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The LVT must both float and fight, although the present version, LVTP-7, seems inadequately equipped for the latter, particularly when it is supposed to spend 80% of its time ashore. The amphibious tractor is a versatile and useful vehicle, hut it’s no tank. Better armor and better weapons will make ,,
it better for battle. And it can still keep its webbed feet.
Vjince World War II, the mission of the amphibious vehicle has not changed. For example, dur- 'ng the Inchon landing in Korea, it was utilized for s 'p-to-shore assaults, logistical support, and river cr°ssings. On several occasions, there were small ^echanized operations. Generally speaking, the role 0 the amphibious tractor in Korea was nothing more an to provide armored motor transport. In Viet- n‘lrn, the role of the amphibious vehicle did not dnge. The main factors that prevented armor from ®*ng fully utilized in the I Corps Tactical Zone were e terrain and the type of war fought. The vehicles WKere Mainly used in a logistical support role, al- they were also used for amphibious raids agger Thrust Operations) and amphibious opera- tl0ns (Starlight, Double Eagle, Deckhouse, etc.).
How will the amphibious tractor be employed in °Ur next conflict? This question is pertinent considering the current mission assigned to an assault amphibious battalion:
“The mission of the Assault Amphibian Battalion is to transport the assault elements of the landing force from amphibious shipping to inland objectives in a single lift during the amphibious assault, to provide support to mechanized operations ashore, and to provide combat support for other operational requirements.”1 The important part of the mission, when considering today s threat, deals with supporting mechanized operations ashore.
In a non-conventional war environment, the amphibious tractor would be limited during mechanized operations by the terrain and the enemy’s ability to employ antitank obstacles and weapons. However, in
a conventional war environment, today’s threat is a modern, highly mobile, and well-balanced force. Even in a low intensity conflict, such as one against emerging nations, we should expect our adversaries to be supplied with sophisticated Soviet weapon systems and military doctrine. Soviet military advisors and technicians will be present, assisting their allies in proper maintenance and training techniques. We can expect mobile forces supported by tanks and well planned artillery fire. Enemy air support may be limited, but we should expect an adversary to have an effective antiair weapon system to counter this deficiency.
To be effective in this environment, an amphibious tractor has to negotiate 10-foot plunging sub and survive the large sea swells often encountered i« the seaward side of the amphibious objective area- Because of this requirement, the design procedures are extremely complicated, resulting in a large’ wide, and awkward-looking armored vehicle.
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With those specifications in mind, many ne"' techniques were incorporated into the newest tractor, the landing vehicle tracked personnel (LVTP-7), re' suiting in many advantages over its predecessor, the LVTP-5A1. David Wray, in his review of the LVTP-7 in Armor, reported the following:
Proceedings / November i
The P-7 [LVTP-7] is 33 percent faster on land, percent faster in the water, travels 110 miles arther on less fuel, and weighs 18 tons less. It is ess expensive to procure and maintain, has signif- cantly improved protection and armament, and is q ^asier to operate.”2
trf er lmportant features of the LVTP-7 include a °P commander’s station and a rear ramp with an Urgency exit.
However, it should be pointed out that the LVTP-7 ^ several limitations:
Ic has a higher freeboard in the water, which Provides a larger silhouette.
t h nC M 85 mac^'ne gun mounted in its elec- r° ydraulic turret cannot be dismounted and em- P °yed on the line with a tripod like the old M-i9i9A4.
hi Wa^e behind the vehicle when operates m the water (rooster tails) raised by the ^aterjets produces an unmistakable signature
^ The vehicle does not operate in the surf as well as the LVTP-5.
ttl LVT burns on the beach at Saipan (facing page), the result of a direct hit by Japanese artillery. The LVT seen coming ashore during the Inchon landing (upper photograph) was later used for logistical support and river crossing. In Vietnam, the amtracs’ missions included amphibious raids such as Operation Deckhouse (above).
Counted with infantry, should be employed with tanks and committed to combat.
