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[31 Ultra Goes to War:
The Secret Story
Ronald Lewin. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978. 398 pp. Illus. Append. Bib. Ind.
$ 12.95 ($11.66).[1]
The Wizard War: British Scientific Intelligence,
1939-1945
R.V. Jones. New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, 1978. 556 pp. Illus. Maps. Ind. $12.95 ($11.66).*
Reviewed by Dr. Timothy Hallinan
A graduate of Harvard, with a D. Phil, from Oxford, Dr. Hallinan has written widely on issues of international politics and economics, and has lectured at universities around the world. He has served as a staff member and consultant of the Rand Corporation in Santa Monica, California, and of the World Bank in Washington, D.C. He is now president of an international consulting firm in Falls Church, Virginia.
Ultra Goes to War is the first scholarly attempt to tell how British (and other) cryptanalysts broke the German military ciphers in the first months of World War II, how they developed an immense, worldwide, and “ultra” secret system for the dissemination of the decrypts, and how the Allied commanders used (and misused) this vast flood of information in the conduct of their operations.
Ultra was one of the great secrets of the war. Despite the large number of people who were involved in decipher- •ng and disseminating the German radio signals (the British assigned 30,000 men and women to the work, the United States at least an equal number), the story was kept secret not only from the Germans and the Japanese for the duration of the war, but long afterward. Churchill in his great history of World War II allowed himself no references to the Ultra system or the role which communications intelligence played in shaping his decisions; when his narrative required that he tell something of what he learned from the Ultra decrypts (as in the case of his messages to Stalin about Germany’s plans to attack the Soviet Union in 1941), he imputed his information to human agents. Even the Official Military Histories were written without reference to the knowledge the Allies gained through the Ultra system, although the accounts so written are many times substantially misleading.
However, the Ultra story could not be suppressed forever; bits and pieces
’’VECTORS,” HUGHES AIRCRAFT
of it began to appear in print, and in 1973 Captain Gustave Bertrand, the former head of the cryptological section of the Intelligence Division of the French General Staff, published an inaccurate and overblown account of Ultra in a book called Enigma (Paris: Plon, 1973). More importantly, the larger purposes for keeping the Ultra system secret no longer seemed so compelling. Churchill made his case for secrecy “in order that there might be neither damage to the future operations of the Secret Service nor any cause for our enemies to blame it for their defeat.” But the cryptanalytical methods of Ultra had long been superseded by advances in mathematics (and particularly that branch of it known as complexity theory) and computers. Wartime enemies were now Allies, and there was little reason to fear that Ultra might become the source or focal point of renewed anti-Western feelings on the part of German youth. Hence the British Government reversed its policy and relaxed its security restrictions, and F. W. Winterbotham gave us our first authoritative account of the Ultra story. He had been in charge, in the war, of the security and dissemination of the Ultra decrypts, and he probably knew more about the organization and management of Ultra than any man then living. His book, The Ultra Secret (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), caused a great sensation, as it clearly cast the military history of the war in a new perspective. But Winterbotham wrote mostly from memory, and was in no position to see at firsthand how the Ultra material was used in specific operations. He left the field wide open
for others to step in.
Mr. Lewin has examined many of the Ultra messages that were then open for study at the Public Record Office in London, and has written with a keen awareness of the dangers as well as the value of the ongoing, operational intelligence which the Ultra system provided. He has also consulted a wide range of published sources, and interviewed numerous people involved in Ultra operations. He is not a professional historian and lacks some of the professional’s touch (particularly in citing his sources), but he is well versed in the field.
The most valuable parts of the book are those describing the development of the “Enigma” machine, which the Germans used for encyphering and decyphering their messages; the role of Ultra in the Battle of Britain; and the extraordinary divergence in the interpretations which Churchill, on one side, placed on the Ultra material, and those of his commanders in the field, on the other. It is also informative about the American involvement in the Ultra system after Pearl Harbor, although the author is clearly not as familiar with American secondary sources as he is with the British. But other parts of the book, particularly those dealing with the fighting in Europe after “D” Day, are choppy, and readers hoping for a well-balanced and systematic account of the role which Ultra played in the European theater (comparable, perhaps, to Patrick Beesly's Very Special Intelligence [Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1978]) are likely to be disappointed. Perhaps a more systematic account was precluded by the relatively small amount of Ultra material which was open for examination when Mr. Lewin began his research. But as his book was published less than 12 months after the first block of Ultra material was made available in the Public Record Office (in October 1977), it would seem that Mr. lewin might have allowed himself too short a period of time to do justice to his subject. In short, he has written an important book on an important subject, but it might have been much better.
