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up and had to steer their own courses for ship sa^et^onvoy-
shiPs in„> an
UU1C. 1 liau 5C1VCU Willi 111UNI Ul - ~r.
from Boston to Iceland the previous week, and J Jurjng
that
In 1982, when I retired from the Navy, 1 30
going to sea was over for me. I had spent 1 ^ afc' years in the Navy at sea. I commanded a trc
other age and health criteria. This selection ^j°captai,lS
The author, coffee cup in hand, surveys his convoy during Ocean Safari 85. He is one of the few, the proud, the convoy commodores. Although it still lacks a high level of interest within the Navy, the convoy commodore program represents the only active use of a vast manpower resource for wartime—retired line officers.
It was Friday the 13th when my convoy of nine ships was attacked by aircraft and surface combatant ships. We had departed Iceland three days before. The Canadian destroyers did their best to provide protection, but the enemy’s forces were too many. Murmansk run? World War II? No, it was September 1985, and the occasion was a large NATO exercise—Ocean Safari 85. The convoy consisted of Free World merchant ships, and the enemy’s forces were British ships and aircraft, simulating a strong opposition.
On that day, as the weather worsened into a full North Atlantic storm, I was the convoy commodore. We were between Ireland and Scotland, en route to southern England. The convoy was visited by a Krivak-class destroyer and an intelligence ship. They were real Soviets; the five British Canberras approaching us were simulating Soviet attack aircraft. Buccaneer aircraft flew low, in the role of surface-to-surface missiles, and Nimrod aircraft circled overhead in a surveillance mode. All day, we received air raid warnings from the Canadian officer in tactical com-
56
* tire C0»*
make bare steerageway. This slowed the enu ,
The two ships dropped back all night in spite of ajne(j in
to keep the ships of the convoy together. We f,Hv or s°'
communication and gradually, during the next ^ as
were able to form up—arriving at Portland, E o
scheduled on 18 September. co
This was not my first experience as a convoy ^ a
dore. I had served with most of these same
a-half earlier, I had been convoy commodore exercise in the Indian Ocean
stroyer, and a destroyer squadron and enjoye jim,, ment of it. So I was pleased to receive the lette ^gh me to join the convoy commodore program even had known nothing of it before. t j an1111
Retired Navy captains and admirals are seretiree: ally for training as convoy commodores. 1 certa111
have had recent tactical command at sea and niecesS als°
includes recently retired reserve admirals •**— c0lll Those selectees who want to attend the convoy^ ^gjve dore course and accept mobilization assignm^n ^ p\e£ orders to a two-week training course at eit e jn Antisubmarine Warfare Training Center AtlanJ^ ^ vVar folk, or Pacific, in San Diego. In the event
Procei
IS**
edings
be call"HC°UrSe ^ qualify as conv°y commodores could serve ^ t0 act've naval service, with their retired or re- The^11^’ t0 command merchant ship convoys.
!ncludi
an.e assistance. Guest speakers cover the history and
o^S Of COnvm/e mprr>hQnf eKin pKoroptAriefipc tinH
->ov °f convoys, merchant ship characteristics, and t° hriji^Htmodore experiences. These courses are open
N;
avalp^Cers from convoy commodore staff units and
Di,
Th,
lego 0C°!rse ^ affended in August-September 1983 in San
•he Un|!U^1 lbere are about 125 convoy commodores in Mth ^ e States, most of them have nothing more to do follow Program after completing the course. There is no veryfewP or required refresher program, and there are v0yCoat'sea training opportunities. Only about 20 con- lke, | 'll0(Jores have had a chance to go to sea and prac- fhree ,,,ave been one of the fortunate few. Besides the
^°se verv1'^^ °®cers who have spent years of duty act*vitiesy StU^s an(f years commanding major subordinate
la q
S Seaiirv^ *^83,1 was invited by the Commander Mili-
^Command i
n f ^ “ »,«»■* «jr vuum.uuui^ i.. c
.Ceaa tu eet exercise at Diego Garcia in the Indian
------------------------------------- — ^--------------------------
k'« ’rainir
an( he e' Ji
aaltijTln ° w vjaii^ia ta a Liiaiitiign, jiauuig
(h6fe i bo C| P ^ew by commercial airline to Norfolk 6 *“'141 ^ e(f a military aircraft. After a five-hour wait, cParted for Europe, then diverted to McGuire
Hi
national
n]pt„,, eniergency, the officers who successfully com, ete the conrep nn/l i ^
Gaining topics addressed by convoy commodores
- u"t • ,
\ Me hC1Vl ^'rectron and naval control of shipping ^ Cont ant characteristics l C 0 °f shipping communications systems % a Panning, including routing, organization, sail-
- dnd forming
^ Conv^reat *° convoys
nianen at'sea operations, including communications, The enn^’ emergency procedures, and protection antisubC°UrSe *S taught by regular Navy instructors at the Reserv,mar'ne warfare schools, often with some Naval
adV;P~
c°nv,
SerVe r<* anc* Canadian students, as well as to Naval Re otticers
Control of Shipping units.
