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What is the motivation behind the Soviets’ growing military presence in Syria? Members of the military and political communities in Israel and the United States commonly assess this involvement as a deliberate move by the Soviets, designed to demonstrate the intensity of their support to Syria and to upset the military and political constellation in the Middle East.
The Soviets have generally followed two patterns in establishing military presence in the Third World in general and the Middle East in particular. The first is an advisory buildup attached to the local army, and the second is the dispatch of independent units in the local country. The more common of the two is an advisory buildup attached to the local army of a friendly state. Every arms deal signed between the Soviet Union and a client state includes, in addition to the supply of arms and military equipment, the supply of technical and advisory assistance, designed to help the local army absorb the new weapon systems.1 This technical assistance is carried out, both in the Soviet Union and mainly in the client state, by Soviet military personnel attached to the local army.
The assistance rendered to the local army by the advisory buildup attached to it is manifested in four fields: ► Delivery, assembly, and maintenance of the purchased weapon systems
► Training of the local personnel in the operation and maintenance of the weapon systems ► Instruction of the local officers by means of preparing training plans and participating in exercises and maneuvers, etc.
► Participation in the operational activities and planning of the local army2
In accordance with these functions, Soviet military personnel in local armies may be divided into three categories—advisers, instructors, or technicians. Each has a different mission and assignment. An adviser is a Soviet officer attached to the local commander both in field and staff units. His mission is to advise the local commander on matters relating to the operative activity of his unit. The rank of the adviser varies with the local commander s rank. The Soviets usually attach to the local command^ an officer with identical rank.3
An instructor is generally a junior officer who traiPs personnel in the operation of the new weapon systems- Most instructors are concentrated in the training faciliheS of the local army.4 A technician is assigned to support the local army in absorbing the new weapon systems by pr°' viding the army with technical assistance and instruction in the maintenance of these systems.
The goal of Soviet military personnel assigned to in local army is to assist under leadership of the local con1' manders. In contrast, the presence of independent Soviet units is designed to ensure the military and strategic inter' ests of the Soviet Union itself. These units do not have any contacts with the local army, nor support it in its routine activities.5 However, independent units are sometimeS used in support of the local army, both in peace and war’
The independent presence may be manifested in severa forms: naval presence (maintenance facilities or ships in a local port), aerial presence (air force and air defense units), and ground presence (intelligence and electron^ warfare units or fighting formations).
What is the operative significance of distinguishing be' tween these two forms of establishing a presence? There are several reasons.
First, ignorance of the difference may result in mistaken assessments of the size and activities of the Soviet military personnel in the local country, not to mention mistaken assessments of future trends. These measurements are crd' ical since the Soviet Union does not publicize its military assistance, including presence in friendly countries, and we therefore must rely on Western sources, which often are inaccurate and unreliable.6 On the other hand, if are aware, for example, that the size and composition 0 the advisory buildup are derived directly from the pattern of arms supply to the client state, we probably could deter'
Vith President Hafez Assad’s face pasted on their trucks, Syrian s°ldiers departed Beirut after the 1982 Israeli invasion. But they did n°t leave Lebanon, and staying behind with them, as part of the Itibillion dollar Soviet arms deal, are their Soviet advisers and Capons whose presence might quickly escalate a new Arab-Israeli h(lr from a regional into a global conflict.
mine quite accurately the exact number of Soviet military personnel attached to the local army and keep track of the Soviet influence on the local army.
Second, independent presence in a client state, such as naval facilities, is regarded by the Soviet Union in most, if not all, instances as a pay-off received in return for their military assistance extended to that country (a part of which is the advisory buildup). Identifying the advisory buildup with the independent presence confuses foreign policy goals with foreign policy instruments.
Finally, dispatching independent units to a local state implies the Soviet Union will be directly involved in the military and strategic affairs of the region in which this state is located. In other words, Soviet independent presence signifies a higher degree of willingness to intervene on behalf of the local state and, consequently, has far more political and strategic significance than does the presence of Soviet personnel in the local army.
