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Were you a Danish Navy planner confronted by one of the many crises a mischievous neighbor could cause your small, vulnerable country, how would you employ such scarce assets as your two Peder Skram frigates, with their versatile weaponry, endurance, and seaworthiness?
More, how would you keep the crisis under control and avoid automatic escalation?
Denmark is the “windy corner" of the European coastline. According to Granville’s dictionary of sailor's slang, a windy corner is “any particularly dangerous part of the coastline that is exposed to the elements, or, in wartime, to enemy gunfire or aerial bombardment.” I do not refer to the prevailing westerly wind in Denmark but rather to our exposed geographical position, which has been brought to focus over the last decade in light of the Soviet maritime strategy and the growing Soviet naval expansion.
The Kingdom of Denmark is not only situated on the European coastline, but it also covers a vast area in the Northern Atlantic. The three parts of the kingdom, Greenland, the Faroes, and Scandinavian
Denmark, are each placed in important, exposed strategic and maritime positions. A consideration of the geographical positions of these three parts of Denmark, noting for instance that the Faroes, 300 miles west of Norway, 260 miles southeast of Iceland, and 150 miles northwest of Scotland, are in the center of Soviet naval deployment in the Atlantic, would indicate that our defense efforts would be predominantly maritime and stretched out along the lines of communication between the three parts of the kingdom. This is not so. The symbolic forces in Greenland and on the Faroes are illustrative ot the limitations to our overall capability and of the priority we attach to our defense posture in Denmark proper. The reason is quite clear: nowhere in the world have the consequences of a full recognition of the influence of naval power and naval supremacy materialized so strikingly fast and so convincingly as in the Soviet Union during the last decade. Soviet maritime strategy has put Denmark's geographical position into focus.
The problem is not new, because Denmark has always been placed in an exposed position on the crossroad of Northern Europe. In an east-west direction, the Danish Straits connect the Baltic Sea with the high seas, making Denmark a natural obstacle to the free passage to and from the Baltic. In a north-south direction, between the North Sea and the Baltic, Denmark connects the Scandinavian Peninsula with the European continent.
The Soviet Union, in its objective to expand its influence as a world power, will continuously expand its naval forces and its activity on the high seas, as well as in the waters between the high seas and the Warsaw Pact countries.
In this context, we Danes certainly do not single- mindedly believe that the Soviet maritime strategy in our area merely aims to open the Danish Straits for unrestricted passage to the high seas. On the contrary, we believe the Soviet naval strategic concept for the Baltic area must also be viewed in the light of the Soviet strategic concept for operations toward the central part of Western Europe. We thus believe that naval operations in the Baltic, the Baltic exits, and the North Sea will be intimately linked with a main ground attack in the coastal front, that is, the northernmost front in Central Europe along the Baltic and North Sea coasts, including Denmark.
We estimate that the Soviet concept entails that complete control of the Baltic exits should be secured in the very early phase of a conflict. Such control will allow for offensive tactical operations in adjacent waters (primarily the North Sea), which in conjunction with control of the Danish area will create the optimum conditions for securing the flank of the coastal front. Control of the Baltic area as well as the North Sea will additionally provide for and secure Soviet naval lines of communication to
Western Europe as a supplement to or replacement for land supply lines, which the Soviets probably envisage destroyed to a considerable degree in the initial phase of a war. It should also be taken into account that the Baltic still is, and is likely to continue to be, the main Soviet repair and base area for forces operating in the Atlantic. Free access not only from the Baltic but also into this area will, therefore, be of a very high priority.
The Soviet and Warsaw Pact fleets in the Baltic are thus tailored to a strategic concept very different from that of the Atlantic-oriented Soviet Northern Fleet. They are composed solely with a view to defend home waters and support offensive operations in what they define marginal sea areas.
I believe the Warsaw Pact fleets in the Baltic have the following tasks:
► To establish naval superiority in the Baltic Sea
► To carry out and support amphibious operations against the Danish area in a very early phase and to support land operations along the coastal front
►To secure the Baltic exits and to dominate the adjacent waters.
Of particular interest and concern are the strength and composition of the Soviet Baltic Fleet and those of Soviet allies in the Baltic. The Soviet Baltic Fleet is 135,000 men strong and includes a limited number of long- and medium-range conventional submarines, cruiser-, destroyer-, frigate-type ships, a large number of fast patrol boats, including missile-firing vessels, and an amphibious lift capability to move two Soviet naval infantry brigades and the Polish Sealanding Division. In addition, there is an administrative lift capability of five-and-one-half divisions. The initial amphibious assault is on the order of some 6,000 troops with tanks and equipment. This offensive potential is of particular concern to Denmark.
