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was that they might close the Straits of Perim in retaliation. Fortunately for the West, the threat was not backed by action.
But one does not have to go back far to see what might have happened. Such a threat was made to the north at the Straits of Tiran, which control the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba, bordered by Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. In 1956, just before war broke out between Israel and Egypt, Egypt’s Colonel Nasser closed all shipping to Israel through the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran. The International Convention of 1888 provided that “the Suez Maritime Canal shall be free and open, in time of war as in time of peace, to every vessel of commerce or of war, without distinction of flag.” Naturally, in time of war a nation is not going to keep a major canal open to enemy shipping. Unfortunately for Israel, when the Straits of Tiran were also closed to any ship wishing to proceed to Eilath, the Israeli port in the Gulf of Aqaba, nearly half of that country’s supplies —including oil—were threatened. Of course, war ensued for that and other reasons. Before the 1956 war broke out, nearly 20 nations stated that the Straits of Tiran and all international waterways must be kept open, but when it came time to act, after Colonel Nasser had closed the Straits, only four nations remained behind their original pronouncement, and they did nothing.
On 22 May 1967, President Nasser again announced his intention of blockading the Straits of Tiran. On 23 May, Israel’s Prime Minister, Levi Eshkol, declared in parliament: “The Knesset knows that any interference with freedom of shipping in the Gulf [of Aqaba] and the Straits [of Tiran] constitutes a flagrant violation of international law. ... It constitutes an act of aggression against Israel.” Aqaba was a veritable lifeline for Israel. On the same day, President Lyndon Johnson said, “The United States considers the Gulf [of Aqaba] to be an international waterway and feels that a blockade of Israeli shipping is illegal and potentially disastrous to the cause of peace. The right of free, innocent passage of the international waterway is a vital interest of the international community.” But the United States did not send in ships, and war broke out on 5 June.
If South Yemen, as Moscow’s surrogate, wishes to close the Red Sea entrance at Perim, if only to shipping intended for one or two nations, such as Israel or Egypt, war no doubt could erupt without warning. Israeli intolerance of such violations of international law is well recorded in recent history. It is not clear what the United States would do in the event that its flag were barred from this waterway.
It is in the best interests of every nation to support the United Nations- sponsored Law of the Sea which the United States has not yet signed. This international treaty is not enough, however, although it does provide the necessary legal basis for condemning unilateral closure of an international waterway. But long-term economic sanctions, for instance, which might result from such a condemnation, are no answer for crises which require immediate resolution. Swift actions—within a matter of days at the most—must sometimes be taken, if hostilities are to be avoided. Warning nations not to break the law—international maritime law, in this case—is not enough. The resolve, the strength, and the tactical plans must be ready before a flare-up occurs.
The United States has not warned the countries surrounding the Straits of Perim that it will not tolerate threats or acts to close the Red Sea. The United States must do so. The United States must develop plans to act quickly in concert with other world naval powers to meet such a contingency.
Dr. Scham received a Ph.D. in French Colonial History from Durham University in England. He is writing a book about the French in Africa.
The Brazilian Naval Modernization Program
By Eduardo Italo Pesce
The Brazilian Navy’s shipbuilding program for the 1980s has received presidential approval, indicating that the naval modernization effort will proceed, regardless of inflation and the price of oil imports in Brazil. So far, a new training ship based on the Vosper-Thornycroft Mk-10 Niterdi- class frigate design has been ordered; four of 12 locally designed corvettes and one of three submarines of German design have been authorized for construction in Rio de Janeiro. Additional ships—including a new carrier of unspecified type—will be ordered later in the decade.
Brazil has the second largest merchant shipbuilding industry in the world, and many of its commercial shipyards can also build naval auxiliaries and small combatants. Major warships can be built at the Rio de Janeiro Navy Yard, and the Bureau of Naval Engineering is developing a local naval ship design capability.
The Brazilian Navy’s main task is the protection of shipping lanes, reflecting the role it played in the Battle of the Atlantic during World War II. This mission has led to an emphasis in antisubmarine warfare (ASW), while antiair warfare (AAW), antisurface warfare (ASUW), and projection of naval power ashore have received less attention.
