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During a freeze on new foreign military purchases, Venezuela took delivery in January 1985 of the tank landing ship Gdajira, the last of four ordered from Korea-Tacoma Maritime Industries.
U. S.-trained “Lightning Battalion” to its Nicaraguan border.
The Caribbean: Cuba remains a principal exporter of revolution. The island provides training and sustenance for numerous revolutionary movements. Cuban proteges are particularly active in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Colombia. The 1985 Cuban defense budget showed a 26% increase over the previous year, and during 1985, the Soviet Navy made its 25th task force deployment to Cuba since 1969. Major additions to the Cuban Navy included four Stenka-class patrol boats and two Sonya-class minesweepers from the Soviet Union.
The last contingent of the Caribbean peace-keeping force was withdrawn from Grenada. The Bahamas ordered three 33-meter Protector-class fast patrol boats from Britain. The Royal Bahamas Defence Force has seven medium-sized patrol craft and numerous smaller ones. In 1980, one of their units, the Flamingo, was sunk by Cuban aircraft. Antigua held joint maneuvers with Jamaican and Barbadian troops at St. Lucia in September. Belize, formerly British Honduras, is seeking a stronger British defense commitment to balance threats from Guatemala. Britain maintains a 600-man force in Belize and a frigate pays regular visits.
Venezuela: Venezuela is one of the few strong democracies in the Caribbean. In spite of its wealth of natural resources, Venezuela, too, is plagued by economic problems. On 1 October, Venezuela, acting through Petroleos de Venezuela, assumed the administration of the refinery in Curacao to prevent the bankruptcy of that Caribbean Island. Two weeks later, Venezuelan President Jaime Lusinchi declared, “Venezuela has a Caribbean responsibility and an Atlantic responsibility that we have to affirm. We are a Caribbean power.” Owing to an economic crisis at the beginning of his administration (February 1984), President Lusinchi ordered the military to freeze all foreign purchases for two-and-a-half years. Thus, no new orders have been placed. The military was instructed to emphasize preparedness.
Venezuela continues to suffer border incursions by M-19 guerrillas operating from Colombia, smugglers, drug runners, and Colombian forces, frequently in hot pursuit of guerrillas. The Venezuelan Government accelerated its program to reinforce the frontiers. In February 1985, the navy inaugurated a minor riverine base at El Amparo on the Arauca River on the Colombian border. Two U. S.- built utility landing craft and 36 patrol and service craft were assigned to the river squadron. In October, Venezuela established a small naval air base on La Orchila Island, about 100 miles offshore. Naval air fields will be constructed at Castilletes on the Gulf of Venezuela and on La Blanquilla Island.
In January 1985, the last two of four tank landing ships ordered from Korea- Tacoma Maritime Industries arrived >n Venezuela. Late in the year, the logistics support ship Puerto Cabello (eX_ merchant ship Siena Nevada) entered set vice. The navy announced that the sut> marine Picua (Guppy H-class), the land' ing ship tank Amazonas (Terrebone Parish-class), and the six Constituent’1' class patrol boats will be modernized t° extend their service lives; no details were provided. Also, the marine corps has contracted to have 11 LVT (tracked lan ing vehicle)-7s upgraded to A-l mode s- The coast guard frigates Almirante Cu mente and General Moran became opera tional in early 1986 after an extensNf overhaul and conversion in Italy to ot shore patrol vessels.
The Venezuelan Navy conducted nU merous exercises in 1985. Combine1 amphibious exercises were conducted by U. S. and Venezuelan marines in Jurie during UNITAS 26. For the third consecutive year, the Brazilian and Venezuela11 navies conducted the Venebras exercise’ this year off the coast of Brazil.
Dr. Scheina has traveled extensively in Latin An> ica and been published in many Latin and Europ1^ publications on Latin American topics. His book, Latin American Naval Power, 1810-* will be published by the Naval Institute Press.
took six years from keel-laying to launc A major German yard, Th>'sS^ Nordseewerke, was saved from ha ruptcy by a credit guarantee by the 5
of Lower Saxony; it had received no
the end of 1984. no new orders for
The most important single factor in European naval development continues to be economic. Western Europe is clearly recovering from recession, but this recovery has been relatively sluggish. As a result, defense spending has been limited, and the announced NATO goal of 3% real growth generally has not been met; in some cases there has been a real decline.
This situation has been complicated by two factors. First, the depression in merchant shipbuilding has continued. The prices of merchant ships have continued to fall (which is why the U. S. Navy has been able to buy so many for the Ready Reserve Force). Consequently, European governments have let naval contracts to save yards. Because these yards have so little other work, the naval contracts have had to absorb very high overhead rates, with consequent inflation of naval building costs and reductions or stretch-outs of overall programs. The Dutch Walrus- class submarine program is probably the most prominent example; the lead boat
mef'
chant ship orders since January This occurred despite a full naval ot book, including submarines for Arg tina and Norway, and the moderniza of German Type-206 submarines.
Nor could any of the builders look much confidence to the export market\
j**es had been placed since the Turkish "ifcKO-200 order, some years earlier. * he only hopeful news was a Pakistani etter of intent for three modified Type's. to be built by British Shipbuilders. s long ago as 1982, a French market survey concluded that 60% of the world’s
navies could not afford new ships; 20% could be eliminated for political reasons, he tightness of the market made for in- ense competition, as in the Australian submarine program, now limited to the Wedish Kockums yard and Germany’s ‘ QWaldtswerke. Moreover, the tradi- honal European builders face new com- Pctitors, such as South Korea, which reportedly offered its HDF-2000 frigate to Greece.
. ^he second major complicating factor js increasing NATO emphasis on main- ain|ng a robust conventional land de- er|se in Europe. Given very tight bud- ®ets> there are intense pressures to eniPhasize land and land-based tactical air forces rather than naval forces. A Str°ng conventional land defense is an aPpealing way of raising the nuclear threshold, thereby limiting the destructiveness of a European war. Paradoxically, however, success in this direction would probably lead to a protracted conventional war, in which NATO’s ability to maintain sea control would be crucial. Thus, the naval cuts used to finance the improved land forces might well cause eventual military failure.
France offers perhaps the best proof of these connections. The only European power to rely almost entirely on nuclear deterrence, France can accept some limitations of its conventional land and air forces. On the other hand, France retains a singular ancillary mission: defense of many of her current and former colonies. Thus, the French Government values naval forces for its projection capability, and (at least as of February 1986) seemed willing to increase its share of the overall NATO defense budget.
If this continues, it will be a radical development: Historically, France has been primarily a land power, albeit with a substantial fleet. Britain, the traditional European sea power, has generally adopted the idea of stronger conventional defense in Europe, and it seems likely that the Royal Navy will resume its post- 1945 decline after a brief Falklands- inspired hiatus.
Several multinational projects are under way. The two most important are probably the NATO Frigate (NFR-90) and the European Fighter Aircraft (EFA). The eight frigate partners are committed to build at least a prototype by 1992. This ship, probably best described as a large destroyer in today’s terms, is therefore a natural candidate for the programs of the 1990s, for example the second or third series of Canadian patrol frigates, a British Type-21 or Type-42 successor, and the successor to the German missile destroyers of the U. S.-built Charles F. Adams (DDG-2) class. However, many of the participants in the NFR-90 program are also maintaining parallel national programs. Britain, for example, may prefer the Type-23 or some derivative. Germany is still proceeding with design work on its Type-124 air defense frigate. Indeed, the MEKO-360 Mod-3
displayed by Blohm & Voss at the U. S. Navy League exhibition in April 1985 reportedly reflects that company’s Type- 124 ideas.