R. V. Jones’s The Wizard War is an entirely different sort of book. In 1940, at the ripe old age of 28, Jones occupied an extremely strategic position in Britain’s wartime scientific intelligence—Head of Scientific Intelligence on the Air Staff, and Scientific Advisor to MI 6. But so pervasive was the role of scientific intelligence, and so tightly knit was the group of senior policymakers in Whitehall, that he was well placed to play an active role in many of the major scientific/ intelligence decisions of the war.
Professor Jones is one of the great raconteurs of our age, as all who have listened to him talk will testify; he can spin a story more deftly than almost anyone alive. As he has (happily) cast his book in autobiographical form, his rather loose format allows him to take time out for many memorable descriptions of the major and minor figures he worked with. He laces his story with many vivid vignettes: Churchill in his siren suit paddling into the Cabinet Room, looking at a distance like a plumber from the Ministry of Works; Lin- demann (later Lord Cherwell) dueling with Sir Henry Tizard in the Senior Common Rooms in Oxford and later on in Whitehall; Watson-Watt refusing at every possible juncture to recognize that radar could be defeated by chaff; and so full a panoply of English eccentrics that they seem to come popping out of almost every page. He vividly describes the atmosphere of wartime London, and the sounds of incendiary bombs falling on his roof. A lover of practical jokes, Jones shows in this book, that a sense of humor is also relevant to intelligence.
But his theme is serious. He describes the plan he drew up for scientific intelligence in 1939, the reasons for his recommendations, and the defeat of his plans in 1945 for a postwar “all-source” scientific intelligence establishment; the Ultra intercept which in June 1940 opened up the “Battle of the Beams”—the radio beams designed to guide German bombers over England to their targets; the development of radar and chaff and all their ramifications on the conduct of air and naval operations; the assessment of the threat of the V-l and V-2, and the damage inflicted on both sides by bombing; and the strengths and weaknesses of Germany’s scientific and intelligence efforts. Jones writes with a unique grasp of what might be called the metaphysics of the intelligence process: why one uncertain estimate might be better than another one; how much of one’s efforts are frustrated by oneself and not by the enemy; why some facts may be widely known, but never accepted as a basis for action.
These two books are important because they address an issue of high policy. A common doctrine holds that as intelligence findings move from producers to consumers, the findings are, or should be, progressively corrected and improved as new information is assimilated and irrelevant material pruned out. Churchill felt otherwise. As he wrote of Haig in World War I, “The temptation to tell a Chief in a great position the things he most likes to hear is the commonest explanation of mistaken policy.” He allowed no one to stand between himself and the raw intelligence data. In so doing, he avoided one source of distortion in the decisionmaking process, but created some others. The value of these books lies in the remarkably rich account they provide of how Churchill read and misread the evidence before him, and the great lengths he would go to in order to make sure he had the facts he really needed. Both books should be required reading for those who concern themselves with intelligence as an element in the making of high policy.
Japanese traffic available to a handful of top Washington officials in 1941. This was made possible through a November 1940 break by American cryptanalysts into Japan’s highest grade system, dubbed Purple, plus other broken systems, collectively known as Magic.
Five volumes contain paraphrases of worldwide intercepts. Japanese Ambassador Nomura’s exchanges with Tokyo are juxtaposed with the U. S. Department of State’s summaries of conferences on which the exchanges were based. Three volumes of appendices contain the verbatim messages.
Purple soon revealed a Japan in an agonizing dilemma. Should it move north or south? How should it solve
’’VECTORS,” HUGHES AIRCRAFT
the China impasse: downplay the Tri-Partite Pact with Germany and Italy to enhance an understanding with the United States, or make it a centerpiece of policy? Secrecy and enmity between ministries exacerbated the confusion. Japanese diplomats worldwide were joining the action with advice and information.
Late 1940 traffic indicated a great step-up in espionage. Targets were the U. S. economic and military situations, politics, blacks, and unions. Don’t get involved with Nisei; it would arouse American suspicions! The portents were ominous.
