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Contents:
Footprints in the Sand The Maritime Strategy The Father of “Forcible Entry” The Far Eastern Navies A POW Camp Lost in History? Angola—A Second Afghanistan? Lebanon: That Was Then
ENTER THE FORUM We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, maritime, or military interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. The Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings.
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“Footprints in the Sand”
(See C. La VO, pp. 84-88, January 1986
Proceedings)
Jerome Schneier, Academy of Certified Social Workers, Chief, Social Work Services, VA Medical Center, Pittsburgh— The special about prisoner of war experiences is most poignant and reflects well on an exceptional group of people who are indeed survivors.
At the Highland Drive Veterans’ Administration (VA) Medical Center in Pittsburgh, we are making special attempts to provide services for former POWs. Providing services to these veterans is a priority at all VA medical centers. Many POWs suffer from delayed psychological effects, resulting from their imprisonment, torture, and starvation experiences. We also know that some of them are reluctant to turn to the VA for the medical help that they are entitled to.
The vignette about Mike Gorman and his attitude—that the government owed him nothing—is characteristic of this stoic group. However, we find the scars produced by the POW experience are deep. The World War II and Korean veterans are in an age category where they are now faced with retirement, loss of spouse or colleagues, and other stressful situations. The camaraderie which can be found in former-POW groups and the act of looking back at the POW experience with peers can help alleviate some pain, albeit belated. The Veterans Administration welcomes former POWs to accept the services available to them, which they so rightly deserve.
“The Maritime Strategy”
(See Supplement, January 1986; G. M. Harned.
pp. 26-28, February 1986 Proceedings)
John M. Collins—Authoritative summa tions of U. S. maritime strategy and the 600-ship Navy by the Chief of Naval Op erations and Secretary of the Navy, c°n tained in your January supplement, are very enlightening. Short, simple answer to the following questions would tnak both statements even more useful.
► The U. S. Maritime Strategy desert
’bed
in re-
leaders prefer ‘ ‘to achieve their goals ftid1 conventional means” (‘‘The Maritin,e Strategy” Supplement, pp. 7-14). HovV does the Navy reconcile resultant con cepts with Rear Admiral J. C. Wylie s widely quoted admonition that “planning for certitude is the greatest of all milttary mistakes”? Has the Navy developed a alternative strategy for naval nuclear war- to be implemented if the stated assumP^ tion proves incorrect? How does it di»® '
- U. S. maritime strategy assumes m
any war with the Soviet Union “alm° certainly . . . will involve Europe’ ‘ II), then presents Europe as the center piece. What prevents the superpo^ ? from fighting regional wars elsewheN’ What interests, for example, would nil tarily involve our European allies, if re gional combat between the United State and the Soviet Union erupted in Asia? How would such conflict affe U. S. maritime strategy? .
- U. S. naval “deployments to the
ern Pacific directly enhance deterred1■’ including deterrence of an attack in b rope” and, should deterrence fail-
nearly ignores nuclear war at sea, sponse to an assumption that Soviet
Captain Keith Oliver, U. S. Marine Corps, Instructor of English, U. S. Naval Academy—While your articles on hardware, tactics, and strategy are consistently timely and useful, the occasional forays into the “right side” of the brain are most welcome, as was the case with Mr. La VO’s piece in the January issue of the Proceedings.
Modem weapon systems notwithstanding, please never discontinue your representative tributes to the “smiling sailor with strong, hairy arms and a coarse stubble, hugging his family after six months at sea.”
trad
10'
limit “the Soviet’s ability to concern their forces on Central Europe” (PP'
13). Would authoritative Navy SP° gS men elaborate, because implied linka& are unclear to most laymen? Clarify . particular how significantly U. S.
operations would limit Soviet land an1
power. ► Some
officials have ‘ ‘quesi
■tione‘
■d
‘Shorl
i
i
how naval power could favorably _
whether the Navy could influence a ^ define the longest short war, and exp^
war’ in Central Europe,” but a proposition is indefensible t°a - (p. 36). Would authoritative spokesn^
the outcome of such brief combat
Comment and Discussion (Continued from page 28)
the Angolan economy lies in ruins
• only
Angola—A Second Afghanistan?