Soviet Military Involvement in the War of Attrition: Soviet military intervention on the largest scale in a Middle Eastern war occurred in Egypt during the War of Attrition from March 1969 to August 1970. This was the first case in which Soviet troops were sent in significant numbers to participate in a local war outside the Eastern bloc.
In April 1969, a month after resuming heavy artillery bombardments along the Suez Canal, President Gamal Nasser of Egypt formally abrogated the cease-fire, which had ended the 1967 Six Day War, and declared a “War of Attrition” against Israel. Egypt aimed to exhaust Israel with a prolonged static war along the canal. The Egyptians believed this the best way to offset the gap in militaO technology between the Israel Defense Forces and the Egyptian Army. On 20 July, Israel reacted by launcher massive air attacks against Egyptian positions on the west bank of the canal. By the end of 1969, the Israeli A,r Force gained total air supremacy over the canal.
This was followed in January 1970 by a series of Israe1 air raids against military targets deep in Egyptian territory- and Israeli Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan declared on 24 January that because Egypt wanted neither peace nora cease-fire, “all Egypt is the battlefield.”7
As a result of the Israeli strategic air raids, Nasser secretly visited Moscow from 22 to 26 January 1970 to per' suade the Soviet leaders to undertake the air defense ° Egypt. The visit proved to be a turning point in Sovie1 military involvement in the Middle East. Between Marc1 and August 1970, a complete Soviet air defense district- including surface-to-air missiles, interceptors, radar n1' stallations, and antiaircraft guns, was erected in EgyP1' This was the first instance in which independent Soviet units became directly involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict-
Soviet missile crews, estimated at about 1,500 air de' fense personnel, arrived in early March and began to in' stall SAM-3 missile sites around Cairo, Alexandria, and >n the Nile Valley.8 To these were added some SAM-2 sites and large numbers of radar-controlled ZSU-23-4 four-barreled 23-mm. antiaircraft guns designed for use aga'nsl low-flying aircraft. By the end of March, about 4,00u Soviet military personnel were manning the missile sites, by 30 June, the number had risen to about 8,000, and by the end of 1970, almost 15,000 troops were manning 75 to 85 independent missile sites.9 At the same time, about 15 Soviet-piloted MiG-21 “Fishbeds” were deployed in sl* Soviet-controlled airfields in the Egyptian hinterland (Eh Mansura, Inshas, Cairo-West, Jiankalis, Beni Suef, an° Aswan).10
In addition to these aircraft and air defense units, the Soviets also dispatched intelligence and electronic warfare units, which included four high-performance MiG-27 “Foxbat” aircraft for reconnaissance/photographic m|S' sions and an unknown number of electronic warfare units designed to jam the guidance systems of the Israeli Hawk surface-to-air missiles and the navigation systems of the Israel Air Force fighter planes. These units were deployed in the Soviet-controlled air bases mentioned previously-
All these Soviet units operated independently of the Egyptian Army, yet in cooperation with it. They were not attached to any Egyptian units.11 The first independent Soviet surface-to-air missile sites became operational on 15 March.12 By 13 April, there was irrefutable evident that Soviet pilots had assumed responsibility for the a,r defense of the Nile Valley.13 Initially, the Soviets tried to keep a low profile. Their fighters were painted with EgyP' tian markings.14 They refrained from threatening, much less attacking, Israeli aircraft intruding deep into Egypt'011 airspace and limited their activity to the area over the Nde Valley, avoiding the Suez Canal entirely.15 This strategy directly influenced the course of fighting. On 6 Aprfl- Moshe Dayan announced his government’s decision to end the raids deep in Egyptian territory. Dayan added that
^rael would continue its aerial strikes, confining them to 116 canal zone, to guarantee a hold on the canal. In referee to this more limited action, he added that he hoped this distinction exists with the Russians.”16 Apparently, the Soviets did not adhere to the role Dayan ^ad assigned them, and, having denied Israeli aircraft acCess to the Egyptian hinterland, they started advancing heir units. On the first day of June, it was reported that Soviet-manned batteries had been moved toward the eanal. Toward the end of the month, Soviet involvement 'n the canal fighting escalated. On 30 June, together with lhe Egyptian Army, the Soviets moved forward 12 batter- les of improved SAM-2s and several SAM-3 batteries, and ’hey shot down two Israeli F-4 Phantoms.17
