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Moscow
The Soviet Navy rarely makes formal public announcements of command changes, even of senior officers. Rather, those interested must keep their eyes on the press for less formal indicators. For example, a second page article in Red Star on 22 October entitled, ‘‘Those Who Should Stand on the Bridge,” by Vice Admiral M. Khronupulo was probably the first identification of him as Commander of the Black Sea Fleet. The title of the article alone made sure that naval officers noted it and, thereby, saw the admiral’s new position. The subject certainly prompted Black Sea Fleet ship commanding officers, in particular, to read the article in full and, thereby, get their new commander’s views on the subject of commanding officer training and responsibilities. The expected promotion of Vice Admiral Khronupulo to full admiral will probably be announced in the same informal way, but perhaps not until his Navy Day article next July.
Such a tight-lipped approach to announcing senior command changes may be appropriate in cases like that of Admiral Khronupulo. After all, those who “need to know” do get the information that affects them. But, in the case of the most important change of command in the Soviet Navy in recent years, the procedure was carried to absurdity.
On 11 December, Red Star carried a small, third page item which announced the visit of Admiral Vladimir N. Cher- navin in Tunisia and referred to him as the Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy and a Deputy Minister of Defense. Until that time, this title had been held by Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergei Gorshkov for almost 30 years while leading the Soviet Navy from a coastal force to a blue water fleet. Admiral Chemavin had been, most recently, one of two First Deputy Commanders in Chief and Chief of the Main Navy Staff.
That article and another similar one following it, were the first public indications of a change in leadership in the Soviet Navy. There were no formal announcements of a change of command, no public honors for Admiral Gorshkov and, indeed, no mention of Admiral Gorshkov to indicate his health, retirement, or, most likely, his movement to a less demanding, honorary, and consulting position.
While such procedures can be understood in light of the traditional Russian penchant for secrecy and in the context of the closed Soviet system, they need not be condoned as acceptable behavior by the international maritime community. If the Soviet Navy aspires to be a first-rate, worldwide, maritime power that is recognized on the high seas, accepted in the ports of the world, and trusted as a party to maritime agreements, it has an obligation to behave with responsibility and adhere to the protocol expected of such a navy. In strictly nautical terms, that means hoisting and flying the flag of the new commander in full view when he is on board and in command. It also means striking the flag of the former commander and piping him over the side with honors upon his relief.
Far East Concerns
Over the past year, the Soviet Union has devoted more internal and external propaganda to opposing U. S. and Japanese military cooperation than to any other issue except nuclear arms control. The propaganda barrage reached its peak in August and September 1985 as the Soviet Union recalled the 40th anniversary of the victory over Japan.
The Soviet view of the Japanese military situation, both then and now, has been described to the Soviet people by major articles in all newspapers. In h- vestiia on 3 September, Marshal Viktor G. Kulikov, Commander in Chief of the Warsaw Pact Forces, wrote of the past:
“As a result of three and one half years of armed struggle, the United States and Britain inflicted great losses on the Japanese Navy and Air Force but were still unable to achieve a decisive victory. At that time the Japanese command still possessed considerable ground forces, and a successful outcome to the war for the allies was impossible without routing them. . . . [I]t was precisely the combat operations of the Soviet armed forces and not the atomic bombing that decided the fate of the Japanese aggressor and accelerated the end ot World War II.
“The Soviet troop campaign against imperialist Japan lasted just 24 days. But in terms of its scope, dynamic nature, and the end results, d occupies one of the most important places among the greatest battles ot World War II.”
Turning to today, he emphasized:
“Literally from the first days of peace, the Pentagon has looked on the Japanese Islands and the southern Part of Korea as a forward base for ',s strike formations and a nuclear bridgehead aimed against the USSRin the Asian and Pacific region. Today there are about 140 U. S. military bases and installations in Japan alone, and the Land of the Rising Sun >s spending over $1 billion on their maintenance. About 50,000 U. S. servicemen and nuclear forces from the U. S. 7th Fleet are deployed there. . . This military-strategic cooperation is becoming increasingly dangerous. . . . Japan has already been assigned a zone of responsibility stretching over a 1,000 mile rad’uS from its shores and, thus, overlapp'11® a considerable part of Soviet territory and territorial waters. .
“The servicemen of the Sovi® Armed Forces cannot ignore Japan militarist preparations, which have a clear anti-Soviet and anti-social* orientation.”
To ensure that they do not ignore it. f1, Soviet military is continually reminded the U. S. military presence in the East. On 24 October, the Soviet Minist1^ of Defense newspaper Red Star told 1 military readers that Admiral Pan' ' McCarthy, Jr., Commander of the U- '
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eventh Fleet, had visited Misawa Air- ,ase> north Honshu, Japan, “where the eployment of nuclear-capable F-16 'ghter/bombers is in full swing.” According to Red Star, “[T]he Commander et it be known that the U. S. Navy is seriously preparing to blockade intema- *onal straits in the Far East and to patrol ae Sea of Japan in the event of a deterioration of the situation in the region.” On November, Red Star also informed its readers of exercise Kubuto-85 near Sen- 31 in Japan, pointing out that U. S. Ma- nnes from Okinawa had participated.
Star also keeps its readers well Posted on the operations of other navies ln ^e Far East. On 9 November, it retried that the Australian ships Perth and talwart had visited Indonesian ports and Were en route to Singapore, Malaysia, an° Hong Kong. On 10 November, it reported British plans to have eight ships, ‘"eluding the carrier Invincible, participate in RimPac-86.