From a naval point of view, the European Fighter Aircraft project is important for two reasons. First, it will probably be the only major fighter development program to be undertaken by its four major participants—Britain, Germany, Italy, and Spain—over the next five to ten years. It will therefore compete with any Sea Harrier successor for scarce funds (and talent). In December 1985, France unveiled its own new tactical aircraft, the Dassault-Breguet Rafale, although it will try to share in some of the EFA program. The EFA is a heavy, twin-engined interceptor; the Rafale is a Jaguar (fighter- bomber) replacement. It is important to the future of French naval aviation that a naval version of the Rafale will probably replace both the Super Etendard attack bomber and the Crusader interceptor. Should France abandon the Rafale in favor of the EFA, this option would disappear, since the EFA would probably be too heavy for the small French carriers.
F/A-18s might be the only alternative.
There are also two multinational helicopter programs, the Westland-Aeritalia EH-101 and the embryonic NATO NH-90, the latter to develop both army and navy variants. One of the two EH-101 partners, Westland Helicopters, was reported near financial failure in 1985; it may be unable to continue development of the new helicopter.
No European power appears willing to finance a new area defense antiaircraft missile. The implicit argument appears to be that area defense against the most important future threat, the high-speed sea-skimmer, is virtually impossible. The most ambitious project is probably the NATO local area missile system, which is associated with the NFR-90 program. In theory, it should enable ships up to ten kilometers apart to support each other. Even this range may be difficult to achieve if the missile is to counter extremely fast (Mach 3) sea-skimmers. Area defense against a short-range, very high speed missile would probably be impossible almost by definition. The key question is whether this threat is the most such expectations.) Certainly, any very short range defensive weapon had better be relatively inexpensive, since it must be deployed on board nearly every ship. In this connection, the British decided to arm their auxiliaries and intend to build a new class of replenishment oilers which will carry the new vertically launched Seawolf point defense missile.
The other major weapon issue concerns antisubmarine warfare. As more navies adopt towed array sonars, the weapon of choice is increasingly likely to be the air-delivered, lightweight antisubmarine torpedo—most likely the U. S- Mark-46 or -50, the British Stingray, °r the new French Murene. France is already developing a long-range (first convergence zone) successor to the current Malafon torpedo-delivering missile (a functional equivalent to the U. S. antisubmarine rocket [ASROC]).
The question is whether any small torpedo can deal with a large submarine- The British Stingray lightweight torpedo was reported to have completely destroyed the decommissioned submarine Porpoise, at a depth of about 100 feet, in
One of the very few nations to pursue a nuclear-powered naval capability, France has, and is building, nuclear submarines like the attack sub Rubis and will build 34,000-ton, nuclear-powered carriers to replace the conventional carriers Clemenceau and Foch (above).
likely, or the most important.
Proponents of the short-range defensive missile seem to assume that such systems will be extremely compact. If it is assumed that they are the only viable future defensive missile systems, then it is no longer necessary to build large and expensive area defense missile ships. (The account of the SAAM project in the section on France suggests the nature of a test late in 1985. The submarine w:lS originally refitted as a Spearfish (heavy torpedo) target.
Britain: From a U. S. point of view’ perhaps the most important British fense development of 1985 is the nf centralized staff, in which a single m> tary officer mediates between the servic and the civil government. A similar ar rangement, described as a much streng
i
®ned chairman of the Joint Chiefs of ... > >s under active discussion in the mted States. Early reports suggest that e British experiment has been unsuccessful. Costs have not been cut; effi- Cle"cy has not really improved.
The new central staff provides another urdle for projects that the government of ,,e day may wish to kill. For example, ® minister of defence was able to stop j ^te on replacements for the two Brit,? amPhibious ships by announcing that e question was being studied by the entral staff. Lobbying was thus halted in ^or of what could be described as an of biased’ objective evaluation. Veterans o^U. S. budget process may find all th' tb'S unPleasant,y familiar. Certainly s type of systems analysis has served t,aVles very poorly in the past; the further ee analysis is from operational experi- the less realistic it becomes, he Royal Navy finds itself squeezed tveen zero-growth (or negative real 0-*) future budgets and the rising cost the new Trident strategic submarine. 0r example, in January 1985, the British bu°yern,nent announced that the 1985-86 8et would show a 2.8% increase over l> 4~85 (excluding Falklands costs), ^owever, budgets from 1986 onward - °u d show zero growth in the general 1Ce mdex, which (depending ujxm the Ual rate 0f inf|ation in defense goods) All d ec*uatc to a cut. For example, the 'Tarty Defence Committee of the r °ase °f Commons predicted a loss in . a terms of 0.5% in 1986-87 and 0.7%
,n 1987-88.
Ro VCn *n 1985, *e Royal Navy and abo 3 Torce had budget overruns of unUt.5 million each. Causes included ealistic estimates of the currency ex- ]ar.n8e rate (particularly against the dol- Sin^. and underestimates of inflation. A f(^1,ar situation led to the 1981 Nott De- na(°e Review, which called for the elimi- °Us°f *e Bf'tish carrier and amphibian °rces. At that time, Trident, the °D1 KexPens>ve British program, was th/^mg considered. Now it is a reality; and 'uSt suhmarine is under construction SeeSa°uld be delivered in the 1990s. It r*8 unlikely that the British Govem- t0W'B cut land and tactical air forces gay for this strategic system, of cuts appear to include limitation an(j oal keeper close-in weapon system lhat nim- Barden gun production, so ,thre0n'y six of a required 26 Goalkeepers area ® Per carrier, and one each for five an(j defense missile ships, ten Batch-2s, The ■ ee Type-22s) are to be acquired. 3q ln’lial production order for 25 cen 1,1 • gun mountings is to be can> although the two prototypes will
lngs / March 1986
The Royal Navy Sea Harrier—shown firing a Sea Eagle antiship missile— will be the first European aircraft to carry AMRAAMs (advanced medium-range antiair missiles).
still be made. There are also indications that planned Type-23 frigate and Type- 2400 diesel electric submarine orders will be delayed.
The result both of Trident and of nearterm cuts is likely to be a declining British general-purpose naval capability, though force levels will remain high for years. Thus, the current government will not renounce its NATO pledge to maintain 50 destroyers and frigates for Atlantic operations. (There will be 50 in service in 1985-86.) Critics have argued that this is little better than the 42 active and eight standby ships announced in the 1981 Defence Review, particularly since the reduced manpower levels announced in that review will apparently be allowed to stand. There have also been subtler cuts: It now appears that four, rather than the announced six, underway replenishment ships are to be built.
Late in 1985 it appeared that the cuts would also be made in naval infrastructure, including the British naval design organization. Many of the cuts are subtle, but they may have important operational consequences. One example (to be discussed further) is the decision to provide only two air groups for the three aircraft carriers.
No account of British naval power can exclude the planned wartime role of merchant ships; British policy in this respect was graphically illustrated in the Falklands Conflict, when ships taken up from trade (STUFT) constituted the bulk of the task force. Unfortunately, the British-flag merchant fleet is rapidly shrinking and mobilization planning may become less and less supportable. For example, in the past, the Royal Navy depended on the British fishing fleet to provide the bulk of its minesweepers; fishing trawlers, with their powerful winches, were considered particularly valuable. Five were taken up from trade for the Falklands. Now this trade is declining, and many trawlers have transferred to more lucrative oil field support tasks, for which they no longer need the winches so important for sweeping. The British Government is attempting to convince owners to retain this gear.
The Royal Navy hopes to build only 15 Hunt-class minesweeper/minehunters, 12 River-class deep-water minesweepers, and a few of the new single-role mine- hunters. In wartime, it expects to mobilize another 100 craft, 80 of which would have to put to sea within a week. At least two roll-on/roll-off ferries would become command and support vessels or minelayers for this force. Remarkably, conversion actually can be done very quickly; Two stem trawlers were able to join this year’s Ocean Safari exercise within five days. However, if the trawler fleet is lost, the burden of wartime sweeping must fall on a fleet bought and maintained in peacetime, at a level of expense which might prohibit the maintenance of other vital types, such as frigates or carriers. This is not a new choice; it led to the wholesale abandonment of the British minesweeper program of the early 1950s—when Britain had a much larger fishing fleet.