Aggressions involving Denmark can take any form from harassment of our fishing and shipping activities in the Baltic to political pressure on the Danish Government by military measures or their threat. Aggressions may occur through limited attacks against Danish possessions, especially isolated islands such as Bornholm or the islands south of Zealand, and on a larger scale, conventional or nuclear aggressions against NATO. The Warsaw Pact possesses the political, psychological, and military capabilities for the execution of a surprise attack with a short strategic warning. Furthermore, the Warsaw Pact in the Baltic area is capable of executing various forms of aggression with a short tactical warning. We must, therefore, base all our operational planning on these assumptions, combined with the fact that we lack the resources for defense in depth.
Denmark has often studied defense in the Baltic Approaches (BALTAP) area of NATO in a situation
where, during a period of tension, we were favored with considerable reinforcement forces and the possibility of building up our own defense posture before an attack was launched. This is a situation in which the NATO headquarters would have to rely upon Denmark’s exploiting these possibilities to the fullest extent. For that reason, the issue of early military political decision-making is one of those foremost in our minds.
We agree that the conditions for warning in relation to our NATO strategy of flexible response and deliberate escalation put emphasis on NATO’s possibilities for keeping a crisis situation under control and avoiding automatic escalation. We also recognize that NATO activity in this field hinges upon its possibilities for the execution of coordinated political, economic, military, and civilian measures. Apart from taking part or following the work in NATO’s Defense Planning Committee, Military
Committee, Political Committee, and Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee, we also recognize the requirement for our national organization to make certain that the highest degree of consultation between Copenhagen and NATO headquarters in Brussels be provided.
However, it is not surprising that such consultation presents a problem, which according to NATO’s former Secretary General Manlio Brosio derives “from the independence of the allied countries and their relative strengths.” Earlier, Mr. Brosio stated at a meeting at the NATO Defense College, “Consultation is, for the larger allies, a way to legitimate and reinforce their foreign policy initiatives, thus obtaining a degree of involvement and support from the smaller allies; conversely, for the smaller countries it is a way of participating, or being seen to participate, together with the larger allies, in important debates and decisions.”
Our own interests and their growing importance are, of course, a result of the development over the last decade of the strategic balance of power between East and West. This balance has led to a decreasing likelihood of a large-scale confrontation and an increasing likelihood of small-scale conflicts or crises in the so-called grey area, which would call upon our will and ability to protect our sovereignty at all levels.
This reasoning is, of course, a part of the NATO strategy of flexible response conducted by the alliance. There is, however, every reason to provide for a national instrument, which could precede the NATO instrument at the low end of the spectrum and, even by effective handling of a local confrontation, prevent the necessity of calling upon NATO.
Since Denmark is in a particularly exposed and vulnerable position toward the more likely forms of confrontation and aggression today, priority must be given to our own unilateral crisis management capability. This consideration should not be new to NATO, which has recently attached great importance to the defense of the Danish Straits and thus to the defense of Denmark and has also aired its anxiety as to our capabilities.
One problem of particular military and political significance for our defense task is the status of the Danish Straits as a combination of internal waters, respectively territorial sea and international straits. The Treaty of Copenhagen of 1857 and the Geneva International Convention of 1958, to which Denmark has also agreed, imply that Denmark in time of peace may not prevent or interfere with the innocent passage of any ship, including warships. The corollary of this is, of course, that we cannot, even in a period of tension, close the Danish Straits, by mining for example, unless we as a coastal state feel that a situation endangering our national security is
Proceedings / March 1982
developing or has arisen. In accordance with international law, Denmark does, however, exercise certain restrictions. No more than three warships of the same foreign nationality should at any moment pass or stay within naval command areas without diplomatic clearance, and foreign submarines should not pass submerged.
The Soviet Union has agreed to the same conventions, but with the reservation that the conditions of “innocent passage,” as far as the Danish Straits are concerned, apply to civil shipping only and not to naval ships. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union adheres to our restrictions more strictly than other nations, including some NATO nations.
The Soviet attitude stems from its well-known desire to close the Baltic to all non-Baltic states. The Soviet Unions’s reservations and repeated suggestion of the establishment of the Baltic as a “Sea of Peace” are linked to the Soviet strategic concept for the Danish area already described.
So much for the international legal aspects. The actual ever-increasing Soviet and Warsaw Pact activity complicates our situation. The number of Warsaw Pact passages through the Danish Straits annually amount to approximately 9,500 merchant ships (cargo), 1,700 oilers, 5,200 fishing vessels (trawlers through depot-ships), and 200 naval units. This equals an average of 46 passages per day, and then the more or less permanent Warsaw Pact naval surveillance of the Danish Straits is not included.
Denmark is compensating for its lack of strong defensive capabilities by planning for the early deployment of forces to forward positions outside its territory. Our national—and NATO's—interpretation of the forward defense concept provides not only for Danish brigades in Jutland to extend their operations into the Schleswig-Holstein border zone with West Germany, but it also extends our naval and air operations as far east as possible in the Baltic to prevent enemy landings on the Zealand Group of islands.