The present fleet composition is suited to a classical “escort” role, with an ASW carrier, ASW and general purpose frigates, and World War II-vintage destroyers, as well as submarines, mine warfare ships, and auxiliaries. Concentration in convoy and ASW tactics was encouraged by the now-defunct U. S. Naval Mission after the war, the only exception being the development of a modest amphibious lift capability. The current modernization program will help to correct some deficiencies of equipment, but the basic mission remains the same.
In a likely war scenario, submarines would still present the primary threat to South Atlantic sea-lanes, on which most of the Middle East oil supplies pass. However, in another Battle of the Atlantic, cruise missiles—not torpedoes—would be the main antiship weapons, rendering classical convoy tactics obsolete.
Against the threat of antiship cruise
missiles launched by submarines, aircraft, major surface warships, or fast attack craft, the lack of adequate area and point defense antiair capabilities would be suicidal. Therefore, if the Brazilian Navy is to remain a credible combat force in the future, its AAW capability must be enhanced.
To be effective against the cruise missile threat in an open-ocean environment. a small balanced fleet should include at least one small carrier or “sea control ship” (with vertical/ short takeoff and landing [V/STOL] fighter-attack aircraft and ASW helicopters), an adequate number of surface escort ships (armed with area defense surface-to-air missiles, antiship missiles, and light ASW helicopters), submarines, mine warfare and logistic support ships, and land-based long-range patrol aircraft. Such a fleet could be afforded by Brazil without any large increase in its naval budget.
During this decade, the Brazilian Navy will face block-obsolescence of most of its ships. To counter this trend, a naval modernization program began in 1977. It will replace obsolescent ships with new Brazilian-built units, providing for at least I carrier, I new training ship, 12 small frigates officially classified as corvettes, 3 submarines, 6 minehunters, and several patrol craft, amphibious warfare ships, and auxiliaries. It emphasizes standardization and local production of shipboard equipment, and all ships, except submarines, are to be locally designed.
Until these vessels are built, the navy may have to accept reduced force levels, unless it decides to acquire a number of smaller, unsophisticated ships for less demanding duties. This “high-low mix" approach is the most cost-effective way to provide the required number of vessels to perform the Brazilian Navy's mission, which—like most Third World navies—involves many non-military duties.
Small numbers of sophisticated, high-mix ships, such as aircraft carriers and guided missile frigates, are needed to form the nucleus of the fleet, while larger numbers of low-mix ships can be used in support roles. Low-cost commercial designs could be modified to perform a variety of naval roles as auxiliaries, amphibious warfare ships, or patrol craft.
The fleet flagship and the Brazilian Navy’s only aircraft carrier is the 19,890-ton Minas Gerais (A-11), a Co/oss/M-class ex-British light fleet carrier that will reach retirement age by the end of this decade, with no firm replacement in view. The ship carries an air group of Grumman S-2A/E Tracker ASW aircraft, Sikorsky SH- 3D Sea King ASW helicopters, and license-built Helibras/Aerospatiale HB-350 Esquilo (Ecureuil) utility helicopters. Only the helicopters are operated by the Brazilian Navy; ship- borne fixed-wing aircraft are controlled by the Brazilian Air Force. Such a division of control represents a serious operational limitation for the Brazilian Navy. This anomaly should be corrected.
The indefinite future of shipborne fixed-wing aircraft may complicate the carrier replacement situation. Before plans for a new carrier were of-
ficially announced last July, it had been mentioned that the Brazilian Navy would replace the Minas Gerais with two smaller ships of local design and construction, operating a mix of V/STOL aircraft and helicopters. Because of today’s long lead time for procurement, a decision about the type and number of ships and aircraft should be made soon.
Political as well as economic, considerations may preclude the acquisition of V/STOL aircraft by the Brazilian Navy, but a rather simple helicopter carrier could perform the ASW role of the Minas Gerais when she is finally retired. Later, the replacement ship could be modified to operate V/STOL aircraft if these became available. _
Although part of the high mix, this ship could be designed with commercial hull standards, like escort carriers and the British Colossus class of light fleet carriers. A containership-type hull design, with a displacement of 1214,000 tons and large internal capacity, could be modified into an escort carrier to operate a squadron of Sea Kings or similar ASW helicopters. For short distances, this ship also could have a limited amphibious lift capability.