On 25 August, the order for the first British single-role minehunter, the San- down, was announced. It will be built by Vosper Thomycroft and is to cost about 25% less than a Hunt-class sweeper/ hunter. Built of single-skin glass-reinforced plastic, she will displace about 450 tons and will be equipped with the new 2093 minehunting sonar and two mine disposal vehicles, possibly of a new deep diving type. (The Sandown is to operate to the edge of the continental shelf.) Vectored thrust propellers, a bow thruster, and an automatic ship positioning system will allow the ship to maintain station near a mine against wind and tide.
Interest in the other side of mine warfare may be reviving. No new British mines have been made since 1945, but British Aerospace is to modernize existing stocks by installing new solid-state electronics. New “continental shelf’ and possibly rising mines are to be developed; the private-venture Stonefish mine may be manufactured in quantity.
The new Trident submarines will be the largest ever built in Western Europe, displacing 15,000 tons submerged. Because it is Jo be able to fire the Trident II (D-5) missile, the new submarine cannot be a simple modification of the existing British Polaris boat, the tubes of which might have been modified to accept Trident I (C-4), as in existing U. S. Poseidon submarines. Moreover, the Royal
39
British Duke (Type-23)-class General Purpose Frigate
Navy has opted for a new reactor (PWR2) to replace the PWR1 descended from its first all-British design, and a new sonar suit (Type-2054). The PWR2 prototype was installed in its test building in June 1985, and is to be operational in 1987.
Much of the total Trident weapon system must be bought from the United States, which has refused to consider any offset arrangement. As a result, the total cost of the system has risen, owing to the relative weakness of the British pound. Presumably there will be some readjustment as the pound rises against the dollar (by about 40% during 1985). Even so, the program will be extremely expensive by British standards—about $14 billion. Of this total, 31% is for the hulls, 14% for the missiles, 22% for weapon system equipment, 6% for shore construction, and 27% for warheads, miscellaneous expenses, and unallocated contingency spending.
Trident spending will probably peak in 1989-96, when many frigates are due for replacement and a decision whether to replace two of the largest British surface warships, the landing ships Fearless and Intrepid must be made. Both ships were scheduled for disposal in the last major Defence Review (1981), and both were reprieved by the Falklands Conflict. They are nearing the end of their useful lives; any replacements must be laid down soon. This is a very delicate issue: Britain is pledged to deploy troops in Norway as part of its NATO contribution, and the Royal Marines have argued that they cannot effectively deploy without specialized amphibious ships. Others have suggested that suitable civilian ships, such as car ferries, might be converted in wartime, using the Falklands experience as a case in point. By late 1985, the decision had been put off until mid-1986. However, the Royal Navy is laboring under severe spending constraints, and the outlook for new amphibious ships is not very bright. It is possible that a compromise solution— modernization—will be adopted.
Late in 1985, the defense minister suggested that construction of new amphibious ships might be made at the expense of frigate construction. The 50-frigate fleet, then, would have to be maintained either by retaining ships in service beyond their useful lives or by abandoning the amphibious force, the latter option having very nearly been exercised in 1981.
With the delivery of HMS Ark Royal, the British V/STOL (vertical/short takeoff and landing) carrier program is complete. The only survivor of the earlier British carriers, HMS Hermes, has been relegated to harbor training. She has been offered to India, which plans to operate three carrier groups in the future; the alternative is probably to scrap the ship. Her fate had not been decided by early 1986, but it seems unlikely that the Indian Government would buy a second elderly carrier, either to supplement or to replace the Vikrant, which is of similar vintage.
With the loss of the Hermes, moreover, the Royal Navy will lose its dedicated helicopter-assault platform; its tactics require the ability to launch eight helicopters simultaneously. The value of such a vertical assault was reportedly
demonstrated not only in the Falkland* but also in a 1984 exercise, which fai'e because of the absence of just such a force. However, proposals to convert tn containership Contender Argent (17.9 tons) into an aviation ship were reject because of the budget squeeze.
It was announced in June that t Royal Navy will maintain only two fr°n line carrier air groups, shifting them fr°rI' ship to ship as each refits. In an ernef gency, aircraft would be drawn from * training pool. A similar policy, tried 1 the 1960s, led to mass resignations fr°n^ the fleet air arm. The current standard group consists of five Sea Harriers a
nine Sea King antisubmarine/airbor
early warning helicopters. Howev ■ from 1988 onwards, the Sea Harrier co& plement is to be increased to eight; ships can accomodate up to 12. By 1 ^ time, the aircraft will have been cleat to carry the new Sea Eagle antiship 1111 sile. Of 34 Sea Harriers originally 0 dered, only 23 are left; 23 replacemeh^ now on order will be delivered from 1 onward. ,
HMS Invincible, the first of the cla ^ is to be refitted at Devonport April 1 . July 1988. She will incorporate the t provements made while the newer ^ ^ Royal was under construction, such a steeper (12° rather than 7°) ski'ju ^ with additional mess deck space* . extra personnel. The ship will be ah internally to accommodate the larger.^eS group, with workshops and magaZ^ enlarged by about 50%. The Inv‘nC>a(li was completed without vital cornu ■ ^ facilities, which is why the Herntts
be
converted to FRS-2 standard from
onward. Falklands experience is
ors
10n entailed insertion of a 30-meter
jo serve as flagship in the Falklands Con- j 'ct. With the older, larger ship gone, the evincible will need those facilities, although limited funds will force the defer- jal of a planned update of her ADAWS (the British equivalent of the U. S. Navy tactical data system).
Work continued on the planned mid- ■fe update of the Sea Harriers; they are to
1989
reflected in the provision of a Blue Vixen look down-shoot down” radar and °ur advanced medium-range air-to-air (AMRAAM) AIM-120A missiles; the ea Harrier will be the first European airPlane to carry AMRAAMs. Alternative °ads will include two AMRAAMs and iwo Sidewinders. Other new features in- ctiide a data bus, secure voice and data lnks, and a microwave carrier landing system. Presumably the latter will make 0ul-weather Sea Harrier operations more Practical; the first British casualties in the alklands Conflict were a pair of aircraft which are believed to have collided beCaUse of poor visibility.
The Royal Navy is reportedly considering a next-generation carrier, to be built around the turn of the century. She would c larger than the Invincible, displacing about 30,000 tons, gas turbine powered, and would operate a somewhat larger air group of perhaps V/STOL fighter- ombers and 15 helicopters. She might e compared to the new French 40,000- 0ri nuclear carrier, designed to operate conventional aircraft. Late in 1985, a nhsh delegation reportedly visited rance to argue in favor of the somewhat smaller V/STOL carrier.
. This was more than an academic exer- j'Se- If the French Navy embraced the . r'fOL concept, France might join Brit- a,n in the development of a new, perhaps supersonic, V/STOL naval fighter. Iherwise the Royal Navy might never lain a viable Sea Harrier replacement,
' lnce the total size of any future fighter 0rder would be quite limited. Moreover, jjny new V/STOL naval fighter might aVe considerable export potential, since veral navies have shown interest in Riding V/STOL carriers; many fewer (.re bkely to be able to afford conven- °nal ships, particularly since they may t^n< it difficult to buy steam catapults for
The Royal Navy is also converting the °ntainership Contender Bezant into the ration training ship RFA Argus, for e°mPletion in late 1986. She is to have an ^tensive flat deck abaft of a conven- nal superstructure, with a large hangar Crved by two elevators) below it. Consection amidships (displacement rose to about 20,000 tons). The original bridge was retained, and a second, larger block added abaft of it. Harland & Wolff, the conversion yard, regards the design as the basis for an inexpensive export carrier, and notes that the ship could have had a ski-jump for Sea Harriers. Even now her hangar is roomier than that of the much more expensive, purpose-built Invincible. However, the Argus is unlikely to be able to accommodate weapons, workshops, or command and control facilities on the scale built into the three In- vincibles. In wartime, she may function as a second-line carrier, probably more for helicopters than for Sea Harriers, and the ship could be armed with containerized Sea Wolf missiles.
