This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
By Captain James L. Taylor, U. S. Naval Reserve, Lieutenant Commander Thomas J. Kapurch, U. S. Naval Reserve, and William True
un, i.u., »-»• 1 »** * -
n already limited supply of eX" ,aCf. weapons. If submarine or ^ ajr ats endanger that task f°r^e.an.he first ;riority is not achieved while e begins the assault, the ^Marine8 ding Force may find h' nt.
lout sustained shore bomba -ts
he Navy must continue to eva ,Qje pon procurement strategy, amPleX development of new an gSUp- ems is cancelled to accelera ^uSt of less complex systems, wgX. sider the situations that creaand five high-tech solutions. Sur jate aunched standoff missiles ^ air il gunfire and restrict the use :es for conventional air suppo
A surface action group is chopped to support a Commander Amphibious Task Force as part of a Northern Flank movement and amphibious assault near the Kola Peninsula of the Soviet Union. In the same vicinity are: the amphibs; U. S. and allied hydrofoil patrol craft; a carrier battle group conducting antisubmarine and antiair warfare in the Green- land-Iceland-United Kingdom Gap; Norwegian F-16s; Iceland- and U.K.- based P-3s, Nimrods, F-15s, and F-4s; and antiship missile-configured B-52s. Facing this hypothetical, multi-service force would be Soviet surface, submarine, naval aviation, long-range aviation, and possibly airborne assault forces. Although outnumbered, U. S. Navy and Marine Corps forces have sufficient numbers of organic and supporting air and sea launchers. But are there enough weapons, and will there be adequate and timely fire support available to effect fire superiority at L-hour?
Today’s Navy policy planners must wrestle with complex procurement strategies and difficult fiscal priorities. (This is especially true in light of the Gramm- Rudman-Hollings bill.) A shortage of modernized fighting ships after the Vietnam War prompted a major effort to upgrade the fleet, which caused painful delays in procurement of other vital Navy assets, such as weapon systems. The result was the acquisition of fewer but more sophisticated systems. Today, the fleet is deployed with relatively smaller numbers of weapons and delivery systems. It faces larger Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces armed with great numbers of less sophisticated systems and deployed close to their homeland and supply lines. Soviet aggression would most likely be met by allied forces armed with limited quantities of effective resources in a target-rich environment. During crises, allied replenishment of and competition for sustained supplies of consumables would be effected through long and complex command and control systems, and logistical
and manufacturing infrastructures.
Overall, the U. S. Navy has done a commendable job redefining mission objectives and priorities, and improving readiness by upgrading offensive assets. However, because subsequent hard decisions limited resources and raised defense expenditures, many government officials have become increasingly critical of Navy strategy and quick to offer their “reforms.” Many question whether the costs of expensive and sophisticated weapons limit our ability to procure and maintain adequate munition stockpiles. They warn that national security is jeopardized by further economic constraints and an inability to effectively command and control the use of complex, less numerous systems.
Among these critics are the members of the Congressional Military Reform Caucus. One of its co-chairmen, Congressman Denny Smith (R-OR), recently opined that “. . . the U. S. is in precisely the same condition as was Israel prior to the Yom Kippur war ...” owing to shortcomings . . in establishing the proper level of war reserves.”* (Marines can especially appreciate this concern, considering the Navy’s reduced emphasis on naval gunfire and increased reliance on air support for this mission.)
Critics and well-intentioned reformers must not lose sight of some of the inevitable reasons for the current procurement strategy. Geopolitical events have shaped a renewed emphasis on a global naval projection capability. As never before, the United States, a sea power, relies more heavily upon its sea lines of communications than does the Soviet Union, a land power. Yet, the United States is outnumbered in all naval and maritime assets except aircraft carriers. Since 1975, and owing to such destabilizing world events as the fall of Iran, the Lebanese crisis, and Soviet adventures in Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast
♦Congressman Denny Smith, “Restock Inadequate Munitions Reserves,” The Wall Street Journal, 29 October 1985.
Asia, the U. S. Navy has had to operate over a wider base. At the same time>P ^ sonnel force restructuring, ae( budget cutbacks, and a defensive rnlIj contributed to one of the biggest dec in Navy history. The result has *3een ,eX creation of larger and more c<j”1^r a naval responsibilities, and a cal modernized 600-ship Navy. Hig ^uS multi-mission system solutions are the consequence of necessity, rather choice. vjCe
Consider the need for joint se ^ command and control, and adequa ^ reserve munitions in the Norther11 naval scenario. In no other type 0 . j fare is there a greater need for con 1 £
fire support than in amphibious wa ^ Shore bombardment depends on a ^ tained quantity of munitions impac i imprecisely located targets, or yk s cisely delivered, sophisticated 1VL’ at precisely located aimpoints. 11 r* an(j instantaneous power project!011’ ^ multi-national, multi-service s jj. could be comprised by delays or ^ ages of fire support, which cou ^ from a diversity of forces in ' ^ore strategic and tactical priorities- r_ the first Marines cross the line 0sca ture, their commander knows ^rce control and preservation of the tas will prioritize the Commander anjc ous Task Force’s (and his non use support, i.e., U. S. Air Fo,rceJtlnenda-
Ironies hardware and associated elec- ronic warfare continue to improve, as do e requirements of newer launcher and vrget acquisition systems. Since the So- :les bave achieved quantitative superior- y over U. S. naval forces, a larger target ay *s created with increased depend- "Ce °n overall system reliability and Pability in an electronic countermea- j es’ aH-weather environment. Battle a]rnTics naturally exacerbate that ea y stretched weapons effectiveness
requirement.
ret^S tbc Navy effected its upgrade in craft11 ^CarS’ 'ts weaP°ns, systems, air- hav i.anC* Sb'F developments appear to
and6 kCpt Stride better than in the l960s Wea Fos*~Mietnam 1970s. Decreasing
nurrf0n soPb'stication to procure more neerous unguided weapons could have ti0nat|IVe resu'ts’> owing to the conven- izer •tlUmbers imbalance, force equals are needed. Congress has already
indicated that further reductions in defense spending are inevitable. Radical changes in procurement policy could stifle recent Navy initiatives and send a dangerous signal to the Soviets. The United States could be outmanned, outgunned, without sufficient quality force equalizers, and strategically dependent upon a lower tactical nuclear threshold. We would have enough rounds to support low-intensity conflicts, such as amphibious raids, but might not have control of the sea lines of communication to ensure the amphibious force’s survivability into the objective area.
A solution may be to combine “dumb bombs” with new, sophisticated systems, integrating evolutionary, interchangeable, and existing and/or emerging technology with proven weapon systems and launchers. Program studies of such emerging technologies as laser guidance could help establish this link (see
Table 1). These systems should be compatible with U. S., NATO, and our Asian allies’ platforms.
Examples of this concept which are already under development or proposed include the following:
► A cannon-launched guided projectile (CLGP), similar to the Army’s Copperhead, is currently being tested for naval applications. The concept uses naval gunfire and laser-guided rounds. Studies of rocket-assisted projectiles (RAPs) for naval and artillery shells found that RAPs did not work well because of impact dispersion. The CLGP has encountered problems with system reliability owing to high initial velocity firing and off-axis and ranging solutions. Nonetheless, both provide a good conceptual approach for exploiting existing and emerging technologies with proven airframes and launchers. Very-high-speed integrated circuit chips may improve CLGP reliability and
A-6E
A-7D
as-ioa
AH-is AH-64A AlPha Jet
aV-8a AV-sb buccaneer Burke DD F-4D/E
P-5E
R15E
Ri6C/D/F
T«
°rnad0
Platform
R18a
f-111D
•*aguar
Mirage in
°V-10
Vehicle/Man-
| Designator | Table 1 Deployed Laser Designators Nation(s) | Services |
| TRAM | U. S. | USN/USMC |
| Pave Penny | u. s. | USAF/ANG |
| Pave Penney | u. s. | USAF |
| LANT1RN |
|
|
| AN/AAS-32 | u. s. | USA |
| TADS/PNVS | u. s. | USA |
| ATLIS 11 | U. K., West Germany | USAF/AF |
| LRMTS | U. K. | RAF |
| Hughes AARBS | u. s. | USMC |
| Pave Spike | U. K. | RN |
| SeaFire | U. S. (Undergoing testing) | USN |
| AN/AVQ-9 | U. S., Greece, South Korea, Turkey | USAF/AF/Navy/Marine |
| Pavespike | U. S., Israel, South Korea, Turkey, U. K. |
|
| LTDS | U. S., Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, Singapore, Jordan, Spain, | USAF/AF |
|
| Thailand, South Korea, Philippines |
|
| LANTIRN | U. S. | USAF |
| LANTIRN | U. S. | USAF |
| Pavetack | u. s. | USAF |
| Pavespike | u. s. | USAF |
| AN/AAS-35V | u. s. | USAF |
| Pave Penney | Norway | AF |
| AN-ASQ 173 | U. S., Canada*. Australia* | USN/AF |
| Pavetack | U. S., Australia | USAF/AF |
| LRMTS | U. K. | RAF |
| ATLIS | U. K. | RAF |
| Atlis 11 | France, Pakistan | AF |
| AN/AAS-37 | U. S. | USMC |
| LRMTS | U. K. | AF |
eked | LTD | U. S. | USAF |
| GLLD | U. S. | USA |
| MULE | U. S. | USMC |
| LORADS | U. S. | USA |
| FIST-V | U. S. (Ml 13 vehicle mounted) | USA |
| LTMR | (Ferranti), U. K., Oman | Army |
|
|
Adapting new technology to proven weapon systems can retard spiraling defense costs and replenish dangerously low munition reserves. Examples of successful combinations include: the Skipper-II missile (right) and the Army’s Copperhead cannon- launched guided projectile (below). The Paveway-III laser-guided seeker (bottom) may be a candidate to combine with Sparrow subsystems.