In January 1941, corroborated in March, Ambassador Oshima in Berlin told Tokyo of Germany’s intended invasion of the U.S.S.R., a move strongly opposed by Foreign Minister Matsuoka. (Under Secretary of State Welles tipped off the Soviet Ambassador on the above and very nearly compromised Magic; the word got to the Germans, who warned the Japanese of a leak. But the Japanese were convinced Purple was unbreakable and made no changes.)
The Washington talks dragged on through the spring, stalemated by diplomatic pirouetting and semantics over the points at issue: economic non-discrimination and stationing of troops in China, the Tri-Partite Pact, and overseas military bases. "Let’s keep talking,” Nomura advised Tokyo, “to stall off further trade restrictions.” Tokyo agreed. Nomura’s fears were reinforced by the spunky little Netherlands East Indies (NEI) rejecting Japanese demands for special treatment, large quantities of rubber, tin, bauxite, and oil.
On 2 July 1941, a divided Japanese cabinet decided against attacking Siberia, so informing the U.S.S.R., with outcries of rage from Berlin. On 12 July, a solid clue was intercepted on which way Japan would move. Tokyo gave Vichy France eight days to consider granting bases in Indochina or they would be seized. Any further doubts were dispelled by a 15 July message from Canton mentioning an intended attack on Singapore and Malaya.
Nomura, of course, had no inkling of why the Washington atmosphere suddenly had grown so chilly, so rough in fact that he was prompted to propose his resignation. The Foreign Minister’s reply was instant, “Your attitude is entirely at variance with policy.” He was equally peppery when his Axis allies complained of the “peace” negotiations in Washington, on which they had been left largely in the dark. “Japan is a free country,” Matsuoka let them know. “It is not necessary to run to others for advice on every turn.” It was Matsuoka’s last chirp. On 17 July the cabinet fell. Matsuoka, the man who had engineered the Tri-Partite Pact, the Soviet non-aggression treaty, and who hated the United States was out of power.
“Continue the talks,” new Foreign Minister Admiral Toyoda instructed Nomura, who on 20 July informed Rear Admiral Kelly Turner, Navy
War Plans director, that in a few weeks Japan would occupy Indochina. This Japan did on 23 July. Two days later, Nomura delivered the word that Japan would be forced to move into Malaya and the NEI if further essential supplies were cut off or assets frozen. On 26 July the United States did just that.
Purple was not only providing a fine window on Tokyo’s Washington machinations, but was also revealing details of the situation in Axis Europe. Germany was winning, reported Ambassador Oshima in Berlin. But Russian resistance was more tenacious than expected. Leningrad was surrounded, though not occupied, as the Nazis didn’t want to feed the 2,000,000 inhabitants. The war might last another year. Admiral Raeder had told Oshima that the Nazi fleet was of inferior quality, lacking the means to carry out an invasion of Britain. Intercepted Japanese messages from worldwide points made it clear that Japan was hurting from the embargo and was buckling on armor for the inevitable showdown: closing out businesses, skeletonizing diplomatic establishments, destroying documents, and stepping up espionage.
On .16 October, General Tojo replaced Premier Konoye as the only one who could control the rambunctious Japanese Army following Emperor Hirohito’s edict to continue efforts to effect an accommodation with the United States. Nomura kept doggedly at it. Interviewing former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral William V. Pratt, he was told by his old friend not to underestimate the United States. It would fight. Added were views on the current CNO: "[Admiral Harold] Stark cannot be said to be a strong individual,” said Pratt. “Hart, on the other hand, although he has enemies within the Department, is a strong character.” (Admiral T. C. Hart was Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, "passed over” by Roosevelt for Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet in favor of Admiral J. O. Richardson.)
November was a month of genuine crisis. Japanese Army authorities had informed the Japanese military attache in Washington that they would “not yield an inch” on the permanent stationing of troops in North China. Ambassador Kurusu, en route from Japan to buck up Nomura, received Tokyo’s advice that Japan was not eager to pursue an aggressive policy against the U.S.S.R. There were insufficient forces in Manchuria— 800,000 against 1,000,000 Soviets. On 3 November, Ambassador Grew in Tokyo was advised not to push Japan too far; it was prepared for war. In passing this information to Washington, Grew warned of a surprise attack, “possibly Pearl Harbor.”