Conversion of a merchant hull would provide an interim carrier to the fleet at a relatively low cost. Indeed, the Brazilian Navy could acquire a ship from the civilian market, either in construction or in operation, and modify her by adding a flight deck and hangar, modular aviation maintenance facilities, austere electronics, and close-in defense armament.
Brazil and Argentina each operate a carrier of the Colossus class, and both ships will need to be replaced in the 1985-90 period. A common replacement would be an attractive and cost-effective solution, if the various navies’ operational requirements could be met by the same basic design. If one ship is to be on station at any time, three carriers and associated air groups are usually required. If a standard carrier design were adopted by Brazil and Argentina, perhaps three ships, two for the Brazilian Navy and one for the Argentine Navy, could be purchased for less money than two ships of completely different designs. Standardization would simplify maintenance and operations. At least one, and sometimes two carrier battle groups would be available at short notice for deployment in the South Atlantic area.
The six 3,800-ton Niterdi-class frigates in the fleet are also high-mix ships. Four are ASW frigates and two are of the general-purpose type. The basic Mk-10 design could be modified to produce a guided missile version, fitted with an area defense surface-to- air missile system. At least two guided missile frigates would provide an enhanced AAW capability to the fleet in the 1990s.
The new training ship being built at the Rio de Janeiro Navy Yard will have the hull lines and forward superstructure of the Niterdi-class frigate, but will carry only an OTO Me- lara 76-mm. compact gun and associated fire control equipment, four saluting guns, and light machine guns. The flight deck will be extended aft, giving the ship a distinctive carrier- type stern. She will be able to receive a Sea King, or any similar-sized helicopter, but will have no hangar. The original design was modified by the Bureau of Naval Engineering to provide accommodations for 200 midshipmen, in addition to the ship’s company and Naval Academy personnel. Construction of this ship began in October 1981, and she will be in commission in 1985-86.
The electronic equipment will be much less complex than that of the frigate. The sensor suite will include a surface search and navigation radar only, and no sonar will be fitted. The ship will provide training facilities in seamanship, navigation, engineering, weapons, operations, and communications. A tactical simulation computer system will be fitted. This system will consist of a main combat information center (CIC) that will generate exercises for three secondary CIC installations, simulating independent ships.
The frigate’s combined diesel or gas turbine (CODOG) propulsion plant will be replaced by two diesels, giving a maximum speed of 19 knots and a cruising speed of 15 knots, with 30-day endurance and a radius of 6,000 nautical miles. Electrical power will be provided by four diesel generating units, and all living compartments will be air-conditioned.
Many believe this ship to be a technical mistake. In fact, a less sophisticated, merchant-type hull could provide the same training facilities at a fraction of the training ship’s cost. The frigate’s hull was adopted mainly because of the requirement to show
the flag overseas. The ship could be converted to a combat role, but only at astronomical costs.
The Brazilian Navy still operates 12 obsolescent ex-U. S. destroyers of the Gearing, Allen M. Sumner, and Fletcher classes. These ships will be replaced by a new class of 12 corvettes of about 1,600 tons displacement. Although smaller and less complex than the Niteroi-class frigates, the corvettes still will be a sophisticated and expensive high-mix design—at least by Brazilian standards.
The corvette project began at the end of 1977, and the Bureau of Naval Engineering is in charge of design. In
1978, the navy signed a contract with the German design bureau of Mari- netechnik for consultant services during the conceptual and preliminary design stages. During the first half of
1979, several feasibility studies were made in order to define basic dimensions, hull lines, and other characteristics of the ships. In June 1979, the alternative to be developed during the conceptual design phase was selected by the naval staff.
Conceptual design was completed in 1980, and preliminary design began in February 1981. During this phase, all shipboard systems such as weapons, sensors, command and control, and propulsion are being defined. Construction of the four units authorized in July 1981 will begin this year, and all 12 ships will probably be in commission by 1990. The operational requirements for the corvettes are: coastal and ocean surveillance, escort of coastal and transoceanic convoys, and screening of task forces with the Mk-10 frigates.