In the first week of July, the Soviets drew closer to the possibility of committing their own forces to battle. They began to fly over the northern and southern ends of the canal front.18 It was not long before Israeli and Soviet planes clashed. On 25 July, Soviet-piloted MiG-21s intercepted Israeli A-4 Skyhawks on a bombing mission near
47
Proceedings / April 1984
the canal, but the Israeli aircraft escaped. Five days later, Israeli aircraft baited, ambushed, and downed four MiG- 215 piloted by Soviets.19
Soviet independent presence in Egypt was not limited to air defense. It was manifested in naval forces as well. Following the sinking of the Israeli destroyer Eilat on 22 October 1967 by an Egyptian “Komar”-class patrol boat, the Soviets dispatched surface combatants to Port Said and Alexandria to deter Israeli retaliatory air attacks on these ports. From then on, the Soviets maintained a permanent naval presence in Egyptian ports until their expulsion on 14 April 1976.20 When in Egyptian ports, the Soviet ships were maintained by Soviet repair facilities granted to the Soviet Union by Egypt following the Six-Day War. These facilities included a large dry dock, two floating docks and repair yards in Alexandria for the exclusive use of the Soviet Navy, and the facilities of the former British naval base at Port Said.21
In addition to the use of Egyptian port facilities, the Soviet Navy was permitted to base about 20 Tu-16, 11-38, and electronically configured An-12 planes in Egypt, thereby providing its fleet with substantial reconnaissance support.22 As mentioned, the continuous presence of Soviet ships in Egyptian ports was intended to deter Israeli air raids on the ports of Alexandria and Port Said, which it did. But more important, the Soviet naval presence, including that of the naval patrol aircraft, was designed for Soviet independent strategic needs, namely to conduct reconnaissance of U. S. and other NATO naval forces in the Mediterranean and outflank them.
Besides the independent Soviet presence, there was also quite a large advisory buildup attached to the Egyptian Army. The Soviet advisory personnel were deployed in all branches of the Egyptian Army; there were reports of Soviet personnel assigned to every air and naval base, military training facility, and major maintenance depot in Egypt.23 Soviet advisers and technicians were also deployed in the operational ground units, where they penetrated down to the battalion level in artillery and armored units.24
Considering the size of the Egyptian Army—three armored divisions, four mechanized divisions, four infantry divisions, 18 commando battalions, and two paratrooper regiments—and the depth of penetration of Soviet personnel into the army, we may assume that 800 to 900 advisers were deployed in the ground forces and the air defense units.25 If we accept the figures given by Sa’ad El Din Shazly, the Egyptian chief-of-staff during the 1973 Arab- Israeli War, in his memoirs regarding the number of instructors (about 100) and assume that the numbers of technicians were more or less identical to the number of advisers and instructors together, we should conclude that the size of the Soviet advisory buildup in the Egyptian Army was approximately 2,000 personnel.26
The size of this advisory buildup was not affected by the War of Attrition, and there was no remarkable growth in its scope during that war. The unprecedented growth of the Soviet military presence in Egypt at that time resulted from the appearance of the independent units in Egypt and not from a growth in the size of the advisory buildup.
As for the participation of the advisory buildup in the fighting of the War of Attrition, the only information indicating such involvement relates to the Soviet personnel deployed in the Egyptian air defense units. For example- among the 12 batteries responsible for the downing of the two Israeli F-4s on 30 June, there were, in addition to the Soviet-manned batteries, Soviet advisers in the Egypt!311 batteries participating in this operation. Thus, both independent Soviet air defense units and Soviet participation it1 the Egyptian units contributed to this engagement.27
Soviet Military Involvement in Syria Since the Peace of Galilee War (June—July 1982): Since the “defection” °! Egypt to the Western sphere of influence in the mid- 1970s, Syria has gradually become the main Soviet mil!' tary foothold in the Middle East, at least as far as military presence is concerned. Similar to their previous involvement in Egypt, the Soviet involvement in Syria found its manifestation both in the forms of an advisory buildup and an independent presence.