Such actions depend on timely decision-making, which explains our concern with crisis management within the NATO framework. A comparison with Israel is useful to describe certain aspects of Danish vulnerability:
► During the 1973 Middle East War, Israel was protected from its potential enemies by occupied buffer zones; Denmark—and the rest of NATO—is not.
► Israel is accustomed to making rapid, unilateral decisions; Denmark is not. NATO is a well-structured organization, but contains disadvantages inherent in any alliance. In a crisis. Denmark may need to make quick decisions by itself—we are studying such requirements.
► Israel has consistently accepted the policy of large defense investments; NATO nations have not.
► While Israel and Denmark are utterly dependent on mobilization, they are also fully aware of its negative impact on economy, and hence morale, if ordered prematurely.
If against this comparison, so very much to the disadvantage of Denmark, it is recalled that the Israelis almost lost the war because they failed to translate into military preparation time the warning provided by a number of indicators, it is understandable why we feel exposed and vulnerable, and why we have crisis management foremost in our minds. That the Israelis took special considerations with regard to the world opinion does not change the comparison; we are accustomed to such considerations. A failure on our part to correctly perceive and interpret the warning for war and to make the timely decisions that indications demand would be a catastrophe, since our opponent is so much more formidable.
The immediate future does not lessen the burden. The evolution of North Sea oil production and defense of these installations have recently become a major theme. This, of course, has resulted in NATO recommendations on the future structuring offerees where it is felt that special consideration should be given to the ability to counteract Soviet maritime expansion, to reinforce the flanks, and to safeguard the increasing oil production in the European area in crisis and war.
Our failure to provide additional forces and NATO's failure to provide reinforcements to the flanks will have to be compensated for in various ways, including our ability to handle crisis situations. In light of the foregoing, it is clear that our main problem is the time factor, especially in the following fields:
►Orders for supplementary forces and subsequent
mobilization .
►Execution of minelaying in territorial and international waters, particularly in the Danish Straits in order to counter the Soviet concept of securing control of Baltic exits early in a conflict
►Early deployment, particularly across the Danish- German border
►Request for reinforcements as appropriate
►Approval on the execution of nuclear strikes if deemed necessary.
Timely decision-making depends on a setup at the highest level which will enable the information required to be processed and displayed and, more important, provide a common knowledge and understanding of the problems and their full implications. We are today making progress in both fields. Based upon the latest experiences from NATO’s exercises, we are in the process of establishing a crisis management organization at government level, and the cooperation with all parties involved is very good indeed.
Individual ministers are responsible, each within his own area, for planning and for executing preparatory measures as requisite. No specific body is given overall responsibility. This indicates the establishment of a collective leadership, and preparations have been made for moving key parts of the government and administration to underground facilities in a period of tension.
All these preparations, however, foresaw an orderly transition from peace to war. We are now more concerned with the provisions of arrangements at Christiansborg Castle in Copenhagen that will enable the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary, the Defence Minister, the Foreign Relations Committee, the Parliament, and others to perform their duties in a crisis situation, and which will also provide for a situation center and joint secretarial functions capable of presenting joint solutions for final decisions. Our experience in this field has included the testing of a situation center in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, manned by the NATO office of that ministry and Chief of Defence Liaison Group to the government. Major decisions were made in committee meetings, which included representatives from the Prime Minister’s office, the Defence Ministry, and other selected ministries.
More important, however, is our progress with respect to studies of all the problem areas, which call for early decision-making, and the provision of useful contingency planning. A working group under a committee, chaired by the Foreign Office with representation from the Prime Minister’s office, the Defence Ministry, and the Defence Staff, has finalized a study on all the legal and political implications of mine warfare in Danish waters prior to the outbreak of war. It is intended that this study should form an integral part of a war book system in the Prime Minister’s office, the Foreign Office, the Defence Ministry, and the Defence Staff. All our expectations with respect to the possibilities for early execution of mining have been met, and the study findings have been confirmed by the legal adviser to the government.
We in the Danish armed forces are fully aware that our mental preparedness should be so thorough and our organization so flexible that we can live up to our adopted motto, expressed years ago in quite another context by Admiral Arleigh Burke of the U. S. Navy; “The difference between a good officer and an excellent one is about ten seconds. A fine rule is to get going sooner than anticipated, travel faster than expected and arrive before you are due.”
Captain Bork was graduated from the Danish Naval Academy in 1949 and has had extensive service in fast patrol boats, corvettes, and frigates, alternating with staff appointments in operational. intelligence, and planning billets. His present task is Commander Danish Fast Patrol Boat Squadron (FPBGS).