Table 2 NATO Sea Sparrow (NSSMS)- or VLS-Compatible Platforms
Launcher I Guidance (if any)
Ship Type
Wasp (LHD)
Tarawa (LHA)
Iwo Jima (LPH)
Burke (DDG)
Ticonderoga (CG)
Spruance (DD)
Knox (FF)
Destroyers:
Shirane, Haruna, Hatsuyuki, Takatsuki. Frigates:
Bremen
Tromp
Van Heenskerk
Lupo
Oslo
Descubierta
Nation
U.
U.
u.
u.
u.
u.
u.
s.
s.
s.
s.
s.
s.
s.
Japan
West Germany
Holland
Italy
Norway
Spain
NSSMS NSSMS NSSMS ^ VLS/SeaFire** VLS/SeaFire*
NSSMS
nssms***
nssms
NSSMS
nssms
nssms
nssms
nssms
Table 3 Possible Deployment Scenarios
Guidance Target Target
Target
Airborne (A-6 TRAM)
packaging; current laser guidance technology could help the integration of RAP and CLGP concepts. RAP guided rounds would increase the mission effectiveness and range of a widely used, relatively inexpensive weapon system.
► Adapting LTV Aerospace and Defense Company’s multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) to Iowa (BB-61)-class battleships is a quick, relatively inexpensive and expandable way to increase those ships’ fire support capability against primary and secondary threats ashore and at sea, respectively.* Integrating Paveway laser guidance technology with the MLRS is a medium-risk engineering solution and would provide smart guidance to an improved free rocket system. Since the MLRS is a candidate for Marine
Air
(A-6)
Seaborne
(DD)
Ground
(Hawk)
Surface
(DD—SeaFire)
Ground
(MULE)
Airborne
(OV-IO)
Surface
(DD—SeaFire)
Ground
(GLLD)
Airborne
(AH-64)
Surface
(DD—SeaFire)
Air
(transport helo)
Air
(transport helo)
Air
(assault helo)
Surface (patrol boat)
Surface (patrol boat)
Surface (landing craft)
Ground
(light armor)
Ground
(shore battery)
Ground
(rocket launchers)
♦See Scott C. Truver and Norman Polmar, “Naval Surface Fire Support and the lowas," Proceedings, November 1985, pp. 130-133.
Ground
(FIST-V)
Weapon’
5 versatility lends itself well to
multi.,
5aPons, and platforms, as well as to one lef the
^'he latest Navy surface developments—
0rps procurement, its deployment on I °ard ships and with landing force artil- ery would ensure continuous single- °urce fire during critical phases of am- Phtbious operations.
Skipper-II is a Naval Weapons Center Program that integrates a Paveway-II aser guided seeker, Shrike rocket motor, n Mark-83 iron bomb. This successful "the-shelf component improves and j*Pands air-to-surface attack capabilities.
range and launch parameters can be Urther improved in the near future since se'k'°Pnient °P an A‘r F°rce Paveway-III ar°kcr is under way. Paveway systems e relatively inexpensive, compatible 11 the Mark-80 series bombs, and aptable to many free-fall bomb racks in
?°« services.
wA flexible and affordable possibility aid be to combine Sparrow subsys- nm ,s wifh Paveway-III. It would use a sof a'rframe and warhead, Mark-58 lev* I r°C*cet motor. and Paveway-III low- 0nC. *aser guidance. It could be deployed amn^3^’ sma0 and large naval vessels, ibl an<d~b’ased launchers, and is compat- shje:ith current shipping, handling, and *P oard stowage equipment. The
national, multi-service missions, den]Ven'Cal *aunch system. It could be and °^Ct' on amphibious warfare ships Wat Patro* craft> giving them shallow- tj0nr’ self-protection firepower in addi- itv (tfl orSan'c shorefire support capabil- tes(. see Table 2). The Marine Corps is lng a concept called Sparrow Hawk,
which would deploy replacement Sparrows or a mix of Hawks/Sparrows to the Hawk surface-to-air missile launchers— M-727 self-propelled vehicle and towed Hawk launcher—with no launcher modification. Table 3 offers possible platform/ guidance system combinations for various target scenarios. Other applications of medium-risk and existing technologies which could provide guided systems for force equalization include application of laser guidance to the Shrike missile, guided eight-inch and 16-inch naval gunfire, and sea-based Hellfire and modified tube-launched, optically tracked, wire- guided missiles.
Because these systems have a healthy manufacturing and engineering infrastructure in place, weapons with improved accuracy and universal applications could be stockpiled. Since system requirements will continue to be more complex, the obsolescence of component technology and integration should be planned rather than reactionary. Designs should be expandable to accept software and hardware improvements, and the fruits of promising research and development of such emerging technologies as infrared and millimeter wave passive and active imaging, information processing, and target correlation tracking. Laser- guided systems, improved derivatives, and follow-on systems should be developed with subsystem component replacements rather than new, expensive missile systems.
If design criteria are established now, and the exchange of technical information between contractors and government agencies permits a smooth and successful reception of new technologies, high-tech system performance through evolutionary upgrades is assured. Expenditures for some research, such as for new airframe designs or capital expenditures, for manufacturing facilities and new product tooling, can be spared for guidance and software integration, and for creating munitions stockpiles and associated operating costs. Meanwhile, more expendable and evolutionary ordnance will help stabilize logistics, training, small unit tactics, and interservice coordination.
Captain Taylor received bachelor’s and master’s degrees in mathematics from North Texas State University, and is a senior member of the technical staff in the missile development cost center at Texas Instruments. In a 22-year Naval Reserve career, he served as a naval aviator, air intelligence officer, systems analysis officer, and executive and commanding officer of a Naval Air systems reserve unit.
Commander Kapurch is a Naval Academy graduate and an operations analysis engineer with a missile development group at Texas Instruments. He is active in the Naval Reserve Intelligence Program at NAS Dallas, Texas. His active duty included flight school; operations staff, 3d Marines, Kaneohe MCAS: and the intelligence staff of Commander Iceland Defense Forces, Keflavik.
Mr. True has a bachelor’s degree in aerospace engineering from the University of Colorado. He is an engineer in the aerodynamic design group at Texas Instruments. He previously worked in aeronautical engineering at the Naval Weapons Center, China Lake, California.
Jljproving the Vision of Periscope Operators
By 5 \/i 7 • --------------------------------------------
' Luria and Commander James F. Socks, Medical Service Corps, U. S. Navy
visi,CCause °f increasing incidence of
nj.'1 defects, the Navy is finding it dif- sta , t0 fecruit men who meet the visual fact f°r the submarine force. In are ’ °~15% of otherwise qualified men tive C^CCte<^ because of excessive refrac- Acarierror- A survey of the U. S. Naval
ficers y ClaSS °f 1985 found that 18 of' for s' iW^°. ^ad expressed a preference
qtalifie'd ar'ne serv'ce were not visual|y
as ree(|ractive errors manifest themselves terferUCtlons *n v'sual acuity that can intine cf W't*1 t*16 PerfonT>ance of subma-
visionUtnS’ many °f which refiuire 20/20 fracti ^csP'te the ease with which resentin'^ errors can he corrected, the peri- diff; Presents difficulties. Because it is t to look through the periscope
while wearing eyeglasses, the most common way of correcting refractive errors is eliminated. A system of optical correction has been built into periscopes, allow
ing focus adjustments by the operator from +2.00 to —4.50 diopters, but there are many applicants for submarine service whose refractive errors exceed this range.
Astigmatism: Optical adjustments can be made only for spherical refractive errors; there is no way to correct for cylindrical refractive errors, which produce the visual defect called astigmatism. It is for these reasons that visual standards are stringent for men who use the periscope, particularly for cylindrical errors. Yet astigmatism is the most prevalent visual anomaly; it is found in about 80% of all refractive errors. In a survey of 1,000 submariners—men constituting a highly selected sample already screened for visual defects—we found that 56% had the
on Figure 2). 0f
It is clear that if the refractive err ^ periscope operators could be fu y rected, it would not only enhance ^ sion of those men whose errors ar ^ fully corrected, but it would Perm' {0 laxation of the current visual stan a ^ allow the accession of officers w
defect. This suggests that an appreciable percentage of men may be disqualified from submarine service on this account.
Refractive Errors: What percentage of current periscope operators suffer from refractive errors that cannot be corrected? We surveyed the crews of 23 submarines based in New London, Connecticut, and found that 210 officers and quartermasters wore glasses all of the time. With about 12 officers and five quartermasters in each crew, this amounts to 53% of the periscope operators. Of these, 17% had refractive errors approaching or exceeding the limits of optical correction available in the periscope, and 83% had some degree of astigmatism.
In general, junior officers had higher refractive errors than senior officers, which does not indicate that vision improves with age, but simply reflects the relaxation in recent years of visual standards for submarine service. The vision of many of these officers will get worse with age. What will their vision be when they become commanding officers?
The Magnitude of Performance Decrement: The general relationship between the magnitude of spherical refractive error and visual acuity is well known. It is generally agreed, for example, that — 1.00 diopter of myopia (nearsightedness) is associated with a Snellen acuity of about 20/60. This means that what the person with normal vision can see at 60 feet, the myope can see only at 20 feet.