Eric Margolis, foreign affairs columnist, Toronto Sun—The media’s coverage of South African racial unrest has neatly and conveniently diverted Western attention away from a pattern of ominous events to the north. Across southern Africa, from Angola on the Atlantic to Mozambique on the Indian Ocean, the Soviet Union is hard at work creating a cordon rouge of Marxist vassal states.
Almost unobserved by the West, the Soviet Union, guided by clear strategy and careful planning, is building its own African Raj at a deliberate and measured pace. It is a long-term strategy aimed at denying the West southern Africa’s vital mineral resources and excluding Western political and military influence from the region. Control of.southern Africa is the cornerstone of Soviet plans to dominate world mineral production.
Western industries, and particularly defense industries, derive 85% of some of their most vital minerals—such as
Dr. Jonas Savimbi (right) and his UNITA forces were assisted by the South African Air Force to overcome Soviet-led MPLA and Cuban forces in the Battle of Lomba River. Captured artillery (below) assists the UNITA forces in their fight to free Angola.
gold, tungsten, vanadium, manganese, chromium, and other rare earths—from southern Africa. In many instances, the only other major source of supply for these strategic minerals is the Soviet Union.
Soviet African ambitions are being expressed through the creation of a chain of client states across the width of the continent. When this plan is realized, South Africa will be isolated, mineral- rich Zaire will be ready for overthrow, and the West’s primary source of strategic minerals will be firmly under Soviet control. This grand strategy is hardly new. In 1900, Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote about the great strategic importance of southern Africa. Mahan’s contemporary, the geopolitician Sir Halford John Mackinder, identified southern Africa as one of the world’s key strategic
points; he predicted that when Russia gained control of the region and access to the Arabian Sea, it would become the dominant world power. .
As a base for its African Raj, Sovie planners have chosen Angola, one ot tn continent’s most important though leai known countries. A vast, sparsely poP'j1 lated nation of only 6.7 million, Ango a has suffered centuries of Portuguese co lonial exploitation and a decade of ctv war between Marxist MPLA (Movinie>l,<> Popular de Libertacao de Angola) f°rc®* and the anticommunist guerrillas UNITA (Uniao Nacional Para a 'n dependencia Total de Angola). Today-
2% of its land is under cultivation Angola has great, unexploited min' agricultural, and fishery resources tn make it potentially even richer than Republic of South Africa. .
More significantly, Angola occupy the strategic nexus of southern Afr'ca_ Bordering on Angola—or within cas' striking distance—are Namibia, ° swana, Zambia, Congo, Gabon, Znu babwe, and the geopolitical heart of A rica, Zaire. Only the fragile, defense^" states of Namibia and Botswana lie ^ tween Angola and South Africa. None these nations, except for South Afr*caj has sufficient military power to withst® even a regimental-sized attack by sonic now stationed in Angola.
Cuba’s African Legion in Angola— along with Cuban forces in Ethiopia— as become the decisive military factor in lack Africa. In 1975, the Soviet Union intervened in Angola on behalf of the "Marxist MPLA by dispatching 12,000 eavily armed Cuban troops. Thanks to ne Cuban expeditionary force, Dr. Jonas avimbi’s anticommunist UNITA forces ^ere driven into the bush, from where I ey have waged a stubborn and, until ast fall, successful guerrilla war.
In September 1985, the nature of Angola s civil war abruptly changed. Cuban °°Ps, which had grown to number ->,000 in spite of five years of fruitless ■ S. diplomatic efforts to negotiate their rentoval, launched a major offensive against UNITA forces. For the first time, many of the 2,000 Soviet military per- j’Onnel in Angola took command of V CA and Cuban forces, down to company level. MiG-23 aircraft and Mi-24/25 ,'nd helicopter gunships almost broke NITA defenses at the Lomba River. nly the intervention of the South Afri- ^an Air Force, which downed at least 15 °viet- and Cuban-piloted helicopters a°ng with a few MiGs, saved the day.
Ah of the massive and growing land Operations in Angola are being supported y the Soviet Navy, whose activities in the South Atlantic have been increasing steadily since 1975. Luanda, Angola’s main port and capital, has become a permanent Soviet naval base. Part of the port has been fenced off for exclusive Soviet use. It is guarded by Soviet troops and protected by Cuban-manned antiaircraft guns and SA-2, SA-3, and SA-6 missiles. The Soviets have constructed repair shops, munitions storage, fuel bunkers, a floating drydock, and shore facilities at the port. Normally a destroyer or frigate, two smaller combatants, and a fleet oiler operate from this base. Soviet Bear-D bombers fly every three months from Cuba to Luanda, monitoring the length of the South Atlantic and the West’s main oil route.