The Soviet-Syrian arms deal of July 1972 signified a turning point in the military relations between the two countries under President Hafez Assad of Syria, who had come into power in 1970. Until this deal, Assad had tried to diversify his arms arsenal and to minimize his military dependence on the Soviet Union. Consequently, the Soviet presence in Syria was limited and consisted of only a few hundred advisers and technicians deployed with the Syrian Army.
The large quantities of arms that arrived in Syria as a result of the July arms deal and the considerable growth in the Syrian Army between July 1972 and October 1973 directly affected the Soviet advisory buildup, which expanded in less than a year to include about 1,500 advisers and technicians.28 This growing tendency continued i'1 1973-75, as the Syrian Army was rebuilding from its losses in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, and was finally stabilized in 1980 when the Syrian Army completed a modernization scheme that included the addition of an armored division. Soviet personnel penetrated to the battalion level in the ground forces, battery level in air defense units, and squadron level in the air force.
Considering the size of the Syrian Army—six armored/ mechanized divisions, two independent armored brigades, four independent mechanized brigades, five commando regiments, and one paratrooper regiment—and the depth of Soviet penetration, we may assume that there were about 2,000 Soviet advisers, instructors, and technicians deployed in the Syrian Army on the eve of the Peace of Galilee War. Similar to the buildup in Egypt a decade before, the armed confrontation between Israel and Syria did not affect the size of the Soviet advisory buildup. It remained more or less constant during and after this confrontation. There has not been any marked growth in the Syrian Army since this war. True, the Syrians started forming another two divisions, but the process is in its preliminary phase and is not expected to be finished before the end of this year. And even so, creating a new division does not necessitate more than 50 extra Soviet advisers and technicians.
Consequently, the growth of the Soviet presence, be- bveen 4,000 and 5,000 personnel, in Syria during the first half of 1983 cannot be attributed to a growth in the advi- s°ry buildup, but rather to the appearance of new indePendent Soviet units in Syria.
The installation of Soviet-manned SAM-5 missiles in Syria does not mark the first appearance of Soviet independent units in Syria. During the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, a,r defense missile units under exclusive Soviet operation and control were sent to Syria and deployed at Latakia and Damascus to protect ships and aircraft involved in massive Sea- and airlifts.29 Since 1976, Soviet ships have been Permanently stationed at Tartus port. This naval presence ls more limited in its scope than that in Egypt was. It eonsists of a few maintenance ships, which repair ships and submarines of the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron.
The current Soviet military independent presence in Syria is of a wider scope and a more demonstrative nature lhan that of 1973. It is composed of four components. First, according to Israeli intelligence sources, there are four SAM-5 missile batteries in Syria; that is, two SAM-5 regiments.30 Second, there are electronically configured helicopters designed for electronic warfare purposes and flown by Soviet pilots.31 Third, Soviet submarine visits to Tartus are more frequent. Finally, the Soviets have erected a telecommunication center for direct operational contact between Damascus and Moscow.32
Outlook for the Future: The Soviet military presence in Syria and that in Egypt during the War of Attrition are 'tearly the same. In both cases, the independent presence has been defensive and supportive and found its manifestation in air defense units, naval units, and intelligence/ electronic warfare units. Until now, the Soviets have refrained from dispatching fighting ground formations, such as airborne units, to the Middle East.
The participation of Soviet personnel in the fighting of both the War of Attrition and the 1973 Arab-Israeli War either by means of advisers or independent units, has been cautious, gradual, and designed to present a low profile. For example, the Soviets refrained from engaging their advisers, deployed in the front-line ground units, in the fighting.33 Further, during extreme tension, the Soviets Pulled back their advisers in the ground units. This occurred when Syrian armed units invaded Jordan in September 1970 and Lebanon in 1976.34 In spite of these preProceedings / April 1984 cautions, however, Soviet personnel did participate in the fighting, mainly in air defense, and inflicted losses on the Israeli Air Force.