Meanwhile, three British companies, British Aerospace Dynamics (Bristol Division), Sea Containers Ltd., and Westland Helicopters, have agreed to promote an Arapaho concept for conversion of merchant ships to austere helicopter carriers, based on the successful conversion of the 23,000-ton Astronomer into the RFA Reliant in 1984.
The British destroyer and frigate force continues to decline, as ships built under the relatively large programs of the 1950s and early 1960s are scrapped or sold. Between 5 May 1979 and 30 April 1985, 28 destroyers and frigates were disposed of or lost, but only nine were ordered— none of them before August 1981. The first of the new Type-23 class, HMS Norfolk, was ordered from Yarrow on 29 October 1984. Three more were scheduled to follow in 1985. In January 1985, the third and fourth Type-22 (Batch-3)- class frigates, the last of their class, were ordered.
The last Type-42 missile destroyer, HMS Edinburgh, was commissioned in December 1985. She will probably be the last British area defense missile ship, as no successor to her Sea Dart system appears to be envisaged. The future Royal Navy will presumably be limited to point defense weapons, and virtually every ship will have to be so armed.
In 1983, the Ministry of Defence announced a design competition for a new austere escort/patrol vessel, OPV(ocean patrol vessel)3. It was to have been built to merchant standards, for minimum cost. As many as six would have been built, at a unit cost of £25-30 million (i.e., about a quarter of the cost of a full- size frigate, or slightly below the cost of a Hunt-class minesweeper). Five firms submitted proposals: Hall Russell, which built the earlier OPVs, Vosper Thom- ycroft, Airship Industries, Yarrow, and Thornycroft Giles. However, by April, the OPV program was rejected as too expensive. The Ministry of Defence was willing to finance some further work at Hall Russell and at Vosper Thornycroft, presumably to develop a design for emergency construction. It rejected the other three proposals.
Perhaps the most interesting of the five proposals was Airship Industries’ 120140-meter blimp, which could accomodate a large search radar in its gas envelope. Its equivalent of combined diesel or gas (CODOG) propulsion was a combination of turbo-props (90 knots) and lightweight diesels (20-45 knots). With a gross lift of 73,500 kilograms, an equipped weight of 35,000 kilograms, and a 6,500-kilogram fuel load (ten days), it could lift 32,000 kilograms (32 metric tons) of crew and mission payload. Unlike an airplane or helicopter, the blimp could obviously hover for an extended period. Moreover, it could carry out the primary OPV mission of investigating ships at sea because it could launch a small boat. French trials were said to show that the blimp could carry out the primary mission under the worst weather conditions a conventional OPV could tolerate.
In April, it was announced that the 28 ships of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary would change from civilian-registered to “British government owned ships on noncommercial service,” ending a 74-year practice. The principal reason was that some would have to be armed even in peacetime, while others have been equipped with chaff and infrared decoy launchers. It is not clear to what extent this change reflects a realization that the Royal Navy may become engaged in large-scale, undeclared wars such as the Falklands Conflict. Another possibility is that modem weapon systems clearly can no longer be extemporized; ships need ready weapons rather than strengthened platforms to mount guns. Or, given a shrinking fleet, the Royal Navy may have to use some of its auxiliaries to perform traditional warship roles. The replenishment oiler specification, for example, demands a large operations center and space for two or more large helicopters. Does it follow that the oiler may perform as the flagship of the antisubmarine warfare group it accompanies?
In accordance with British Government policy, the nationalized shipyards are being sold to private companies. In November 1985, the Queen’s Speech (announcing government policy for 1985-86) included privatizing the management of the Royal Dockyards by 1987, the most recent in a series of denationalizations. The government ar-
t*r
gues that competition among the newly privatized yards should make them more efficient and, incidentally, should improve their chances in the world warship market. None of the yards has sold a frigate or submarine since nationalization and merger as British Shipbuilders in 1977, although that may have been a consequence of market conditions as well as of high British costs. The reported sale of modified Type-21 frigates to Pakistan was certainly a hopeful sign.
Yarrow, the first of the five main British warship yards to be privatized, was bought by GEC, an electronics company. Trafalgar House recently bought Scott Lithgow, which has submarine expertise and a new proposal for a modernized export model of the venerable Oberon class. The same engineering firm is said to be interested in the principal British submarine builder, Vickers (Barrow), which is to be sold as a package with Cammell Laird (Birkenhead). The political logic was to link the profitable submarine builder with a yard that has been in trouble for some time. Cammell Laird, in turn, might attract Type-2400 orders from Scott Lithgow, the only other British yard with recent submarine experience. Of the three other major yards (Vosper Thomycroft, Hall Russell, and Brooke Marine), the latter was the only one to show a loss in 1984, and thus the least attractive. Interest in buying Hall Russell fell after the collapse of the OPV3 program.
France: The projected 1986 defense budget is 5.4% higher than in 1985. If current statements are followed through, moreover, the French Navy should receive a growing proportion of this money. The 1986 budget should pay for laying down the first of two nuclear- powered carriers, a seventh nuclear attack submarine (with two more planned), and a new-design nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine.
At the end of 1984, the French Navy planned to order the following ships under its 1984-88 five year plan:
► First half: one nuclear-powered attack submarine, six mine countermeasures ships, four patrol vessels, and one am-
Demonstrative of France’s devotion of one-third of its defense budget to nuclear systems, the sixth ballistic missile submarine, L’Inflexible, was commissioned in April 1985, carrying the first French submarine-launched, MIRVed missiles, each with six 150-kiloton warheads.
phibious transport dock (LPD)
► Second half: one nuclear carrier, three frigates, two more attack subs, five more mine warfare ships, two logistics support ships, and two more LPDs
The nuclear submarines will continue to be of the Rubis design, the smallest operational nuclear submarine in the world. The sixth (ordered in 1984) and later units are to be of modified design. France will not build any more diesel submarines; the French Navy considers nuclear propulsion well worth the cost.
The frigates are a new FL25 type (discussed later) paid for partly by the cancellation of the seventh and last C70 antisubmarine warfare frigate. The mine warfare ships are a new class, replacing the last five Tripartite-class minehunters. The logistics support ships are intended to support French operations in the Pacific. They will have LPD-type wet wells sufficient to transport a 400-ton patrol boat to the South Pacific, but have much more dry cargo capacity than an LPD. Although they are to be built largely to commercial standards, they clearly represent a potential element of a French overseas intervention force. The patrol boats are the last of ten 400-ton units for exclusive economic zone enforcement; delivery of the class began at the end of 1984.
French naval policy continues to emphasize two themes: the strategic nuclear deterrent and the ability to project force into the Third World. It is estimated that one-third of the current defense budget, a far higher proportion than in the United States, is devoted to strategic and tactical nuclear systems. The continued viability of the deterrent requires close attention both to advances in Soviet antisubmarine warfare and to future improvements in Soviet ballistic missile defense, both conventional and exotic (as in the U. S. Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI] program)- Thus, the sixth French ballistic missile submarine, L’Inflexible, became operational in April 1985, carrying the first French submarine-launched, multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) missile, with six 150-kiloton warheads replacing the previous single one-megaton warhead. Range increased from about 3,000 to 4,000 kilometers, allowing the submarine much more sea room. The French Navy regards this M4 missile roughly equivalent to the U. S. Poseidon. Reportedly, its warheads can cover a 350 by 150-kilometer “footprint.” The 1985 budget will finance the first modified M4 missile, carrying 3 miniaturized TN71 warhead to a range of about 5,000 kilometers, again for increased sea room against Soviet antisubmarine warfare. It will be carried by the Le Tonnant, which is to complete her refit in 1987.
Four of the five original French nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) are to be refitted to carry MIRVed M4 missiles. The prototype, Le Redoutable, will not be refitted because she is to be replaced by a seventh (new) SSBN, the first of a new generation, in 1994-95.