Luanda, it should be noted, is the only major port on the African coast of the South Atlantic between Simonstown- Capetown, South Africa, and Lagos, Nigeria, to the north. Luanda is ideally positioned to dominate the South Atlantic and to interdict the main tanker route from the Persian Gulf, around the Cape, to Europe and the United States. Luanda is also well placed to police the South Atlantic’s narrowing between Brazil and Africa. It is also no coincidence that the Cubans are extremely active in the little- known Cape Verde Islands that lie astride the West Africa-Brazil passage.
Expanding Soviet naval activities around Africa’s southern end provide the maritime half to the tightening ring being drawn around South Africa. South of Angola lies the mineral-rich South African protectorate of Namibia, with only one million people. If South African troops withdrew from Namibia, Cubans could take that nation in a few days; and this would place South Africa within range of MiGs based in Angola. A bankrupt Zambia is teetering on the brink of collapse. Zimbabwe, a self-proclaimed Marxist state, is warming relations with Moscow. Mozambique, in spite of recent accords with South Africa, is under strong Soviet influence. Botswana, South Africa’s other northern buffer, has only 920,000 people and must rely on South Africa for defense.
As the Soviet cordon rouge across southern Africa tightens, there remains only a beleaguered South Africa and UNITA capable of opposing Soviet- backed forces. Yet, after decades of international arms embargoes, South Africa’s air force and navy are perilously weak.
The South African Navy, once protector of the West’s oil routes around the Cape, is now no more than a coastal defense force. This tiny fleet must not only defend South Africa’s long coast and the
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important harbors at Capetown and Durban, but also safeguard the sea routes over which 98% of South Africa’s strategic minerals travel to the West. Refusal by NATO to use Simonstown, because of South Africa’s racial problems, means that the nearest NATO base to the important Cape route is nearly 4,000 miles away at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean.
Equally ominous, the Soviets and their Cuban satraps have recently completed an extensive and quite massive air defense system that covers almost all of Angola, overlapping into neighboring Namibia and Zaire. Similar to Soviet air defense systems deployed in 1970 at Suez and in 1971 at Golan, the Angolan system includes hundreds of SA-2, SA-3, SA-6, SA-7, SA-8, and SA-9 missiles.
Hundreds more radar-directed, 23-mm- 37-mm., and 57-mm. antiaircraft gunS are netted into the air defense system, providing dense, layered defense frorn ground level to 80,000 feet.
The “missile phalanx” means that the South African Air Force can no longer dare risk its irreplaceable Mirage aircra by providing ground support and air cover for UNITA forces in Angola- Cuban-piloted MiG-23 and Hinds vrt likely force UNITA, deprived of air cover, to scatter into the bush and give U.P any hope of seizing towns or cities. Sim1 larly, South Africa may no longer be ab to provide air cover to protect Namibia or Botswana.
At the relatively low cost of $2 billi°n’ the Soviet Union and its allies have be come the dominant military power in tn rich, southern portion of Africa. An“> incredibly, the Gulf Oil Company’s wel * at Cabinda, protected by Cuban troops and East German security personnel, Pr° vide 95% of the Marxist regime’s m come. These dollars are used to Par Cuban mercenary troops and to buy arm from the Soviets—an arrangement tn would have made Lenin smile. .
While the Soviet Union proceeds a most unhindered to make Angola in another Afghanistan, the West has Pr°v^n unable to take any decisive action southern Africa, contenting itself to a nounce and chastise South Africa. Mea^ while, the Soviets destabilize the West s major source of strategic minerals- A Soviet troops lead Angolans and Cuba into battle in Africa, and with Sovl armored divisions in Afghanistan 011A 500 miles from the Arabian Sea, 1 ^ gloomy prediction of Mackinder see very close to becoming reality.
“Lebanon: That Was Then”
iq^ C S' Calhoun, PP- 74-80, September *985 Proceedings)
John C. Thompson—It is inevitable when one reads Midshipman Calhoun’s well-documented chronicle about the successful U. S. intervention in Lebanon ln 1958 that one compares it with the re- ucnt disastrous peacekeeping role which • S. naval forces tried to fulfill as part of e multinational force sent to Lebanon, he tactical situation was favorable for us en the painful converse was true dur- lng 1982-1984.
