Eight to nine million barrels of oil are transported daily to Western Europe and Japan by ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz. Because of this oil, the “forgotten” Iran-Iraq War has become a powerful factor in the national strategy of the United States.
Iraq has threatened to destroy Iran’s oil exporting facility at Kharg Island in the Persian Gulf with Exocet missiles launched from French-supplied Super Etendard fighter-bombers. Iran has threatened to block the Strait of Hormuz or attack oil tankers from other gulf states.
In his press conference of 22 February 1984, President Ronald Reagan said that the United States was committed to keeping the Strait of Hormuz open. The U. S. Navy, with a carrier battle group in the vicinity of the strait, has become the leading edge of that commitment as diplomacy and force merge as instruments of national foreign policy. The presence of the U. S. battle group has added importance because this local war could precipitate a major crisis involving superpowers. Sea control, strategic deterrence, projection of power ashore, or presence—what is the role of the U. S. Navy and, in particular, of the carrier battle group in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea?
Before addressing that question, it is important to understand the historical developments of the area, any of which could have contributed to the war. These include unsettled questions rooted in the Islamic development in the area surrounding the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers; long-standing territorial disputes concerning navigation rights on the Shatt al-Arab, which forms part of the border between Iran and Iraq; and the decades’ old pursuit for autonomy by the Kurdish tribes that inhabit both countries.
Religion: The social and political organization of the Iran-Iraq area in pre-Islamic days centered around tribes whose leader was elected by elders from the most prominent family in the tribe. The leaders were sheikhs in Arab tribes, khans in Iranian tribes, and aghas in the Kurdish tribes.1
The tribes were both urban and nomadic. The urban tribes built garrisoned cities, which became the seats of power for the ruling leaders who attempted to control the surrounding areas by forming fluid alliances.
Into this tribal world was born Mohammed in the city of Mecca in Saudi Arabia in 570 A.D. Mecca was a wealthy commercial center almost monopolizing trade between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean. The tribes respected the Meccans because of their business acumen, intellectual abilities, and self-restraint. But, Mohammed preached against the social excesses and divisions that existed in Mecca. Thus, the Meccans, fearing the effects of his preachings on the successful trading economy, opposed Mohammed. Furthermore, acceptance of his denunciations of the extremes of wealth and poverty and the injustices of class barriers threatened the existing political structure and authority.2
Mohammed was engaged by Medina, 200 miles north, to mediate disputes between warring tribes. In 622 A.D., he and his followers fled to Medina and brought order there. After a series of battles between Mecca and Medina, the two cities joined forces under Mohammed’s leadership.
The tribes of the area were divided into groups by Mohammed, and since no fighting was permitted among those tribes that had accepted Islam, Mohammed’s religion, their energies were directed outward. Their conquests were considerable. After Mohammed’s death in 632 A.D., a period of dissension occurred, but this was overcome by the success of a raid on Palestine ordered by the caliphate (caliph meaning successor) and eventually by the conquest of Persia,* Iraq, and Syria.3
Islam spread throughout the Middle East in the 7th century with Arab conquests. The spread, however, was accomplished through an acceptance of Islam by the conquered peoples as the conquering Arabs tended to permit existing infrastructures and religions to remain. The Arabs were more interested in revenue than converts, and they remained in disciplined garrisons rather than mingling with the conquered.4
The Arab conquests proceeded rapidly, and Persia was subdued by the Caliph Omar in 642 A.D. The Persians accepted Islam, but they accepted Ali, cousin and son-in-law of Mohammed, as the true descendant of Mohammed rather than the conquering caliphs.
On the other hand, the Iraqis, conquered also by Arab tribes, accepted the authority of the conquering caliph. The dispute between the Iranians and the Iraqis about the caliphate arose from secular desires for power amidst intrigues of family rivalry and assassination.
In 656 A.D., rebels from Egypt killed Uthman, the third caliph, and elders of Medina. The supporters of the assassins made Ali caliph. Umayyad Muawiyah, the governor of Syria and a relative of Uthman. challenged Ali for the caliphate. After indecisive battling, Muawiyah agreed to submit the dispute to arbitration. The decision was made in favor of Muawiyah, and the caliphate was lost to the followers of Ali, the Shiites, forever.
Shiism is derived from “Shiat Ali” or partisans of Ali who opposed the government of the Umayyads because they believed it was oppressive and secular. In essence, this was a political rebellion against an orthodox state. Ali maintained his claim to the caliphate but was assassinated by dissidents in 661 A.D. He was the last of the caliphs to originate in Medina.
