A full evaluation of Washington’s response to the ordeal of TWA Flight-847 must wait the passage of time. Detailed accounts of what transpired will be written in the tradition of the numerous books and articles on the Iranian hostage crisis. But there are preliminary lessons to be learned by evaluating the diplomatic and political moves that took place during the odyssey of Flight-847—not so much to assess how the incident was handled, but rather to raise essential questions about U. S. policy on threats and acts of terrorism. Each incident might differ, but common assumptions about the development of an appropriate response must be addressed—if we are to counter an enduring and growing threat to national security.
Strong Rhetoric—Painting Oneself Into a Corner: Prior to the hijacking of Flight-847, the United States had a declared no-concession policy that could be traced back to the Nixon administration. The government had clearly enunciated a major tenet of that policy in The United States Antiterrorism Program, A Summary Report of the Executive Committee on Terrorism, prepared by the Executive Committee on Terrorism for the Special Coordination Committee, National Security Council, June 1979.
“We will not accede to terrorist blackmail because to grant concessions only invites further demands.”
But suffering the seizure of the American Embassy in Teheran was a strategic failure, despite the fact that the resolution of the conflict was interpreted by some as a diplomatic victory for the United States. The concessions that were granted, coupled with Washington’s failure to use the military option successfully, eroded U. S. credibility in the region.
The current administration has bolstered the declaratory no-concessions policy with an even more hard-line approach. Secretary of State Alexander Haig stated that the war on terrorism would take precedence over the concern for human rights that marked the Carter years. But the ability to take a hard line in response to incidents was tested and again found wanting with the bombing of the Marine Battalion Landing Team Headquarters in Beirut on 23 October 1983. And a major element of U. S. Middle Eastern policy—support for the development of an effective Lebanese Government—fell victim to the geopolitical shock waves that followed the incident.
The Long Commission Report on the tragedy showed insight in assessing the changing nature of terrorism and the actions necessary to counter it. The commission reache the following conclusion in the Report of the DoD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, 23 October 1983 released on 20 December 1983:
“State-sponsored terrorism is an important part of the spectrum of warfare and that adequate response to this increasing threat requires an active national policy which seeks to deter attack or reduce its effectiveness.”
This desire to take the initiative was expressed by Secretary of State George P. Shultz in an address before the Park Avenue Synagogue in New York on 25 October 1984.
“We must reach a consensus in this country that our response should go beyond passive defense to consider means for active prevention, preemption and retaliation.”
The option to use force was enunciated on 25 March 1985 by the President’s National Security Advisor, Robert C. McFarlane, in a National Strategy Research Center news release entitled “Terrorism and the Future of Free Society.”
“We cannot and will not abstain from forcible action to prevent, preempt, and respond to terrorist acts when conditions merit the use of force.”
Nevertheless, this strong rhetoric failed to deter the seizure of Flight-847 on 14 June 1985. Even more disturbingly, the administration was placed in the uncomfortable position of having to translate its words into action. This brings us to the first lesson we should have learned from the Flight-847 incident: Rhetoric—no matter how strong or well intentioned—does not act as a deterrent. Furthermore, a declaratory statement of possible actions can raise expectations that an administration will take actions that may not actually prove feasible in a real crisis. If declaratory statements must be made, they should be general. A statement condemning international terrorism, coupled with general remarks indicating that appropriate action will be taken, is sufficient. The option to use force should be tacitly understood, but should not be stated.
Priorities—Some Hard Decisions: The response to the seizure of Flight-847 was based in part on a number of assumptions used in attempting to resolve previous incidents. These assumptions must be questioned in light of the administration's stated goal of seizing the initiative from the terrorists. And questioning them creates difficult and uncomfortable choices that Washington and the public will have to address when the next hostage-taking or skyjacking takes place.
Since the tragedy of the Munich Massacre in 1972, there have been impressive advances in techniques of response to acts of terrorism. These advances have been particularly notable in the art of hostage negotiation, as authorities have learned new ways to resolve incidents without the use of force or the loss of life. Domestic and foreign police forces have displayed the ability to defuse situations in which hostages are seized, say, during a bank robbery. The same negotiation techniques have also been effective in handling terrorist incidents. But do the assumptions surrounding negotiation techniques apply to handling incidents that involve dedicated fanatics—who are willing to die for their cause, who may be sponsored by a state, and who are now skillfully engaging in a very real if undeclared war against the United States? The case of Flight-847 illustrates the need to question the conventional wisdom surrounding the negotiation process.
An axiom of hostage negotiation is that the primary goal should be the hostages’ safe release. This goal is laudatory, but two vexing questions must be addressed in relating the goal to a politically motivated incident of international terrorism. In the first place, if the seizure is a hostile act against the United States and its policies, Washington itself becomes, essentially, the primary hostage. Tragically, the terrorists often view the hostages—as in the case of Flight-847’s passengers—as no more than cards in a game of armed negotiation. While it is understandable and commendable that the United States will do everything possible to seek the safe release of the hostages, we cannot ignore the long-term ramifications of placing the individual hostages’ lives at the forefront in resolving an incident. The freeing of the passengers on Flight-847 was clearly a tactical victory, but the long-term strategic implications of that incident are still not fully evaluated. In seeking a diplomatic tactical victory, the United States both violated the “no concession” policy, thus encouraging future incidents, and suffered yet another loss of credibility. Through the media, the terrorists were able to engage in “armed propaganda” and make Washington appear powerless, because the hostage-taking enabled a mass audience to personalize the complexity of international politics.
The Flight-847 incident confirmed both the government’s and the public’s tendency to concentrate more on the short-term drama of the hostages’ fate than on the longterm result. The safe release of the hostages is a major goal in an incident of international terrorism, but that goal must also be placed in the context of national security.
The requirement to consider using force at the outset of an incident relates to a final axiom of hostage negotiation—one that may not be applicable to a politically motivated act of terrorism similar to the Flight-847 seizure. Conventional wisdom dictates that time is on the side of the authorities, because they have the preponderance of force and control of the environment beyond the skyjacked aircraft or the barricade. But this axiom did not apply in the case of the seizure of the U. S. Embassy in Teheran, where the Iranian Government engaged in what can be called officially sanctioned hostage-taking; nor in the case of Flight-847 where elements of the host government were either incapable of action or were tacitly supporting the hostage takers. And time will work against the United States in this age of state-supported terrorism.
Taking the Offensive Against Terrorists: We must realize from the hijacking of TWA Flight-847 that it is now time to go beyond a policy of reaction and make “active strategy” a reality. The United States must initiate actions to counter terrorists and the states that sponsor them if we are to break the cycle of response that has characterized the U. S. war on terrorism.
The United States must develop the capacity to have a fully integrated program of terrorism preemption, which not only incorporates the option of using force when necessary, but also includes the capability to identify, penetrate, and apprehend those individuals and groups who are now waging a war against U. S. citizens and interests overseas. Developing this capacity takes time. It may take a decade to train dedicated personnel who have the necessary expertise and skill to take the offensive. But we should do whatever is necessary no matter how long it takes, because today’s terrorism has already become tomorrow’s war.
Dr. Sloan has served as a consultant for organizations in both the public and private sector, that are responsible for dealing with the threat of terrorism. He has authored three books on terrorism, including Simulating Terrorism (University of Oklahoma Press, 1981).