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The Three Rs: Responsibility, Recognition, REWARD
I believe that an internal threat exists in the officer corps that is just as important, and possibly more insidious than any external threat, such as the Soviets pose.
The problem facing the officer corps is multifaceted, but can generally be summed up in one phrase—officer grade stagnation. We need an integrated officer personnel management and pay system which pays officers for what they are worth and what they are doing—not for how long they have been in the service. For example, all 05s with 18 years service now get paid the same monthly salary. It doesn’t matter if the 05 is a military aide to the Secretary of Defense and working 14 hours a day, or if he is the recreation officer at Schofield Barracks, working seven hours a day.
This inequity in pay and level of responsibility leads to two obvious conclusions: (1) not all officers of the same grade are equal in ability and talent; and (2) not all jobs and positions within a grade require the same level of expertise, ability, etc.
Therefore, the task of DoD’s personnel managers should be to get good officers into jobs that challenge them, and then pay them a commensurate salary. Conversely, they need to get the average and less-than-average officers into the remaining positions of responsibility, and pay them a salary which is less than that of the good officers’.
Our current promotion and pay systems might provide the necessary incentives to do well—i.e., you perform well, you get promoted, and thus get more money. Unfortunately, there are too many variables in those systems that negate their benefits and incentives. Principal among these variables is the Officer Grade Limitation Act and its debilitating consequences on upward mobility. What incentive, other than self-pride, does the twice passed-over Navy commander have to perform better than his peers and seek more challenging positions? Many of these officers are very capable, but because of a declining promotion rate, these officers stagnate in grade and are stereotyped by their service.
We need to develop an officer personnel management and pay system for grades 03 through 06 that recognizes individual differences in ability, and accordingly assigns, promotes, and pays individual officers. My solution is now possible because of the increased use of computers and the availability of efficiency/fitness reports that can be easily scored and fed into the computers. My proposal is simple in design, but complex in execution. We need to take a concept from our civilian work force in government, and improve it to fit the following outlined needed "steps within grade."
The accompanying table would work as the foundation of an officer personnel management, assignment, and promotion system. There are no time- in-service considerations in this system, only merit. The system would operate as follows:
Authorizations:
► Common officer positions in the service will be standardized—for example, commanding officers at any level, step 8; XOs could be step 6; and principal staff could be step 5.
► Other officer positions will be classified by a local board and the results approved by the major commander (08 or above). For example, service school instructors may be step 7 within grade.
► The overall limitation on each of the above is that 10% of the positions within each grade must be in each step. For example, if an organization is authorized 200 03 positions, 20 of these authorizations must be in step 1, 20 in step 2, etc.
y Likewise, at the service level, overall distribution of assigned officers must also follow the 10% rule—for example, 10% of Army lieutenant colonels must be in step 1, step 2, etc.
► All step classifications of positions will be made on a qualitative basis—- i.e., degree of responsibility will determine the step level for any given position.
Assignments:
\ As an initial action, each officer on active duty (grades 03-06) will be assigned a step rating. Assignment to steps will be strictly on a merit basis, and will follow the 10% rule.
Table 1
GRADE | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | STEP 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
06 | 2400 | 2450 | 2500 | 2550 | 2600 | 2650 | 2700 | 2750 | 2800 | 2850 |
05 | 1900 | 1950 | 2000 | 2050 | 2100 | 2150 | 2200 | 2250 | 2300 | 2350 |
04 | 1400 | 1450 | 1500 | 1550 | 1600 | 1650 | 1700 | 1750 | 1800 | 1850 |
03 | 900 | 950 | 1000 | 1050 | 1100 | 1150 | 1200 | 1250 | 1300 | 1350 |
► All assignments, beginning on a specified date, will be made to a step position. For example, an Air Force major step 5 assigned to McChord
must be placed, as a minimum, in an M step 5 position. He can be placed higher, but never lower. This assignment will be the responsibility of the local commander and will generally follow the current requisitioning process—i.e., request replacements by paragraph and line number, identifying the step.
Pay:
^ In no case, will an officer of lesser grade make more money than an officer of higher grade. Under the current system, you can see 04s with 20 years °f service making more money than 05s with 15 years service.
^ Officers will be paid what they are Worth—assignment to a position and Pay will be commensurate with identified abilities.
^ The maximum $450 difference Within grades is sufficient to encour- a8e competitive performance, and results in lateral mobility. The 05 who cannot make 06, but is a step 4, has s°mething to look forward to with continued good duty performance, as he can receive both immediate and long-term benefits by doing his best, ms is in direct contrast to the current system which increases his pay simply for staying in another two years.
Promotions:
l There will be both local and service promotions to steps within a grade. Local commanders will have the authority to promote officers one step each year, as long as the overall local distribution does not exceed the 10% rule. These local promotions can be based on annual evaluations or local boards, similar to the current civilian incentive awards committee. Thus, regardless of an officer's past performance and evaluations, current good performance at the local level can be rewarded. At the service level, each officer’s file will be reviewed annually, and a one-to-three step increase can be made by the service.