In a study of the effects of astigmatism on performance, we measured the distances at which observers with various degrees of astigmatism could discriminate pairs of ship silhouettes, one U. S. and one Soviet, drawn on 3x5 cards. Observers with no refractive errors could tell them apart at an average distance of 27 feet (see Figure 1). Then they looked through lenses which produced various degrees of astigmatism. (The axis of the astigmatism was 90°, the orientation which produces the least amount of degradation in the perception of ships.) When 0.75 diopter of astigmatism was introduced, the mean distance at which the ships could be discriminated dropped to about 20 feet; with 4.00 diopters, it was reduced to about four feet. A 300- foot ship at 2,000 yards subtends about 3° visual angle. These results indicate that what a man with no refractive error can see at 12,000 yards, a man with 4.00 diopters of astigmatism can see only at 2,000 yards. If the axis of the astigmatism had been other than vertical, the reductions would have been even greater; in fact, the axis of astigmatism falls to near 90° only 20% of the time. The re
suits in Figure 1, therefore, err on the optimistic side.
Actual conditions are most likely to be still worse, of course, since astigmatic errors are usually accompanied by spherical errors. Figure 2, taken from Peters, gives a general idea of the level of Snellen acuity to be found in individuals having a combination of spherical and cylindrical errors.* An individual with no spherical error would, of course, have 20/20 acuity (point A on Figure 2). If he had 1.00 diopter of astigmatism, his acuity would be about 20/40 (point B). If he had, in addition (as would be quite possible), — 1.00 diopter of spherical error, his Snellen acuity would be about 20/80— twice as bad (point C). With 2.00 diop-
♦Peters, American Journal of Optometry, 1961.
fers of astigmatism and no sphej^ error, his Snellen acuity would be a 20/70 (point D). Again, this means w what the normal observer can see a feet, this individual can see only a feet. The standards for periscope °P tors permit 2.00 diopters of astigma i The Type-18 periscope corrects about -4.50 diopters of spherical re tive error; the Type-15 for about .jop_ diopters. An operator with -5.5 ters of spherical error—the Navy ^ for submarine duty—would be le 1 w residual myopia of -1.00 ^
former and a visual acuity ot 2U/ • ^
Type-15 periscope would leave mm almost 2.00 diopters or uncorrecte pia and an acuity of about 20/100 (pom not qualified for submarine service- ^ Improving Acuity: There are W0 ble methods of fully correcting the re
tive errors of periscope operators. _ to substitute contact lenses 0 ,n0f glasses. The second involves af(jt0 modification of the periscope eyeg permit the insertion of the operato ^g. refractive correction into the optic of-sight of the periscope. a
► Contact Lenses: Contact lenses ^
number of advantages over sPec ra_
particularly for myopic periscope g6
tors: The field of vision and retinal are size are increased; optical aberra 1 cjeS decreased; reflections from the sPe ^
are eliminated; it is possible to -eCe, eye close to the periscope cy something which spectacle fram jo0k
vent; and the operator can qu'ctr0l from the periscope around the room and back to the PerisJ0tfed- eyeglasses must be donned an
(, Contact lenses have other benefits. u mariners must sometimes wear emer- fCnc>’ breathing masks. Many eyeglass rames cannot fit under the masks, and Jen when they can, the frames tend to introduce leaks.
However, in addition to the ever- resent risk of loss, contact lenses present ertmn disadvantages. All but the ex- n ed-wear contacts must be removed ea keeping. When a submariner is akened unexpectedly for drills or for cerTlergency, there is little time to put tiQntacts 'n- Ocular inflammation, infec- frJ1’ and injury to the cornea can result * Contact use, and contaminants in the 0|- ,marine atmosphere increase the risk ]Cn^rritat'on and an inability to wear the in “k ^°mC men cannot wear contacts frSU marines; others must remove them tha?Uent^ ^bere is also the possibility sub 3 SU^niar'ncr who has qualified for theniarme du'y with a waiver based on cUse °f contact lenses could claim a act problem to get off the submarine.
► Modified Periscope Eyeguard: The disadvantages of contact lenses favor the second solution: modifying the periscope eyeguard to permit the insertion into the periscope optics of the operator’s full refractive correction. This fully corrects the operator without interfering with his ability to put his eye into the eyecup.
This method has one major disadvantage: an operator does not have optimal acuity when he looks away from the periscope. If he is continually looking back and forth between the periscope and the control room, he might have to put on his eyeglasses to look around the room. Nevertheless, three crews have evaluated the periscope insert on patrol, and only one operator reported a problem. In general, men with smaller refractive errors saw little need for it, but those with larger errors (more than 3.50 diopters) favored it.
Dual Approach: Since an operator using the inserts would be uncorrected when he took his eyes away from the periscope, contact lenses are preferable. On the other hand, the disadvantages of contact lenses suggest that a backup system, such as the modified periscope eyepiece, is desirable. The Navy is now supplying contact lenses to officers and quartermasters on submarines. The modification to the periscope eyeguard could be made on submarine tenders. The disadvantages attendant to both methods strongly suggest that both methods should be implemented together.
Dr. Luria has been a research psychologist at the Naval Submarine Medical Research Laboratory in New London, Connecticut, since 1957, and has conducted research in various aspects of vision. He is head of the Vision Department at the laboratory.
Commander Socks has been a research optometrist at the Naval Submarine Medical Research Laboratory since 1979. He has a master’s degree in bioengineering from the University of California and served incountry Vietnam during the 1968 Tet Offensive. He is now the executive officer at NSMRL.
jjjtness You Can See
y lieutenant Commander David B. Huber, U. S. Navy
lonf;:)Ur years ago, the Navy launched a w . 0verdue effort aimed at reducing
S.lnes and pulse rates. True, the new lejs^lca' Htness test (PFT) was easy: a bod mde~and-a-half run, sit-ups, No/ if1 rneasurement, and the sit-reach. Phys- e^ess’ those of us who consider pRlSlcal fitness important saw the revised for f'3S 'USt dlc opening salvo in the fight tj0nllness; We expected the implementa- Vvhich°^ 'ncreas*ngly tough standards ami Would eventually create a “lean
niean ’ fighting force.
"lately, all the Navy ever got have C t0tady inadequate PFT; we still Can . a ot °f fat sailors. What measures y 77/ taken to improve the Navy’s PFT? eXc i| run: The run-walk could be an ness u*1 measure °f cardiovascular fit- With °WCVCr’ to be able to “max” it 40 3 tlme ten ,T|inutes (a six-minute,
Walk ^ facc) 's absurd. Even a brisk ah)noCa[l ^aSS The run should be more three u ^*nCS *he Marine Corps’ is m . e run> where a six-minute pace ^jequired to max it.
aT1 a*/1'mC111*3*'°n' Stretch the mile-and- Stand. to two niiles and raise the Pace / S' reclu‘r'ng 21 least a six-minute pass0 max and a nine-minute pace to
the l»hPS: Sit‘LIPs measure anaerobic (in Navv SCncc free oxygen) fitness. The requires a one-foot separation between the heels and buttocks, which is virtually impossible to enforce, especially during training, and holding the arms as instructed is difficult. The Marines have been doing bent-leg sit-ups for years. Why invent our own? Recommendation: Plagiarize.
- Sit-reach: The sit-reach supposedly measures flexibility, but with the last PFT revision, it became so easy that it is pointless except as a morale booster for the unfit.
Recommendation: Drop it.
- Body-fat measurement: Outstanding personal appearance is a matter of pride and professionalism. A high body-fat percentage and an outstanding appearance are mutually exclusive. For males, passing the test is more a function of a fat neck than a thin waist. Examples abound of the “ex-wrestler gone to seed” body shape—a head sloping directly to the shoulders—that passes the test. Indeed, some who pass the test are actually obese.
Recommendation: Require passing
scores on both body-fat and height/ weight measurements.
- Push-upslpull-ups: Push-ups and pull- ups are not included in the Navy PFT, but they should be. Anyone might have to handle a fire hose or haul a shipmate out of a flooding compartment. Lack of upper-body strength invites injury.
Recommendation: Again, plagiarize from our sister service. (Marines must do 20 pull-ups for the max score. They do not do push-ups as part of their PFT.) ► Frequency: Afloat commands have difficulty administering the PFT. The temptation to “cram” for annual tests instead of maintaining year-round fitness is too high. Sailors do stupid things, such as wearing rubber suits while exercising
or starving themselves, attempting to undo in a week the product of months of neglect.
Recommendation: Require semiannual testing.
► Point system: The final PFT score is adjectival, based on the average score of all the tests. Assigning points as well would foster competition and facilitate the use of positive incentives. Possibilities include registering PFT scores on evaluations and fitness reports, granting 96-hour liberties for the best score, and including a command’s average PFT score in “Captain’s Cup” and battle readiness competitions.
Recommendation: Incorporate a point system similar to the Marine Corps’s.
► Fairness: This is the most sensitive, most important area of all. While enlisted sailors can be denied promotion for failing to pass the PFT, this does not hold true for officers. It is not only the naval officer’s responsibility, but his or her privilege, to lead by example. Recommendation: Make officer promotions contingent upon meeting weight standards.
Our sailors are the best in the world. It should make us uneasy when we look over at that anchored Soviet combatant and see organized physical training. Our
approach to physical fitness “good enough,” but to quote o ^ gei’s proverbial sign, "Better is enemy of good enough.”
Commander Huber has a bachelor s degree i a cal entomology from Ohio State Universi ^ master’s degree in strategic intelligence ^ar. Defense Intelligence College. He serve in .gwer ragut (DDG-37) and the Dwight D. his (CVN-69), with Commander Naval Surtac ^ Atlantic, and the Fleet Intelligence t-en'er’ roander and Atlantic. Currently, he is attached to 0 4).