Was it coincidence, Grew’s prescience, or something else, that on 5 November, Admiral Yamamoto issued Combined Fleet Ultrasecret Operation Order #1, establishing “Y” Day? Unfortunately, this information was not recovered until 4 June 1945, from a wrecked Japanese warship. But this would have been immaterial had certain intercepts during the week preceding the attack been put en clair in time. They would have pinpointed the principal target if not zero hour.
On 15 November, Hull laid it on the line: the Tri-Partite Pact must become a dead letter if any kind of understanding was to be reached. After hurried exchanges with Tokyo, read by the “cryppies” as fast as by the Japanese code clerks, Kurusu and Nomura made a last proposal on 20 November: Japan would withdraw from South Indochina to North Indochina if the United States would lift sanctions, supply oil, and cease aid to China. Unless sanctions were lifted, Japan must fight. Meanwhile, traffic analysis indicated large air, surface, and submarine movements into the Mandates, while Japanese air and surface patrols had commenced covering the United States-Australia sea routes.
On 22 November, Tokyo advanced Nomura’s deadline from the 24th to the 27th, "after which, things are automatically going to happen.” On 24 November, the United States occupied Dutch Guiana. "The NEI is next,” Nomura told Tokyo, “to protect the tin and rubber.” On 27 November, the United States warned its Pacific forces of imminent war. Three days later, Oshima told German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop that “war may come more quickly than anyone dreams.” Ribbentrop promised Germany’s support. The balloon was up. The famous 14-part message breaking relations, intercepted the day and evening before the attack on 7 December, was something of an anticlimax, the last strategic act of Magic. Henceforth, exploitation of Magic would be for tactical purposes.
This monumental work, first compiled by cryptanalytic personnel in 1944, has been edited, to a mild degree sanitized, cleared of marginal notes of interest only to another “cryppie,” and has a detailed list of contents in lieu of an index. It is a storehouse of material highly useful to any historian or war buff for a proper understanding of on what informational basis our 1941 leaders made decisions. There are no discussions or conclusions—only factual evidence.
With a mirror behind our sometimes not-so-honorable opponent, did the United States play its hand to the best advantage? Unfortunately, the riddle of Pearl Harbor—where the guilt lies—is not to be found here.
The Man Who Broke Purple: The Life of Colonel William F. Friedman, Who Deciphered the Japanese Code In World War II
Ronald Clark. Boston: Little, Brown, 1977. 271 pp. Illus. $8.95 ($8.06).*
Reviewed by Captain Roger Pineau,
U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired)
Captain Pineau served as a Japanese linguist in World War II, as assistant to S. E. Morison 1947-57, in the Department of State,
1957-65, with the exception of one year in the Institute for Defense Analyses, and then as managing editor of the Smithsonian Institution Press. Recalled to active duty in 1972 to he director of the Navy Memorial Museum, he retired in October 1978. He is author, co-author, editor, or translator of numerous articles and several books, principally on World War II and Japan.
This is a biography of William Frederick Friedman, whom the author calls the world’s greatest cryptologist. Everyone who knows the subject agrees.
Ronald Clark has written a readable account of Friedman’s life. I believe, however, that there is more to be told about this remarkable man; perhaps by a friend or colleague who knew him and his work personally, which the present biographer did not. Perhaps only an autobiography could have dealt adequately with a man of Friedman’s genius and complexity.
Coming from Bucharest to Pittsburgh at age two, how did this son of poor Rumanian Jews—schooled and trained in his adopted country in biology and genetics, but “plagued by all sorts of trials and tribulations”— become the foremost cryptologist in history? With the help of the Friedman family, Clark (whose other biographies of great men include Einstein, J.B.S. Haldane, the Huxleys, Bertrand Russell) tells of Friedman’s major accomplishments. Clark was fortunate to have Elizabeth Friedman’s guidance through the cryptologic maze of Friedman’s career. She is the charming other half of the greatest husband-wife team in the history of cryptojogy. Happily, some of her many professional achievements are included.
Clark also captures much of Friedman’s feelings of doom, gloom, and despair, as well as some of his whimsical and pixyish humor. All readers will enjoy this well-written story, but scholars will regret the lack of source credits (except for a brief general acknowledgment) and a bibliography. Although this is the first full book devoted to Friedman, he is mentioned in many others, and in articles, whose reference here would have been useful.
