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Proceedings / August
A More Relevant Navy
The Italian Air Force general stood before the group of U. S. naval officers to present his portion of the NATO exercise debrief. In heavily accented English, which did not hide his anger and frustration, he asked, “Do you realize I committed a major portion of my annual training budget to this exercise? Why would a NATO member humiliate one of its partners so casually and deprive an ally of needed learning opportunities essential to our common defense?” Without further comment, the general left the room.
Details of this incident should embarrass all thinking members of the U. S. Navy. The exercise provided an opportunity for Italian Air Force squadrons to practice antiship strike tactics against U. S. Sixth Fleet units. Since the Italians had no method for locating the ship, it was agreed the aircraft carrier would follow a prescribed track, with homing beacons radiating.
With formal planning completed and his force at sea, the U. S. commander directed a different plan. The carrier altered her track and went into electronic silence, thereby eluding all Italian training strikes.
During the exercise debrief, the Americans were elated at the success of their ruse. They arrogantly ignored our need for integration with and support from strong allies. It never occurred to them that their “game” had wasted an ally’s resources and earned the lasting contempt of a fellow professional. This lack of cooperativeness and naive infatuation with gamesmanship are small examples of a much deeper malaise that permeates our Navy—a determined unwillingness to face reality.
The U. S. Navy is visible around the world. Its technology is superb, drug use is down, readiness statistics are on the rise. Unfortunately, the real issue is not how eagerly and efficiently the Navy is performing its duties, but whether these duties are relevant.
In 1983, the Navy was elated at the opportunity to steam the USS New Jersey (BB-62) through the Panama Canal
114 to support the Marines in Beirut. The move justified the dollars spent to rejuvenate the battleship. An objective assessment should have included a question such as: Wouldn’t heavier main batteries on existing Sixth Fleet ships have provided more timely support?
During a moderately sensitive contingency operation, an E-2C early warning aircraft, two F-14 fighters, two A-6 attack aircraft, and one EA-3B electronic intelligence aircraft flew cover over ships in transit. The E-2C’s radar was inoperative, both F-14s were incapable of firing missiles as a result of weapon system malfunctions, the A-6s were both “iron bombers” because of radar and computer malfunctions. Only the venerable EA-3B was able to properly perform its assigned mission. Unaware that the tigers overhead were no more potent than an analyst’s paper study, the uninformed ships sailed into potential danger. (I am not suggesting this is typical of current fleet readiness. However, I was the E-2C mission commander and was explicitly “directed” not to inform the ships concerning our status.)
In recent years, I have attended numerous major fleet exercise debriefs. Many of these presentations have claimed achievements unsupported by available facts. False claims were made regarding performance of specific weapon systems. Without rigorous commitment to facts and a willingness to clearly label estimates or informed speculation, the risk of deadly selfdelusion is run.
How has the Navy come to this state of affairs? It is the result of unconscious biases deeply imbedded in our promotion philosophy and current methods for measuring operational effectiveness.
An ensign learns quickly that recognition, advancement, and opportunity accrue to those who strive for efficiency. Contrary to popular public perceptions, blindly following orders with an unquestioning, “Aye aye sir!” is not the path to success. Putting more warheads on the target, getting better results from a smaller working party, a
taut watch—these are the attributes of progress.
Questioning details is acceptable, even encouraged, as long as basic principles are not challenged. Read the comments on the fitness reports of any “front runner”—“aggressive improvement of procedures, better statistics in a given category of performance, superior accumulation of flight hours or carrier landings,” etc.
In reviewing the performances of several hundred officers during a selection board, I found almost no entries in praise of independence of thought, astute questioning of traditional concepts, or clear articulation of bold new ideas in the records of obvious front runners. When such comments were on the record, they generally described an officer ranked as average or slightly below average.
We have a system that stresses statistical achievement. After many years in this competitive environment, it is understandable why an officer’s professional focus tends toward better use of existing resources; pressing weapons delivery to ever-increasing ranges; manipulating 1,000 pieces of data when the best achieved last year was 750; flying more sorties or expending more ordnance per quarter than last year’s record holder. Ships and squadrons are trained and tested to such standards, weapon system requirements evolve from such efforts, budget cycles and analyses that support them are colored with this intense drive to refine and excel.
The Navy has stagnated and calcified in its tactical thinking. Activity is mistaken for progress. Statistics measure only what is done, not what we should be doing. Distorted fleet performance reports become foundations for decisions regarding weapon selection and budget priorities. Contractors’ grandiose performance estimates are blended into predictions of actual combat performance for individual weapon systems and further escalated into assumed capabilities for entire battle groups.
A common criticism from NATO allies, at the working level, is that the
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United States has forced many tactical procedures on other NATO nations.
But when it comes time to execute these concepts in battle groups of mixed nationality, it is usually the U. S. units which are least prepared.
We are philosophically and physically unprepared for tactical nuclear warfare. There is a need for tactical development, training, and equipment to face this form of combat.