Serve (^ns'sfed of 7 retired Navy captains, 19 Naval Re- Alth(,. ICers’ ar|d 1 Canadian reserve officer.
events j Sea c°nvoys, I have participated in additional I'lerch'i„.V°'Ve(f with naval control and naval protection of 0fha7t.shippmg. P
eW jnVoj e retired naval officers I have asked, only those pS°ciati VCt* 'n convoy commodore program have any H an H1 a rnobilization task. I have been unable to k^rgen Pro§ram that provides for mobilization or t . y Use of retired Navy line officers. The Navy is Nor y to train Naval Reserve officers to augment H?e f°r r tS ^°r cr's's situations, but apparently has little
on to serve as convoy commodore in a
\yeded ^ exercfse was scheduled for February 1984, eekencj ^ a weekend of refresher training at San Diego, st ^ ^aval ai,nin§ ts common in the convoy commodore f a fs are m '“0ntro* °f Shipping programs because the °r an exanned by Naval Reserve personnel. Preparing The Ra^i'Se becomes their weekend training. c®. JUst ^ °w Reef exercise was a marvelous experi- altij,, ^etting t0 Diego Garcia is a challenge. Starting
Air Force Base in New Jersey. Six hours later, on a different C-141, we departed again for Europe. After stops of two-to-four hours at Torrejon, Spain; Sigonella, Sicily; and Nairobi, Kenya, we arrived at Diego Garcia, some 40 hours in elapsed time after my Baltimore departure.
Diego Garcia is an atoll in the north central Indian Ocean owned by the British and leased to the United States. It is about 15 miles long and 7 miles wide. The enclosed lagoon provides an excellent anchorage for about 14 merchant ships of the Maritime Prepositioning Program, formerly known as the Near-Term Prepositioned Force. These ships are loaded with heavy equipment, which could be used to support a large-scale military operation. They go to sea at least once a month under their own squadron commander and practice formation steaming, which makes them the most experienced merchant ships in the world in convoy procedures. Four times a year, these at-sea exercises are made available to the Naval Control of Shipping Organization and labeled Rainbow Reef. A convoy commodore and Naval Reserve staff, and a Naval Control of Shipping officer and staff conduct these exercises. The ships’ masters and mates are familiar with the signals, formations, and procedures and do not hesitate to inform the convoy commodore of an incorrect move. It is a challenge for the convoy commodore and staff, and a fine opportunity to learn how to control a group of merchant ships at sea. As all convoy commodores have a background of Navy ship experience, the first lesson to be learned is that these are not Navy ships. And the difference between Navy and merchant ships is not trivial.
The weather was fine throughout this exercise. The ships steamed with no problems in the various formations and maneuvers. It was a valuable learning experience.
The briefing I gave the Commander Military Sealift Command was well received and generated an interest in other Navy activities. My briefing generally covered convoy procedures, the prepositioned ships at Diego Garcia, and my specific Rainbow Reef exercise. But questions usually centered on naval protection, which is a separate but related subject, so I did some research on that. Since adjusting my briefing to include naval protection of merchant shipping, I have lectured at many Naval Reserve units and addressed classes taught at Navy schools.
On 8 May 1984,1 lectured at the Master Mariners Readiness Training Course. This was the first of its kind—a one-week pilot course at the U. S. Merchant Marine Academy, Kings Point, New York, for 12 working merchant ship masters. The course provided specialized training in naval requirements for maneuvering in convoy routing procedures, rescue and assistance, underway replenishment, reactivation of mothballed ships, and military communications. The course was sponsored by the Maritime Administration. That pilot course has since been given to U. S. merchant ship masters a number of times. On 13 February 1986, I gave another lecture in the same course at Kings Point.