Prior to this book, the most complete public coverage of Friedman was in David Kahn’s The Codebreakers (MacMillan, 1967) wherein many pages mention him (including the statement, “Singlehandedly, he made his country preeminent in his field.’’) Nevertheless, Friedman disliked that book, despite its many accolades to him, because Kahn had the temerity to pass negative (and, in my opinion, questionable) judgment on the justice of Friedman’s compensation for his cryptologic inventions. Aside from that lapse, Kahn’s book covers Friedman’s work well, is good history, and yet it is never mentioned or referenced in The Man Who Broke Purple.
Many of Friedman’s frustrations were occasioned by security restraints. These are a hazard of the cryptologic occupation, to be sure, but his anguish can be understood when one learns of the seemingly mindless way some of those restraints were applied against him.
Jotting notes of his inner worries, Friedman once wrote, “Why am I driven so by feeling that I must continue to garner laurels?’’ This is as close as the book comes to indicating his goal. As a friend of the Friedmans since the 1950s, I was privileged to an insight on that subject. On one visit to their gracious home, Friedman had moved from jollity to a blue phase which I sought to brighten with a reminder of all he had achieved, and asked what more he could possibly want. Brief pause, then, “I want my name to be 'remembered a thousand years from now.”
No one can tell for certain what will be remembered a millenium hence, but this book is another stepping-stone toward fulfillment of Friedman’s desire and just deserts.
Spies & Spymasters, A Concise History of Intelligence
C. J. D. Haswell, London: Thames and Hudson 1977. 176 pp. Illus. Bib. Ind. $10.95 ($9.86).*
Reviewed by Lieutenant Commander John C. Peters, U. S. Naval Reserve
Lieutenant Commander Peters is a member of a Naval Reserve intelligence unit in San Diego.
Spies & Spymasters is the lesson-laced product of an author well qualified to relate the subject. Jock Haswell, a Sandhurst graduate now working at the School of Service Intelligence, Ministry of Defence, is a military historian with such works as British Military Intelligence (London: Weidenfield & Nicolson, 1973) to his credit.
The author’s military career, including action during World War II and later service as a Retired Officer Grade 2 (Author), uniquely prepared him for the task of writing this book. Haswell meets the challenge well. His writing style is crisp and enticing. Drawing
upon his background and access to the few available research sources, Haswell gives us a book of espionage in flowing vignettes.
Espionage is the glamorized clandestine aspect of intelligence. Both the entertainment industry and the mass media have projected this image. This thrust has created a misconception by the general public who view intelligence as being carried out in a James Bond fashion.
Of course the opposite is far more accurate. Basic intelligence, done overtly in laboratories and libraries by thousands of specialists ranging from anthropologists to zoologists, represents the bulk of the intelligence program. And Haswell reminds his readers of this fact.
But, Haswell is also cognizant of the attraction of Mata Harish tales. Spicy stories—from those involving the prostitute Rahab who helped Joshua’s agents at Jericho to more modern sexploits—abound.
The serious side of spying, however, is not neglected. Haswell makes several observations: (a) “The principle of protection [of sources] is a vital one;” (b) “[A spy’s] mission must be clearly stated;” (c) "Reliable knowledge itself is power;” and (d) “Centralization is the fundamental control principle.”
The author cites examples of those sleuthhounds throughout history who failed because of their disregard of the preceding principles. A notable violation of the centralization principle was The Third Reich’s competing intelligence networks—Canaris’ Abwehr and Himmler’s Sicherheitsdienst.
Perhaps the most significant contribution of Spies & Spymasters is Has- well’s attempt to differentiate among nations’ attitudes toward intelligence activities. He seems to suggest that Oriental leaders, such as Genghis Khan, and Continental Europeans, especially the Russians, long have appreciated and nurtured large intelligence forces for both internal and external security reasons. In sharp contrast, the British, who certainly have a modern history of extensive and effective espionage, are portrayed as being somewhat reluctant about admitting such activities. Americans are correctly presented as much belated entries in this deadly game.
Considering issues as they relate to SALT II, Spies & Spymasters reinforces the need for effective intelligence has never been more critical in any peacetime period. This is especially so with the loss of Iran as a listening post and the seemingly fragile state of affairs in Turkey. Satellites and miniaturization represent technological advances in the state of the art of spying. Still, recent intelligence failures reemphasize the need for trained intelligence operators, both overt and covert, who can collect, collate, analyze, and disseminate information effectively.
