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We’ve all poured our heart out to our boss, spouse, chaplain, or kid and asked, “Right?” only to be told, “I’m sorry, 1 wasn’t listening.” Nobody listens any more. But a few do read. If nobody seems to care what you think about anything, perhaps you ought to contribute to our “Nobody asked me, but ...” column.
Maybe what you have been saying isn’t worth listening to. But, if it is, we may print it and pay you $60.00. If it isn’t, you’ll feel better for having gotten it off your chest.
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and, within proper fora, present
The Military and Politics: A Bad Mix?
At the Current Strategy Forum hosted in June 1984 by the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, Lieutenant General Bernard E. Trainor, U. S. Marine Corps, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Policy, and Operations, said he believed there is an “almost inevitable probability” of limited war with the Soviet Union in this generation. Later in the same forum, Vice Admiral James A. Lyons, Jr., U. S. Navy, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy, and Operations, spoke out on the War Powers Resolution, which empowers Congress with the authority to halt U. S. combat operations within 60 days unless the legislative branch has declared war or enacted specific authorization for the use of U. S. armed forces. He labeled the resolution as “insidious” and an “impediment” that needs to be removed. Admiral Lyons also said that the United States may have to “draw the line” to stop the “cancer” of Cuban exported communism. He further observed with respect to the Navy’s forward strategy, “Today the Norwegian Sea is ours. . . . We intend to keep it so.” In addition, Admiral Lyons stated that the Vietnam War led to a period in which “. . . appeasement became the objective . . . .”
These statements by General Trainor and Admiral Lyons, plus views expressed by Secretary of the Navy John Lehman, were sufficient to energize the Washington press for more than a week. That is not so noteworthy considering that the Democratic primaries were over, the presidential nominating conventions had not started, and Congress was leaving town for the Independence Day recess. We were, after all, in the midst of the “summer doldrums,” and the “silly season” was upon us.
Columnists and editors generally were only expressing their substantive disagreement with General Trainor’s and Admiral Lyons’ views. The appropriateness and propriety of these senior uniformed officers stating their beliefs were not at issue.
Such was not the persuasion of some members of Congress, and it is the congressional reaction which is more troubling. Senator Robert C. Byrd (D- WV), Senate Minority Leader, labeled as “outrageous” Admiral Lyons’ views on the War Powers Resolution. Senator Byrd also chastised Admiral James D. Watkins, Chief of Naval Operations, who earlier this year suggested that Congress should reassess the War Powers Resolution as one means of expiating “. . . the Vietnam syndrome of humiliation and defeat.” Senator Byrd declared,
“It is outrageous that the uniformed leaders of one of our armed services should take to the podium to voice such constitutional and political arguments. They are walking on very thin ice .... // our Admirals wish to debate national law and policy, they should divest themselves of their military duties and authority and run for office as politicians.” (Emphasis added.)
Following Senator Byrd’s lead, others including Admiral Stansfield Turner, U. S. Navy (Retired), and Lieutenant General Dewitt Smith,
U. S. Army (Retired), opined that military leaders should eschew "political issues and limit their public staternen i and advice (and presumably their tfnn I ing, as well!) to technical, tactical, strategic, or “military” concerns. .
Does the First Amendment not apP' to senior military leaders? ...
The unarticulated but probable un i lying concern motivating the reaction^ of Senator Byrd and others reaction* the Newport statements is rooted in traditional fear of the military “ina.n.J a white horse” who challenges pol'11 leadership and subverts the constitU' tional provision of military subordina tion to civilian officials. Though suC concerns are understandable, these c ics overreact when they suggest tha1 military leaders resign if they wish discuss public policy issues, parties ^ larly issues relating to national secU J Indeed, our country would be ill'se^ if its military leadership, which stan as the ultimate instrument of foreign^ policy, were not permitted to voice views on those national security P° cies which it must implement. 1
There can be no question that the . J military must execute without hesiU^ the policy decisions and directives Congress and the President. The h" vll tary cannot establish or execute its national security policies.
However, military leaders shoul > indeed they must, consider, discuss^
views on matters of national secUI?!jr seems unarguable that the Naval W College and the Current Strategy Forum provide such a vehicle. \
The propriety or impropriety eral Trainor’s and Admiral Lyons opinions pale in comparison with importance of their right to considv^ and judiciously express their vie"'* national security matters. Sir Wiljia ^ Francis Butler, a 19th century soldier and author, said it well: nation that will insist on drawing 11 ^ broad line of demarcation between ^ < fighting man and thinking man >s j to find its fighting done by fools a its thinking done by cowards.”
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Proceedings / Noveiri**