The main and, actually, only difference between the Soviet presence in Egypt and Syria is the scope of the independent involvement, which was much wider in Egypt. (The advisory buildup was somewhat identical in both cases.)
What may we conclude from this comparison regarding the current Soviet involvement in Syria and its future implications? From the military point of view, there will not be a significant growth, if any at all, in the advisory buildup as long as there is not a large growth in the Syrian Army. However, since the first months of 1983, the Soviets have deviated from their custom and permitted their advisers to remain with the Syrian ground forces in Lebanon.35 Although the actual number of Soviet advisers in Lebanon is limited, their presence may signify both a willingness by the Soviet Union to engage them in future fighting and a step toward legitimizing the presence of the Syrians in Lebanon.
On the other hand, as long as Soviet SAM-5s remain in Syria there may be a widening of the Soviet independent presence in Syria, either by the installation of more SAM-5 missiles or by the appearance of Soviet-piloted interceptors. Such a widening of the independent presence would not be a deviation from the current level of intervention. Rather, it would be a complementary step, since interceptors are integral to any air defense district.
Regarding the political and strategic implications of the current Soviet presence in Syria, the common view, especially in Israel, considers this presence destabilizing to the Middle Eastern strategic equation. I reject this view. The installation of the SAM-5 missiles in Syria is a stabilizing rather than a destabilizing factor.
Since any Soviet involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict by independent units is a direct action, its potential
cost is much higher than an intervention by means of an advisory buildup. The risks inherent in a direct involvement are twofold, since it arouses the probability of direct armed confrontation with Israel and a superpower. The United States views an advisory buildup in the local army as a legitimate mode of involvement since it is integral to an arms deal. However, it considers the independent presence a deviation from the unwritten rules of the game. From the U. S. point of view, independent Soviet involvement places the U. S. local client state (in this case, Israel) in a direct confrontation with the rival superpower and imposes on the United States an urgent need to take action on behalf of its client should hostilities break out. And the U. S. dissatisfaction with the installation of the SAM-5s has been reflected quite clearly.36
But if in peacetime, the potential risks of the independent involvement might be somewhat balanced by its gains—a rise in the Soviet prestige and credibility, strategic advantages vis-a-vis the Sixth Fleet, etc.—this situation is changed in war. Should a war begin, the Soviets will face a dilemma. On one hand, the Syrians expect the Soviets to participate in the fighting; on the other hand, the Soviets are aware that operating their missiles against the Israeli Air Force will probably lead to destruction of the missiles, thus putting the Soviets in a most undesirable situation. If the Israelis attack Syrian military targets and injure or kill Soviet advisers attached to the Syrian Army, these casualties are a by-product of the Syrian losses and may pass unnoticed and without publicity (unless there is specific incentive for one of the belligerents to make it public). But if the Israelis attack Soviet independent units, they will be directly attacking exclusive Soviet targets, thus pressuring the Soviets into acting in retaliation to preserve their prestige as a superpower. In such case, there is a danger of the conflict passing from the regional into the global arena.
Therefore, since the Soviets realize the risks involved in another war in the Middle East, they will do their best to prevent the Syrians from initiating another armed confrontation with Israel. The Soviets found themselves in this exact situation a decade ago in January 1970. Nasser visited Moscow, asking the Soviet leaders to take responsibility for the air defense of Egypt:
“Then Nasser produced his bombshell. The only way to bridge this gap, he said, would be for the Russians to give Egypt the necessary crews. Brezhnev and the rest were not prepared for this demand. . . . Brezhnev said that this would be a step with serious international implications. It would provide all the makings of a crisis between the Soviet Union and the United States. . . . ‘This will involve a considerable risk [he said] and I don’t know that we are justified in taking it.’ ”37
After deliberation and after Nasser threatened to resign, the Soviets agreed to send their independent units to Egypt, but they were not eager to do so, and they were well aware of the seriousness of their act.