My report and briefings led to an invitation to participate as a Chief of Naval Operations representative on the formal audit of the Convoy Commodore and Staff Officer Course taught by the Fleet Antisubmarine Warfare Train-
convoy c°n'
r officer <
at
modore and vice commodore with their staffs listen
ations- val in'
van-
As convoy commodore, I gave a short talk on t ^ ous formations and maneuvers we would use, a^-j'0’s internal convoy communications procedures. ^oU)d Commander Standing Naval Force Atlantic.
who
.from
Bos'
of
the schools and in the naval control of shippmg 1
°*ercb“>
S0e
more complex and the merchant snips - , ct\c& more familiar with formation steaming. We Prstati°n zagging and changing stations, as well as
ing centers. This gave me an opportunity to include in this course some of the lessons I had learned from my experiences and from the discussions which always followed my lectures.
The Naval Sea Systems Command (NavSea) had a project which included considerations of various combat systems for naval protection of shipping. My involvement in the convoy commodore program and extension into naval protection of merchant shipping provided the basis from which I developed a scenario that included various requirements for and means of protecting merchant ships in wartime. I contributed the scenario to the NavSea project.
During 1984, the Royal Navy extended an invitation to the U. S. Navy to send a convoy commodore to the British course at HMS Vernon in Portsmouth, England. The British wanted a U. S. convoy commodore with experience in a Rainbow Reef exercise to provide a mutually beneficial dialogue. When asked, I leaped at the opportunity.
Convoy commodore training in the Royal Navy is not as extensive or intensive as it is in the U. S. Navy. The Royal Navy course is three-and-a-half days in duration as compared to ten classroom days in the U. S. Navy. Within the short time available, the Royal Navy course is able to cover only the basic elements of how to run a convoy. The U. S. Navy course includes much more of the background, threat, organization, and procedures of convoys. The Royal Navy course is taught at the Maritime Trade Faculty by a staff of five officers dedicated to teaching naval control of shipping and convoy procedures. There is no similar organization in the U. S. Navy, where naval control of shipping and convoy procedures are taught as additional tasks by the Fleet Antisubmarine Warfare Training Centers. The U. S. Navy piggybacks naval control of shipping on antisubmarine warfare instructors who take the time for preparation and classes “out of hide,” including many weekends. The Royal Navy has dedicated people for this purpose.
A weekend of refresher training for the convoy portion of Ocean Safari 85 was held in Norfolk, Virginia, on 3-4 August. It was an excellent opportunity to review the de-
58
tails of convoying with people who would be invo the Boston-to-Iceland-to-England convoys. The eX^n28 started in Boston with a pre-sail convoy conference August.
ference hosted by the Naval Control of Shipping c- a Coast Guard facility. Masters, chief mates, an _ officers of the convoy ships, the officer in tactica mand and his staff, representatives of each escor _ representatives of associated staffs, and the coaV°J eCj to
presentations on mine countermeasures, communic departure procedures, en route operations, and arri structions. The convoy we were forming would sa> ^ Boston to Iceland. At Iceland, another convoy w° formed to sail to southern England.
be officer in tactical command for the departure fre ton and the first day under way, gave a briefmg ^ anticipated threat to the convoy and his intentions ^ ing protection. The at-sea schedule called for ^ora^cCx in Canadian Fleet with his ships to take over as 0enta- tactical command on our second day at sea. A mP tion tive of the Canadian command gave us some m 1tj0nS' on protection procedures and his commodore sin g^t in The conference followed a formal agenda, as ^octrjne
Weather, which later proved to be the most imp0j^e- considerations, was not covered in the conference' channels swept through simulated minefields- At sea, I formed the convoy in a circular ^ then into rectangular, diamond, and various o ^gC rations. Gradually, the formations and maneuv ^31
keeping in formation. . f0rac°flV°v
Probably the most important consideration ^ ^ KaVj
commodore and staff is patience. With a gr° ujClcly aI1 destroyers at sea, tactical signals are execute
Proceeding8
C^C S^'PS hustle to their stations at high speed. With mer- with • iPS 'n a conv°y the signals must be put out slowly,
ume to look lin thp mpaninff anH Hptprminp thp nrnnpr
av°id ir
a . ; to look up the meaning and determine the proper
Pro°n ^16n st§na^ *s executed, followed by a slow Pen ^ achustment- This can be frustrating for Navy hut understanding the ship control procedures of Pr , 1 nt ships leads to patience and appreciation for the ems of maneuvering these ships.