In addition to the massive Soviet naval uildup in the Mediterranean and elsewhere, the Soviets had vastly enhanced ctr strategic nuclear capabilities to achieve parity with or even surpass the uJ’'ted States by 1982. Syria, mean- P ile^ even without a “Nasserized Sypt to assist it, had built a formidable ;‘rmy rivaling some NATO members’ argest armies.
Although the evolution of the Soviet nd Syrian war machines did affect our ®Cent intervention in Lebanon, there .,ere other diverse and complex elements oj,at no U. S. political or military leader 1958 could have foreseen which di- rec'ly caused the failure of our stabiliza- t,0n mission there.
Lhere was a fundamentalist Islamic v°lution led by Iran’s spiritual leader, e Ayatollah Khomeini, who advocates j. ar,.vrdom to stop Western influence J°m eroding traditional Moslem values. e suicide truck bombing of the Marine attalion landing team’s headquarters, 'Ih its 241 fatalities, was the most in- Oimental factor in the U. S. failure to Secure Lebanon.
though political necessities dictated e introduction of U. S. ground units ring both Lebanese crises, only during e first intervention were military regents considered to be a dominant p influential part of mission success; resident Eisenhower deployed a Ma- „ e'Army expeditionary force of brigade Length to end an essentially docile re- lge‘j°n- President Reagan and other allied jj .ers, because of domestic political Citations, landed only a disharmonious ^national regiment to quell a more atde and much larger Moslem versus ristian civil war.
e ”e Vietnam legacy and the War Pow- ^solution of 1973 have produced an of “too many chiefs, not enough Raves’’ by granting Congress the power . nianage all conflicts instead of allows ? an elected President and his selected s . °rdinates to conduct war. The days of V ashing a few amtracs and flying ^bat-laden jets and helicopters over
the beachhead, expecting our adversaries to cower in awe of us, are over. U. S. victories, no matter how small, will be won strictly on the merits of our performance in the field and on the home front.
The true depth of a great nation is measured by how well it learns from its mistakes. Ironically, we did not have a proper critique of our peacekeeping actions in Lebanon because of our stunning political and military victory one-third of
the world away in Grenada. Unfortunately, the problems of Lebanon and the Mideast remain. The greatest danger is not a Syrian-controlled Lebanon—the Golan Heights border area between Israel and Syria has been a model of peace for the Mideast—but a radical Islamic state, a la Iran, sitting on top of Israel’s northern border. Syrian President Assad’s actions are predictable, but as the past has shown, Islamic zeal is not.
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we
will . . . fight our way toward S°v,f home waters” (p. 11), to destroy Sov‘f fleets, bases, and support structures all theaters” (p. 13). Do the President Secretary of Defense, and NATO leader* approve a frontal assault on Soviet na' strength at the onset of war in wate where risks are greatest? What altetj1^ tives did they reject that were designed produce combat on terms more favora to the United States and its allies or lea' the Soviet Navy in isolation?
move
forward, we will wage an aggreSfV. campaign against all Soviet. ■ ■ ball‘s missile submarines,” even in conV ^ tional war, and threaten “direct at,a,, against the [Soviet] homeland • ■ ' (p. 11-14). “Escalation in response maritime pressure serves no useful P pose for the Soviets . . (p. 14)- “
could threats to Soviet SSBNs anti 1 homeland help confine the scope and
► “Ai the [U. S.] battle groups
tween NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the Federal Republic of Germany?
- U. S. naval deployments during the transition to war ‘ ‘must be global as well as early" (p. 10). Fairly even distribution is indicated (p. 36). How would that practice permit the U. S. Navy, already spread thin, to concentrate its combat power at decisive points?
- Intelligence assessments suggest that “initially the bulk of Soviet naval forces will deploy in areas near the Soviet Union, with only a small fraction deployed forward. Soviet exercises confirm such an interpretation" (p. 7). How could the Soviet Navy interfere seriously with U. S. objectives in a conventional war, if only a small fraction deployed forward? Under such conditions, why wouldn’t a passive defense line across the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom Gap protect our sea-lanes? Why are U. S. maritime strategists concerned about a Soviet first salvo, if the Soviet Navy stays home?