Carrier Group Four’s staff. He is a two minute marathoner.
LAMPS-III: Carrier Battle Group Synergist
to process a large number of sono simultaneously. Finally, and Peajj. most significantly to the AS > important, ASW-related inform ^ including threats, tracks, datums, other information, is relayed *r0
By Commander George Galdorisi, U. S. Navy
The LAMPS (light airborne multipurpose system)-III weapon system is finally entering the fleet in numbers after completing one of the most successful research, development, test, and evaluation programs in modem weapon procurement history. Numerous articles in Proceedings and other professional journals have described the system’s outstanding technical capabilities. What has been less clearly articulated is the tactical utility of the system, particularly as a prime asset in the discrete context of carrier battle group operations. The LAMPS-III weapon system has met or exceeded all of its specific, technical milestones. Even more noteworthy has been the way that the system has complemented the capabilities of our carrier battle groups owing to its synergistic effect across the spectrum of battle group operations.
LAMPS-III provides the composite warfare commander (CWC) with a versatile, all-weather, multipurpose system. Its superb reliability and maintainability, as well as extensive supply support infrastructure, make it virtually a trouble-free system which does not drain other battle group assets. Significantly, the LAMPS- III system, with its organic Autocat (automatic transmission relay) capability, provides the composite warfare commander with the capability to communicate directly with his subordinate warfare commanders via plain or secure ultrahigh-frequency communications regardless of their relative distance from him and without resorting to highly vulnerable high-frequency communications links.
One of the prime beneficiaries of the LAMPS-III weapon system is the antisubmarine warfare commander (ASWC). LAMPS-III gives him the capability to redetect, localize, classify, attack, and reattack subsurface contacts up to three convergence zones away, and to remain on station for two hours—even with a full stores load of 25 sonobuoys and two torpedoes. This takes battle group ASW out of the quick reaction mode where air ASW assets have a limited amount of time to get a weapon away. Airborne and shipboard processing using the same state-of-the-art equipment (the UYS-1 Proteus computer) provides the capability
including threats, tracks, datums, ^ other information, is relayed *r0 ^
SH-60B LAMPS-III helicopter i _ parent ship and then automatica y j
ferred via Link-11 into the Navy ^ data system. Therefore, the A reaj ceives all of this vital information i time—regardless of the platform ^ riding. This allows the ASWC to active participant in the asvv y instead of an after-the-fact °bserv . ■ Another primary LAMPS-W e ary is the antisurface warfare comn ^ (ASUWC). He now has instant ac.^ g a state-of-the-art radar (APo-i^ ^ 0siti°n 160-nautical mile range and can p this radar at extended ranges
The LAMPS-III weapon system enhances operations to the point where the composite warfare commander is provided with a battle group capability which is greater than the sum of its parts.
search, and coordination and al-
lowi
Prime
asset to warfare commanders who
,atde ^rouP- Furthermore, with the (At> S-HI identification friend or foe X-172) interrogator and programma- e electronic support measures capabil- ay (ALQ-142), the ASUWC can achieve 'Sn degree of correlation on any radar lts>. providing both threat warning l significant targeting capability for attle group surface-to-surface missiles. lfiO ^‘^B’s 4.5-hour endurance and -knot+ maximum speed allow it to °ver wide ocean areas, making it an out- ending platform for surface surveil-
lng the ASUWC to achieve a correct
surf*16 friend|y and P°tential*y hostile ace ships, particularly when carrier '£ht operations are curtailed. The auto- „iadc transfer of all important LAMPS- ASUW information into the Navy tac- eal data system allows the ASUWC to ctivefy participate in the operation as the la'c surface warfare coordinator. lAlu uniclue capabilities of the MPS-III weapon system make it a
traditionally might have neglected to include a ship-helicopter asset in their inventory of weapons. Deployed antiair warfare commanders are finding that the LAMPS-III system gives them significant threat warning, particularly when radar, identification friend or foe, and electronic support measures (ESM) pictures are correlated. (These all appear on the same display for the LAMPS-III airborne tactical officer.) This successfully complements the E-2C vector logic grid, which even in best-case scenarios does not provide 360° coverage around the carrier battle group. The electronic warfare commander (EWC) is another beneficiary of the LAMPS-III system. Deployed EWCs have successfully integrated the LAMPS- III ships’ SLQ-32 ESM information with the SH-60B’s ALQ-142 ESM data to achieve good ESM cross-fixing. In addition, EWCs have made good use of the APS-124 radar and the syncronized APX-172 IFF to achieve outstanding identification friend or foe corroboration on ESM “cuts.”
It is axiomatic that no one weapon system will make or break the success of carrier battle group warfare. However, the LAMPS-III weapon system has broken new ground in providing the CWC and all of his subordinate warfare commanders with real-time information on which to base their tactical decision making. This inherent ability, coupled with the system’s synergistic effect of having all warfare commanders compete to share the same assets, is having a profound effect on the way we fight the fleet.
A 1970 Naval Academy graduate, Commander Gal- dotisi has served in LAMPS-1 and LAMPS-III squadrons on both coasts. His most recent afloat assignment was with Commander Cruiser Destroyer Group Three on board the USS Kitty Hawk (CV-63). He received a master’s degree in oceanography from the Naval Postgraduate School and graduated from the Naval War College with highest distinction. He has been associated with the LAMPS-III weapon system since 1981; currently he is executive officer of the newest squadron, HSL-43.
jjgviet Airborne and Air Assault Forces—Part II
^ ^aPtain Edwin W. Besch, U. S. Marine Corps (Retired)
*n ad<Jition to airborne divisions
the
So
p
aS ^OTE: ^''s ‘s l^,e second port of p °~Part article which began in the July codings. Part IPs footnotes follow Wentially those in Par, ,
Jhe Soviets have seven airborne divi- grar|S Guards at Pskov in the Lenin- at (f ^*d4ary District (MD); 7th Guards
riso 3UnaS’ Baltic MD; 103d Guards 2ar_ l(j?J1,ed at Vitebsk, Belorussian MD; Gu ,Guards at Tula, Moscow MD; 98th Guar|S 3t BolSrad< Odessa MD; 104th MD- S 31 Kirovabad, Transcaucasus Per ’ UnC* Guards, garrisoned at
ins8ana' Turkestan MD, but now fight- 41: in Afghanistan with the 103d Guards. Traf1' ^ unit, the 44th Guards Airborne ming Division, is stationed at Janova, Halhc MD.1’ [1]
dependent, 500-man air assault battalion is assigned to selected tank and combined arms armies. These troops wear the same uniform as the VDV, but have slightly different insignia. The air assault and airmobile brigades are lifted by Soviet Air Force composite helicopter squadrons equipped with a mix of Mi-8 Hip medium lift and Mi-6 Hook or Mi-26 Halo heavy lift helicopters, and they would be provided tactical support by Mi-24 Hind attack helicopters.15
Air assault and airmobile brigade missions would include seizure of important lines of communication, bridges, mountain passes, and the like, probably within the tactical depth (50-100 kilometers) of the enemy’s rear in direct support of front (or army) operations. Their use could free the airborne divisions for deeper penetrations into the enemy’s operational depth (50-500 kilometers) or for strategic operations. Up to 16 brigades, with three or four battalions each, of airborne-trained Spetsnaz special purpose forces are an additional threat to NATO and other rear areas.16 The air assault, airmobile, and Spetsnaz brigades represent real growth in Soviet airborne strength and capabilities, compared to the West’s mere modernization of airborne division equipment and correction of deficiencies evident from World War II experience.
Airlift for airborne and air assault units is provided by the Soviet Air Forces’ Military Transportation Aviation (Voyenno-Transportnaya Aviatsiya [VTA]), which became a separate element in 1955. The VTA is operationally subordinate to the Soviet General Staff, and it also transports other military forces, special weapons, ammunition, supplies, etc., as well as evacuating wounded. Some VTA units dedicated to supporting airborne operations are located near airborne units to allow continuous coordination and training.
The VTA has more than 600 medium- and long-range cargo transport aircraft, which can be supplemented during wartime by 1,200 similar passenger aircraft belonging to Aeroflot civil aviation. The VTA has more than 375 An-12 Cub (similar to U. S. C-130 Hercules) four-turboprop aircraft that can airlift 90 troops, drop 60 paratroops, or carry virtually any type of airborne combat equipment (excluding engineer equipment), including two BMD-ls or an ASU-85. The An-12 has a maximum range of 1,400 kilometers with maximum payload; 90-115 An- 12s are needed to transport a BMD- equipped airborne regiment.
The An-12s are being replaced by 11-76 Candid (similar to U. S. C-141 Starlifter) four-jet transports, which can carry 140
which has responsibilities ^e„
... . airborne-
complete, have five divisions, “i ar,
airmobile, Alpine infantry, g,
mored, and Marine, most of whic ^
or will have, significant numbers ^ wheeled light armored vehicles (L g various types.24 West Germany s ^ airborne brigades will be equippe ^
carriers
Despite fewer personnel and more limited lift resources, Soviet paratroopers take to their aircraft with greater firepower, tactical mobility, and survivability than their U. S. counterparts.
paratroopers who can jump simultaneously from four exits, or 40 tons of cargo, including three BMD-ls, or any other airborne equipment. Range with maximum payload is 6,300 kilometers; 50-60 Il-76s can transport a BMD-equipped airborne regiment. The 175 Il-76s could transport two reinforced airborne regiments for an assault out to a maximum radius of 3,150 kilometers from their bases. Both An-12s and ll-76s can land on unimproved runways, so it may be unnecessary to capture airfields to airland troops and equipment.