Many arguments will be started over the above simplified statement. Marines will point out that the silhouette is too high, it lacks sufficient ar- H001-! it cannot destroy a tank, it doesn’t have a large v ^*P0n system, and marines cannot fight from the , 'c e' AM °f these observations are correct, but ^er^are methods which could be adopted in order r C e LVTP-7 to survive on today’s battlefield, silh S t^scusseM earlier, the vehicle’s size and large ne °Uette are based on the designed specifications to ter^0t*ate SUr^ an<^ Migh seas. Proper utilization of ^ ,ri’ tke overwatch method, high-speed direction tio^nges when contact has been established, utiliza- wn ob suPpressive fires, and innovative antiarmor jtlM°n tactics will enhance the vehicle’s survivabil- °n the battlefield. The I.VTP-7 does present a
higherSllh0Uette’ but the M_6° tank is 5 inches
A 1 i . ,
neeMltl0nal <armor protection for the LVTP-7 is Ho e ’ f>art'cuHtly against direct hits from artillery. het'VeVer’ the ballistic protection for the LVTP-7 is ^UaT C^an *tS PreMecessor s» and its hull armor is Jn fac(.C° tbat the Army’s M113 personnel carrier. t0P hC' LVTP~7 kas more armor protection on its an tke Ml 13. At present, the vehicle’s armor is tecti0 °Ut integral aluminum, and additional pro- This°n CoulM be provided by using bolt-on armor. With teckn*9ue was successfully demonstrated War jj ear*y amphibious tractors during World or sp ' ,^ew metal alloys, British chobham armor, lern jCe armor could be used to improve this probin the0 °r^er not ro binder the vehicle’s performance bolt-r,0 Water during the ship-to-shore phase, the
bepn ° arrnor would be installed after the beach has en secured.
The LVTP-7’s predecessor, the I.VTP-5, was designed to operate 90% of the time in the water and 10% of the time on land. The LVTP-7 was designed to operate on land 80% of the time. Thus, with additional armor protection, the LVTP-7 would be able to perform a more active and aggressive role on the battlefield.
The theory that the amphibious tractor can’t destroy a tank is a matter of perception. It is true of the vehicle in its present form. However, there are several improvements that could be made which would provide the LVTP-7 with the capability of destroying a tank. Probably the simplest and least expensive method would be to modify the vehicle to fire the TOW (tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided) or Dragon antitank guided missile. The TOW has a range of 3,000 meters, and the Dragon’s range is 1,000 meters. Either missile will knock out a tank. Concomitantly, the amphibious tractor would provide covered protection for the marine firing and controlling the missile, so that he would not be harmed by enemy machine gun or artillery fire. At the present time, the TOW is mounted on an M151 Jeep where, without any protection, it is extremely vulnerable to enemy suppressive fires. I am not suggesting that the TOW or Dragon, mounted on the LVTP-7, should be considered as the main weapon for destroying a tank. The best antitank weapon is still another tank. However, the LVTP-7 provides the commander with a covered and mobile weapon system that he can utilize to augment his antitank defenses.
Another argument often heard against using the amphibious tractor as a fighting vehicle is that its weapon system is not sufficient. The definition of an armored fighting vehicle is evidence of this: “An armored fighting vehicle is any armored combat vehicle, either tracked or wheeled, that mounts a direct fire support weapon.” ’ Right now, the United States is the only major country that employs a 12.5 mm., .50 caliber weapon station on its personnel carriers; only Britain’s is smaller. The LVTP-7 was originally scheduled to have a 20 mm. weapon system, but because of various mechanical problems and insufficient turret space, this system was not adopted. An immediate improvement on the LVTP-7 would be the use of high-performance .50 caliber ammunition such as the Canadian tungsten carbide core (armor piercing/tracing C44) round and the Norwegian multipurpose depleted uranium round.
The vehicle’s turret could be redesigned at a considerable cost, if it were considered necessary to employ a 20 mm. or 25 mm. weapon system. In addition, the vehicle could be mounted with an auto-
matic 40 mm. grenade launcher. Israel has mounted automatic grenade launchers on its Ml 13 vehicles, and during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, a direct hit from this weapon system was able to seriously impede or knock out Soviet BMP-1 armored personnel carriers. With improved 40 mm. ammunition, the range of the automatic grenade launcher increases and can reach a trajectory of more than 1,000 meters. The 40 mm. grenade weapon system would also provide the vehicle with an excellent suppressive fire system against area targets. This is very important, particularly when confronted with antitank guided missiles.