°ffi 606X1 Commander Canadian Fleet took over as CaCer 'n tactical command, and the Canadian ships be- The6 escort force for the next 21 days of the exercise. e'sew°h*ler P°rces departed to meet requirements
af e Weather was fine when we departed Boston, but in off Kr^a^S ^ started to deteriorate. Along the Grand Banks ^WroundlanH wp had tn rlivprt toward thp past tn
Newf ICehergs- As we transited from Nova Scotia past ula(je0andland, land-based aircraft flying from Canada based Sl.mu^ated air attacks on the convoy. U. S. carrier- Piilesaircraft from the Navy battle group several hundred to the southeast often overflew the convoy.
Subrt^ Pract'ccd emergency turns and evaded an exercise Werearine- However, by the fourth day the sea conditions 'n8 H° ^ ^at t*ie smah ships had difficulty maneuver- an(j’ winds and heavy seas forced the convoy to slow ePtb °, Steer courses into the seas. I felt fortunate to be rode 'n a large> comfortable merchant ship, which n)erc^e^ eycn in heavy seas. At night, the smallest of the com ant S^'PS dropped back, and the officer in tactical than^and and I decided to keep the convoy together rather only ?C'are the small ship a straggler. The convoy made about two knots good until the weather improved. Iceiar®e SeParate storms hit the convoy before we reached c0nvn ' ^ach time, the smallest ship dropped astern, the Weat^ s^°wed to a crawl, and we hung on until the ileau,er improved. The convoy experienced sea state 6, feet w°u Sca'e *n each of the storms. Seas were 30 to 40 Smai] wtnd speeds up to 60 knots, and the master of the fwest merchant ship reported 50-degree rolls, fr^nsit Ser'ous medical problems developed during our do\vnto Iceland. A crewman in one merchant ship came Ulan in^ 3 severe case °f pneumonia, and, later, a crew- had to , anot^er ship developed acute appendicitis. Each rn°nia6 rernovcd from his ship by helicopter. The pneu- the f*atlent was in critical condition and was treated by append' °r.on hoard a Canadian Armed Forces ship. The crease(j1Cltls case was put on board a destroyer for an in- helico tsPeec^ mn toward the north and then a long-range ^rvivT tr'f 'nt0 a hospital at Iceland. Both crewmen On 7 because of outstanding attention by Canadians, "'as at September, during a period of decent weather, I sUrvej]i Unch when the bridge called to report a Soviet time t03nce aircraft. I bolted up five levels of ladders in fiear ci *re a Soviet Bear, just below the cloud layer. The sky cle<f the convoy and disappeared into the overcast
Cobtniod ° fer'°^s °f 24 hours each, I turned the convoy hill] an(j °re duties over to the vice commodore to give also „ "ls staff the experience of running the convoy. It e fny staff and me a little more rest. I knew that on
the next convoy, from Iceland to England, I would be vice commodore, and I hoped the convoy commodore would reciprocate.
The convoy had consisted of four ships when we departed Boston, and the next day Commander Canadian Fleet brought an underway replenishment ship with him. A few days later, two large merchant ships joined, and the next day another, so that there were eight ships in the convoy as we arrived at Iceland on 9 September. We entered a fjord at Hvalfjordhur with the last ship anchoring just before midnight. The port information book included little about the fjord. Of 41 detailed headings grouped under general information, logistics, port facilities, and navigational information, 29 were covered by “information not available.” It was interesting that, according to the port information book, Hvalfjordhur was pronounced “kwoffewda.” The next question was how do you pronounce “kwoffewda?”
At Iceland the next morning, we met in a steel building near a fuel pier for the “hot wash up” meeting of the Boston-to-Iceland convoy. After discussing the convoy and what could have been improved, we took a short break and reassembled for the pre-sail conference of the Iceland- to-England convoy. The same ships participated, along with a small Norwegian freighter, bringing the total to nine ships. They carried the flags of the United States, Canada, Great Britain, Germany, and, now, Norway. Similar to the pre-sail conference at Boston, the Iceland meeting followed a formal agenda according to doctrine. A Canadian commodore took over as convoy commodore, and I became vice commodore. After the pre-sail conference we departed Hvalfjordhur under gray skies, met our Canadian escorts, and formed the convoy en route to southern England.