The An-22 Cock is a long-range (4,200 kilometers), four-turboprop aircraft that can airland 175 paratroopers or heavy equipment such as self-propelled artillery, main battle tanks, mobile surface- to-air missile launchers, and heavy engineer items. In wartime, 55 An-22s could be used to bring in reinforcements after an airborne assault.17
The Soviets are flight-testing the massive new An-124 Ruslan (named after a heroic giant in Pushkin), or Condor, a long-range, heavy-lift jet transport for service entry during the mid-to-late 1980s. Larger, heavier, and more powerful than the U. S. C-5A, the An-124 is expected to carry 200 paratroopers or 120 tons of cargo to a stated maximum range of 16,500 kilometers. It is fitted with soft- field landing gear and front and rear loading ramps.18
The U. S. Air Force has 273 C-141Bs, 77 C-5As (to be supplemented by 50 more-capable C-5Bs during 1986-89), and 239 C-130 transport aircraft; the U. S. Marine Corps has 40 more KC- 130F assault transports/tankers. The C-141B is the result of a "stretch” program that increased its capacity by 30%: all U. S. aircraft except the more numerous C-5As are superior to their Soviet counterparts in range and payload. These assets could be supplemented in wartime by about 600 aircraft, mostly earlier model C-130s, of the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve.19 The U. S. advantages are offset, however, by the Soviet Union’s geographic proximity to most potential crisis areas and the need for the United States to project its power over longer distances.
The estimated total Soviet airborne/air assault strength is 102,000-107,000 men, consisting of eight Soviet 6,500- man airborne divisions, eight 2,000-
- man air assault brigades, three
1,700-1,850-man airmobile brigades, about ten 500-man independent air assault battalions, and 16 1,500-man
Spetsnaz brigades.20 Soviet Naval Infantry strength may be as high as 18,000, with 9,000 in the Pacific Fleet division plus three 3,000-man brigades.21 Naval special operations brigades, each consisting of three battalions of combat swimmers, an airborne battalion, a midget submarine unit, and support elements, are allotted to each fleet and add an estimated 6,000 total personnel.22
U. S. active-duty airborne strength is much smaller than the Soviets’: 22,000 airborne-trained personnel—in the Army’s 13,000-man 82d Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina; 1st Battalion, 509th Airborne Infantry in northern Italy; four Special Forces Groups; and three Ranger battalions (1/75 and 3/75 at Fort Stewart, Georgia, and 2/75 at Fort Lewis, Washington) plus small, specialized airborne units in all four services. In addition, there is the
- man 101st Air Assault Division at Fort Campbell, Kentucky.
When airborne and seaborne power projection forces are added and their totals are compared, the United States far exceeds the Soviets in overall numerical strength and lift capabilities of its intervention forces. The United States has about 233,000 (38,000 airborne/air assault personnel primarily in Army units plus 195.000 Marines in ground combat units, supporting aviation, or employed in other roles ashore and afloat) compared to roughly 126,000 -131,000 Soviet airborne/air assault/Spets/wz personnel and naval infantry in combat units alone. Both countries’ intervention forces could be augmented by airborne units and
Marines of their NATO or ^arS.a^ound allies, as well as by conventional gr ^ forces. Neither country, however, ca more than a fraction of its assets in a ^ gle air and/or sea lift. The Soviets c ^ use amphibious and merchant ships assault waves. -..a
North Korea has up to 100,000 sp forces/airborne troops in roughly - ^ gades, three of them amphibious mandos, and separate battalions, has three airborne divisions. Four na^^ maintain airborne forces of d*'’1 ^ strength: Germany, France, Polun . the United Kingdom; Israel trains ra_ mechanized brigades in airborne °P tions. Many other countries throug ^ the world maintain smaller al£ teS) forces.23 Besides the United (0 France is the only Western coun have a significant rapid depj0I1 force. Its 47,000-man Rapid Force, ’ ' ' 1 mimes
NATO and outside Europe
2.9-ton, tracked weapon v«>"-- ^
armed with a tube-launched. °PtlL :|e tracked, wire-guided (TOW) 1,113n launcher or a 20-nun. automatic With these two exceptions, non- o . airborne forces will be lightly arine footmobile for the foreseeable tuture-^ Despite the publicity Soviet an forces received for their limited P ^ projection roles in Czechoslovakia ^ Afghanistan, and their threat to rear areas as raiding or divers'0 forces, their major role in a large ■
/ August
conventional ground forces, and air> ground, and/or naval opera
‘‘rP-bab,y would be to support the siv' at^vance °f ground forces in offen- j_tC °Perat>°ns by aerial envelopment(s) fm° c enemy’s rear- The chief danger th n* .V*e* a'rborne forces lies not in *r, [2]'n8ular power projection or other viet* * Per se’ *3Ut >n the overall So- o capability to orchestrate and project UsjensiVe capabilities over a wide range, Pn J!® targe combined-arms ground for- with°nS en masse and in combination fore airborne and helibome air assault u i es and naval infantry amphibious as'virtually all of them mechanized— relatively fewer and less mecha- jirC defending forces, in virtually any AnT")00 *r°m ^ov'et borders. The new ^ tleet, however, will significantly tion°Ve ^ov'et airlift and power projec-
a capabilities by 1990.
the Cnera* Sukhorukov’s statement about (,ra(l"1tl0ss'h'lity of (ground) offensive op- the 10nS w't^out aerial envelopment of 0 enemy- coupled with the formation of iishratl°na* maneuver groups and estab- gad1"^111 °P airmobile and air assault bri- ieveT ant' battalions at front and army on f !ndicate renewed Soviet emphasis NATn m“ a niethod of breaking through ness ground defenses. The effective- confl°! ^ov'et airborne forces in a future is cW'd dePend on how well their use Strji^rd'nated with nuclear or chemical other '
tions_ *
nui as wel] as the strength and inge- By 01 (lle opposition. fon.eSldes 'he threat, Soviet airborne Sonie °"er Western military planners Unit[3] T^SSOns *or 'heir own light infantry Ct j [4]°Viets are far ahead of the fant m niechanizing airborne, light in- a mar)d marine units, and giving them Use 3ated fighting capability through the ProvVi br'nP P°rts. Mechanization can firen 6 a° '"Gantry squad with heavier carrv°Wer’ s'8nificantly greater mobility, prote caPacity, and endurance; armor aud iCt'0n 31 least against small arms fire 'ional [5] ^ra8men's while mounted; addi- an(j , Pr°tection against gas or radiation; duri [6]r movernent to cut exposure 'etai^ ■n® assaults. And the squad still oftens lts ability to fight dismounted, suPP°rted by its carrier vehicle’s
main armament.
bom d‘Stinct con'rast, U. S. Army air- si0e’ a'r assault, and light infantry divi- batt_S,’. ar|d U. S. Marine Corps infantry sWirn10nS Wdl Use tbe uttarmored, nonhigh mobility multipurpose trans °d Veb‘c*e (“Hummer”) as ground rine^y131'011 and weapon carriers. Ma- LVTP7° emP[7]y AAV7A1 (formerly f0r_'A1) amphibious assault vehicles Protecting ground transportation.
Only one battalion in each Marine division will be equipped with the Swiss- Canadian-designed Piranha 8x8 light armored vehicle in the nine-man capacity, 25-mm. gun troop carrier version, or the command, mortar carrier, TOW antitank, logistics, recovery, and, eventually, assault gun and air defense versions. The Marines’ LAV-25 is transportable by CH-53E helicopter, and up to six LAVs can be carried in the Navy’s new air cushion landing craft.
The hardest problem for U. S. airborne and helibome units is the requirement for a “tank substitute” or “light tank.” The weight constraint makes it difficult to mount a tank gun and withstand its recoil. Antitank missiles, with their relatively long time of flight (compared to high- velocity gun projectiles), the need for the gunner to track the target during flight, and their high cost when used in other fire support roles are only a partial solution. The latest Soviet solution appears to combine BMD-1 airborne infantry fighting vehicles armed with AT-4 antitank guided missiles and the M1981 I20-mm. SP howitzer (airborne) firing antitank ammunition. The U. S. Marine Corps will arm its LAV-assault gun with one of the following: a 90-mm. gun, 75-mm. rapid fire gun, or 60-mm. gun, and use it in combination with the LAV-TOW antitank version. The U. S. Army is seeking a tracked Armored Gun System that can mount a 105-mm. soft-recoil gun, weigh 18-23 tons, can be fitted with applique armor, and will be capable of low-velocity air drops and low-altitude parachute extraction from C-130 aircraft. Other possible combat vehicle alternatives for U. S. Army airborne and light infantry divisions that should be seriously considered are a combination of the General Motors of Canada LAV-25 (including a 6x6 version, two of which can be carried in a C-130) and the new French Panhard M11 4x4 ultralight armored vehicle, both of which offer significant mobility, survivability, and other advantages over the Hummer. They should be made airdropable, if necessary using a copy of the Soviet parachute retrorocket system.
Within NATO, only Britain seems to have reacted significantly to the rear area threat from Soviet mechanized airborne forces. The Royal Air Force Regiment already has equipped its light armored squadrons for airfield defense with Scorpion 76-mm. gun light tanks and Spartan armored personnel carriers. The U. S. Air Force recognized the Soviet airborne threat to its forward airfields in central Europe when it sought the dual-purpose Mobile Weapon System, armed with GAU-13/A 30-mm. gun and Stinger surface-to-air missile pods in a turret, possibly mounted on the Marines’ 8x8 LAV chassis. Air Force interest ended when the Army was assigned responsibilities for both air and ground defense of forward Air Force airfields; the Marine Corps is sponsoring further development of an air defense version of the LAV.