__________________________________ Toadying to the Frogmen________________________
A sign at one of the bases where Navy Frog Men are trained read: Reserved For Cars of FROG Men Only! All Others Will be TOAD Away!!
Leonard Bossard
(The Naval Institute will pay $25.00 for each anecdote published in the Proceedings.)
Books of Interest
Compiled by Professor Jack Sweetman, Associate Editor
NAVAL AFFAIRS
Almanaco Navale 1979 (Naval Almanac 1979)
G. Giorgerini and A. Nani. Genova: Iscicuto Idrografico Della Marina, 1979- 805 pp. Illus. Append. Ind. Approx. $50.00.
The current edition of this respected Italian naval annual describes all warships known to be in service throughout the world today. Four appendices are devoted to naval aircraft, shipboard missiles, guns, and torpedoes. An insert card provides translations of key terms in English, French, German, and Spanish for the convenience of foreign users.
Auf den Spuren der Goeben (On the Track of the Goeben)
Matti E. Makel'a. Munich: Bernard & Graefe Verlag, 1979. 140 pp. Illus. Maps. Append. Bib. 39 DM (Approx. $21.05).
Few individual warships have played as fateful a role in the making of history as the German battlecruiser Goeben and her consort, the light cruiser Breslau. Stationed in the Mediterranean at the outbreak of World War I, they eluded the efforts of the British Mediterranean Squadron to trap them and ran through the Dardanelles to anchor in the neutral port of Constantinople. There their presence greatly influenced Turkey’s decision to enter the war on the side of the Central Powers. Transferred to the Turkish Navy in 1914, the Goeben was renamed the Yavuz and continued in active service until 1950. This pictorial tells her story.
Cover-Up: The Politics of Pearl Harbor, 1941-1946
Bruce R. Bartlett. New Rochelle, NY.: Arlington House, 1978. 189 pp. Append. Bib. Ind. $8.95 ($8.06).
A documented study probes the responsibilities for the disastrous surprise by which U. S. forces were taken at Pearl Harbor. After examining the cover-up charges raised in the aftermath of the numerous wartime investigations of that question, the author concludes that there was, indeed, a cover-up of sorts; and that while the Roosevelt administration had not, as its most extreme critics claimed, “set up" the Pacific Fleet, that the president had deliberately goaded the Japanese into initiating hostilities in order to overcome isolationist sentiment among the American public, and that he was well aware that an attack would be made at some point.
Famous American Admirals
Clark G. Reynolds. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1978. 446 pp. Ulus. Append. Ind. $16.95 ($15.26).
The careers of 215 outstanding American flag officers are traced in a well-researched reference. Each biography includes every one of the subject’s duty assignments, ashore and afloat, and is illustrated by a portrait. Useful appendices list the holders of the Navy’s senior flag commands, 1776-1976.
[3] The Fleet Submarine in the U. S. Navy
Cdr. John D. Alden, USN (Ret.). Annapolis, MD.: Naval Institute Press, 1979. 290 pp. Illus. Append. Bib. Ind. $28.95 ($23.15).
The first U. S. fleet submarine was laid down in 1916; the last was decommis
sioned in 1975. The technical history of the hundreds built between those dates is presented, class by class, in an authoritative monograph.
[31 Handbook for Marine NCOs Col. Robert Debs Heinl, Jr., USMC (Ret.). Annapolis, MD.: Naval Institute Press, 1979. 595 pp. Illus. Append. Ind. $12.95 ($10.35).
Originally published in 1969, this ready reference for the noncommissioned officers of the U. S. Marine Corps appears in an extensively revised and updated second edition.
|31 A History of Naval Tactical Thought
Adm. Guiseppe Fioravanzo, Italian Navy (Ret.), Translated by Arthur W. Holst. Annapolis, MD.: Naval Institute Press, 1979. 251 pp. Illus. Maps. Append. Ind. $16.95 ($13.55).
Conceptual rather than descriptive in its approach, this study traces the development of naval tactics from ancient times through World War II. After an introductory examination of strategy and tactics, the work is divided into four chronological “Ages"—those of oared ships, sail, the screw propeller, and naval aviation, each of which is arranged by ship characteristics, tactics, and illustrative battles.