Sunni is derived from the “way” of Islam, which is based on the society Mohammed created in Medina.5 Muawiyah moved the caliphate to Damascus and made succession hereditary.
The Shiites continued to attempt to regain the caliphate and supported Ali’s second son Hussein in his claim for it. The Umayyads killed him in the battle of Kubala in Iraq in 680 A.D. The battle perpetuated the dispute between Shiite and Sunni as the Shiites elevated Hussein to martyrdom and refused to accept the legitimacy of the Umayyads.6 The followers of Ali were predominantly Persians, people from a territory that had not been and eventually would not be again part of the Arab empire.
The Abbasids, descendants of Mohammed’s uncle Abbas, challenged the Umayyads next. They were victorious and moved the caliphate to Iraq and built a new garrison at Baghdad in 750 A.D.
Over the course of centuries, Crusaders from Europe, Mongols from Asia, and Turks ruled Persia. But Shiite Islam remained strong.
In 1499, in Persia, the Safavid dynasty rose to power in the form of Ismail who, supported by Turkish tribes, consolidated his power through successful military action. Ismail’s lineage was traceable to Ali, and he proclaimed Shiism as the religion of Persia. Ismail was a charismatic leader. His followers viewed him as priest and king and often fought for him without armor to win martyrdom, a Practice that has been observed in the “human waves” Iran has sent against Iraq in today’s war.
As H. A. R. Gibb wrote in his book, Mohammedanism, Persia was not the original home of Shiism, and there are indications that in the early centuries, Shiism was a standard revolt against the ruling classes rather than theological opposition to Sunni doctrine; however, Ismail’s proclaiming it as Persia’s national religion made Persia a Shiite state.
In summary, the Sunnis accept the legitimacy of the leader in authority, however he may have attained his position, and the Shiites acknowledge no one as a legitimate ruler unless he is a descendant of Ali. The Shiites accept the authority of a leader as long as he abides by their guidance in following and upholding the Sharia, the laws and rules governing the Moslem way of life. The Sunnis have no intermediary between them and God, and modem day Sunni religious officials, in Iraq for example, are paid by the state. The Shiite religious officials have no allegiance to the state as such and are remunerated by their religious communities, in Iran for example.
In the centuries since the Safavids, the Sunnis generally were in political power in what came to be the Ottoman Empire, of which Iraq was a part, and Shiite primacy continued in Iran.
Territory: In 1821, the last campaign between the Ottoman Empire and Iran was begun. Iran defeated the Turks in 1823, and the Treaty of Erzerum was established. In conjunction with that treaty, Iran conceded territory to the Turks, because the Iranians were concerned about a Russian invasion from Afghanistan. This concession gave Iran “friendly” relations with its Ottoman neighbors.
In 1842, Great Britain and Russia held a conference in Erzerum in an attempt to avert war between Iran and Turkey as a result of border hostilities. The 700-mile border between the two had not been clearly defined in 1823 and was a source of dispute. A commission was formed to demarcate the frontier, and after four years of discussion, the second Treaty of Erzerum was signed in 1847.
The 1847 treaty also addressed the Shatt al-Arab waterway. The land to the east of the river belonged to Iran, and Iran was given freedom of navigation on the river, which is formed by the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates as they join the Iranian Karun River. The Shatt al-Arab is about 130 miles long, and 55 miles of it forms the border between Iran and Iraq.
The so-called Mixed Commission, which consisted of Turkey, Iran, Russia, and Britain and was specified as a dispute solver in the Erzerum treaties, met in 1849, 1850, and 1851 at Mohamera and Baghdad, but did not conclude an agreement. In 1851, British Foreign Minister Lord Palmerston suggested a border be drawn in Constantinople by representatives from Turkey and Iran with assistance from commission members. Despite subsequent difficulties between Turkey and Iran and additional Mixed Commission intervention, the last boundary marker was erected in October 1914, thereby completing the demarcation of the border.7
The Mixed Commission agreement, the Constantinople Accords, also addressed the Shatt al-Arab. Iran did not receive control of the river except for a three-mile area near Abadan, a port about 25 miles upriver from the Persian Gulf. The 1847 Treaty of Erzerum was therefore affirmed once again.
This was the last border controversy with the Ottoman Turks since that empire disintegrated during World War I. The area that became present-day Iraq was a mandate of the British after the war, and the internal struggles involved in Iraq’s march toward nationhood suspended the Iran-Iraq border dispute until 1932 when Iraq achieved independence and joined the League of Nations.
