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This aircraft carrier definitely wouldn't be a sitting duck; her ten jet engines (atop the wing rather than below) would elevate her at 600 knots to a height of 40,000 feet, out of harm's way, where her two-ton remotely piloted craft, most of them recoverable and reusable, would deploy to launch their variety of warheads, including nuclear.
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As the fifth year of each five-year plan for the Navy has been approached, the number of ships and aircraft to be provided the Navy has been reduced. The U. S. fleet has dwindled to the point where the most recent Chief of Naval Operations had to say, in what must have been one of the most painful statements of his remarkable career, that the fleet can no longer meet its commitments against the fleet of a continental power which has an economy only one half as strong as that of the United States.
Our “island nation,” with increasing import and export requirements and worldwide commitments, has also let its merchant fleet dwindle from the world’s foremost to one inadequate to support our commitments and our economy. More than one shipyard is now building its last ship, and many maritime suppliers have gone out of the ship business.
If existing trends are allowed to continue for ten years—which is equivalent to about two proper development cycles—the United States and its allies probably will have suffered serious, perhaps irrevocable, defeat by the communist world. The Soviets have been investing more capital in building a strong merchant marine and weapons of all kinds and in technological development in these areas than the United States and its allies. The Soviets have stated that they will not be out-produced by any nation in weapons; and with their willingness to inflict privation on their people, they may match their boast.
Clearly, the United States must identify and develop solutions to meet the threats posed by the Soviets.
An examination of the Navy’s main functions should suggest which critical areas seem most appropriate for change.
Strategic Missiles: So long as even a small portion of the seas can be controlled by the United States, the Poseidon-Trident submarine-launched ballistic missile system will be effective. Since the early 1950s, submarine systems have been the stable base of our strategic systems. The Trident will be effective until an antiballistic missile (ABM) system, or something even more exotic, is perfected. The awesome power of each ship means that few will be required. The fact that the Soviets have built an equivalent system means little to the stability of the mutual deterrent.
Attack Submarines: We can barely man the nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) we now have. We also have difficulty building them fast enough to keep up with the attrition to age of the number we now have. This force has a powerful antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capability. Unfortunately, it is greatly outnumbered and is now being surpassed technically by a growing Soviet submarine force whose main task—i.e., sinking surface ships—is much simpler than ASW. Adding cruise missiles to our SSNs will increase their strategic and antisurface capabilities, but the mission flexibility of this force remains limited, its speed of response is slow, and its expandability and replaceability are very low.
Surface ASW: Too small in numbers to protect convoys carrying even minimum support to our overseas troops, much less vital support to our allies and to protect imports vital to the U. S. economy, U. S. surface combatant forces are increasingly vulnerable to torpedo, mine, and missile attacks. Outnumbered by Soviet surface forces, our surface forces will surely be committed to support of our carrier battle group forces in an effort to control the seas and project force. Today, we cannot expand or replace this force with the speed we did in World War II. The Royal Navy’s recent experience off the Falk- lands probably points up the need to change the traditional meaning of “ASW” to “at sea war.”
Amphibious Warfare Forces: Although amphibious warfare forces have advanced technically since World War II, they are untested against modern opposition and must be limited to small operations against limited opposition. Their reaction speed is low compared with the speed with which crisis situations can develop today. The force’s vulnerability during transit to an operating area could be high, and its logistic support capability is limited. In any case, amphibious war on a scale truly critical to the United States must follow a U. S. victory at sea. In fact, the logistic buildup necessary for an amphibious operation could require a victory at sea.
Mine Warfare Forces: With effective technology and small, but expandable forces, our offensive mine warfare capability is high and of great potential importance. But, our fleet is vulnerable to similar or greater capability in the hands of the opposition, and our defensive mine warfare forces are weak.
Non-Shipboard ASW and Reconnaissance Forces: Reconnaissance satellites, sonar surveillance system (SOSUS), and other sensor systems are effective and highly vulnerable. Our land-based naval air forces are effective, short ranged, and small in reasonably expandable numbers. We have failed to make use of the reconnaissance value of thousands of fishing and merchant vessels. Project “Arapaho,” which could add naval value to the merchant fleet by providing merchant ships with a naval air capability, has been under study for almost 20 years and has yet to become operational except in the Royal Navy’s Falkland operations.
Carrier Battle Group Strike Forces: There has been little change in the carrier concept since World War II, and there have been few tests of the concept in naval conflict. There have been vast improvements in the operational capabilities of carrier aircraft and their sensors and weapons. The carriers also have been improved sufficiently to support frontline aircraft, and nuclear power has greatly reduced their logistic vulnerability. But their speed remains the same, and the carrier’s vulnerability relative to current weapons remains about the same. But other factors have changed.