Overall, the United States has numerically superior (by nearly 2:1) air- and sea-projection forces and lift resources, but their Soviet counterparts are conceptually more modem and have greater fire power, tactical mobility, and survivability on the battlefield despite their fewer numbers. Their threat has long been recognized (and sometimes exaggerated), but when will U. S. defense planners begin to study tlieir advanced tactical concepts and technological innovations and learn from them? After all, the Soviets learned their airmobile/assault techniques from U. S. Army and Marine airmobile operations in Vietnam.
,3LtC Guenter Lippert, “Luftlandtruppen: Die Strategischen Eingreifverbande der Sowjetarmee.” Soldat und Technik 3/1983, pp. 123, 124. Soviet Bloc Elite Forces, pp. 16, 17.
l4David C. Isby, “The Vertical Threat: Air Assault and Airmobile Brigades of the Soviet Army," Amphibious Warfare Review, August 1985, pp. 51, 54. ''Ibid. pp. 51-55. i6Zaloga and Loop, p. 26.
17DDB"-1110-2-82, pp. 7, 8; FM 100-8-2, Soviet Army Specialized Warfare and Rear Area Support. August 1982, pp. 2-9, 10.
18Soviet Military Power (2d ed ). March 1983. Defense Intelligence Agency, p. 46; “Ruslan the Great," International Defense Review, 7/1985. p. 1040.
19Military Balance. 1983-84, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London; C. F. Suba. “Key Airlift Issues to Face New Congress," National Defense, March 1983, pp. 32, 33.
“Airborne division strength: DDB-1110-2-82, p. 5; air assault and airmobile units: Isby. pp. 52-54; Zaloga and Loop, p. 27; Spetsnaz brigade strength is author’s estimate.
21Zaloga and Loop. p. 25; Norman Polmar. "Soviet Naval Infantry: Increasing in Capabilities and Possibly in Size,” Amphibious Warfare Review, August 1985, p. 26.
22Zaloga and Loop. p. 27. Author estimates naval special operations brigade strength at 1,500.
21Military Balance, 1983-84.
24Maj Richard A. Stewart, U. S. Marine Corps, “The French RDF,” Proceedings. March 1985. p. 161.
The Sword of the Fleet
By Lieutenant Commander Robert L. Frazier, U. S. Navy
The sky over the Gulf of Mexico on 20 May 1986 was partly cloudy; there were light seas and a moderate breeze. The “sword of the fleet,” the Mark-41 vertical launching system (VLS), on board the USS Bunker Hill (CG-52), was honed for Trial Bravo. In two days, the Bunker Hill's VLS scored six of six successful missile firings, including a triple launch test vehicle ripple fire test (see cover) and two perfect SM-2 Blk-II surface-to-air missile engagements against drones. Teamed with the ship’s Aegis combat system, SM-2 Blk-IIs, Tomahawk land- attack and antiship missiles, and vertically launched ASROCs (antisubmarine rockets), the VLS firepower is awesome.
VLS is being incorporated in three ship classes: the Ticonderoga (CG-47)-class cruisers beginning with the Bunker Hill, retrofits in the Spruance (DD-963)-class destroyers, and the Arleigh Burke (DDG- 51)-class destroyers.
The Bunker Hill will be commissioned in September in Boston, Massachusetts. The Ticonderogas have two 61-cell launchers and will carry SM-2 and Tomahawk missiles. Vertically launched
The successes of both the Bunker Hill's vertical launching system, here firing an SM-2, and the Aegis weapon system have unsheathed a lethal sword for tomorrow’s fleet.
ASROC (VLA) missiles will be carried starting with the San Jacinto (CG-56). The Spruance (DD-963) is the first of her class to have VLS installed. She commenced overhaul at Ingalls Shipbuilding in Pascagoula, Mississippi, in June 1986. This class will have one 61-cell launcher and carry Tomahawk and VLA. The Arleigh Burke will be commissioned in 1986 and have one 61-cell launcher aft and a 29-cell launcher forward. Like the Aegis cruisers, she will carry SM-2, Tomahawk, and VLA.
Unlike a traditional launcher and magazine combination, the vertical launcher space contains most of the sophisticated electronics that control the system. Each canister loaded into the launcher acts as a launcher rail and provides the traditional safety factors of a magazine. The canister provides a security boundary within its corrugated steel box, continuous hazard monitoring through an umbilical cable connection, and a deluge system to suppress inadvertent rocket motor ignition.
VLS provides a significant increase in firepower to a ship since 61 missiles are “on the rail.” The system manages multiple, simultaneous engagements and any combination of missiles can be fired.
Once a missile is loaded into a VLS canister, it is not touched again until it is offloaded at a weapons station for periodic inspection, virtually eliminating onboard maintenance of missiles. Another reduction in maintenance results from the increased reliability of the system. The arrangement of the 61 cells in eight modules provides redundancy. The built-in test function of the system provides continuous internal monitoring of every major component and alerts operators to any casualty. If a casualty occurs, the system selects another missile automatically without having to clear a rail, greatly reducing the time between firings in a casualty mode. The automated operation and reduced maintenance of the system reduce manning requirements. The Ticonderoga- and Arleigh Burke- class ships will have nine gunner’s mates and the Spruances will have seven.
The versatile VLS is made up of three basic modules. The eight-cell module provides structural support, electrical power, hazard monitoring, exhaust gas management, and a command interface for eight canisters. (Normally, four of these modules are installed in a launcher.)
The eight-cell system module is similar
to the eight-cell module but has e subassemblies which provide level lighting, communications, an
ard reporting. (There is only one eig cell system module installed m launcher.) , >e
The five-cell strikedown nrtou ’ which has a hydraulically operate c (similar to a backhoe with a winch ca installed in place of three cells, most critical basic assembly. (This c provides the ship with an underway ^ plenishment capability and allows o ^ handling of canisters and maintenan the launcher independent of shore a^ ties. The crane currently handles and VLA but will be certified to ha ^ Tomahawk in port, at anchor, or ^ere emergency situation in calm seas- is only one five-cell module insta e each launcher.) a
Each ship controls her launchers w pair of computerized launch contro ^ (LCUs). The LCUs are the heart ^
large telephone-switching networ' ^ ^
selects specific missiles and cams e launch. The LCUs interface w«n Aegis, Tomahawk, and VLA com a , terns, enabling the launchers to resp_^ to the needs of each system. The ^ and the launchers respond to the c0 systems in three modes of operatm ,[nL1. standby mode, the launchers are c0^aj|a. ously evaluating missile/module a ^ bility through extensive built-in ies^Qj{l continuous interface verification s each of the three weapon control sys ^ (WCSs) to each of the 61 missile celi each launcher. The simulation mo e(0 vides the WCSs with the capabi i perform periodic testing and tra*n’n® :tjjin VLS. This function is performed w the LCU software and allows f°r s- -eS fault insertion and simulated invcn while maintaining real-missile proper inventories, and fault rep The ready-alert mode of operation i ^ ready-to-fire condition. In addition ^ processing of launch orders, vert *c^ of interfaces from the WCSs to eaa|ert, the missile cells continues. In ready VLS can schedule and process mu ^ launch orders from any of the t*iree^j]jty fare areas simultaneously. This caPanl- requires VLS to perform its own mand and control in prioritizing 11 warfare operations. . , to
The VLS launchers are designe^ accept any type of canister in any ^ The three types of canisters use^1Q,i..[I, are the Mark-13 Mod-0 for SM--
loi
ters
%er than the Mark-13 and -15 canis-
VLA Tand the Mark'15 Mod-° for , • The Mark-14 canister is three feet
a<Jan(W ''Cd reclu‘re a three-foot canister gac?er when loaded into a launcher. tj0cai>ister has a special critical func- Saflnterrupt switch (CFIS) or canister criti e?a*3*e switch (CSES) which control
lnCa s'§nal voltages to the missile. everC[Cnt sa^ety was designed into rema’ 6Ve' tke system’ which will ^Wed" Sa*C tkree basic precepts are fol- perso ' Tirst, only trained and certified a]|0n,!e* using approved procedures are tem £~ t0 operate and maintain the sys- ciali i CSe Personnel are trained at spe- 'hrouh schools and certified
tion ^' l'1C uulitary personnel qualifica- certif ^tandards or tke civilian personnel Vlj ICation program. A complete set of cards CL'hnical manuals and maintenance (jUrc ^C(<>ntain the only approved proce- letj ' aerf will not be any technical bul- for S Polished which could be mistaken
hures6*11' °^IC'a* ckan8es to the proce- notaS,;and "heck-plate engineering” is in»n nonze(l because it could lead to an
Thertent missile launch- c0rn ? Second and third safety precepts
an :^ ement each other and could lead to not fa Vertent missile launch if they are req0 owed- The sophistication of VLS cal nV S ■dlat WC nla'nta‘n a dead electri- laUnchISSlle interface until we intend to
tors • ?nd Ut n° t'me can we m'x simulate i ? “rdnance- A head electrical mis- n eiface does not prevent built-in test
or hazard monitoring, but missiles that are continuously on the rail will launch if critical missile commands are received. For this reason, VLS uses the simulation mode and canister CFIS/CSES to prevent inadvertent missile launch. If a simulator is mixed with ordnance in a launcher, the system will attempt to fire a simulator in a test and, failing that, will select another cell and launch a real missile. Thus, at no time can we mix simulators and ordnance. This precludes end-to-end testing, such as daily systems operability tests, but built-in test simulation mode will satisfy combat system test requirements.