Today’s convoys rely too heavily on VHF voice radio communication, but sometimes revert to the World War I and II use of signal flags as did this Navy crew member on the author’s ship during Ocean Safari 85.
Again, we exercised convoy fundamentals, including various random formations. The weather was nice the first few days, and there were no exercise attacks from our simulated enemy.
I suppose I have always been a little superstitious, but that did not come to mind when the convoy commodore duties were turned over to me on Friday the 13th. However, as I mentioned earlier, a Soviet destroyer visited the convoy, along with a Soviet intelligence ship and waves of British aircraft conducting simulated attacks on the convoy. By 14 September, the weather was similar to the storms we encountered en route to Iceland. The small Norwegian ship had serious problems keeping station in heavy weather. Again, the convoy had to slow, making little to no speed, and wait for better weather. We considered de-
Convoy to Casablanca
" ’ll
last goddamned walk you xoected take. As an officer, you’re exp to move ahead.” , ^ue
This pretty well took care o Army, and it certainly awaken ^ conference. Then he said:
Rear Admiral Cooper graduated from the Naval Academy with the Class of 1927 and, following service afloat in a battleship, two cruisers, and three destroyers, was assigned in June 1940 to the NROTC unit at Harvard. Immediately after Pearl Harbor, he assumed command of the USS Palmer (DMS-5) which ultimately joined the convoy that participated in the assault and occupation of Fedhala-Casablanca, Morocco, from 8 to 11 November 1942. The following was adapted from the nine interviews (1973-74) that John T.
Mason, Jr., conducted with Admiral Cooper.
On a Saturday morning in October 1942, the commanding officers and communications officers were summoned to the Army base at Norfolk and, for the first time, learned that we were going to Casablanca. Our beachhead was to be at a place called Fed- hala, a few miles northwest of Casablanca. The briefing went on for four or five hours, as we discussed the various annexes of the operation order and plan. After the first shock of hearing where we were going had passed, the proceedings had become quite dull. We had just finished discussing the graves registration detail, as I remember, when an Army officer wearing pistols and with a rather high falsetto voice got up and really brought the conference back to life. I found out later that this was Major General George S. Patton. While none of us in the Navy had ever heard of him before, the Army officers present knew who he was.
By one trick or another, he brought the thing into full perspective. He was asked whether he wanted to make these landings during daylight or darkness.
He said during darkness, because if the troops ever saw the beaches they’d never want to land. He also said, in jest I’m sure, “I’m under no illusion that the Goddamned Navy will get us within 100 miles of the beach or within a week of the date set for landing.”
Our landing force commander assured him that he would be put on the beach at the time and location indicated in the plan. He said, “It doesn’t matter, put us on Africa, we’ll walk.”
He then passed on some information particularly to the junior Army officers. He said:
“Now, if you have any doubts as to what you’re to do, I can put it very simply. The idea is to move ahead. You usually will know where the front is by the sound of gunfire, and that’s the direction you should proceed. Now, suppose you lose a hand or an ear is shot off, or perhaps a piece of your nose, and you think you should walk back to get first aid; if I see you, it will be the
‘I have
piece of information for the When you get back to your s k^rs please assemble your crews a pj, and read annex so-and-so, slire
so-and-so, signed by me. Ma ^eifl that everyone hears this and e that it means what it says. Q find We couldn’t wait to get aC „ to out what he wanted to pass a,^e the Navy and to everyone e s ■ ^
instruction read: “Any Amen ^orlian viceman molesting a M°roCpatton. will be shot.” Signed G. 6- eX_
It was interesting to watc ^
pressions on the faces of the ^ members as this was read jnfre
There was a little bit of a s , ,()0(j it-
ranks, but they certainly un ^owev61’ So far as we were concerned vVfi it had little application becau didn’t have liberty ashore t ^
By comparison, Rear A n ^ say Kent Hewitt had almost n0*f prelirn>' at the briefing, except for v calTieO nary remarks. Our briefing ander- on by the landing force co sve
rin a nassaee to Casablan
Proceedings
personnel ran my merchant ship.