In less than half the time required to build one modern carrier, we built dozens of large and scores of small carriers, and we built thousands of aircraft. In World War II, the war zone of main carrier ac- homing signals for enemy weapons. Modern satellites, aircraft, and sonars have vastly increased the detectability of our strike forces.
tivity was relatively small. Today, the threat is worldwide. In World War II, we could concentrate our carrier forces—and had to—to win. Now, we are constrained to one or two carriers to an area.
As one of Captain Marc Mitscher's three officers of the deck in the Hornet (CV-8), it was a great comfort to us during the Doolittle Raid and the Battle of Midway that the enemy did not know where we were. Those days are gone: the modern inability to operate without electronic emissions provides
In World War II and since, our carriers have not been faced with a serious threat of sabotage. Now, however, our nation is filled with smuggled drugs, perhaps weapons, and certainly spies, and yet the United States still depends on a personnel security
system which was designed to be no more than reasonably effective for a short war. The opposition has had time to place dedicated individuals into our system. This vulnerability is accentuated by the small numbers of carriers and the large numbers of people per carrier.
We are not building enough of our wonderfully capable carrier aircraft to keep up with accidents and obsolescence. The numbers of carrier aircraft today—far fewer than World War II numbers—are small compared with the number of possible targets. If one can judge by Israel’s 1973 war experience and Argentina’s experiences over the Falklands, the vulnerability to modern defensive missiles may make manned aircraft prohibitively expensive. And we may not find out until too late.
What we have is slightly more than a dozen of history’s most powerful naval strike forces; but they may not be sufficient to deter or win the next war. These forces are necessary but not sufficient! And we cannot get more soon!
In the past, this kind of dilemma has often foretold innovation. The truly vital importance of, size of investments in, and age of the concept of the carrier battle group make it promising for innovation.
Many years ago, I was surprised to hear an airline executive point out that a mere seven Boeing 707 jets could outcarry the largest, fastest passenger liner in the transatlantic trade and at much-reduced fares. The complete replacement took place in half a dozen years.
The airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft have completely obsoleted the ground-controlled intercept concept which won the Battle of Britain. Carriers even carry their own radar disccarrying aircraft for control of naval air operations.
In the last dozen years, three U. S. corporations have produced hundreds of “wide-bodied jets,” with huge payload and range potentials for amazingly cheap air travel. These aircraft probably operate more reliably than do surface ships. There is nothing which says that in another development cycle planes two to three times as big cannot be developed. The newly feasible computer-aided design and manufacture will make the effort all the more possible.
We have recently watched the most intimate communication with men on the moon and precise control of satellites millions of miles into space. The technology of very compact, relatively cheap communication and control through complex, secure, redundant, time-dispersed signals is here. We are close to being ready to employ remotely piloted aircraft in all the usual functions of war planes. At least three U. S. corporations are capable of developing, beyond presently produced drones, the variety of remotely piloted aircraft which may be required.
Those familiar with the establishment of requirements will recognize the logical circularity which exists—i.e., the requirement has not been established because the feasibility has not been shown because the requirement has not been established sufficiently to justify funds to establish feasibility. An arbitrary input is required in logical theory. The input must be a synthesis of ideas, and this synthesis must precede analysis, or the analysis will probably be in error. Pentagon files are loaded with fruitless analyses. Yet, experiments flying aircraft from a converted collier in the early 1920s led. in a decade, to the aircraft carriers Lexington (CV-2) and Saratoga (CV-3). Surely, we can do as well now!
The following, then, is an effort to synthesize the concept of what must be added to U. S. capability following interim experiments with existing widebodied jets.
No doubt creative engineers and analysts can refine and improve the concept. Tapping skills of our allies could be important to realizing true innovation in many areas.
The function of the aircraft carrier will be elevated to 40,000 feet, speed will be increased to 600 knots, numbers will be expanded greatly, and pilots will be kept in the carrier.
There will be four fleets: two Navy and two Air Force. Each fleet will consist of 125 aircraft two to three times the size of a 747; 25 of these will be in upkeep at any time. Each aircraft will be a jet which will fly at about 600 knots and 40,000 feet, vastly increasing the electronic horizon. Each aircraft will be a carrier of 100 missiles and remotely piloted aircraft and about ten remotely controlling pilots. Each carrier will carry about 40 other people.