The Mark-41 vertical launching systems technical manual and spare parts break-out support the “lowest replaceable unit” maintenance concept. Under this concept, failed circuit cards and submodules are replaced in their entirety without attempting to repair individual small components which are too complex for shipboard repair facilities. This concept prevents unauthorized changes which could cause an inadvertent missile launch and improves reliability through rigidly tested standard components. It also reduces system maintenance time. Adequate spare parts support is currently provided through the interim depot facility at Martin Marietta in Baltimore, Maryland, and will move to Ship’s Parts Control Center Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania, in 1989.
Training is crucial to the success of VLS. VLS gunner’s mates attend a rigorous 19 1/2-week operations and mainte-
Modularity is the key to VLS. In addition to missiles and other support functions, a strikedown module provides a hydraulic crane that offers an underway missile replenishment capability.
nance course before they are given a 0981 Navy enlisted classification. Each gunner’s mate also attends a prerequisite three-week digital fundamentals course. Because new-construction ships are subject to phased manning, a two-week strikedown team training course is being developed to ensure that each ship has an experienced VLS handling team.
On the fleet support side of VLS, inservice engineering agents (ISEA) and field service representatives (FSR) attend a 15-week VLS course and must complete a personnel certification program before they are allowed to work independently on the system. The civilian engineers provide intermediate-level maintenance support, conduct installation and testing at shipyards, and assist the fleet with major repairs. Personnel from each major weapon station are also trained and certified for encaning and decaning missiles, and dockside loading operations.
Four training sites will be required to train more than 600 gunner’s mates and fleet support personnel for VLS. The Navy training unit at Martin Marietta is teaching its fourth VLS operations and maintenance course and second ISEA/ FSR course. The guided missile school at Virginia Beach, Virginia, will commence training in May 1987 and the Navy training unit at Port Hueneme, California, will commence training in October 1987. Fleet training center, San Diego, California, will commence VLS training in 1989.
The Mark-41 VLS is a new system with new concepts and new procedures. Applying old standards and old procedures to the system could be dangerous. As with any system, safety is built-in and redundant. The fleet support is already in place and will continue to expand with growing requirements. The “sword of the fleet” is in the fleet and its potential is limited only by one’s imagination.
Commander Frazier graduated from the U. S. Naval Academy in 1974. He served as main propulsion assistant in the Bordelon (DD-881), damage control assistant in the William H. Standley (CG-32), combat system officer in the Towers (DDG-9), and operations officer of Destroyer Squadron Fifteen. He received a master’s degree in mechanical engineering and a subspecialty in weapon systems engineering from the Naval Postgraduate School. He is currently serving as fleet introduction officer for the Mk-41 VLS Program Office (NavSea PMS-410) while awaiting ship assignment as executive officer.
Stemming the Haitian Tide
By Lieutenant Commander George D. Bond II, U, S. Coast Guard
1971 by his son’
ceeded upon his death in
floor and thatch roof. A common s'
treat11
Haitians migrate illegally to the United States attempting to flee Haiti’s oppressive economy. They will continue their illegal migration until Haiti’s economy improves. Even the fall of Jean Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier did not stem the flow of Haitians trying to reach the United States. The Coast Guard, meanwhile, will continue its effective program of interdicting Haitian migrants at sea and repatriating them to Haiti.
The Coast Guard Haitian Migrant Interdiction Program is the result of Commandant Message 020150Z October 1981, which ordered the Coast Guard to “intercept certain vessels . . . engaged in the trafficking of undocumented migrants.” The operation began that same month when the U. S. Coast Guard Cutter Hamilton (WHEC-715) departed Boston for the Windward Passage. Coast Guard Air Station Clearwater, Florida, dispatched a C-130 aircraft, establishing Aviation Detachment Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. All this activity was for a 90-day test program.
The “temporary” operation involves Coast Guard, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and State Department personnel in Washington, D. C., Miami, and Port-au-Prince. Haiti. There have been more than 245 individual interdictions involving some 9,017 migrants. Of the more than 8,200 Haitians who have been stopped, about 7,500 have been repatriated to Haiti. The operation cost the life of INS interpreter Jacques Crevecoeur. The Gold Lifesaving Medal and two Coast Guard Medals were awarded for actions taken when a 28-foot sailing vessel capsized with 73-89 persons on board while INS and Coast Guard personnel boarded it on 6 June 1984.
Background: Coast Guard involvement in Haitian migrant interdiction was proposed following the arrival (mainly in south Florida) of an estimated 15,000 illegal Haitian economic migrants in 198081. The Coast Guard was directed to conduct the at-sea interdiction and return of Haitian economic migrants while the State Department was tasked to develop an agreement with the Haitian Government. The Justice Department was told to prepare for the expected countersuits and challenges from Haitian support groups in the United States. This operation, which was to limit, not stop, Haitian migration, was to last three months and be conducted near Haiti.1
This is a costly program in terms of both cutter days and personnel. Currently, there is one dedicated cutter with a deployed helicopter operating in the vicinity of the Windward Passage between Cuba and Haiti. A fixed-wing resource is maintained with a four-man aviation detachment at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The Coast Guard has a liaison officer in the Port-au-Prince Embassy who oversees the three- or four-man material assistance team working with the Haitian Navy.
Article 33 of the United Nations Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees states:
“No Contracting State shall ... return [refouler] a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”2
Since all refugees must be given a chance to substantiate any claim for asylum, INS officers and interpreters are also deployed on the Coast Guard cutter to interview all migrants at sea. Any person displaying a well-founded fear of persecution is questioned by an INS officer. If any doubt exists, the migrant is transported to the United States to make a formal claim for asylum. As further protection, the U. S. Embassy in Port-au- Prince has designated a returnee officer to interview those repatriated to Haiti.
The Coast Guard interdiction effort is directed south of Great Inagua Island in the Windward Passage because the great expanse of water between Haiti and Miami proportionately increases the difficulty of locating Haitian vessels and repatriating those interdicted as the boats increase their distance from Haiti. The Coast Guard also has a cutter in the sailing routes through the Bahamas, the most likely path of emigration. Experience indicates that two-thirds of all Haitians “emigrating to the Bahamas” are actually destined for the United States.3
Justification for Coast Guard involvement in stopping illegal migrants on the high seas led to the first exercise of 8 U. S. Code Article 12 (f), which gives the president the power to stop potential immigrants from entering the United States if he believes that their entry would be “detrimental to the United States” for whatever period of time he believes is necessary.4
This operation also falls tinder search and rescue provisions of 1 •
Code Article 2, 88—duty torenderaw distressed persons and vessels. T is ^ tion became more applicable as t e ^ perate physical and loading conditions the Haitian vessels, especially the sal - vessels, became apparent.
History: Haiti entered the 20th ce” as a backward nation in political s bles. The largest improvement in ^ ^ structure support took place be 1915 and 1935 when U. S. Marines o ,ier pied the country. The infamous Duv . regime began in 1957 with Fran ^ “Papa Doc” Duvalier. He was
Jean-Claude “Baby Doc.” PaPa .
reign was one of despotic dictators
However, under Baby Doc it *,ec^mgaby
repressive. On 7 February 1986,
Doc fled Haiti for France. His g°
ment was replaced by the Nationa
emment Council (CNG) led by
Henri Namphy. The CNG has reins 1 ,|ie
freedoms only dreamed about un e{
Duvaliers. However, the CNG is a ^
attack by the Haitian populace or
reversing overnight the ills o
Duvaliers’ rule. It will take years to
to bring Haiti back into the econ
mainstream.5 ^u
a
Pro-emigration Factors: country (about the size of Mary ® which is four-fifths mountains an ^ Haiti’s population density excee s ^ dia’s. Haiti is rife with tuberculosis.^ nereal disease, malaria, and—niosj P ^ alent of all—malnutrition. Ranke ^ ^ to or at the bottom of World Ban ^ World Health Organization scales, has a per capita annual income ot $a deceptive figure, since the average ^ zen may do well to see $25 in cas
Year- r aCtion
The CNG is taking stronger ac^
against the smugglers arranging ^ emigration. However, there is ljtt e^ajtj nomic deterrent to leaving Haiti- has a yearly deficit of $33 m'"l0ne]0p- U. S. Agency for International ^eVaCp ment provides about $50 milli°n year and the U. S. Haitian eon1111 ^
sends more than $150 million annua friends and relatives in Haiti.