Even given these ranges, French SSBNs must spend much of their time near the European coast. The French view is that they therefore risk encounters with Soviet surface and submarine forces. As a result, the French Navy tends to emphasize active defensive measures; it arms its SSBNs like attack sub-
Marines. For example, they now carry the M.39 submarine-launched Exocet.
The other major antisubmarine threat !° tbe French SSBN force is an attack on ■js base at Brest. French Navy planning nerefore encompasses the construction °t a new class of deep-water minesweep- ®rs» to protect the deep approaches to rest. This 800-1,000-ton, glass-rein- °rced plastic BAMO or ocean minesweeper will work out to the edge of the continental shelf, using a towed side-scan sonar based on the DUBM-41B, and a remotely controlled submersible. It will so carry mechanical and magnetic ^eePs. The prototype “stretched UBM-41B” is being tested on the trials ''essel Betelgeuse. It is to be effective own to 300 meters, and will sweep a 0-meter swath on each side at ten ots; the DUBM-41B is credited with a , ,|'rneter swath at four knots. The mine- 1 **ng submersible will probably carry its ?Wn sonar to reacquire a mine detected y the towed body. The first of five ships 'n tbe current program is scheduled to be Covered in 1990.
The French Government expects the °viet Union to deploy its own SDI-type tenses, and has begun research into c°untermeasures for French missiles— ePottedly including the use of a new reactive skin and rotation of the missile ab°W its axis.
Power projection, carried out by a car-
t>hventerec* ^eet anc* a substant*al am~ P lbi°us force, accounts for much of the r.ench naval budget. In 1985, naval avi- i *°n (which includes both the carrier and nd-based aircraft) accounted for more ^an 11% of the total naval budget. This °uld rise as the new carrier is built and w maritime patrol aircraft are pur- Mase(J; plans call for 42 Atlantique lg^'2 aircraft to enter service from cl ,? onward- The first two were inboth *n tbe budget. Meanwhile, b carriers are being refitted. Their four * ^.9-inch guns are to be replaced by i.,° Crotale EDIR point defense missile aunchers.
Th
Vv,.ne carrier force operates aircraft res i ^ no (°n8er >n production. As a (of attr'bon can run it down. Only 71 st .,tbe 100 requested) Super Etendard (i C aircraft were built before the line IrSe<T 'n 1983; five of those were lent to lin\anC* returned *ate ‘n 1985. The front- 246 j?rce consists of 38 Super Etendards, nn i' Wbich are capable of carrying the 4jC ®ar ASMP stand-off missile. Of the
• S. LTV A-7 Crusaders bought in
’ 0n|y 27 are left, and they must Cre 6 trough 1991. Maintenance is in- ^mgly difficult.
e French Navy would prefer to operate a single strike/interceptor aircraft. In the early 1980s, it agreed in principle to navalize the advanced combat aircraft then envisaged. A similar agreement concerning the Anglo-French Jaguar strike fighter failed some years before, resulting in the Super Etendard program. If the current program succeeds, the airplane will be a derivative of the Dassault- Breguet Rafale, which is scheduled to make its first flight in June at Istres. This delta-winged fighter is powered by two General Electric F404 engines, as is the U. S. F/A-18. Like the U. S. fighter, it employs fly-by-wire technology. Maximum speed will be about Mach 2, and takeoff weight will be about 14,000 kilograms in the air defense version and 20,000 in the ground attack version.
It is also possible that the Super Etendard production line may reopen, which would provide a hedge against further attrition and delays in Rafale development. At the 1985 Paris Air Show, Dassault announced that a land version of the Super Etendard would be offered as a pany estimated that orders for 40 would reopen the line. New Super Etendards would not incorporate naval features, but surely the French Navy would be able to order additional navalized aircraft.
Of the two new major surface warship classes, the FL25 frigate will displace about 3,000 tons standard, compared to about 3,800 for the C70ASW (Georges Leygues). More importantly, the new frigate will be highly automated, with a complement of only about 156, compared to 216 for the C70ASW. Like the new British Type-23, she will employ diesel- electric machinery for low silent speed (12 knots) and economical operation at high speed; the high-speed plant will be similar to that of the C70 or the French- built Saudi F2000. The FL25 will tow a passive sonar array, as in the C70ASW, and have a bow sonar. Current descriptions list export, rather than French Navy, sensors (such as the Jupiter-II air search radar), which suggests that the design was originally prepared for export, or France hopes to export it on the basis of French Navy adoption. Antisubmarine weapons will be limited to 18 lightweight Murene torpedoes fired from tubes and dropped by a single eight to ten-ton helicopter; the ship will not carry the Malafon stand-off weapon.
Perhaps the most interesting weapon development is SAAM, the surface-to-air antimissile weapon planned for future French warships. SAAM is conceived as part of a tri-service program, in which the French Army and Air Force (air base de-
A navalized version of the Dassault- Breguet Rafale may replace France’s Super Etendards and Crusaders. The prototype, with the same engine as the F/A-18, will make its first flight in June 1986.
For example, Aerospatiale proposes a 12-kilometer weapon for the navy, and a 30-kilometer weapon for the other services. Thomson-CSF, the prime contractor, planned to begin full-scale development by the end of 1985. SAAM would be used as the basis of the longer-range SAMP (army/air force) program beginning about 1987; France would hope to lead a European consortium to develop SAMP. Matra and Aerospatiale submitted missile proposals in December 1984.
The SAAM system design is driven by a French Navy requirement to intercept highly maneuverable sea-skimmers flying at speeds up to Mach 3 beyond five kilometers. SAAM would operate primarily as a point defense weapon, but it would provide limited local area defense, so that ships up to six or seven kilometers
35 knots). Weapons will include SM-1 (medium range) area defense missiles (Mark-13 launching system), one eight' cell point defense missile launcher (Aspide missiles, Albatros system), °ne 5-inch/54-caliber gun, three 3-inch/62- caliber OTO-Melara “Super-Rapid guns, eight Otomat Mark-2 (Teseo) surface-to-surface missiles, two Mark--'- triple torpedo tubes, and two antisubmarine warfare helicopters.
The Netherlands: The Royal Netherlands Navy (RN1N) found its operating budget limited by the rising costs of ship construction. Although the 1986 budget showed 2% real growth and 3% expected from 1987 onward, the navy had to reduce the force goals set in 1984. By mid" 1986, the RN1N will have 20 (rather than
class has grown into a general-purP°^ frigate with a towed array and assoCta large antisubmarine helicopter. Four ■ on order, a second group optional, an third group of four are projected, first unit was laid down on 26 Februa
>985. m
The original M-class design 'va' u some ways a triumph for Anglo-Un cooperation, as the Dutch chose the tf ish Spey engine while the British ad°P the Dutch Goalkeeper close-in weaP
apart could provide mutual support. The French Navy is expected to buy 12-25 ship-sets, depending on price.
As described by Thomson-CSF, the SAAM system is very nearly a miniature version of the U. S. Navy’s Aegis, using a stabilized, masthead-mounted, rotating phased-array radar to track 50 targets simultaneously, and control 10-20 defensive missiles in flight at any one time. The defensive missiles, in turn, would have programmable autopilots, as with Aegis: They would be pre-programmed to fly into appropriate “footprints,” then updated in flight via a digital data link. Unlike Aegis, this system would provide each missile with an active Ku-band seeker; there would be no requirement for the current slaved illuminator for terminal homing. As in current Aegis cruisers, defensive missiles would be launched vertically, at a maximum rate of about one per second. Models of the launcher show 12 cells per module: eight for missiles, two for gas management, and two for essential services.
As described, the SAAM system would be a creditable performer even in a large ship, yet it was designed for ships that are too small to carry the Crotale missile. Unless the system can be pared down to approximate the Crotale’s or Sea Sparrow’s size and weight, it will be an unacceptable burden on a ship primarily dedicated to antisubmarine warfare or antiship attack. Should the SAAM project fail, it may prove that defense against fast sea-skimmers demands an alternative technology, such as directed energy, with defensive missiles limited to long-range targets.