Another improvement for the LVTP-7 would be to design and utilize a modular weapon system, which would provide the Marine Corps with additional firepower and flexibility. The modular weapon system could be employed by removing the 9- by 5-foot cargo hatches on the amphibious tractor and inserting a particular weapon system into the vehicle. The complete system would be self-contained, weigh approximately 4,000 pounds, and be able to be lifted into or out of the vehicle by organic retriever vehicles. Examples of various modular weapon systems are the 90 mm. or 105 mm. gun used on our old M-48 tanks; the 105 mm. gun, when the M-60 tank becomes obsolete; a much needed low altitude mobile antiaircraft weapon system that could be utilized up front with the infantry or in the rear area protecting our airfields; a 30 mm. antitank gun; direct fire mortar systems; or even a multishot flame system. The advantage of this system is that the commander would be able to organize his weapon systems based on his mission and the enemy situation. The disadvantage would be the reduction in overall LVTP-7 assets made necessary by carrying personnel or supplies.
But this disadvantage can be turned into an advantage. Nothing will ever replace the infantryman. He is still the marine who comes face to face with the enemy, places accurate fire on the enemy forces, destroys the enemy, secures the objectives, and polices the battlefield. The amphibious tractor is intended only to provide mobility, shock power, limited firepower, and protection to the infantryman. There will be times, depending upon the situation, when the infantryman will have to dismount from the vehicle and slug it out with the enemy. There may be other times when the infantryman will be able to stay inside the vehicle, protected from small arms fire and shell fragments, and be driven to the objective. In any event, the fighting vehicle is only a tool for the infantryman to consider, and it should not be
looked upon as a panacea, for today s modern battlefield problems. The infantry commander will have to base his decision upon the advantages of the armored vehicle against its disadvantages, particularly being disorganized when disembarking. During the last Middle East War, several important facts were discovered and should be noted concerning personnel carriers:
y Attacking antitank strongholds, either with infantry or tanks alone, resulted in heavy casualties. The positions were eventually attacked by mounted armored personnel carriers using their machine guns and artillery support. y Except at night, dismounted infantry attacks led to an unacceptably high casualty rate.'[1] Port, starboard, and rear firing ports could be installed on the amphibious vehicle. This would provide the embarked troops with a place to fire their weapons from within the vehicle. Although small arms fire from the embarked troops may not be highly accurate, it would provide additional suppressive fire and shock effect to the amphibious tractor. Placing machine gun mounts on the cargo hatches would be another method of obtaining more neutralizing fire. Although this method does not provide overhead protection for the infantryman and would not be effective against artillery airbursts, it prove<- to be successful for the Israelis in 1973, when they mounted as many as five machine guns on each M-113.
The Marine Corps should take another look at the tank and assault amphibious tractor battalion organizations. There are several factors that should be considered in the future. First, the Marine Corps shoul only have one military occupational specialty for <tS armor officers. All armor officers would attend the Army’s Armor School at Fort Knox, Kentucky. Tl>e officers would be instructed in both the tank and the amphibious tractor. Second, the tank and assaim amphibious tractor battalions should be merged int0 one armor organization. Although this would create an extremely large, expensive organization with some monumental logistical problems, it does have seven1 advantages:
► Reduction in personnel. A platoon would cot^ sist of five tanks and ten amphibious tractors, an a company would have 17 tanks and 47 amphih1^ ous tractors. Reorganization of tank and LVTP- platoons is also a possibility. For example, a Plr toon of tracked vehicles might consist of three tanks and seven amphibious tractors. y Improved training for mechanized units. A Pla toon, company, and battalion could train togethe
A.t it has from its beginnings 40 years ago, the LVT continues to provide amphibious motor transport. The new role for both the LVTP-7 and the new LVTP-7 Al, seen at left undergoing tests, is to support mechanized operations ashore.
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FMC CORPORATION
and be able to operate as a team.