Haitian life centers around 1 e . a tended family. The standard homere 20-foot x 10-foot, two-room stru ^ constructed of sticks and mud wit ' ^
provides drinking water, sanitary
water'
°°king water, and bathing water.
most a feudal society, the families ha,feral|y °wn from one-quarter to one- leav.acre and cling to the land, seldom lng the immediate area—except to hoiw1 passa8e t0 Miami. There is no bift °r ac*vancement and no social mo- 1, Neither voodoo nor Christianity onimiSe 3 better **fe on earIh- Thus, the y Way to break out of poverty is r°ugh emigration.6
is ajt‘an Emigration: Illegal migration 0ng-standing and widely accepted ertan.s escaping Haiti’s persistent pov- ille ' j-mtil the mid-1970s, migration was e®a ’ Casual, and largely for seasonal hon”°^rnent' The Haitians would “island far ■ UP hie Bahamian Chain, possibly as w ]a s south Florida, as migrant farm ers, boat crew, or domestic workers, bee rneasurable number of Haitians l97^n arr'ving in the United States in of p ter lhe death of Papa Doc. Claims Conf0 *t*Ca' Persecuti°n and repression Hait'nUeC* t^lrou8h 1979-80, when the t0°k advantage of the Cuban adny16-'* Boat Lift. During this time, grou'7nS 1° the United States on the s °f economic hardship became "'as6 C°mrnon—so long as the migrant eont lnterv’ewed at sea and had not had tem-aCt W'tb migrants held in U. S. de-
nhon centers.
of f, 1S econ°mic migration was the result
- sf0Ur major factors:
basin*11™*011 Haitians in the Caribbean nn~„, a comparable increase in local ^employment
tirmo *■ 6n,Ce °P better economic condi-
- Th *n thC United States
Stated 6aSe op remaining in the United ■ng fr,an^ ab'hty to work while wait-
hended bfiflN? hearingS_if appre‘
dlega^ appearance °f major traffickers in wide rni®rat'on who advertised country- leavft’ uconv*nc>ng hesitant peasants to
Th Ram f°r Untold riches e ahamas are now viewed as the
stopping-off point for the eventual trip to the United States. Recently, the Bahamian Government concluded an agreement with the Haitian Government permitting the return of nonresident Haitians. Should the Bahamas begin an active round-up and detention of illegal Haitians, there may be an increase in the flow of Haitians from the Bahamas.
Methods of Emigration: Boats provide the major form of transportation from Haiti. They vary from decrepit 40-foot sailing vessels carrying more than 100 people to 65-foot inter-island freighters with ten “excess” crewmembers. In the first years of the interdiction program, the boats tended to depart from the Golfe de la Gonave and swing up through the Windward Passage to the United States. Now the traffickers depart from the northwest coast of Haiti—Port-de-Paix and the Isle de la Tortue specifically— and follow the Bahamian navigational lights along established trading routes to Nassau or Freeport. From there, the Great Isaacs Light or Bimini serve as points of departure to cross the Straits of Florida.
The sailboats often have no one on board who has made the trip. A total lack of navigation capability is compounded by a dependence on wind and currents. Often, the only navigational guidance is the direction to “follow the setting sun.” The sailboats generally cross the Grand Bahama Bank (often running aground on its shallows) or bump along the Cuban coast, where they have received assistance from the Cubans—provided they keep moving.8 (The INS and Coast Guard estimate that 50% of the sailboats departing Haiti never land, capsizing or foundering with total loss of life.)
Emigration is not free, and costs have increased over the years. The average emigration fee has risen from $400 -$600 in the mid-1970s to $2,000 in 1986.9 In many cases, the price depends on what the traffic will bear. In one instance, a
Packed together like sardines and paying up to $2,000 apiece in illegal emigration fees, Haitians attempt to flee to the United States. The price is worth it to those who hope to escape Haiti’s poverty.
group of villagers bought their own sailboat and sailed toward Miami for about $30 each.
The emigration fee buys a passport, exit visa, entry visa, job references in the United States, and travel by motorboat. Migrants often do not realize the deceptive practices of the traffickers until they are under way in a sailboat—ostensibly to meet a motorboat that never appears.
Demographically, the migrants cover the range of the Haitian population. Half of those returned are 18-29-year-old males with minimum education. A full 90% of these repatriated males indicate they will try again.
One-fifth of the returnees are 3040-year-old males who are unable to support their families. They prefer to migrate legally for seasonal work, returning to Haiti during the off-season. Males 40 and over constitute 5% of the returnees.
One-fourth of the returnees are female, almost all of whom are 18-35. More than half are unmarried, but most have several children to support. It is not unusual to interdict a boat with a woman in the last stages of pregnancy. If the woman’s child is bom in the United States, the child is a U. S. citizen.
Program Results: While the program is directed toward intercepting the Haitian economic migrant, a wide variety of other nationalities have also been returned home or turned over to the INS for exclusion hearings.
Interdictions have increased markedly since the program began in 1981. Part of this increase is attributed to the increased law enforcement (narcotics intervention) activities of the Seventh Coast Guard District. With more cutters on drug enforcement patrol, more Haitian vessels are sighted, boarded, and interdicted. As the figures in the following table indicate,
Interdictions (through June 1986)
Fiscal Year | Number of People | Number of Boats |
1982 | 363 | 12 |
1983 | 600 | 35 |
1984 | 1,946 | 69 |
1985 | 3,971 | 73 |
1986 | 2,137 | 56 |
TOTAL | 9,017 | 245 |
almost half of the interdictions occurred in fiscal year 1985.
There is no typical interdiction. More than half of the interdicted boats have held Haitian migrants only. The rest, largely boats crossing from Bimini or Dominicans attempting to slip into Puerto Rico, have contained mixed nationalities. Sailboats account for 40% of the interdicted boats. While the vast majority of interdictions have had less than 50 migrants on board, there have been two cases with more than 250. Many of the Coast Guard cutter’s repatriation trips have consolidated loads in excess of 200 illegal migrants.
Once interdicted and after initial questioning by the INS, the migrants are brought on board the Coast Guard cutter where the INS agents conduct further interviews to determine each individual’s name and home address, date and location of birth, and details of the smuggling attempt. The responses to these questions, as well as any other evidence observed during the boarding, establish the basis for identifying any migrant who appears to have a well-founded fear of persecution and who should not be returned to his or her home country. (Thus far, only two such claims for political asylum have been established.) The Haitians are then repatriated to Haiti on board the cutter.
The return trip requires the care and feeding of up to 400 migrants; the Coast Guard consolidates return trips to Port- au-Prince. The corpsman provides available emergency care; blankets are provided for sleeping on the decks; food is provided; and deck sanitary systems are provided along with an outside shower. The return trip can take up to four days for an interdiction close to Miami.
About half of the interdictions occur north of 23° north latitude, beyond the reach of the deployed cutter. Thus, another resource must make the interdiction and repatriate the migrants. However, the deployed cutter has racked up an impressive record of drug seizures and general law enforcement boardings. The deployed cutter is the only resource always in the vicinity of the heavily traveled Windward Passage.10
The Haitian Migrant Interdiction Operation has slowed the illegal entry of economic migrants, but it has not stopped it. It will continue as long as the economic conditions in Haiti persist. Improved communications will continue to foster emigration as those in the Third World learn of life and conditions in the more economically developed countries. Also, the freedoms U. S. citizens enjoy—
ironically freedoms which are 'n11'10 ately passed on to illegal nl'gr“"‘Lorjal the moment they enter U. S. te ^ waters (prohibiting immediate JLf>a . tion should they be interdicted w three miles of the coast)—will conanj to make the United States the targe ^ destination of the less fortunate- -s solution to Haiti’s economic pro t- ^ found, the Coast Guard will corjlinLs'’|aw humanitarian tradition along with i s enforcement activities.
i /r-OLE/3D
'Commandant, U. S. Coast Guard ^ ^u_
memo 16200 to Secretary of Transporta i° • gust 1981. | from
2Memo for the Assistant Attorney /-jeneraL Larry L. Simms, Deputy Assistant Attorney Office of Legal Counsel, 5 August 198 • p. 'Memo for the Attorney General from c^. ^egal Olson, Assistant Attorney General, Of >ec Counsel, 11 August 1981.
Albid. . tion was
5In large part, the information for this s vjjcd drawn from an excellent historical summary by the Canada Employment and Immigra 1 poem mission, “An Analysis of Haitian ,/vmer'
ments,” February 1980. Also of value was (jated ican Embassy, Port-au-Prince Airgram 0pment on or about 15 June 1983 and the World Dev Report 1985 from the World Bank. blbid. . (A'8)
American Embassy, Port-au-Prince Airgr dated on or about 15 June 1983. ^ (A-8)
"American Embassy, Port-au-Prince A'r£r„ u£ gp- dated on or about 15 June 1983 and t e ^ '•‘The forcement Agency Special Report (SR- ~ (1972"
Haitian Tide—Haitian Alien Smugg inr 1983),“ 19 March 1984.
y“The Haitian Tide.” • deal com[8]
l0Drawn from Commandant (G-OLE) statis efa. pilations of the Haitian Migrant Interdicti tion Program, Fiscal Year 1982 to the Pres
/ Aligns' *9!i6
[1] 6(vitS ^ave formed at least eight 2,000 front, man a‘r assault brigades to suppon stan r* lnc*udlnS one brigade in Afghani- tWo RJheir maneuver units consist ol tap ‘'' ^-equipped airborne assault bat- chutns and tvvo (non-mechanized) para- vice6 mtantry battalions. Combat and ser- eqUi suPPort elements are similarly are as ln ^ airborne division bul of K.ma 'er ln Slze> e-8-< company instead attalion. They have no ASU-85s.
1 oi1nere also are three or four 1,700’ -man airmobile brigades, and an in-
Captain Besch is a U. S. Naval Academy graduate,
Marine infantry officer retired for Vietnam wounds,
and a former CIA intelligence analyst. His military
experience includes two parachute jumps and ten
combat operations in Vietnam. From 1974-83, he
studied foreign armored vehicles at the U. S. Army Foreign Science and Technology Center, and then spent a year as a Defense Intelligence Agency professor of science and technology intelligence. He is now Chief, Asia Branch, U. S. Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center, Washington, DC. The author’s views do not represent official Army, Defense Department, or U. S. Government policies.
[8] u II S. Coast Commander Bond graduated trom the • rce in Guard Academy in 1969 and has a master s He public administration from New York nlV^gg-403) served as executive officer of the Spot ^pB' and as commanding officer ot the C°Pe. . ° pr0ject 95316). He recently served as the Haitm.person^ Officer for the Seventh District. He is now ■ 1 services officer at Coast Guard Hcadqua c •