The Soviet independent presence in Syria should be regarded as a stabilizing factor rather than a destabilizing one, since its pay-off is much higher in peacetime rather than in war. During peacetime, it enables the Soviet Union to reap political and strategic gains by indicating the Soviets’ resolution to back their local client without risking anything. This arrangement would be turned upside down if a war broke out.
Therefore, in the long run, the Soviets would probably prefer to withdraw their independent units from Syria (as there are indeed some indications these days to this tendency). But to refrain from antagonizing the Syrians, the Soviets might turn the SAM-5s over to the Syrians. By doing so, the Soviets would both avoid the risks involved in the existence of independent units in Syria and keep their credibility and prestige vis-a-vis their Arab clients- ‘Arms Flows to LDC's: US-Soviet Comparisons, 1974-77 (Washington, D ^ CIA, 1978), pp. 1-2, ii.
2R. Pajak, “Soviet Arms Transfers as an Instrument of Influence,” Survival, Juu August 1981, p. 169.
3Sa’ad El-Shazly, The Crossing of the Suez (San Francisco, CA: American Mi East Research, 1980), p. 164.
4M. Heikal, The Road to Ramadan (London: Collins Son & Co., Ltd., 1975)* P’ 150.
5Shazly, p. 164. ^
6There are Western journals that sometimes publish information leaked to them an introduce it as reliable information.
7 J. D. Glassman, Arms for the Arabs: The Soviet Union and War in the Middle Eas (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1975), p. 74.
8R. Pajak, “Soviet Arms and Egypt,” Survival, July-August 1975, p. 167.
9London Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 1970, p. 47.
I0Ibid.
"Shazly, p. 166.
12A. Z. Rubinstein, “Air Support in the Arab East,” S. S. Kaplan, edDiplomacy of Power (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1982), p. 474.
13L. L. Whetten, The Canal War: Four-Power Conflict in the Middle East (Cam bridge, MA: MIT Press, 1974), p. 95.
14Premier Golda Meir revealed this on 5 May. Jerusalem Domestic Service, 5 May 1970, FBIS-Middle East and Africa, p. HI.
15B. Dismukes, Jr., and J. McConnell, eds., Soviet Naval Diplomacy (New York- NY: Pergamon Press, 1979), pp. 229-230.
I6Glassman, pp. 77-78.
17Whetten, pp. 108-109.
18Dismukes and McConnell, p. 232.
19Glassman, p. 79.
20A. N. Shulsky, “Coercive Diplomacy,” in Dismukes and McConnell, Soviet Naval Diplomacy, p. 119.
21 Pajak, “Soviet Arms and Egypt,” p. 168.
22M. Vego, “Moscow’s Quest for Naval Facilities in the Mediterranean,” Defease and Foreign Affairs Digest, December 1979, p. 14.
23 Pajak, “Soviet Arms and Egypt, ” p. 166.
24Ha’aretz, 23 September 1971.
25 According to Shazly, there have been 870 advisers attached to the Egypt,an Army. Shazly, p. 164.
26The number of technicians should be close to the number of advisers and instructors because the technicians had to be deployed, as a result of the nature of the*r duty in most of the Egyptian units, like the advisers and unlike the instructors- 27Dismukes and McConnell, p. 232.
28During July 1982 to October 1983, the Syrians established three additions ground brigades and a few commando and paratrooper battalions.
29Glassman, p. 134.
30Financial Times, 1 March 1983.
31Ma’ariv, 28 April 1983.
32Ha’aretz, 28 April 1983; Ma’ariv, 28 April 1983.
33Glassman, p. 134.
34B. Kalb and Marvin Kalb, Kissinger (Boston, MA, 1975), p. 207.
35Ha’aretz, 25 April 1983.
36The U. S. Minister of Defense Caspar Weinberger told the NBC television network that the existence of the SAM-5s in Syria arouses the prospects of another war. Yediot Acharonot, 1 March 1983.
37Heikal, pp. 86-87.
Mr. Karsh is studying for his PhD in international relations at Tel-Aviv University. He is a retired officer of the Israel Defense Forces, where he was involved in military and strategic research.