► “The United States must be in position to deter the Soviets’ 'battle of the first salvo' or deal with that if it comes," by “rapid forward deployment of additional forces in crisis” (p. 9). Why would exposing additional U. S. ships to Soviet missiles be more likely to deter than invite a (nuclear?) first salvo? What deterrent do U. S. maritime strategists pr°" pose, if the warning time is too short for required reinforcements to deploy forward?
- U.S. “maritime forces must. ■ ■ wea_r
down the enemy forces. . . ?” (pa naval strategy of attrition best suited for the United States, considering present/ projected naval balances and the impera' tive need to reinforce and resupply f°r" ward deployed elements of the U. Army and Air Force soon after hostiliheS commence? What alternatives have been debated and discarded? , ,
- “We are prepared to accept the ?lS
that our nation will make the right decl sions to prevent losses of forces early conflict . . . ” (p. 38). What irreducib ® decisions must be made, and how wou they prevent losses? ,
- The need for “aggressive forwaf movement" of U. S. naval combatant^ “is obvious” (p. 9). “If war comes,
tensity of conflict, a public objective U. S. national military strategy (see. , Secretary of Defense Caspar Wein ger’s FY 86 posture statement)? Do President and Secretary of Defense . lieve that U. S. operations descry would provoke no Soviet retaliation- what basis? , cj
► The United States could eon 1 “forcible entry by the 55,000 men Marine amphibious force" (p. 12)- long would it now take to assemble phibious ships scattered around ^ world, then mount a division-size0^ sault on well-defended shores? Ten )1‘
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from now? How would that action affect all other theaters, which would have to be stripped of amphibious capabilities?
- The U. S. Navy needs “the same size fleet to meet peacetime deployments as we do to fight a war'’ (p.35). How could 15 carrier battle groups, even with an increased operations tempo, accomplish all wartime tasks prescribed by the maritime strategy? How could they avoid attrition during high-intensity naval war (nuclear or conventional)? How could we compensate for disabled or destroyed carriers, of which none are readily available from the Naval Reserve?
- ‘‘In wartime, purely U. S. forces in the Sixth Fleet would have to include three or four carrier battle groups, operating to meet NATO commitments’’ (p. 34). What threat to which U. S./NATO objectives would justify that size force in the Mediterranean, a closed body of water?
- ‘ ‘The Second Fleet is the heart of the Atlantic strike fleet for NATO.” It is responsible for naval operations in all of the Atlantic and neighboring waters, including bits of the Arctic Ocean and the Caribbean. Four or five carrier battle groups are required (p. 34). How could the Second Fleet, even with allied assistance, handle its huge wartime responsibilities with roughly the same size U. S. force planned for use in Mediterranean operations?
- Pacific fleets need seven carrier battle groups, two of which must “meet our commitments in the Indian Ocean, Southwest Asia, East Africa, the Persian Gulf area, and Southeast Asia” (p. 34). What threats underpin U. S. wartime force requirements for the Third Fleet and the Indian Ocean, if the Soviet Navy remains in home waters, as U. S. naval intelligence estimates indicate?
- “One often hears self-appointed strategic experts suggest that’ ’ a carrier battle group ' ‘represents a single target. ” In fact, it disperses over an area of 56,000 square miles (p. 12). What area contains the ships, as opposed to aircraft on the wing? What would happen to the offensive striking power of each battle group, if one ship—the aircraft carrier—were sunk?
- “By the end of the decade, we will have adequate sealift for the movement of military forces. But we will neither be able to tolerate attrition typical of World War II nor provide adequate dedicated sealift to transport the strategic raw materials we will require” (p. II). Sealift by the end of this decade will be adequate to support what forces, where, under what circumstances? How can it be adequate, if unable to move all imperative loads, including strategic raw materials, even in the absence of heavy attrition ■ ► “I also have confidence in the Mantime Strategy because we test it in exercises, in war games, and in real-life scenarios” (p. 15). How many Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs o Staff, or Navy war games have centered on a U. S.-Soviet nuclear war at sea- What assumptions controlled their conduct? What were the outcomes? Ho" many times have umpires ruled that a U. S. aircraft carrier was sunk or disable in a conventional war scenario? When was the last time?
Finally, how does the Navy refute crh ics who, being unable to answer these questions, conclude that America’s man time strategy is based on the best U. case (in which we control events ft0111 start to finish), and that it does not dove tail well with the total needs of other armed services or the nation? wiv wouldn’t more selective aims accompllS essential U. S. missions at less risk an cost?