Iranian border incursions stemming from dissatisfaction with the Shatt al-Arab demarcation led to another treaty in 1937, which was no more satisfying to Iran. The Iranians believed the British forced them to accept it.8 Oil had been discovered to the east of Abadan in 1908, thus border demarcation became important. Great Britain had the major influence in Iraq and wanted to ensure that oil for its naval ships was transportable on an Iraqi-controlled river.
As a result of the 1937 treaty, the border remained on the Iranian side of the Shatt al-Arab, and Iraq had sovereignty over the river. The area excepted from this demarcation was around the Iranian ports of Abadan, Khorramshahr, and Khosrowabad, where the border was the thalweg or the center of the river’s navigable channel. Also, according to the treaty, ships on the Shatt al-Arab were to employ Iraqi pilots and fly the Iraqi flag, except in the thalweg area, and a joint commission was to be established to administer the river.9
Beyond the British interest, why all the concern about the river?
Since Iran has three ports on the river, it naturally wanted to control them. Khorramshahr is particularly important because it is located at the junction of the Shatt al-Arab and Karun rivers, which is also the southern delivery/pick-up point for the trans-Iranian railway. It is more cost-effective for a ship to transport material to the railhead here rather than to a port in the Persian Gulf.10
The river is considerably more important to Iraq because it is the country’s primary maritime access to the gulf. Basra, Iraq’s only commercially important port, is located about 50 miles upriver from the gulf. Next to the river are crude oil pipelines, and a major tank farm is located at Faw near the mouth of the Shatt al-Arab. The Shatt al-Arab is Iraqi maritime business’s only link to the Persian Gulf. Iran, on the other hand, has considerably more opportunity for gulf access through other ports. Thus, geographically, Iraq’s most important economic tie to the outside world is unprotected—at least for as long as unfriendly relations exist between the two countries.
Because of relative stability within Iran and Iraq, both countries avoided confrontation regarding their common border from 1937 until the Iraqi revolution in 1958.
The 1958 revolution in Iraq disturbed relations between the countries because the monarchy-to-monarchy comfort factor was removed. The Shatt al-Arab dispute was not now only a territorial dispute but activated ideological differences also.
In a press conference in November 1959, the Shah of Iran addressed the problem of Iraqi interference with Iranian ships on the river:
“In the past we had agreements with Iraq on the Shatt al-Arab which were never respected by Iraq. . . . Naturally a river which forms the boundary between two nations cannot be used exclusively by one side only. . . . We cannot accept the imperialistic policy of Iraq in this respect. . . .”11
Both sides reinforced their frontiers, but no conflict ensued. Iran perceived Iraqi military strength to be too great, and the revolutionary regime of Iraq did not wish to engage itself in a war so soon after consolidation of power. The dispute ended in January 1960 with nothing settled and nothing having changed hands; the waterway situation, however, had been further exacerbated.
In August 1960, Iran wanted a joint commission established to administer the river. Iran also wanted vessels entering Iranian ports to be piloted by Iranians rather than Iraqis. Iraq countered by having its river pilots strike, thereby stopping river traffic to and from Abadan. Because of this economic stranglehold, which caused Iran to lose about $30 million, the Iranians were forced to drop their demands in April 1961.12
The Shatt al-Arab dispute remained dormant for almost ten years, while relations between Iran and Iraq improved since both countries had less-than-fervent relations with Gamal Nasser’s United Arab Republic.13
But in April 1969, Iraq informed Iran that, since the river belonged to it by the 1937 treaty, all Iranian-flag ships would be required to lower their flags and all Iranian nationals should disembark while in the river. In response, Iran abrogated the treaty. Iranian naval forces went on alert in the gulf, and Iran notified Iraq that interference with its ships would result in conflict. To give credence to its assertion, Iran escorted its ships on the Shatt al-Arab. Iraq did not attempt to enforce its position.14
A truce evolved between December 1970 and July 1971 as both countries cooperated with the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to force oil prices to new levels. Deterioration began again, however, when Iran laid claim to three islands—Lesser Tumb, Greater Tumb, and Abu Moussa—and when Iraq expelled 30,000 Iranians from the country. As a result, diplomatic relations were broken.
