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Since it entered into force, the Antarctic Treaty has been an outstanding example of international cooperation in a century characterized more often by confrontation than by conciliation. Now, more than halfway through the initial 30-year period of the treaty, a major challenge to the continuation of this record of cooperation may be looming ahead—a challenge brought about by the growing search for fuel in an energy-hungry world.
Significant international cooperation in Antarctica began in late 1951, when the scientific community, working through the International Council of Scientific Unions, agreed to sponsor an International Geophysical Year (IGY) in 1957. Scientists from 12 nations participated in the IGY Antarctic programs, with the informal understanding that all of their activities would be regarded as nonpolitical and thus of no significance to future claims to Antarctic territory. Without this understanding, cooperation in the Antarctic would have been impossible, because seven of the 12 nations (Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom) had staked out claims over wedge-shaped slices of the continent. Although the remaining five (Belgium, Japan, South Africa, the Soviet Union, and the United States) made no formal territorial claims, they reserved the right to do so in the future.
As the result of informal talks initiated by the United States, President Dwight D. Eisenhower announced on 2 May 1958 that the 11 other countries which had participated in the IGY Antarctic programs had been invited to a conference to negotiate a treaty. Attended by delegates from all 12 nations, the conference completed the treaty on 11 December 1959- Ratification procedures were finished in about 18 months, and the Antarctic Treaty became effective on 23 June 1961.
One of the major goals of the treaty is to prevent the Antarctic from becoming an area of international discord. Its articles emphasize the peaceful use of the continent, provide for continuous scientific freedom and cooperation, and bar the extension of claims while the treaty is in force. Nuclear explosion and disposal of radioactive waste are prohibited in the entire Antarctic, which is defined as that area below 60 South latitude. However, no regulations concerning mineral resources were included in the treaty, because the drafters recognized that such matters were so contentious that any attempt to deal with them directly in the text would have prevented an agreement from being reached at all. Consequently, resource issues have become important questions for discussion at the periodic “consultative meetings" of the 12 treaty signatories.
Proceeding’s / December 1979
At Vostok (facing page), one of six Soviet scientific stations, flags of the Soviet Union, United States, and New Zealand fly together, symbolizing the spirit of cooperation among the three nations and the nine other signatories to the Antarctic Treaty. Animals (from flies to penguins) and vegetables (mosses and shrubs) have been studied, but the overriding interest now is in the possibility of mineral deposits— specifically oil—in this most inhospitable of lands.
The presence of mineral deposits in Antarctica has long been suspected. In a 1974 report on the subject, the U. S. Geological Survey stated that . . the probability that mineral deposits exist in Antarctica seems to be high." But, continued the report in an Important observation, “the crucial factor ... is whether they can be found.”
The principal obstacle to exploration is the extreme harshness of Antarctica’s environment, the coldest, highest in altitude, and windiest of all seven continents. Snow and ice cover 98% of the surface, leaving only a few inland mountain ranges and the Periphery of the continent uncovered, and that for only part of the brief summer season. In parts of East Antarctica, the ice cover rises to a height of more chan 13,000 feet, from which the ice flows slowly Coward the Southern Ocean, forming vast floating ice shelves in the Weddell and Ross seas. These shelves eventually calve off immense tabular icebergs. The Cotal area covered by ice and snow is also doubled each year by the sea ice which forms around the con- dnent during the long winter. So brutal is the winter chat the lowest temperature yet recorded on earth, ^88.3°C (— 126.9°F), was recorded at Vostok, the Soviet Union’s antarctic station. The mean temperature during the warmest months is only 0°C (32 F) °n the East Antarctic plateau. Winds of more than 70 knots are common in some coastal areas of East Antarctica, and gusts exceeding 120 knots have been registered on the continent.
Because of this incredibly harsh environment, little hard data exist which would confirm the existence of substantial mineral deposits in the Antarctic. Nevertheless, copper and iron ore deposits are known to exist on the continent, with vast quantities of iron ore believed to lie in the “Dufek intrusion,” located near 83° South and 50° West. Large coal beds are also known to exist on the continent, the fossil remains of that remote time when the climate was subtropical and East Antarctica was joined with Australia, Africa, India, and South America to form the supercontinent known as Gondwana. The “Dufek intrusion” is a scar in the polar land caused when the continents broke away from each other.
The mineral resource which has excited by far the greatest interest in Antarctica is oil. The 1974 report of the U. S. Geological Survey stated, “Antarctica seems to have some petroleum potential, but lack of information precludes real appraisal.” A group of scientific and technical experts meeting at the Fridtjof Nansen Foundation in Norway in 1973 found that “. . . the offshore formation probably represents the most attractive mineral potential of the continent, largely because it is accessible by drill-
ing ships despite the hazards of large Antarctic icebergs.”[1] Although there is no evidence as yet that oil exists in commercially profitable quantities, the presence of hydrocarbons in some form on the antarctic continental shelf was demonstrated by the discovery of traces of methane and ethane in three of four holes drilled in 1972-1973 in the Ross Sea by the Glomar Challenger. Other offshore areas where petroleum or natural gas may eventually be found are the Weddell, Amundsen, and Bellingshausen seas.