Foreign audiences are continually Propagandized in the Soviet media about "at the Soviets consider to be U. S. Sgressive intentions in the Far East. The ASS international news service on 29 etober reported that “Nuclear-powered ""marines with Tomahawk cruise mis?’ es call at the ports of Japan. Nuclear ases are set up on the country’s terri- oiy. ’ On 13 November, TASS carried a short list of confessions and pieces of v‘dence [that] clearly shows who is hipping up tension in the Far East and here the real . . . threat to peace in the on-?*1 comes from ” It quoted Secretary defense Caspar Weinberger as saying, ur resolve to remain a Pacific nation is ^.“hstantiated by the improvement of our n°rces intended for the region,” and oted his comments on the deployment of "e USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70), the USS tr?1?^ersey (BB-62), and F/A-18 aircraft on t ^ar ^ast- TASS described a report e S. naval operations by a Japanese £ P^rt, citing U. S. exercises close to shores, “including the Sea of ^Khotsk,” and “provocative” P-3C cl* h tS ^rom Misawa Airbase. TASS con- jjraed that “it is the U. S. that has mili- ,77 superiority, it is the U. S. that con- ^ the seas.”
At •
-TfPyg a Weather Eye on NATO
a T^e Soviets also keep their own people ^world well advised of U. S. and Co ■ nava* operations and what they ,unsider the “provocative” intent of 8e operations.
m ,n 30 August, the Moscow television So ‘tly news Pr°gram reported to the Vlet people that “the biggest naval
maneuvers in NATO’s history, codenamed Ocean Safari-85, have begun. . . . About 200 warships belonging to 10 countries in the North Atlantic bloc are involved.”
On 1 September, Pravda carried a column entitled, “Dangerous Hunt in the Atlantic,” on the exercises, stating, “The main role during the exercise is being played by U. S. ships—the nuclear aircraft carrier Eisenhower, the battleship Iowa and the aircraft carriers America and Saratoga.” It went on to conclude that “the exercises that have begun are clearly provocative in nature.”
On the same date, a worldwide Moscow radio broadcast in English carried extensive coverage, detailing the scenario and the forces. It concluded that “The anti-Soviet nature of the NATO naval exercise is obvious to everyone. . . . But as provocative as the NATO exercises . . . are in military terms, politically they are no less provocative.”
The Soviet view of BaltOps-85 was even more alarmist. On 7 October, TASS news service reported to the world “the arrival of the U. S. battleship Iowa in the Baltic Sea.” On 8 October, TASS described the nuclear capability of the Iowa and the USS Ticonderoga (CG-47) and said that “the war games are clearly provocative in nature,” while criticizing Norway and Denmark for permitting U. S. Navy port calls.
It was not until a month later, however, that the Soviet people were treated to a full description of the exercises. On 8 November, the Moscow television weekly prime time program devoted to military affairs, “I Serve the Soviet Union,” carried a report entitled, “Caution, BaltOps-85.” It described the exercise while showing film clips of the Iowa and reporting her characteristics. The program also showed warships engaged in gunnery exercises and F-14 aircraft flying. Vice Admiral Henry C. Mustin was quoted as saying, “The task dictated by naval strategy lies in projecting forces to forward positions and, if need be, waging combat on the territory of the enemy, that is on the territory of Warsaw Pact countries.” The Soviets described the exercises as “unprecedented both in scale and even more, by their provocative intent.”
Tracking the U. S. Navy
Soviet knowledge and reporting of U. S. Navy activities is based on careful monitoring of a wide variety of Western open sources. For example, on 4 September, TASS reported from Washington that “The United States has staged a large scale show of military might by alerting the crews of 44 attack submarines based on the country’s Atlantic coast and taking them out to the open sea within 24 hours.” This report was attributed to Associated Press reports of closed door testimony by Chief of Naval Operations Admiral James D. Watkins and Navy Secretary John Lehman. Likewise, on 11 November, Moscow Radio told its Russian listeners that the United States and Great Britain had reached agreement on the construction of a U. S. nuclear .submarine base at Ascension Island based on a British Sunday Telegraph report.
The Training Year
Soviet military training is based on “Socialist Competition” between units, that is, between divisions on board ships and between ships. It is scheduled and proceeds with increasing complexity over a “training year,” which begins after the annual celebration of the 7 November Revolution Day and lasts until the stand- down of activity for the holiday the following year. During November, the General Staff promulgates the official training goals for the year and, in turn, all military units set their own performance goals by undertaking “obligations” or “pledging” to fulfill those official goals.
The beginning of the process for the 1985-86 training year was marked by an article in Red Star on 20 November entitled, “Competition—Measuring up to Current Requirements,” by Admiral A. Sorokin, First Deputy Chief of the Main Political Directorate.
Admiral Sorokin is highly critical of the “patterned behavior,” “formalism,” and “excess regimentation” in the goalsetting process which, he said, indicated a failure of leadership and the lack of real commitment or participation by unit members. He states that numerous units set goals to become outstanding but do not reach those planned standards and cites the Pacific Fleet as one of the particular places where this occurred. In addition, he notes that some units were chronically poor and that outstanding units should assume an obligation to help them. The patrol ship Rezkiy was cited as an example of one such outstanding unit.
Based on Admiral Sorokin’s article, it appears that the official training goals for the coming year are to raise the overall combat readiness of the forces by placing particular emphasis on “rational” use of material resources and by developing “initiative” in problem solving. Emphasis is also to be placed on improving the living conditions of servicemen and their families.
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