Italy: The 1985 Italian Defense White Paper called for sufficient naval forces to operate at least two task groups: one each for the Western and Eastem/Central Mediterranean. This would seem to imply the construction of at least one more carrier, but none was mentioned. Each group is to comprise one air-capable cruiser (the Guiseppe Garibaldi and Vittorio Veneto), two to three missile destroyers, and five to six frigates. The paper listed the following planned new ships:
- Two 5,000-ton, area air defense destroyers (the Animoso and Ardimentoso)
- Two antisubmarine frigates (the Maestrale or NFR-90)
- Two 8,000-ton amphibious ships (LPDs)
- Four more 1,300-ton corvettes
- Two improved Sauro-c\ass submarines
- Six to eight minehunters (improved Lerici-class ships with a better minehunting sonar)
The V/STOL carrier Giuseppe Garibaldi was the most important warship delivery of the year. Others included the last two of eight Maestrale-class frigates (delivered in May 1985) and the first four Lerici-class glass-reinforced plastic minehunters.
Although the Garibaldi was delivered on 31 July, Italian law still prohibits the Italian Navy from operating fixed-wing aircraft. The next day, the defense minister submitted a law re-establishing a naval air arm. Parliamentary approval may take 12-18 months. The purchase of aircraft would be even further off. Even so, there are reports of Italian interest in industrial offsets (such as British Army purchase of Mangusta antitank helicopters) as part of a Sea Harrier purchase.
A change in the law would have much wider implications: It would probably permit the Italian Navy to set up a shore- based air arm. Italian maritime patrol aircraft (Atlantiques) are flown by mixed air force/navy crews. The Italian Navy is reportedly interested in a shore-based naval (antiship attack) variant of the Italian-Brazilian AMX strike fighter. Reportedly, the Italian Air Force plans to base half of the Italian Tornado force in southern Italy (with Kormoran missiles for antiship strike) were an attempt to forestall such an initiative. Moreover, any Italian Navy attempt to develop a substantial naval air arm would challenge the current ratio of budget allocations among the services. The government proposal leaves the choice of naval aircraft to a bi-service aircraft procurement office dominated by the air force.
The two missile destroyers have been planned for some time; they will replace the two Impetuosos, and complete the six destroyers needed for the two planned wartime task groups. Their design is based on that of the Audace class, but they are larger (5,300 rather than 4,400 tons) and hence slower (31.5 rather than the planned 22) frigates and destroyers- of which 16 will be operational, sup ported by two fast replenishment ships- two Tromp-class command/area antia,r warfare missile ships, two Jacob vaH Heemskerck-c\ass area air defense de stroyers, ten Kortenaer-class antisubma rine frigates, and two Van Speijk-clasS frigates. In addition, the navy will oper ate four (rather than the planned six) sU marines, and 11 P-3C Orions, with tvV° more in reserve. In 1985, the Dutch G°v emment concluded an agreement to base one of the Orions in Iceland.
Meanwhile, work proceeded on 1 new classes: the De Zeven Proving! (M)-class frigate, designed initially replace the old Wolf-class corvettes sup plied by the United States in the 195 and the Walrus-c\ass submarines. S'nt\ its conception, the De Zeven ProvinL,e
7OS6 ated
are
l#
system. This year, however, the Dutch rejected the British Seawolf point defense 'nissile system for the M-class, preferring [he NATO Seasparrow. The British Min- lstry of Defence had prepared a memorandum of understanding for collabora- hve development of a new variant of heawolf with a phased array radar for second-batch M-class frigates and the British Norfolk class (Type-23).
Both the frigate and the submarine c,asses were begun early in order to assure continuity of work at the yards in- v°lved (de Schelde and Rotterdam). Steel '['as cut for the submarines even before l contract had been signed on 15 June 979. The Walrus was launched on 28 ctober 1985. She is a modified version ° [he earlier Zwaardvis class, itself a erivative of the last U. S. conventional submarine design, the Barbel (SS-580).
he most visible change is an X-stem, a [^figuration also adopted by the Swed- lsh Navy and likely to appear (in somewhat different form) on the new U. S. oN-2i submarine. Pielstick diesels, sunilar to those of the Standard frigates,
replace the Werkspoor diesels of the earlier class. The new submarines have four, rather than six, torpedo tubes (as in the Zwaardvis). Construction was reportedly complicated by a Dutch Navy request, after the contract had been signed, for a 50% increase in diving 'depth; this required the use of French Marel high- tensile steel. Redesign cost two years and 40% in real terms.
West Germany: Reportedly, the 4,500-ton, Blohm & Voss MEKO-360 frigate on display at the U. S. Navy League Show in 1985 displayed features under consideration for a new German area air defense frigate, the Type-124. The model suggested increased interest in a naval form of stealth: Its two diesels had water-cooled exhausts at the waterline to limit infrared signature. In theory, the ship would normally operate at diesel speed, relying on passive sensors. Having detected its target (or having been detected), it would switch to high (gas turbine) speed, using an active radar for target tracking. This combined diesel or gas plant (two diesels, two LM2500s) would give a maximum speed of 29.5 knots. In the same hull, an all-diesel plant would give 26 knots and an all-gas turbine plant (four LM2500s) about 35 knots. The model showed vertical launchers for missiles up to SM-2 size (16 forward of the bridge and 32 just abaft of amidships), plus a five-inch gun, two quadruple Harpoon launchers amidships, four Seaguard close-in weapon systems, and antisubmarine torpedo tubes. It had extensive fragment protection; studies show that even if the close-in weapon system destroys a missile 250 meters away, a ship would be swept by fragments.
The German cabinet approved the purchase of two more Bremen (Type-1221- class frigates, subject to parliamentary approval. They will supplement the six existing ships and should be built in 1986-89. Unless they are built, the four Hamburg-class destroyers will have to be modernized again, pending construction of new NATO frigates in the 1990s. This will account for only eight of the 12 frigates planned in 1976, and the German Navy faces increased responsibilities.
In January 1985, the German Defense Ministry selected one of two competing aerospace electronics firms (rather than a shipyard) to build ten new Type-343, fast mine countermeasures craft. Messer- schmitt-Bolkow-Bohm will lead a consortium including Lurssen, Abeking & Rasmussen, and Krogerwerft. The new craft will replace the 21 340/341-class minelayer/minesweepers in 1988-1990. The Type-343 is unusual in that it is built of nonmagnetic steel, rather than glass- reinforced plastic or wood. Since Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Bohm’s bid was at least 10% higher than the German Government had expected, some reductions in capability are likely.
Twenty Type-332 minehunters are to follow the Type-343 program using the same hull; they will replace the ten Type- 394 coastal minesweepers and 12 Type- 331 minehunters.
Spain: Perhaps the most important naval issue for Spain is full membership in NATO. The current socialist government ran on a platform which promised a referendum on NATO membership; public opinion polls show that a majority probably favors withdrawal. This is a reaction partly to the presence of U. S.
Launched on 28 October 1985, the lead boat of the Netherlands’ Walrus- class submarines was derived froifi the Zwaardvis and U. S. Barbel (SS- 580) designs. Her X-stern design may be incorporated in the U. S. SSN-21.
bases, and partly to the absence of a perceived Soviet threat. Improving Spanish relations with North Africa, including Libya (an agreement was recently signed), have reduced the perception of any threat from the south. However, the government favors membership, albeit without integration into the NATO military command. As of late 1985, the referendum was scheduled for March 1986. Problems include the status of Gibraltar and the lack of a NATO commitment to help defend the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla on the North Moroccan coast. Although the Spanish press generally supported Argentina in the Falklands Conflict, there was some concern that Morocco might follow Argentina’s example with respect to the enclaves. Spanish public opinion also finds it difficult to accept the inclusion of the Canary Islands in an IberLant commanded by a Portuguese admiral.