0Ur final day at sea, as the convoy entered the south-
On
west
call‘^FrC)aCkes to the English Channel (which the British or,f SwaPPs”), British and Dutch ships and British air-
wdrt r~ ’
C 'n8 the two smallest and slowest ships to proceed CQUta through the Irish Sea, while the remainder of the ever t0 Prcscr'hcd track west of Ireland. How-
eetu’ Fecausc it was judged more important to stay to- er, we all rode out the storm. sj. §ain> I was fortunate to be in a large, comfortable 'P- Tonnage is misleading, but the merchant ship I rode ahout the size of an Iowa (BB-61)-class battleship.
Wever, while the Iowa carries a crew of about 1,500 men, 26 eon ant* sui5mar*nes conducted simulated attacks on the cal ^ater> ’n heavy fog, the Canadian officer in tacti- rtlinC°mmand passed control of the convoy to British anc^epers which guided us through safe channels to cult °ra^e areas °ff Portland, England. Boating was diffi- staffln t'le heavy chop, and it was after midnight when my Bin ,and * arrived at the hot wash-up meeting ashore at mleaves, Portland Harbor. e hot wash-up meeting marked the end of a long, rough transit for the convoy ships, and so the gathering took on a festive air. British, American, Canadian, German, and Norwegian seagoing officers enjoyed the refreshments provided by the Royal Navy.
There is always paperwork associated with fleet exercises, and Ocean Safari 85 was no exception. I submitted a report to the NATO command and another to the U. S. Navy, making the following recommendations to improve convoy procedures:
► Tactical Communications: In World Wars I and II, convoys used various visual methods as primary tactical communications, including flashing lights, colored lights, signal flags, and shapes. Since World War II, the bridge-to-bridge very high frequency (VHF) voice radio has become the primary means of communicating among merchant ships, just as truckers use the citizens band radio on our highways. The visual signals became secondary systems. Because modern merchant ships are so large and need dispersal as a means of protection, we have separated the ships from the former few hundred yards to the current few miles. This increased distance among ships—plus the obstructed views, scarcity of personnel, and lack of famil-
By Rear Admiral Joshua W. Cooper, U. S. Navy (Retired)
•Hander; .
(BB-3-2 *n tae °'d battleship Arkansas the fn ’ wh'ch rode in the center of by rrnation. The admiral talked to us CVery 24 rac*'0, * think, 18 hours out of niande4 ta,^ed t0 the screen com- scree,/’ Var*ous members of the oUs c ’ an<f others. There were numer- tive °ntacts> and he would take an ac- Was n^d 'n their development. This tJiuci) , 80()d procedure. There was too
voice r (ftter Were new t0 t*le vel0p ^i<ai0’ and it took us time to defer lSc'Phne and proper procedures Where US6' ^ had skip-distance vagaries Versatj SOlIlet’mes you could hear con- a\vay ?ns a couple of thousand miles c°nsi’t 0ud and clear- This wouldn’t be Suhrnarent’ ^Ut certainly the outlying attach f*neS W0Ldd be assisted in their Unde°rn,ation by this sort of chatter. Iem f0rrWa-’ fcplcnishment was a prob- C°Ukln’tUS' F°r exanlPlc’ my ship 'tig. ,mahe the trip without refuel- *’ve nwhen our time came to refuel &eeir Sger Seen a rougher day. With 't'e C]0sas coming over the forecastle hty ver,C dle oder and hooked up for Vvhich l lfSt evo'ut'°n of that kind for Alters ni'naS resP°nsible. I’d watched Ur,dersta h °^’ ^ut y°u don’t really 0,1 Vou d untd the whole'burden is 1?at'on a .1S’ °h course, involves organ- l<)h)re u *ots °f signals which here- and ,i-,1CCn managcd by flag sig- 'hat sort of thing. With our new toy, the voice radio, it took us time to develop proper discipline.
One highlight, as I recall, was that the USS Palmer (DMS-5), as the flagship of the squadron commander for minesweeping efforts, was in the van of the formation and made the first landfall on the coast of Africa. At about midnight of the day before the landing day, far out in the distance, we could see one light which went off abruptly, perhaps two hours before we had gotten to a beachhead position. At about this time, our formation was directed to sweep ahead of the transports, and we rigged for all three types of minesweeping—mechanical, electrical, and acoustic. We felt very confident but found no mines.
I thought we had been sweeping for about 20 minutes when a young engineer asked me when we were going to start sweeping. So far as magnetic mines were concerned we hadn’t been doing anything because the proper switches on his control panel in the engineroom had not been thrown.