With an optimum commonality, the two-ton remotely piloted craft (RPC) will come in the number of variants required to meet the variety of missions assigned. The RPCs’ long ranges will enable the carriers to avoid combatant contact. The RPCs must also have range sufficient for coordinated attack in concentration from many carriers in their flying formation. In concentration, numbers are important as n squared, not just n.
Most of the RPCs will be recoverable and reusable. Therefore, the carrier will require a boom or drogue recovery arrangement. And the RPCs will carry various warheads, including nuclear.
The carriers will be air refuelable and adequate tankers must be provided to ensure the viability of this concept. Some carriers will be able to refuel rapidly by scoop at the surface, much as firefighting planes now reload.
Some of the carriers will be amphibious, using the principle of an air cushion vehicle for landing on land or water. A hydro-ski may be used to augment the system providing stiffness. The engines of these aircraft may be atop the wings rather than below.
The hundred carriers flying as a fleet will be controlled as a fleet—i.e., a group of units so equipped and controlled as to sweep all before it. This is distinguished from the usual Air Force concept of central control of, for example, uncoordinated B-52s which act more like privateers or blockade runners than as fleets.
To accomplish the control and coordination, both ground-launched and fleet-launched orbiting relays will be developed. Very high-flying drone relay planes also might prove to be viable.
Provisions will be made for the launching of gliderwinged command active sonobuoys. About 8,000 of these sonobuoys will be carried by each carrier. Satellites will monitor the sonobuoys and the RPC attack. Provisions will similarly be made for the rapid laying of mine fields.
A fleet of the proposed carriers should be able to insonofy the North Atlantic in 100 hours. The two Navy fleets should aim at the capability to destroy all surface opposition in 100 hours. They then can concentrate on war against subsurface and, with the Air Force, land forces.
The complexity of these operations will require that vast quantities of information be presented on large screens in each carrier. Provision also will be made for optimum use of laser communications, target designation, and weapons.
This effort could be accomplished in two proper development cycles; feasible interim steps also exist. A development cycle lasting more than five years is probably an indication of too high a ratio of lawyers and accountants to engineers. It is unfortunate that we cannot pass out case histories on how the U-2 and YF-71 were developed. The Polaris program is another fine example of how a complex concept can be made into a viable military capability.
What is proposed can be done. And given the added effectiveness which this concept offers, it would cost less than existing systems produced in adequate numbers.
The President’s recent efforts to stabilize mutual nuclear deterrence systems will no doubt increase demand for systems to deter war short of nuclear. The “elevated fleet” is an important step in that direction, which it would be most perilous to allow the other side to acquire first.
Captain Laning graduated from the U. S. Naval Academy in 1940, Berkely in 1950, and the National War College in 1960. During World War II, he served in the Yorktown (CV-5), Hornet (CV-8), Salmon (SS-182), and Stickleback (SS-415). He was the first commanding officer of the USS Seawolf (SSN-575), the Navy's second nuclear ship, and the USS Proteus (AS-19), the first Polaris tender. After retiring in 1963, he became a corporate planner with United Aircraft Corporation until 1971. He is now a full-time free-lance author.
_______________________________ „__ A Questionable Answer-------------------------
By the very nature of the mission, pilots at the Navy’s Advanced Air Navigation Squadron sometime experienced a degree of professional frustration. To compensate, one pilot developed the in-flight instructional technique of asking the student navigators questions on basic airmanship. Although he attempted to tailor the frequency and difficulty of these questions to the individual talents of the student navigators, the pilot would occasionally become overenthusiastic and overwhelm the students. Recognizing the problem, some navigation instructors counseled the pilot to reduce the quantity of his questions and to orient some of them toward the navigation problem.
On the next flight, the pilot began asking questions and was pleasantly surprised that the highly competent navigator answered correctly. As the questions continued, the student’s responses began to get curt. Remembering the advice of the instructor navigator, the pilot finally asked, “Nav, are we north or south of course?”
The navigation student immediately replied, “Flight, that depends ... are you sitting in the pilot’s or copilot’s seat?”
Lieutenant Commander T.Q. O’Rourke, USN
Binnacle Bill, the Sailor
As an ensign instructor in seamanship at a Reserve midshipman's school in early 1942, I was conducting an oral quiz in seafaring terminology.
“Mr. Jones,” I said, “please define the term ‘binnacle list’.”
The midshipman addressed, who did not have a reputation as a scholar, hesitated only a moment.
“A binnacle list, sir, is ... ah ... a list of a ship to port or starboard caused by having too many binnacles growing on one side of the bottom."
Commander Edward P. Staffor, USN (Retired) (The Naval Institute will pay $25.00 for each anecdote published in the Proceedings.)