The ships will have a distinctive frigate-like appearance, although more square-looking than the Niteroi class. In Mk-10 style, the deck line will be broken, running at 01 level from the bridge superstructure to the flight deck. They will be armed with two OTO Melara 76-mm. compact guns forward and aft, and two quadruple canister launchers of an antiship missile—probably the MM-40—will be mounted on the superstructure abaft the bridge. Two triple Mk-32 ASW torpedo tube mounts will be carried amidships.
Each corvette will have a hangar and flight deck aft for a Sea Lynx ASW and surface attack helicopter. On top of the hangar will be two launchers for an antiship missile defense (ASMD) system. Twin Emerlec 30-mm. antiaircraft guns, or an equivalent type, will be on two side platforms abeam the hangar.
The radars will probably be of British and Dutch origin. On a platform above the bridge, there will be a Ples- sey AWS-2 air-warning set (or similar set) and a navigation and surface search radar. On top of a trellis mast, just forward of the square funnel, will be an HSA M-22 or M-24 fire control radar director, while two electro-optical devices will be mounted on top of the bridge and on the hangar. A hull-mounted sonar will be fitted in all ships, and some units may even receive a towed-array set.
Command-and-control facilities will include a system similar to the computer-assisted action information system (CAAIS) on board the Mk-10 frigates, and they will be able to exchange data with the CAAIS- equipped ships through data link. Extensive communications facilities will be provided, and electronic countermeasures (ECM) equipment in several frequency bands will also be carried.
Corvettes will be cheaper to operate than the larger frigates. Large air intakes indicate gas turbine propulsion—probably two diesels and one turbine—driving two shafts in a CODOG arrangement. Electrical power will be provided by diesel generators, and the air-conditioning plant will be designed for operating in the tropics. Habitability standards on board the corvettes will be similar to those of the Mk-10 frigates.
The first four vessels probably will be constructed at the Rio de Janeiro Navy Yard, but the corvette program may eventually involve several yards. The successful completion of these ships in Brazil will represent an enormous gain in technology that will largely justify the money spent in their construction. At least part of the armament and electronics may be produced under license in Brazil.
Three submarines of the German IKL-209/1000 design (which beat out the French Agosta and the Italian Nazario Sauro designs) are to be built at Rio to supplement the three British- built Oberon-class units, and replace five remaining ex-U. S. Guppy-class boats. About 70% of materials to be used in the construction of these submarines will come from Brazil. The first unit will probably be laid down in 1984.
As for the low-mix ships, development of a missile-armed fast patrol boat class was cancelled because the design could not meet the endurance requirements of the Brazilian Navy. Fiberglass minehunters can be ordered from commercial yards which have experience with fiberglass hulls. The amphibious lift component could be modernized by replacing the three attack transports with either new or converted roll-on/roll-off ships. A new class of low-cost tank landing craft could replace the two ex-U. S. LSTs, and supplement four LCUs and several smaller landing craft.
Underway fleet support could also be modernized at a relatively low cost. A civilian tanker could be converted into a fleet replenishment ship to supplement the one in operation, and a relatively cheap merchant hull could be modified into a repair ship. A submarine rescue ship could be produced by modifying a large tug design.
Logistic support ships usually receive little attention in Third World navies, because they look less conspicuous than warships. In order to support distant-area operations for longer periods, a larger number of fleet auxiliaries are required by the Brazilian Navy.
Additional low-mix patrol craft, tugs, buoy tenders, and other such small units can be produced for comparatively little money because the designs are readily available. A large commercial fishing trawler design could be modified as an offshore patrol vessel to replace ten small corvettes in that role. Larger auxiliaries, such as survey and oceanographic ships, could also be built along merchant ship lines.
The price of warships and naval auxiliaries shows a firm tendency to go up, making the task of naval planners difficult. A number of expensive and sophisticated major fleet units, with enhanced AAW capability, will be required by the Brazilian Navy to meet the cruise missile threat in the 1990s. However, a larger number of less sophisticated, but capable, ships will also be needed if the navy is to meet its many commitments—the high-low mix concept can provide such numbers.
Mr. Pesce is an instructor of English at the Rio de Janeiro State University's Language Laboratories in Brazil, and a founding member of the Brazilian Center for Strategic Studies.