Realizing that the squadron commander was on the other side of the bridge, I grabbed him by the throat to prevent any further speech and led him quickly off the side and said, “Get the hell down there and get the magnetic tail activated.” I felt it might upset the squadron commander a great deal to discover he hadn’t been sweeping all this time.
Everything went quite well until about 0600, when there was a burst of gunfire from the beach and the signal— “play ball!” (i.e., “release your guns”)—was transmitted over all of our circuits. Suddenly, there was a great deal of noise, particularly from those whose principal function was to provide gunfire support. This went on sporadically throughout the first landing.
We got a lot of people ashore in the first landing, but we left a good many of the boats there, too. It was the first large landing we had made, and we learned a great many things that would help us later. There was a very bad following sea, which upset a lot of the boats about the time they hit the beach.
It was fairly quiet during the forenoon, which our squadron commander exploited to determine if any mines were close to shore. This was done to develop a safe anchorage for various ships. We were developing this area when we discovered a shore battery at point-blank range, about 3,000 yards, following us very methodically.
Since the shore battery wasn’t shooting at us, we kept creeping along, getting a little closer to it all the time, with our own fire-control officer calling down warnings to the effect that he was practically looking down the
iarity with visual methods—have made all visual means of communications impractical. We now have a usable primary system, the VHF voice radio, but no secondary means of tactical communications. The VHF voice radio is easy for an enemy to exploit. Often, we encounter interference from other ships or fishermen. The VHF voice radio should be relegated to a secondary status, and new technology should provide a primary tactical communications system for convoys. The new system might be electromagnetic or laser. It could be digital, burst transmission, or data stream. It should have a low probability of intercept and should be portable.
► Formations: Past convoys and convoy exercises have used the broad front rectangular formations developed during World Wars I and II. The threat then was the diesel- electric submarine, which generally used a tactic of positioning ahead of the convoy, letting the convoy run over her submerged position, and firing torpedoes as the target merchant ships passed. The broad front rectangular formation was designed to minimize the targets presented to the submarine. Today’s threat submarine has much more endurance and mobility and more sophisticated torpedoes.
The merchant ships are larger, faster, less maneuvera ^ and must be spaced further apart. New formations been developed which are more flexible, provide protection, and allow more maneuverability. These formations should become part of our convoy d°c r .fl
- Convoy Composition: Existing doctrine, learne ^ World Wars I and II, provides for forming convoy ^ slow, medium, or fast, based on the merchant ships ^ dared speeds. There are other important factors, s ^ the ships’ capability to proceed in heavy weather. ^ ships have to make more speed because of engine yP a the need to maintain control. The grouping of s 'Ps. convoy should take these considerations into acco ^
- Naval Liaison Officers: Masters and mates are n t() miliar with convoy procedures and cannot be expec j be. In Ocean Safari 85, each merchant ship had a liaison officer (NLO) provided by his country, ^eS proved quite valuable. In many cases, masters an ^ do not pass along information on convoy procedu ’ £S_ have language problems. The NLO can provide t e ^ ^ sary information to help the mates on watch. A P ^ NLOs should be established. They probably s 0
Proceeding8
Va reservists, and perhaps they could be members of on h°^ cornmod°re staff units, to provide officers to go su n°art? merchant ships in convoy. There should be one e ■ ° lcer Per ship, familiar with convoy procedures and - PPed with the portable communications system rec-
k fended earlier. r Escort-
cort: The Boston-Iceland-United Kingdom convoys
oean Safari 85 received excellent escort services, pn-
S. Navy has appar- cting the sea lines of ited. The U. S. Navy ant shipping nor is it stro schools. The commanding officer of a Navy de-
nia i aidU receivea excellent escort service entl* ^ ^r°m t^lc Canadians. The U. S. Navy has appar-
a°r°gated its basic task of protecting the sea lines of
comm,-- ■ 6
does Unical'on- The doctrine is outdated. The U. S. Navy tau ,not Practice protection of merchant shipping nor is it
t St Schools Thp pnmmanHino r\ffir*F»r nf Maw Hp.-
tactical
r or frigate could very well find himself as officer in
command of a convoy, a role for which he is not
an<d has no documentation or background on of nto rely- The Navy should recognize the importance resouVal Protection of shipping, organize for it, dedicate nava]rCeS ’ anc^ tra'n in an(J develop procedures for modem ing Pr°tection of shipping. This should include convoy- i as WeH as other means of protection.
