting with the paint of the ships in such a way that previously accepted methods of decontamination were essentially worthless. Most of the ships eventually had to be towed away from Bikini, since the radiation level throughout the ships remained at a hazardous level for a long period following the detonation. The deposited radioactive contamination would have emitted enough radiation to have created a serious health hazard if crew members had manned and moved the ships from the lagoon under their own power. It was this radiation problem which led to the formation of NRDL, since five ships of the target fleet were towed to the San Francisco Naval Shipyard for decontamination and/ or investigation of techniques for such decontamination processes.
Even for a near-surface detonation of a several-megaton explosive, which would be needed to create anything even resembling the phenomenon Mr. Brown suggests, the radiation problem from fallout is more critical in producing adverse effects than a VHSS, especially if the nuclear explosive contains a significant fission-fusion ratio. For example, the 15-megaton detonation of 1 March 1954 (Shot Bravo of Operation Castle, also at Bikini Atoll) produced lethal amounts of radiation in its fallout more than 100 miles downwind from the site of detonation. Fortuantely the Rongelap Atoll was not in the center of the downwind fallout pattern, so no deaths occurred there following the Shot Bravo detonation. However, many of the natives on Rongelap Atoll received enough large radiation doses that they exhibited radiation sickness and had to receive medical attention.
Quick Reference GUIDE
To MILITARY SWITCHES^
• MS • BuShips ips etc
7 16 BASIC SWITCH TYPES
Thousands of w Variations! V
SWITCH SPECS • Poles (Contacts)
Positions
ELECTRICAL SPECS
- Ratings
- Resistances
'm Dielectrics etc. ^
^ TROS w/ tch
w„,ELEctro SWITCH corp.
Vmouth, Massachusetts 02188 Te|ephone: 617/335/5200 710/388/0377
MECHANICAL SPECS^
- Shock/Vibration
- Torque • Temperature
Corrosion etc. a
Actual Size: 11" x 17
"ceedi
,ngs 1 Septemb
er 1986
105
“Silently, In Darkness and Fog”
(See R. C. Suggs, pp. 40-48, June 1986
Proceedings)
William Burgess—Someday Robert Suggs’s thesis about the “fall” of Admiral Sergei Gorshkov to a political conspiracy may prove correct, but, for now, the evidence he provides in support of his case is insufficient. In the abstract, Suggs’ hypothesis is plausible. Gorshkov was of no use to Andropov after 25 years on top of the navy, and Chemavin, if promoted, would owe Andropov everything. The argument is not carried off, however, in Chemavin’s case.
Chemavin replaced Admiral Yegorov
combat and the systematic improvement of combat readiness. The particular differences between Chemavin, Stalbo, and Gorshkov on these points did not amount to a split between the admirals. The burden of proof is still on Mr. Suggs if he would pit Chemavin against Gorshkov in the arena of political struggles.
I prefer the view that the Morskoi Sbornik series on naval science was an attempt to form a consensus among the navy’s senior personnel to justify the navy’s right to participate in the definition of its proper range of missions—a range of missions that the General Staff, dominated by ground forces marshals, was tending to restrict as the 1970s wore
Soviet leaders paid him the unPre,jtjl dented honor of letting him stand Chemavin atop the Lenin Tomb w they all reviewed the annual May ^ parade this year. This was no disgra figure; places on the tomb are not g< L to the fallen.
“Exploiting Shipboard Talents
(See P. T. Deutermann, pp. 110-112, -j?ne
1986; C. F. O’Leary, p. 84, August 1989
Proceedings)
Captain J. D. Sharpe, Jr., U. S- Commanding Officer, USS Emory ^ Land (AS-39)—Although the concept^ using shipboard talents, wherever are found, to solve shipboard problen surely not new, it works. As a subm engineer officer from 1968-71,1 ^roUp pleasure of watching a truly superb g of first-class petty officers set up a sy5 . very similar to the one described by tain Deutermann. This group °*
(who incidently all made E-9, warrantj,ey limited duty officer) decided that ^ would refuse to let any division ^ “licked” by an electrical, electronlC^aS interior communications problem- .cS common to find a navigation electr ^ technician (ET), nuclear ET, nuC^ea^Q,
non"
SOVFOTO
Admiral Gorshkov (extreme left) reviews this year’s May Day parade from the Lenin Tomb with other senior Soviet leaders, including his successor.
as Chief of the Main Navy Staff. Yegorov was probably removed because of Brezhnev’s diplomatic embarrassment resulting from the Soviet Whiskey-class submarine running aground on the Swedish shore in November of 1981. As Chief of the Main Navy Staff, Yegorov was responsible for all fleet operations and would have taken the heat for Gorshkov. The incident was purely fortuitous; the political heat might have been simply a matter of Brezhnev’s wrath, or it might have been aggravated by the plotters who wanted Yegorov replaced by their man, Chemavin—if, in fact, he was their man.
Chernavin’s article discussing naval science that appeared in the Morskoi Sbornik did not harshly contradict Stalbo or Gorshkov, but offered some definitive corrections and suggestions for further research on operational problems of interest to him, which Stalbo had named- in particular, the massing of forces for
on. If navy leaders could agree among themselves that naval theory was a proper field of competence for its officers within the general arena of Soviet military theory, then they would have a leg to stand on while arguing for the ships to perform the missions that naval theory mandated.
In the Morskoi Sbornik discussion, Chemavin joined the consensus that naval theory had a proper field of competence, and he cleverly asserted two needs for further research therein—the massing of forces and the systematic improvement of combat readiness. These were both actual naval problems and, at the same time, were also general problems under consideration at the General Staff, for all the services, in planning for a conventional war against the technologically richer West.
How, then, did Gorshkov’s retirement go? The immediate circumstances surrounding Gorshkov’s retirement are still unknown in the West, but there had been signs that Gorshkov would become a “general inspector” and turn over his command. In July 1985, the popular magazine Ogonyok profiled him as an old sailor whose career was now ripe for reminiscences. After retiring him, the
nuclear IC, electrician’s mate, and a sile technician huddled around a Prlgvver technical manual in search ot an a ^ to a sticky problem. As they develop expertise, the lines of community, throughout the ship also improved.
not long before this group became an tegral part of our routine mainten
iance
efforts.
The same concept was tried, success, during my submarine contour (1980-83). I noted with interest ^ the best seat-of-the-pants ET during ^ long deployment turned out to chief quartermaster. arjne
As commanding officer of a sU*:,,TI0f tender, I find that formation of a ll-a^ii(a| people, which again crosses depart ^
ship’5
AS
with*5,5
pmm^
lines, is the only way to get on top never-ending maintenance on cranes, elevators, and conveyors-^ with the combat systems electronic ^ ness team Captain Deutermann disc or|t
my team consists of people who
testing;
However, they also have the respor*s ity for operator training and quail
primarily on maintenance and
and component certification.
ermaun;
I fully endorse Captain Deuten-^ef concept. It works in many aieaSuC|1 to than combat systems and does m ^ open lines of communication thro the command.
108
Proceedings
I Sepwn,ber