“The Father of ‘Forcible Entry”’
(See R. S. Rogers, pp. 62-70, November D85
Proceedings)
Victor Suthren, Deputy Chief CuraiC' Canadian War Museum, Ottawa—j Rogers’s article on Lieutenant Genet Sir Ralph Abercromby is a most intern^ ing study of an early practitioner “forcible entry”; it may be inaccura^ however, to portray Abercromby as father of the amphibious assault. .
In 1758, British land forces were serted into the Cape Breton coastline- the face of considerable French opP°s tion, to attack the Fortress of LouisbouhF In the following year, one of the m significant landing operations took Pla^- at Quebec, where the naval forces Admiral Sir Charles Saunders of ^ Royal Navy deposited James Wolfe aj^ his army ashore to defeat the Fren under Marquis de Montcalm de Sal Veran, and thus end, for all practical p poses, the French empire in Amen Indeed, the poorly trained but enthus1^ tic New England force that took L°u ^ bourg in an earlier assault in 1745 seaborne force. Even as early as O the British, under Admiral Edward ^ non, carried out what can only be { scribed as an amphibious assault agal Portobelo in the Caribbean. oUt
Mr. Rogers is quite right to point ^ Abercromby’s refinement of the set of amphibious assault, but that he ( birth to it is less defensible an argm11 in the light of history.
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“The Far Eastern Navies”
(See J. V. P. Goldrick and P. D. Jones, pp. 6065, March 1985 Proceedings)
Yoya Kawamura—The Tokyo Shimbun (21 October 1985)—one of Japan’s leading middle-road newspapers—took offense at the allusion in the Proceedings to an alleged plan for the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) to own an aircraft carrier in the near future. The newspaper, above all, expressed strong displeasure over the fact that the subject, which is almost taboo in Japan, is being discussed overseas. The paper implied
THE TOKYO SHIMBUN
that there must be a sinister intent of uniformed members of JMSDF behind all this. (The newspaper also referred to the 1985 edition of Jane’s Fighting Ships which contains a similar report.) The Tokyo Shimbun article mentioned that on 18 August 1985, the Japanese Defense Agency officially notified Jane’s that absolutely no plan was afoot to build an aircraft carrier for the JMSDF.
The newspaper stated that even discussing this topic tends to incite the Soviets and only serves to exacerbate the military tension in the Far East.
After introducing every possible argument against and citing every disadvantage of Japan’s owning an aircraft carrier, the newspaper ended its long commentary by quoting a member of the Lower House who said: “What is behind this recent carrier hullabaloo is the unfulfilled dream of (the surviving elements of) the Imperial Navy shattered by the defeat in WW II—in other words, an illusion of (the rebirth of) a great Navy.”
Editor’s Note: The Tokyo Shimbun reaches 1.5 million readers each day— nearly twice as many as The Washington Post—in a highly literate, homogeneous population. Unsurprisingly, the Japanese Government regards the mass-circulation dailies as significant reflectors—and molders—of public opinion.
“A POW Camp Lost in History?”
(See D. A. Brugioni, p. 110, July 1985;
Editor’s Note, p. 148, September 1985; R. P. Daley and D. J. O’Hanlon, p. Ill, December 1985 Proceedings)
Reverend Captain Robert C. Belleville, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—Recently I became the Port Chaplain in Quebec City, Quebec. Many of the men taken prisoner in Hong Kong came from the Royal Rifles of Canada, a local militia unit. After reading Mr. Brugioni’s article, I gave it to Mr. Denzil Firth, an exSergeant, Royal Rifles of Canada, who was taken prisoner at Hong Kong. He told me that although he was not at this camp, he would take the article to a forthcoming reunion and see if he could find anyone who recognized the picture. Hence the following information:
The camp was Narumi, in Japan. The three buildings in the left side of the picture held American prisoners from Cor- regidor in the upper building, and Canadian prisoners in the middle and lower buildings. The building in the lower right with “HONG KONG MEN THANK YOU” on the roof was the kitchen. One veteran claims that when the USS Wasp (CV-18) dropped their food parcels, one load demolished the right-hand side of the middle Canadian barracks and also destroyed part of the infirmary (the building in the center with the cross on it). At the end of the war, only four or five Canadians were left in the camp.
(Continued on page 132)
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