► Each year, service promotion boards will meet to consider all officers in steps 8-10 for promotion to the next higher grade. In all cases, promotion will be made to the lowest step in the next grade—i.e., the lowest 04s step is better than the best 03s’ step. However, this does not mean that an officer promoted to step 1 in the next higher grade cannot be assigned to a higher step position; he can, but will only be paid step 1 pay. The officer advances through the steps by local promotions (one step per year) or service promotions (maximum three step jump) until he reaches steps 8-10. Then, the whole system repeats itself, and the service board considers him for promotion to the next higher grade.
Under the current promotion system, 03s through 06s are spending eight or more years in grade awaiting promotion or retirement. Something has to be done to encourage competition and enhanced duty performance. Lateral mobility, through a “steps within grade” system, is one possible solution. It will probably be an administrative nightmare initially, and it will make some of us wear the scarlet letter. But both of these weaknesses already exist to some degree in our current system. ,
Since the services are composed of people, it is time we start recognizing individual abilities and talents, and rewarding them accordingly.
Nobody asked me either, but . _____________________
Lieutenant Commander George D. Bond, II, U. S. Coast Guard
Is Mot Well in Married Housing Th
ne common, current activity in service housing is to provide adequate Quarters for bachelors. While I jungly support this idea, having I een s*ngle and stationed afloat, 1 be- leve this argument implies that all is j ■1 'n married housing. It is not!
Presently live in government quarters, in a small two-bedroom apart- rilent. These are quarters which 1 VV°uid have been eligible for when I ^as a married, childless ensign. I now ^ave two children (ages nine and six), ave collected ten years’ worth of fur- ltUre, and have not moved up in authorized quarters. This lack of mobility is because I have two children of the same sex. Similar sex children only “deserve” a separate bedroom if they are ten or older. Children of dissimilar sex rate a separate bedroom at age six.
1 find this a blatant example of sexism. If one child is entitled to a separate bedroom at six, all should be.
My present duty station is located on a base that has a wide disparity of quarters, from 1870s mansions to 1950s cramped quarters. All were designed when the occupants traveled to and from government quarters using government-supplied furniture. The average occupant did not have his own stove, refrigerator, washer, dryer, canopy bed, and other personal furniture. Now, the occupant supplies his own furniture, or goes without. This aspect has great impact on available space in the smaller units. My wife and I have collected furniture that we like, we use, we want. Yet, because of the size of our quarters (approximately 800 square feet), we have to store some furniture.
While I am living cramped, others, sometimes with all of two adults and a child, are living in homes with four, five, or even six bedrooms—the classic case of rank has its privilege. I do not disagree with the use of rank in determining quarters, yet such determinations should not be at the total
expense of the junior officers. If a junior officer has a large number of children, why should he not be assigned to quarters with a large number of bedrooms? Likewise, if a senior officer is childless, or has no dependent children living at home, why should he occupy quarters with a minimum of three bedrooms?
Assignment of quarters is another aspect in which rank is given undue importance. When I reported to my current unit, I could not be assigned quarters, or even go on the housing list, until I was actually detached from my last assignment. As I now attempt to move into adequate quarters, I find I am competing with a senior officer who is not yet married (although plans to marry). Is this difference in determining the placement on the housing list necessary? Projections of incoming and outgoing personnel are necessary in any housing situation. Efficient management of the unit’s housing resources would require a knowledge of
this sort to minimize vacant periods while maximizing the matching of needs to the available quarters. Does not this eliminate the need for strict adherence to detachment dates and place the emphasis on the reporting date?
Another major problem lies in the BAQ rate as contrasted to the size of quarters assigned. As an example, the range of space for lieutenant commanders is from approximately 800 square feet to approximately 2,500 square feet. This means that those living cramped pay 40e per square foot while those in relative palatial splendor pay only 13e per square foot. The rich get richer. The cost differences are even greater when contrasting captain BAQ and quarters to lieutenant commander BAQ and quarters.
I suggest major changes to standard housing policies. The changes I propose would require action by the joint housing sections of the services to ensure standard treatment for all:
► The age for additional bedrooms for children should be lowered to six for all children, regardless of sex.
► Assignment to quarters for all grades should be based on the available move-in date instead of the detachment date.
► A flat rate per square foot should be established—say 20e—so an individual, regardless of rank, in 1,000 square feet pays $200 per month, an individual in 2,000 square feet pays $400 per month, and so on. This would permit those with large families to pay more, yet receive more. Those with small families and large space would pay for the privilege.
A person’s satisfaction with his job is largely dependent on where he lives. If a member is unable to be comfortable at home, he will have difficulty in being comfortable at work. Better home conditions will increase retention and encourage enlistments. Can we afford less?
Weapons That Wait
Mine Warfare in the U. S. Navy
By Gregory K. Hartmann
Mines are of vital importance in the waging of war. They have, on occasion, made the difference between victory and defeat.
In the course of this probing analysis of mine warfare in the modern navy, Dr. Hartmann has investigated and revealed the effectiveness of mines and mine countermeasures by briefly examining past applications and by explaining current technological developments and their relationship to the use of mines as naval weapons. He has included illustrated and detailed discussions of mine types, effectiveness measures, delivery, targets, strategy and tactics, and the role of mine warfare in the future control of the sea.
19791300 pages 180 illustrations
A Naval Institute Press Book
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