Assuming that such deposits exist, the problem, as the U. S. Geological Survey pointed out, is whether they can be found. Icebergs, storms, and the greater depth of the antarctic continental shelf in relation to other shelves (1,650 feet below sea level at the seaward edge compared with an average depth of 600 feet for the shelves of other continents) combine to create tremendous logistical problems for locating, extracting, storing, and transporting hydrocarbons. Nevertheless, the ever-increasing world demand for petroleum, the probability that known reserves will be exhausted by the end of the century or shortly thereafter, and the rapid advance of technology make it appear likely that the logistical problems will have to be overcome. The scientific and technical experts, meeting at the Nansen Foundation, summed up the situation this way:
“. . . it is therefore only a matter of time before the attention of oil and gas companies turns to a consideration, if not the active investigation, of the Antarctic . . . and it is likely that applications for prospecting rights will be made sooner or later.”[2]
But to whom shall such applications be made? Who shall grant the licenses? And who shall be responsible for protecting the antarctic marine environment from the effects of exploring for and extracting oil and gas from the continental shelf? The Antarctic Treaty is completely silent on such questions- What does seem clear, however, is that if serious seismic work is undertaken in the Antarctic leading to exploratory drilling—and especially if such drill'
2Ibid., p. 74.
ing establishes the existence of substantial petroleum reserves—the seven treaty signatories who claim territory in the Antarctic might reassert their claims. They may wish to stake out rights over those portions of the continental shelf which, if their claims are recognized, would be theirs alone to exploit under the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention or a successor Law of the Sea Treaty. Such a reassertion of rights could easily lead to the collapse of the Antarctic Treaty, to the end of the record of international cooperation built up in the Antarctic since the 1957 International Geophysical Year, and to the despoliation of the antarctic environment. Thus, as a majority of those experts attending the Nansen Foundation meeting agreed, “. . . it is urgent for the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties to teach agreement on adequate political and legal measures to be taken within the framework of the Antarctic Treaty to avoid uncontrolled commercial mineral exploration on the continental shelf within the Treaty Area.”3
In 1977, the 12 original signatories to the Antarctic treaty (plus Poland, which had achieved status as a “consultative party” earlier that year) met in London and agreed to a moratorium on exploration and exploitation of Antarctic mineral resources while they continue to seek an acceptable legal means to regulate mineral resource activities. The moratorium obviously was in no sense a solution to the predicament facing the Antarctic Treaty partners, but it has bought them precious time with which to find that solution, if it can be found. Whether the outlook for the preservation of the Antarctic Treaty is bright or dim may well become clearer when the 13 consulta- rive parties announce the results of their most recent meeting, which began in September.
The issue remains highly complex. Its resolution requires reconciling the positions of “claimant” and 'nonclaimant” parties to the treaty and considering demands by other countries for shares in the mineral health discovered. Equally important is the need for
3Ibid., p. 75.
more scientific and technical information regarding the probable impact on the antarctic environment of the search for this wealth.
Whatever agreement is finally reached, however, one thing is now clear: the nations which wrote the Antarctic Treaty in the optimistic afterglow of successful international scientific collaboration must soon be willing to extend their cooperation from scientific research to the development of environmentally safe arrangements for the exploitation and sharing of essential mineral resources. The ability of treaty partners such as the United States and the Soviet Union to meet this challenge in Antarctica may well foreshadow the prospects for peace and wellbeing in the rest of the world as a new century dawns.
Rear Admiral Schwob was graduated from the U. S. Coast Guard Academy with the class of 1949- He commanded the Coast Guard cutters Cape Upright (WPB-95303), Cherokee (WMEC- 165), and the polar icebreaker Southwind (WAGB-280). He also served as Assistant Chief, Officer Personnel Division, Coast Guard Headquarters, Washington, D.C., and as Commandant of Cadets at the Coast Guard Academy in New London, Connecticut. Admiral Schwob is a 1955 graduate of the Command Communications Course at the Naval Postgraduate School (Monterey), and of the National War College (1973). After promotion to rear admiral in 1975, he served two years as Chief of the Coast Guard Reserve. Since June 1977, he has been the Commander of the First Coast Guard District, Boston.
Mr. Tollerton was educated at Princeton University and the Yale University Law School. He is currently with the Commission on International Relations of the National Research Council, Na-
_______ » tional Academy of Sciences, in Washington,
D.C. Previously, he was employed with the ■AiH Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT); the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT); the College of Marine Studies of the University of Delaware; and as a civilian employee of the U. S. Coast Guard. While with the Coast Guard, Mr. Tollerton served on a temporary assignment with the Plans Evaluation Division of the Office of the Chief of Staff.
---------------------------------------------------- A Friend in Need--------------------------------------------------------
During the Vietnam War, while our husbands attended the Marine Corps Officer Basic School, we wives had numerous activities scheduled for us. One was a special “Vietnam Day,” designed to inform us about the country, about our husbands’ duties there, and about plans for rest and recreation. We also had a chance to ask questions, which the company commander answered with great aplomb. To the question, What will my husband be like on R&R? he replied s>mply, “Friendly—very, very friendly.”
Shelley Bassett
(1'he Naval Institute will pay S25.00 for each anecdote published in the Proceedings.)
[1] “U. S. Antarctic Policy,” report of the Nansen Foundation to the U. S. Senate subcommittee on Oceans and International Environment, 15 May
1975, p. 70.