The Spanish economy remains relatively weak, and Spain has tried to reschedule repayments of some U. S. military loans ($500 million of several billion). Spain reportedly hopes to use its military export industry to help industrialization. It already exports considerable numbers of land weapons, and hopes to increase naval exports to match.
The V/STOL aircraft carrier Principe de Asturias should enter service early in 1987, replacing the elderly Dedalo. Her 12 AV-8B aircraft are to be delivered in 1986-87. An antisubmarine warfare task group will be formed around her, and the next naval plan is to include a new replenishment ship to support the group. The new ship will replace the Teide.
Canadian Hailfax (“City”)-class Frigate
Approval was expected at the end of 1984, but will probably have to wait until the end of 1985. The new ship was conceived as a duplicate of the French Durance, but it is now to be a Spanish design, with a replenishment station on each side and one aft, plus a helicopter deck for vertical replenishment. Requirements include a speed of 21 knots and an endurance of 4,000 nautical miles at 20 knots (7,000 nautical miles at 15 knots). Displacement should be about 13,000 tons.
The preliminary design of the Franco- Spanish S-80 Bipartite submarine, to replace the Daphne class, has been completed. Four are to be built at Cartagena, the lead unit commissioning in 1992. Presumably, the design will also be offered for export to other operators of the Daphne design. New features include longer range (70-day endurance) and greater weapon capacity (20 mines, torpedoes, or submarine-launched missiles) than the Daphne.
Portugal: NATO efforts to support new Portuguese frigate construction continued. Reportedly, the failure in 1984 to finance a Dutch-built Standard frigate stemmed from German reluctance to pay for the support of a foreign yard (KM de Schelde). In 1985, both de Schelde and Blohm & Voss continued to seek this order; Blohm & Voss emerged as the winner, with a contract to build three MEKO-200 frigates—subject to financing, which defeated the 1984 attempt. Not surprisingly, the Netherlands’ willingness to supply funding was diminished by the loss of the order to West Germany, which will finance most of the project.
Canada: The Canadian armed forces are slowly emerging from a long decline under the Liberal government of Pierre Eliot Trudeau, with that reversal showing an alarming tendency to reverse itself again. Perhaps Trudeau’s most radical (and most bitterly resented) step was to unify the three Canadian services (with a single uniform) as the Department of National Defense; the Canadian Navy became the maritime command. It may be symbolic that the Conservative government has chosen to revive the distinctive uniforms of the three service arms- Can separation be far behind?
Given a weak Canadian economy, it1S much more difficult for the Canadian Government to reverse the material decline of the Canadian forces. Moreover, the demands of Canadian nationalism (*n the form of sovereignty patrols in the Arctic) are likely to collide with NATO requirements for more, and more modem, antisubmarine warfare forces. The latest form of this conflict is the project to build a new $500 million icebreaker, which may require cancellation of the projected second series of six patrol fng' ates, as well as the modernization of the four Tribal-class destroyers.
The Department of National Defense submitted a 1985-86 budget calling f°r a 6.9% growth over 1984-85. Assuming 6.3% inflation, that was a mere 0.6% 0‘ real growth. In fact, the budget as approved showed a 5.6% increase, which equated to a decrease of 0.7%. The m- crease in defense was the largest m u«- budget, except for foreign aid.(originahy scheduled for a 13.8% increase).
Symptomatic of the budget problem
Was the decision, announced in late 1985, !° decommission the six 28-year-old, St. Laurent-class frigates in 1987. Three (the faser, Skeena, and Ottawa) were to ave remained in service until 1989-90. facially, all six are being withdrawn r°m service because crews for the six "ew Wgates will have to be trained, but U(fgetary problems are more likely. As a result, Canada will be reduced to a total 0 six frigates on its east coast.
Early in 1985, it was reported that the new “City class” frigate program had er)countered problems, and a new man- a§ement team consisting of men formerly LSs°ciated with Bath Iron Works was Pr°ught in. In May, St. John Shipbuild- jng and Dry Dock Company announced at the first ship would be delayed seven n'°nths (delivery in November rather an April 1989) and the second five ||J0nths (to September 1990). However, e remaining four were still on schedule 0r completion by April 1992.
Work continued on the planned second j, “ third series. Contract definition for e second batch of frigates is to be comP eted by 1987; presumably, they will be rePeat design. The third batch, for compaction in the late 1990s, would probably an entirely new design, and possibly 1 even a conventional ship. Canada l^t also decide whether to buy the Aro frigate, which is to be ready for punching in 1992—in time for the sec- n hatch. Its characteristics should be lrm by 1987.
u ^etails of the ambitious Tribal-class ate and modernization program f*KUMP) were published in 1985. As recast, the ships are to be given modem ev3 ^.e^ense antiaircraft weapons. How- r> instead of an existing system, they gj6 to combine vertically launched SM-2 ^ Ch-Il missiles with a variant of the liech Signaal fire control system (an ear- lhe >Vers'on °f which formed the basis for qm' Mark-92 system in Oliver Haz- 'fill ^erry tEFG-7)-class frigates). This require a new (presumably very ex- thSlve) system development: It will be ej 'rst integration of SM-2 with a for- lau ^"lre contr°t system. The vertical grcher reportedly was chosen for its health P°tentjal- However, a 29-cell ver- 4q . Puncher was substituted for a °n|rniSSi*e’ Mark-13 single-arm launcher lheVate ‘n '984. The missiles replace the 1Ve'*nch gun formerly mounted on wJ|e ships, but an OTO-Melara 76-mm. is nP°n is to be mounted abaft of them. It on ulear why the Bofors 57-mm. gun The i,new Patr°l frigates was not used. °Uiit ^arP00ns originally planned were sib) °wing to cost, however it is pose that a vertically launched version of
Harpoon will be developed.
The existing antisubmarine warfare systems will not, apparently, be updated. Designed by Litton Systems Canada, the Tribal-class frigate update and modernization program was accelerated 12 months to support an ailing Canadian shipbuilding industry; work will start at Davie Shipbuilding in late 1986. Given an estimated 18 months per ship, the last unit will be completed in May 1991. However, as the cost of this and other programs rise, it appears that one or two of the four Tribals will not receive TRUMP modernization.
Nor is it clear whether Canada will be able to replace her force of Sea King helicopters. The Canadian Navy may require as many as 60 replacements from 199091 onward; the same helicopter might replace the CH-113 (CH-46), to increase the number to 100 or even 130. The most likely candidates are the inner zone variant of the Sikorsky SH-60F (with its AQS-13F dipping sonar) and the Aerospatiale AS.332 Super Puma. The EH-101 is likely to be too heavy for the frigate’s helicopter deck at 13,600 kilograms.
Probably the next major Canadian program will be submarine acquisition. The three Oberons are being modernized (under a SOUP—submarine operational update program), but even so, they will have to be retired in 1992-1994. The replacement program, the Canadian submarine acquisition program, is to provide four replacements, with final recommendations in 1987 or early 1988; the first new submarine would enter service in 1992 or 1993. Bidders will be asked to quote prices for up to eight additional submarines, as by the 1990s Canada may decide to buy submarines instead of more frigates—as New Zealand very nearly decided in 1985. Presumably, the Canadian choice will be heavily influenced by the Australian decision next year.
Denmark: The Danish Navy is to receive seven new multipurpose, Standard Flex-300 craft to replace its old minesweepers and patrol boats. However, the two largest Danish warships, the 2,700- ton frigates Herluf Trolle and Peder Skram, will be reduced to nucleus crews from 1986 onward; they will be fully manned only in an emergency. The ocean-going Danish naval force will then be reduced to three 1,300-ton corvettes. On the other hand, Denmark will buy (rather than lease) three reconditioned, 435-ton, Kobben (Type-207)-class submarines from Norway. A Danish naval delegation inspected three Norwegian submarines in March 1985 with a view to leasing them. Leasing was not a new idea: The rifles of Danish front-line army units are leased from West Germany, pending the development of next-generation weapons.