ISceIlaneous: Other recommendations include consid
erations of maneuvering a convoy under conditions of restrictive electronic emissions, the function of preparing the sailing folders for each ship, pre-exercise in-port training, and the equipment needed by a convoy commodore and staff at sea.
As one of the most active retired officers in the convoy commodore program, I have become an experienced convoy commodore. It is not a crowded field.
Perhaps we will never need convoy commodores in a real global conflict. I certainly hope not, but in case we do, the program deserves the best we can give it. Thousands of retired Navy people could provide worthwhile experience to the active forces in a crisis. There should be more programs that make use of the background and experience of these retired personnel.
Captain Landersman has commanded a frigate, destroyer, destroyer squadron, and tactical training group. He was a member of the first Strategic Studies Group at the Naval War College, and has written for the Proceedings in the past. He is currently employed by the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory in San Diego, California.
down our mainmast. Miracu-
loi
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e . teH- Ironically, the only
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ln ^asahi°ne ^ h1’1165 that I know of 0vvn minanca Was from some that our
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hea^ a ^Un barrels. Suddenly, we WhiCh VeT *0U(1 crack- The first shot, judged to be a French 75- Was ju..etlt through a trash can that took a • our galley- Later, we c°°k s-^IctUre °f two men, one a ship’s anci^u'H^ on one s'de °f the trash stan<jin *ae °ther man, a fireman, the shof a*30ut where they were when Wasn’t l535561! through. Fortunately, it Becan explosive shell.
S° freemSe We ^ad l°st fuel-oil suction °n putt- ently I could not take a chance sUtge ■ n§ to° much of a demand for a "to cou,;^, although I wanted all Which w g6t' * ran8 UP "full speed,” started Tu-JUst enough to get us next skls seemed to do because the ‘tod t0ok ?10ved about 50 feet astern
The th- ?,ne was hit. ship, "o shot went just abaft the
^ktyttien ','ously the French ar- toeot, ana 'utl gotten a single adjust- Thisthey fired three fast ones. i'^CePinJ)f1^etet' our elose-in mine- e<lha|a r,°t Ihe day, and we reported aS Wa . arbor clear nf minpc cn far
min?!. lrom some lnat c tied an ,a^ers laid to make a pro- pSPitul sh °ra8e■ Later on, a Canadian °Ur en,>12*®nored a warning of one ^d'ng ships, the USS Auk (AM-3), and sailed through and set off a couple of them.
The Casablanca landings and those at Oran as well were well-kept secrets. I don’t know anybody who knew anything about them except the planners in the higher echelons.
About the equivalent of an Army division landed. 1 suppose the convoy numbered some 30 or 40 transports.
We had several squadrons of escorting ships. The principal escorts were the new destroyers. At that time, I was very envious of those because I had been promised a new ship some time before and had been told that in due course I would get one. Besides the battleships Arkansas (BB-33) and the Massachusetts (BB-59), we had some of the small carriers and new cruisers. However, they were not in our formation. They were some distance from us. They arrived at about the same time we did, though.
It wasn’t like the traditional landing which we developed pretty much as a power play both at Normandy and in the numerous ones in the Pacific. In these operations at D minus so-and-so many days we’d start our reconnoiter- ing work, reconnaissance work, and then at about D minus four we’d start softening up the landing area with air attacks and heavy artillery at prearranged targets. In theory, at least, our
troops then could land with minimum obstruction and minimum opposition.
In North Africa, our enemy just wasn’t well defined. We didn’t know how to treat him except to stand off at the ready and to fire only if fired upon, and that was exactly what we did at Casablanca. There were some tense moments. For example, we knew the French battleship Jean Bart was there and when she cut loose our ship happened to be rather close to the Augusta (CA-13), which was Admiral Hewitt’s flagship. I certainly was impressed with the height of those splashes that resulted from the Jean Bart's shells. However, after an exchange participated in by the new Massachusetts and the cruisers, the Jean Bart was reduced to silence. It was at about that time that the French decided that this phase had gone on long enough and called it quits. I guess, after sufficient bloodletting, French honor was assuaged. There was a joint ceremony attended by the senior French officers, General Patton, Admiral Hewitt, and many more. Then we were friends, or at least we weren’t shooting at each other.
Shortly after Casablanca was secured, my ship, together with the rest in what was then called Mine Squadron Seven, was attached to the Moroccan Sea Frontier.