Another completely different idea, but one that w°uld influence the current limitations now found in amphibious tractors, would be to change the j ‘lr’ne Corps’s role in and responsibility for develop- s"g the amphibian vehicle for the ship-to-shore mis- fj10n' che Navy were responsible for delivering the -WaVe of marines, their equipment, and material o the high-water mark, this would preclude the retirement and major influence of design in our cur- t^nt Vehicle. The Navy has the capability to provide -pt suPport by using its surface effect ships (SESs). v h' W0ldd carry our smaller armored fighting m the high-water mark, where they would be re °aded- The armored fighting vehicle would still quire an amphibious capability in order to cross or Sottate water hazards.
the Navy assumed this role, would the Marine veh^ 3^e t0 deve^°P ‘ts own armored fighting cur'Cle’ °r.would lt be “force fed” by the Army’s is veb'cle' Another question that must be asked Ve|W etber ‘t is feasible for the Marine Corps to de- jt °b lts own armored fighting vehicle. At present, t.lsp°Ubi seera unlikely, because the Marine Corps is ed t0 develop amphibious vehicles while the ys responsibility is developing armored vehicles. (ja , e importance of the amphibious tractor in to- extrS environment cannot be stressed enough. It is an riel ^usebui vehicle when employed as a person- and^1^’ Carg° °r ecluipment carrier, prime mover, fant/110^10 a‘d station- The vehicle provides the in- assety COmmander with additional communications vjjeS aKnd firepower. Concurrently, the vehicle pros* the occupants with mobility, protection from
crr._ armS and shel1 fragments, and the ability to Water obstacles.
lerSln8 Proper suppressive fires, including air, artil- lau ’ Srn°be> machine gun fire, mortars, grenade terr . ers an<J small arms fire, proper utilization of m*ssde location techniques, and high- °n t 1 lr,ect‘on changes, armored vehicles can survive prestays battlefield. The Marine Corps has, in its ent inventory, 470 LVTP-7S. Out of this total,
400 have been allocated to supporting marine infantry units. Because of the large number of vehicles and the options provided to the infantry commander, they must be considered and utilized as another weapon system.
The Soviets are not giants on today’s battlefield, and their antitank weapons can be evaded, suppressed, or destroyed. Even though the amphibious tractor has its faults, it can be employed effectively. The Marine Corps’s new amphibious vehicle, the I.VTX, is currently being developed for the 1990s. In addition, the improved LVTP-7, the I.VTP-7A1, which is part of the service life extension program, is scheduled for delivery to the Fleet Marine Force in the early 1980s. This vehicle will include many improvements over the present LVTP-7; however, until it has been replaced, we should be thinking of what we can do to improve the employment and capability of our present vehicle. The amphibious tractor has played an important role in Marine Corps history, and the LVTP-7 will continue to play an important role in future mechanized operations.
Major Gressly was commissioned in the Marine Corps m 1964. As a platoon commander with the ' 3rd and 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion in »&-. ( Vietnam, he participated in the first Dagger Thrust raids. From 1966 to 1969, he was an op- i /H erations briefer with Fleet Marine Force Pacific. Major Gressly earned a master’s degree in technology of management at American University in 1970, then went on to be operations officer with Depot Maintenance Activity in Albany, Georgia, from 1971 to 1974. He was an instructor at the University of South Carolina NROTC unit from 1974 to 1977. In 1978, Major Gressly was graduated from the Command and Staff College in Quantico, Virginia, and was assigned to the Tracked Vehicle Battalion of the 3rd Marine Division, Okinawa, as executive officer/commanding officer. * [2] [3] [4] [5]
rfQC.
U. S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Mechanized Operations (ECP 9-1) (Quantico, Virginia: Education Center, Marine Corps Development and Education Command, 1977), p. 3.
[2]David Wray, Jr., “LVTP7 Amphibious Armor For Marines,” Armor, May-June 1971, p. 17.
•'‘Joseph H. Alexander, "The LVTP-7 and the Surface Assault," Marine Corps Gazette, June 1972, p. 32.
[4]U. S. Department of the Army, Operations (Field Manual 100-5) (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1976), pp. 2-12.
[5]U. S. Marine Corps, Amphibious Vehicles, (FMFM 9-2) (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 103.
'’Charles Wakebridge, “The Syrian Side of the Hill," Military Review, February 1976, p. 26.