Iraq invited Iran to resume diplomatic relations in 1973 after Iraq had transferred some of its troops northward to the Syrian border in response to the 1973 Arab-lsraeli War. Although relations were resumed, Iraqi troops were again deployed along the Iranian border when the ceasefire occurred in the Arab-lsraeli conflict.15
Strained relations continued between the countries. Iranians even engaged Iraqi military aircraft as they fought against Kurdish rebels in Iraq. In March 1975, at the OPEC meeting in Algiers, the Algerian president was instrumental in causing direct talks between the Shah of Iran and Iraqi Vice-President (now President) Saddam Hussein to occur. They reached agreement on three major points:
- The territorial border would be marked on the basis of the Constantinople Protocol of 1913 and the minutes of the demarcation meeting of 1914.
- The border at the Shatt al-Arab would be the thalweg.
- The border would be patrolled by both Iran and Iraq, preventing sabotage and terrorism (that is, Iran agreed not to assist the Kurds in Iraq).
Regular meetings concerning the border took place between the two countries, and no major incidents occurred until the revolution of February 1979 in Iran. Subsequent to the revolution, differences arose, and Iraq abrogated the 1975 agreement on 12 September 1980.
The Kurds: Between seven and 12 million people spread throughout a crescent-shaped region in the Middle East (Kurdistan) divided among Turkey, Iraq, and Iran. These are the Kurds. Their language is Indo-European, and they remain distinct from the other peoples of the region they inhabit. The Kurds have not been a political entity in and of themselves. They have been ruled by Armenians, Persians, Turks, Arabs, and Byzantines. The Ottomans were able to attract the Kurds to a semblance of allegiance against the Iranians on the basis of religion— the Kurds are Sunnis and the Iranians are Shiites.16
The Kurds have been and continue to be a vocal minority within Iran and Iraq. Both countries have used the Kurds to their advantage. At times, both were interested in suppressing Kurdish activity in unison. In 1963, Iranian authorities discussed the possibility of conducting joint operations against the Kurds.17
Iran, however, aligned itself with the Kurds who, like the Iraqi Shiites, opposed Iraqi moves toward Arab unity and who could weaken the Iraqi Government and prevent it from settling other issues. Whenever relations between Iran and Iraq improved, the Kurd question essentially disappeared.
Renewal of the Shatt al-Arab dispute in 1969 encouraged Iraq to seek a settlement with the Kurds. Although the Kurds could not overthrow either government, they could be a considerable nuisance.
In 1970, secret negotiations between Iraq and the Kurds led to national autonomy of the Kurds. The Kurdish language was recognized, Kurdish rebels were granted amnesty, and proportional representation within the government and the armed forces was ensured by constitutional provision. The secret agreement never was fully implemented. Hostilities ensued and Kurdish resistance began again—this time with assistance from the United States. Iran, and Israel.18
The 1975 Algiers agreement again “solved” the Kurdish question. The issue was dormant until the Iranian revolution, when the Kurds apparently saw an opportunity to renew their demands for autonomy. The Khomeini regime was not sympathetic to them since any minority group autonomy within a nation comprised of about 50% minorities would be potentially divisive.19
There has also been varying degrees of Soviet support for the Kurds, because they could have provided visible difficulty for Iran during its alignment with the United States.
Impact and Projections: The deep-seated, complex differences between Iran and Iraq are amplified by both the oil factor and the antagonists’ mutual desire to be the dominant state in the Persian Gulf region.
Iraq has officially stated its war aims to be:
- Recognition by Iran of exclusive Iraqi navigational rights on the Shatt al-Arab
- Return of Abu Moussa and the Tumb Islands to Arab sovereignty
- Application of self-rule to the Arabs in Khuzestan
Iran has demanded:
- The removal of Saddam Hussein and withdrawal of any remaining Iraqi forces from Iranian territory
- Admission of aggression by the Iraqis
- Reparation of the cost of the war
- Recognition of Iranian rights on the Shatt al-Arab
Until the divergence of war aims is narrowed and the extremism of at least some of each country’s demands is modified, or until one side (more probably Iraq) collapses under the strain of military and economic attrition, the war will continue. Formal disengagement will not occur (although both states would probably like to disengage) until one finds a way to end the combat without losing face. Outside powers could possibly intervene by mediation or by applying heavy pressure to force the conflict to end.
Khomeini’s abhorrence for Saddam Hussein (because Hussein forced Khomeini out of Iraq after he lived in exile there for 14 years) will not disappear, but it could be put on ice for the time being.
The religious motives of the Iranian revolution are heated and fervent. With time, however, religious fervor displayed on the battlefield will not contribute to the well-being of the Iranian economy. Neither will it sustain the principles of the revolution. As Crane Brinton, a recognized historian of revolution, has written, “There is no eternal fanaticism.”