The supercarrier and its supporting forces are claiming a painfully large share of the Navy’s resources. As to the carrier’s much-debated vulnerability, how soon we forget that one small rocket, released accidentally on the USS Forrestal (CVA-59) in 1967, effectively eliminated the ship from combat action. Many consider that event a statistical fluke, one small incident under the worst possible circumstances. I imagine the commanders of the Japanese carriers at the Battle of Midway had similar feelings.
The fact that air power is crucial to success in modem sea combat has been distorted by reluctance to embrace new and better approaches to employing such power. Vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) aircraft are the next generation of maritime combat aircraft. The lesson of the British experience in the Falklands is not that large aircraft carriers are vital, only that the British needed a VTOL radar early-warning aircraft to support the Harriers that fought effectively with a highly capable (and cheap) air-to-air missile. With minimal support, engineers have already produced the next Harrier model, doubling its payload and combat radius. One wonders what could be achieved with a research and development budget similar to that lavished on the F/A-18?
Nuclear submariners are justifiably proud of their technical edge and deadly tactical skills. Unfortunately, these tactical skills are too narrowly focused. Submariners are often unfamiliar with fleet missions or tactics and little is being done to integrate their powerful weapons into fleet operations.
Our specialized, thin-skinned, and lightly armed surface ships may in no Way match their assigned missions in a future conflict. Many of our ships lack credible offensive or defensive weapons for antiair, antisubmarine, or antisurface operations. Most of our ships are deficient in their ability to absorb pun- •shment from modem weapons.
Our sophisticated, long-range munitions have price tags that make it impractical to practice with them frequently or realistically. The few training shots permitted each year are so highly prized as hands-on experience, we are rarely willing to make a shot in an “actual” combat environment. As a result, notions regarding probability of kill for such weapons are often a compilation of blatant brochuremanship by the manufacturer and carefully groomed test data, accumulated during politically sensitive acceptance trials.
We have consistently placed higher priority on fielding new weapons than acquiring the stocks of munitions and spare parts needed to make existing systems combat ready for sustained operations. Our high technology industry does not have the potential, even under duress, to churn out a flood of missiles, sonobuoys, or replacement parts without a multiyear buildup.
Our intelligence estimates profess a profound respect for Soviet Backfire bombers—especially during budget reviews for the F-14 fighter or Aegis cruiser—but we do not acknowledge the strong potential of maritime bombers ranging worldwide from U. S. airfields. Such a force could revolutionize many aspects of naval warfare, especially when supported by space-based sensors. (This idea is doubly attractive because it is largely immune to submarine attack.)
We could begin to rectify these shortcomings by turning away from “scenarios.” The Navy’s present approach to selection of platforms, weapon systems, and tactics is to hypothesize a vague mission as a framework and then theorize how a potential enemy will fight. Efforts are then focused to meet the requirements indicated by this scenario. Unfortunately, from Pearl Harbor to the USS Pueblo (AGER-2) incident, the Navy’s ability to accurately predict enemy actions has been extremely poor. It can even be argued that constructing a scenario and devising strong counters to an opponent’s expected actions virtually assures an enemy will take some other tack, to avoid confronting obvious strengths.
A better approach would be to start with basic mission requirements as a foundation. We must be precise in defining missions. Sea control is not a mission, it is a concept. Convoying in hostile waters is a mission, involving aspects of. sea control.
We could then propose, design, test, and produce balanced forces responsive to these missions. While such forces must be capable of coping with future threats, it is essential to maintain objectivity and build against generic threats rather than optimize against likely opponents’ known or projected weapons. We simply cannot predict the specific threat over the 20-30 year lifespans of ships and aircraft.
Next, everyone must be far more rigorous in dealing with the truth. Performance of weapons, tactics, and people must be assessed accurately. Failures should be dealt with in a mature, straightforward manner. Integrity must become more highly valued than any appearances.
Finally, the officer corps must think about naval warfare and sort principles from time-honored habits. War is one of the least predictable of human affairs. It rarely occurs when or with whom we expect. War is invariably inconvenient, and we are usually shocked at the ineffectiveness of our existing capabilities in dealing with the enemy. To prepare for sea combat, the Navy must stick to well-known basic concepts supported by modem but simple weapons. Planners must not forget that victory at sea is rooted more in clear-thinking, aggressive sailors than in sophisticated technology.
We’ve all poured our heart out to our boss, spouse, chaplain, or kid and asked, “Right?” only to be told, “I’m sorry, 1 wasn’t listening.” Nobody listens any more. But a few do read. If nobody seems to care what you think about anything, perhaps you ought to contribute to our “Nobody asked me, but ...” column.
Maybe what you have been saying isn’t worth listening to. But, if it is, we may print it and pay you $60.00. If it isn’t, you’ll feel better for having gotten it off your chest.
The U. S. Navy is strong, reasonably efficient, and very active. The same might have been said of many military organizations throughout history, just prior to bloody lessons in the hazards of tactical and technical complacency. This nation has the rare opportunity to reverse this trend at the cost of a few bruised reputations, a number of gored sacred cows, and several cherished but outdated traditions put to rest. Now is the time to put aside parochialism within our warfare communities and get on with the challenge of creating a more relevant Navy across the spectrum of war at sea.
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Proceedings / August 1984