In vier Marinen: Lebenserinnerungen als Beitrag zur Zeitgeschichte (In Four Navies: Recollections)
VAdm. Friedrich Ruge, Federal German Navy (Ret.). Munich: Bernard & Graefe Verlag,
1979. 456 pp. Illus. Append. Ind. 39 DM (Approx. $21.05).
One of the world’s most distinguished naval officers, first Chief of Naval Operations of the West German Bundesmarine, reviews the opening 80 years of his eventful life. The four navies in which he served are those of the German Empire, the Weimar Republic, the Third Reich, and the Federal Republic. He also describes his remarkable second career as a University of Tubingen professor and naval historian following his retirement in 1961.
Soviet Naval Developments
Norman Polmar, Editor. Annapolis, MD.: The Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1979. 119 pp. Illus. Map. Append. Ind. $14.50 ($13.05).
First published under the title Understanding Soviet Naval Developments by the U. S. Navy in 1974, this survey of Soviet sea- power has been revised and updated by its original author, noted naval analyst Norman Polmar.
Q U. S. Naval Fighters
Lloyd S. Jones. Fallbrook, CA.: Aero Publishers, 1977. 352 pp. Illus. $14.95 ($11.95).
Every U. S. Navy and Marine Corps fighter, including experimental designs and unbuilt "missing links,” from 1922 to present, is described in a pictorial.
U. S. Naval Ships Data Arranged by Hull Classification, Volume III
H. H. Musgrove. Stoughton, WI.: Nautical Books, 1978. 283 pp. Bib. Ind. $13.50 (paper).
The third volume of a projected five- volume series which traces all the vessels that ever served in the U. S. Navy through their sometimes successive hull classifications, features amphibious vessels and minecraft.
MARITIME AFFAIRS The History of Ships
LtCdr. Peter Kemp, OBE, RN (Ret.). London: Orbis, 1978 (distributed in the United States by Two Continents Publishing Group, Ltd., New York). 288 pp. Illus. Bib. Ind. $19.95.
The development of ships of all sorts— merchantmen, men-oj-war, ceremonial, working, and pleasure craft—is traced in a lavish pictorial. More than 250 of the illustrations are in color. The author, one of Britain's best-known naval historians, is former Head of the Naval Historical Branch, Ministry of Defence, and vicechairman of the Navy Records Society.
Law of the Sea: Neglected Issues
John King Gamble, Jr., Editor. Law of the Sea Institute, University of Hawaii, 1979. 545 pp. $17.50.
This volume contains the proceedings of the 12 th annual conference of the Law of the Sea Institute held in The Hague, The Netherlands, in October 1978. The meeting focused on issues which were partially or completely ignored at the third U.N. Law of the Sea Conference.
131 Steam and Gas Turbines for Marine Propulsion
Maido Saarlas, Annapolis, MD.: Naval Institute Press, 1978. 214 pp. Illus. Bib. Ind. $16.95 ($13.55).
The fundamentals and principles necessary for understanding the operation of steam and gas turbines are explained to introduce students of marine propulsion plants to the use of shipboard turbines. The author teaches naval system engineering and mechanical engineering at the U. S. Naval Academy.
MILITARY AFFAIRS
Flying Bomb: The Story of Hitler’s V-Weapons in World War II
Peter G. Cooksley. New York: Scribner's,
1979. 208 pp. Illus. Maps. Bib. Ind. $12.50.
Between June 1944 and March 1945, nearly 8,000 German V-l and V-2 rockets reached the coast of England. The history of these weapons, the measures taken to deal with them, and how life went on under the world’s first missile bombardment are related in a readable narrative. The 15 appendices contain a wealth of technical and statistical information, including the location of preserved V-ls and V-2s today.
Jane’s Combat Support Equipment
1978/79
Christopher F. Foss, Editor. New York: Franklin Watts, 1978. 547 pp. Illus. Append. Ind. $84.50 ($76.05).
The first edition of a new addition to Jane’s naval and military annuals treats combat support equipment in use in the armed forces of the world. It is divided
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Nov Dec
For the first time ever, we are offering valuable back issues of the Proceedings to our members. For a $1.50 shipping and handling fee for 1 or 2 issues or a $2.00 fee for 3 or more issues—you can take your choice of the many available issues listed. Just circle the issues you want on the form below. Fill in your name, and return the coupon to us with $1.50 or $2.00. Your order will be handled on a "first come first served” basis—so don’t delayl
.COMPLETE YOUR LIBRARY OF PROCEEDINGS.
into seven topical sections: armored engineer vehicles; recovery vehicles and equipment; mine warfare equipment; construction equipment; transport equipment; and other, miscellaneous equipment.