Oil is the economic asset of both countries. Although Iran is involved in an Islamic revolution that scorns traditional methods of business, Iran has, in fact, devoted considerable energy to increasing its oil production and regaining its former non-U. S. markets. Although both countries seem to be trying to normalize their external affairs, oil will remain as the major factor of the war, because of the revenues needed to conduct the war and because of internal economics. The most serious future threat to the quantity of oil exportable may result from the internal oil needs of Iran and Iraq, as each country rebuilds and continues its economic development.
The United States and Western Europe are not the only concerned parties. Japan is particularly threatened by the war and is attempting, without success, to encourage both sides to stop fighting. Tokyo is providing technical aid and trade to both countries, and Japanese diplomats have reportedly shown Iranian leaders computer projections demonstrating that a war of attrition is a losing one for Iran also.20 Japan would suffer a catastrophic loss if Iraq bombed its $4 billion petrochemical project (Japan’s largest overseas venture ever) at Bandar Khomeini, an Iranian Port city on the Persian Gulf.21
The ripple effect of this “forgotten” war will be increasingly severe each day the fighting continues.22 It is a losing situation for both Iran and Iraq. Oil in the region is a finite resource. Every drop wasted in supporting a war effort is one less drop that can provide revenue for the real needs of the area—projects to assist in distribution of the water from the Tigris and Euphrates for agriculture, housing projects, education, transportation, and other lifestyle-advancing projects.
The threats against Kharg Island by Iraq and against the Strait of Hormuz by Iran seem to be manifestations of each country’s desire to bring the war to a conclusion. The presence of the U. S. carrier battle group in the vicinity of the Strait of Hormuz could provide the leverage of credible force that, if skillfully employed, could provide disengagement by diplomatic negotiation rather than battlefield victory.
The function of the U. S. battle group’s presence is to deter either Iran or Iraq, or any other state that suddenly becomes interested in providing assistance to either party, from making an international waterway or the right of free passage via international sea-lanes a factor in resolution of the war. Accompanied by periodic formal statements, regarding the mission of the battle group, the operations of the ships cannot be misinterpreted by any observers, regional or global.
The battle group’s presence could remove the threat to close the Strait of Hormuz as an issue and permit the diplomats to negotiate. Thus, U. S. naval forces can provide the initial means for implementation of a national strategy component designed to permit a nagging foreign policy situation to be solved.
1. Avi Plascov, Security in the Persian Gulf 3: Modernization, Political Development and Stability (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982), p. 4.
2. H. A. R. Gibb, Mohammedanism (London: Oxford University Press, 1949), p. 3.
* The names Persia and Iran will be used interchangeably in this article; however, the change in name from Persia to Iran in the late 1940s was a reversion to what was considered historically correct since Persia refers to only one part of the area encompassed by Iran. Firuz Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864–1914 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. xii.
3. William R. Polk, The Arab World (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), p. 5.
4. Ibid., p. 49.
5. Polk, p. 42.
6. Thomas W. Lippman, Understanding Islam (New York: Mentor Books, 1982), p. 127.
7. Sir Percy Sykes, A History of Persia (London: MacMillan and Co., 1930), p. 365.
8. Author’s interview with Ambassador Mahmaud Foroughi, former Iranian Ambassador to the United States, 1960–1965, on 18 November 1983.
9. Robert Litwak, Security in the Persian Gulf 2: Sources of Inter-State Conflict (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981), p. 1.
10. Stephen R. Grummon, The Iran-Iraq War, Islam Embattled (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1982), p. 6.
11. Shahram Chubin and Sepehr Zabik, The Foreign Relations of Iran (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), p. 173.
12. Ibid., p. 176.
13. Ghareeb, p. 60.
14. Chubin and Zabik, p. 186.
15. Litwak, p. 5.
16. Edmund Ghareeb, The Kurdish Question in Iraq (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press), p. 5.
17. Chubin and Zabik, p. 180.
18. Litwak, p. 15.
19. Ibid., p. 17.
20. Earl W. Foell, “Why Japan is Taking the Lead on Cooling the Iran-Iraq War,” The Christian Science Monitor, 17 October 1983, p. 1.
21. Youssef M. Ibrahim, “Japan Threatened by Iran-Iraq War,” The Wall Street Journal, 8 November 1983, p. 38.
22. Edmund Ghareeb, “The Forgotten War,” American Arab Affairs, Summer 1983, p. 59.