Under a contract signed on 27 July, the prototype Standard Flex-300 is to be completed indigenously by a yard at Aalborg in 1987, after which funds will be released for six more to be built in Denmark. All are to be delivered by 1991, and the contract includes an option for nine more. The first seven are to replace eight obsolete Daphne-class patrol craft. Up to 20 would replace eight wooden Sund-c\ass minesweepers and six So/oven-class torpedo boats. The first seven Standard Flexes will be fitted primarily for surveillance and mine countermeasures. The next nine will be missile attack boats; their missile will be chosen in 1987-88.
Norway: The Royal Norwegian Navy hopes to modernize its five Or/o-class frigates and two Sleipner-class corvettes over the next five years, with Oslo-class refits scheduled in 1986-89. Ship service lives will be extended 15 years. The navy would like to add three more frigates, but that seems unlikely considering the money being spent on other new equipment, such as F-16 fighters. Norway has already rejected the NATO frigate.
Norway’s frigates and corvettes will be fitted with new Thomson-CSF Spherion hull and variable depth sonars; the after twin three-inch guns will be replaced by single 40-mm. Bofors guns taken from decommissioned patrol craft. Their antisubmarine warfare fire control systems will be converted from analog to digital, and chaff launchers will be added. Sonar contracts were let in December 1984.
Similarly, the submarine fleet will be limited to six modernized Kobbens and six new Ulas (Thyssen Nordseewerke); an option for two more Ulas (which would make a total of 14, equal to the current fleet) will not be exercised.
The navy is seeking shipbuilder proposals for replacements for the ten 30- year-old U. S. Falcon-class minesweepers; the first will be required in late 1988 or early 1989. The new ships may have a secondary escort role.
Sweden: The Swedish Navy continued its new emphasis on antisubmarine warfare, paid for out of the other two services’ budgets and out of internal reallocations in roughly equal amounts. The navy now estimates that it will spend about a fifth of its 1985-90 budget on antisubmarine weapons, sensors, and support. Approximate proportions* will be: surface vessels—40%, helicopters— 10%, and submarines—-50%.
The Stockholm, the first of two Spica-
of
continued with the launch of the first
two
two more are to be built in Turkey
Turkish yard also completed the home-built, SAR-33 fast attack boat frigate has been named the Yavuz, rec; ing the battlecruiser which for man; years served as flagship of the Turk1* fleet. Displacing 2,784 tons fully loade it is to be armed with a five-inch gun,
ceedings and other professional naval mag^
tzines-
With no experience with the newly commissioned Stockholm (namesake of the class, right), Sweden has ordered a new class of larger corvettes, the Type-90 Goteborgs.
Ill-class missile/antisubmarine corvettes, was commissioned on 1 March 1985; she was completed in December 1984. These ships and their successors are designated corvettes rather than fast attack craft, owing to the dual capabilities. Design work has been completed on the next corvette class, the Type-90 (Goteborg), which is similar to the Stockholm but slightly larger (with hull lengthened to accommodate antisubmarine weapons) and all-diesel instead of combined diesel and gas propulsion. The Goteborgs originally were to have been ordered in 1986— 87, but all four were authorized in the 1985-86 budget. The Swedish Government signed contracts on 18 December 1985 to construct the four Goteborgs. They were considered costly, and opponents argued that the two Stockholms already built should be evaluated before new orders were placed. Plans called for the first ship to be delivered in 1988, the second in 1989, and the other two as soon as possible thereafter, to replace the four Spica-1 s.
Unlike the Stockholm, this KKV-90 was designed from the beginning for antisubmarine warfare. The first operational naval displacement hulled craft to be powered by waterjets, it was chosen by the Swedish Navy for shallow water maneuverability, silencing, and resistance to damage by floating logs—a common problem in the Baltic. A variable depth sonar like that of the Stockholm class will probably be supplemented with a towed array, and the antiaircraft guns (57-mm. forward and 40-mm. aft) will be supplemented with a naval version of the Bofors RBS-70 laser-guided missile.
Further corvette procurement may be limited, however, as turbine cracks were found in some of the Kawasaki-built, Boeing-Vertol Kv-107 antisubmarine warfare helicopters. Up to 20 must now be re-engined at a cost equivalent to that of two Goteborgs.
Another Swedish antisubmarine warfare initiative was the purchase of a British passive array sonar, Ameeco Hydrospace’s shallow water system. Developed since 1983 with Swedish government and British private venture funds, it was successfully tested against two Swedish-manned, Yugoslav-built midget submarines purchased in 1985. The static passive array is dropped over the side; the deploying craft then stops to listen. The array can be towed to an alternative area or reeled in. Two have been tested on board Swedish patrol craft.
The Scandinavian navies are generally responsible for gun and missile shore defense. Sweden uses the RBS-08 missile, but a land-based version of the RBS-15, which arms the missile boats and corvettes, is to be ordered in 1988-89, with delivery from 1993 onward. For shorter ranges, Rockwell is to develop an antiship version of its antitank Hellfire missile (RBS-17), to replace French SS-lls (RB-52); 25 Hellfire batteries will replace 32 SS-11 batteries. New Bofors 120-mm. guns are also being installed in Norway and Sweden.
Belgium: Belgium decided to build a fast armed patrol vessel, capable of 20 knots and manned by 12-15 personnel, for fishery protection. Reportedly intended to enter service in 1986, the craft had not been ordered by late 1985.
Finland: Wartsila handed over the second of four Helsinki-class fast attack craft in June. The Turku has one Bofors 57-mm. gun, two (rather than one) Soviet-type 23-mm. twin mounts, and eight RBS-15 antiship missiles. A third, the Oulu, was delivered on 1 October.
Greece: The most important naval issue in Greece continues to be its shift away from NATO. Early in 1985, several very senior government officials announced that the threat to Greece was “not from the north, but from the east,” (i.e., from Turkey). Greece has refused to participate in any joint NATO exercises since May 1984. Later in 1985, Greece was more conciliatory to her allies, but tensions with Turkey still run high.
Meanwhile, the Greek economy slumped. In April, Hellenic Shipyards threatened to suspend operations, because of the depression in shipbuilding. It is the only Greek yard with recent naval experience, having built six of the ten Greek fast attack craft, and there was speculation that the Greek Government would rescue it by ordering frigates to replace the existing ex-U. S. destroyers. Greece is considering new frigate construction; several foreign yards have made proposals. In May 1985, the four most likely candidates to direct production in Greece were reportedly Blohm &
Voss, Howaldtswerke, CNR, and Vosper Thomycroft.
More importantly, perhaps, the Greek Government stated in February 1985 that it hoped to sell $4 billion worth of weapons to Libya over the next five years. Ah equipment would be of Greek design, and thus would not require licenser approval- This might include patrol craft designed by Hellenic Shipyards. The agreement appears to have resulted from a visit to Athens by the Libyan foreign minister in June 1984 to discuss ways of resolving Libya’s large debts to Greek construction firms. An overall trade agreement signed by Greek Prime Minister Papandreou t*1 Libya in September 1984 included potential defense sales. In January 1985, the Greek Government announced that 3 $500 million protocol for the sale of mil1' tary equipment to Libya had been signe in Tripoli.
For some time, there have been report of Libyan interest in buying one or more frigates; France has been mentioned as a possible builder. The new Libyan-Gree agreement suggests that Greece may B the supplier. Spain has also signed an arms agreement with Libya. .
Turkey: Turkish naval modernization
German-built, MEKO-200 frigates:
first
The
all-
two
quadruple Harpoons, one eight-cell Sea Sparrow launcher, and three quadrup Sea Zenith 25-mm. close-in weap0 systems.
West Germany has opposed the sale Egypt of German-designed Type- submarines built under license in Turk V it was part of a deal to exchange Turk naval vessels for 34 Egyptian F-4 *11 tom fighters.
Dr. Friedman is a defense analyst working unde tract for the U. S. Navy and several private c° nies. The author of many books on naval ^ and ship designs, he is a frequent contributor to