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Aviation Week & Space Technology on SALT
Clarence A. Robinson, Jr., Senior Military Editor. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979. 340 pp. Illus. Maps. $8.75 ($7.88) paper.
Several years of SALT-related articles from the pages of Aviation Week & Space Technology are organized in a provocative compendium with an introductory overview. It is scarcely necessary to read between the lines to deduce that the editors do not consider ratification of the SALT II agreement, as currently constructed, to be in the national interest of the United States.
The SALT Handbook
Michael B. Donley, Editor. Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1979. 151 pp. Ulus. Bib. $3.00 ($2.70) paper.
Conceived as a reference manual to the current SALT II debate, this work reviews the historical background and describes the strategic weaponry relevant to the topic. Persons interested in familiarizing themselves with the vital technical aspects of the agreement will find it a concise and convenient guide.
Russia and the United States
Nikolai V. Sivachev and Nikolai N. Yakovlev, Translated by Olga Adler Titelbaum. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1979. 301 pp. Ind. $12.95.
The history of Soviet-American relations is interpreted in what most American readers will deem an exercise in double-think, from the Soviet point of view. Professor Sivachev teaches history at the University of Moscow; Mr. Yakovlev is a senior research scholar at the Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R.
World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1979
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute London: Taylor & Francis, Ltd., 1979 (distributed in the United States by Crane, Russak & Co., New York). 698 pp. Append. Ind. $47.50 ($42.75).
The tenth annual SIPRI Yearbook analyzes world arms production and expenditures, and arms control negotiations and agreements down to 31 December 1978. Among the most arresting of the innumerable arms-related statistics included is that
world military spending is now running at a rate of $60 million per hour.
PERIODICALS
Sea Classics—Special Presentation:
A Pictorial Monograph of the Fighting Fletcher Class Destroyers of World War II
Frank D. Johnson, Editor. Canoga Park, CA.: Challenge Publications, Inc., Fall 1979. 98 pp. Illus. $3.00.
A special issue of Sea Classics magazine is exclusively devoted to Fletcher-class destroyers, more than 100 of which served with distinction in World War II.
OTHER BOOKS RECEIVED
Arms Control: A Survey and Appraisal of Multilateral Agreements
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. New York: Crane, Russak & Co., 1978. 238 pp. Append. $27.50 ($24.75).
The Atlantic Alliance (A Bibliography)
Colin Gordon. New York: Nichols Publishing Co., 1978. 216 pp. $25.00.
The Cruising Sailor’s Medical Guide
Nicholas C. Leone and Elisabeth C. Phillips. New York: David McKay, Inc., 1979. 209 pp. Illus. Ind. $12.50 ($11.25).
Honorable Men (My Life in the CIA)
William Colby and Peter Forbath. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978. 493 pp. Illus. Ind. $12.95 ($11.66).
Inside Cuba Today
Fred Ward. New York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1978. 308 pp. Illus. Ind. $12.95 ($11.66).
Military Obedience
Nico Keijzer. The Netherlands: Sijthoff and Noordhoff International, 1978. 312 pp. Bib. Ind. $45.00.
Salt II: How Not To Negotiate With The Russians
Foy D. Kohler. Coral Gables, FL.: Advanced International Studies Institute, University of Miami, 1979. 34 pp. $3.00 ($2.70).
USSR Facts and Figures Annual (Volume 3)
John L. Scherer. Gulf Breeze, FL.: Academic International Press. 1979- 308 pp. Maps. Approx. $38.50.
Yankee Samurai
Joseph D. Harrington. Detroit, MI.: Pettigrew Enterprises Inc. 1979. 383 pp. Illus. Ind. $12.95.
[1]For details on ordering books and special prices see the Book Order Service note in the Books of Interest department.
The “Magic” Background of Pearl Harbor
Department of Defense, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office (for sale by the Superintendent of Documents), 1978. 8-Vols., 3,010 pp. Maps. Append. $36.00 ($32.40) (Sold in sets only)*.
Reviewed by Rear Admiral Kemp Tolley, U. S. Navy (Retired)
Admiral Tolley is the author of the lead article in this issue.
Until the release of this set of books, few could have known how great was the volume of high-level