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*?ack then, in 1917, the U.S. Navy and the eet Naval Reserve shared equal hilling in 11 hat seems to have been one large second-story office in a Los Angeles building. And, from Sl/ch cooperative ventures, the Reserve f“rnished 60% of those naval officers and men u’ho served in the first World War. But the Parade has moved on; Captain Sorcho’s Submarine Show no longer plays the Pantages; and it has been a long time since anyone has Maimed anything like equality for the Naval Reserve.
The 23rd national conference of the Naval Reserve ssociation was held in Philadelphia in 1976. J- William Middendorf, II, who was then Secretary the Navy, was the opening luncheon speaker. He rew understanding applause when he stated humor- °usly that the Naval Reserve was about to undergo lts tenth annual bimonthly reorganization.[1] How- ^Ver> this is not a laughing matter. Nor is it one to e taken lightly. Nevertheless, as Middendorf’s Comment indicates, it is a situation which has existed 0r many years.
On 28 February 1925, the Cong ress of the United tates passed legislation which provided for the crea- tl()n, organization, administration, and maintenance °f the Naval Reserve in a “new” form. The signifiCance of this law was not that the Naval Reserve was Slmply being recreated or reestablished, for that had already occurred several times during its history, father, Congress now intended that it be “. . . a c°mponent part of the United States Navy, ...”
This requirement had not been placed upon the Navy before. In theory, the reserve was no longer to be an ineffectual appendage. In reality, it has never become part of the total force.
Still more laws affecting the Naval Reserve have been passed by the Congress in succeeding years. The Naval Reserve Act of 1938 reiterated the congressional intention that the Naval Reserve be a component part of the Navy. Congress also directed the establishment of the Naval Reserve Policy Board which was to meet annually for the purpose of advising the Secretary of the Navy on the formulation of reserve policies. At least half the members of this board wpre to be Naval Reserve officers called to this duty from an inactive duty status.
The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 stated in part that:
There shall be no discrimination between and among members of the Regular and reserve components in the administration of laws applicable to both Regulars and Reserves. . . . The bureaus and offices of the Navy shall hold the same relation and responsibility to the Naval Reserve as they do to the Regular Establishment.”[2] This act also established a Reserve Forces Policy Board at the Department of Defense level.
Public Law 90-168, the Reserve Forces Bill of Rights and Vitalization Act, was enacted on 1 December 1967 and became effective 1 January 1968. This bill was developed in an atmosphere of dissatisfaction with the way reserve components were being supported by the parent armed forces. The law was a congressional mandate to provide adequate support to the reserve components and thus to ensure their mobilization readiness to fulfill assigned missions. It further added the newly established Assistant Secretaries (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) of the Army, Navy, and Air Force to the Reserve Forces Policy Board. This board was now to act through these assistant secretaries as the principal policy advisor to the Secretary of Defense on matters relating
had
Since World War II, the United States has
to the reserve components. This act also authorized designation of a flag officer, since then a regular Navy vice admiral, by the Secretary of the Navy to be directly responsible to the Chief of Naval Operations for Naval Reserve affairs.
The raison d’etre of this legislation has been to provide the United States with a responsive, combat- ready Naval Reserve. The question of whether or not the various laws enumerated here have met with any great degree of success is open for discussion. Since each law indicated that Congress believed it necessary to pay attention to the reserve viewpoint and to stress regular/reserve unity in an attempt to reverse the self-perpetuating problem of poor working relationships, many would argue that the Navy’s reserve program has not been successful. On the other hand, this regular/reserve system has gotten the Navy through two World Wars by employing full mobilization. We have had partial mobilization during the Korean Conflict, the Vietnam War, and two other confrontations. Therefore, proponents of this system argue that the reserve program has been both successful and cost-effective.
How has the Navy mobilized its reserves? The Federal Naval Reserve, created 3 March 1915, was composed of men honorably discharged from the regular Navy. This Reserve was modified 1514 months later by a 1916 act which established a Naval Reserve Force and stipulated that it would be composed of citizens who “. . . obligate themselves to serve in the Navy in time of war or during the existence of a national emergency declared by the President. . . .”3 By the time war was declared upon Germany, procedures for the procurement, training, and indoctrination of recruits that had been worked out since August 1916 made it possible to expand the Navy effectively. The increase in personnel from the entry of the United States into the war in April 1917 until Armistice Day in November 1918 consisted of some 30,000 officers and 305,000 enlisted. Thus, by the end of the war, 60% of the men and women in the Navy were naval reservists.
During World War II, U.S. naval forces grew from approximately 170,000 enlisted personnel and 8,600 officers in 1941 to almost 3-5 million enlisted and 315,000 officers in August 1945. Of the latter numbers, about 2.5 million and 300,000 respectively were reservists. Included in this number were 8,000 officer and 78,000 enlisted women reservists. Since President Franklin D. Roosevelt had declared an unlimited national emergency and ordered the mobilization of all organized fleet and local defense units of the Naval Reserve on 27 May 1941, the Navy had a six and one-half month head start on
full mobilization when war was declared on 8 De cember 1941.
As seen above, neither of these World ar mobilizations required an “immediate” response y its reserve call-up. As stated by Rear Admiral Julius A. Furer: ,
“It would in fact be inaccurate and misleading to speak of the United States Navy of World War II as composed of regular personnel and of reserve personnel. During the war all were in a temporary status as to rank and ratings, with equal opportu nities to all for advancement and assignment to duties based on the experience and qualifications of the individual. The principal difference between the so-called reserve and regular during the war was that as a rule the latter planned to make the navy a life career when he entered the service whereas only a small percentage of the former planned to remain in the navy beyond the perio of hostilities.”4
some degree of involvement in more than 50 con flicts between or within other nations. U.S. military forces have been committed in support of the na tional interest on more than 15 of these occasions, and on four occasions Naval Reserve personnel have been involuntarily mobilized to augment the active forces. These four instances were the Korean Con flict, the Berlin Crisis of 1961, the situation create by the seizure of USS Pueblo (AGER-2) in January 1968, and the Vietnam War.
When six North Korean divisions, armed wit 1 heavy artillery and 200 Russian-made tanks, swept across the 38th parallel and invaded the Republic 0 Korea on 25 June 1950, no pre-conflict reserve mobilization preparation had been made. Between July 1950 and March 1953, 265,000 reservists entered active naval service as the result of the deck' ration of a national emergency by President Harry ^ Truman. Even so, their services were not require “immediately” because the ships and aircraft they eventually manned had to be reactivated from the reserve fleet. By the end of December 1950, 907 combat aircraft were withdrawn from “mothballs, ant by the end of June 1951, 381 vessels were recommissioned and placed on active duty. It was only as these ships and aircraft were reactivated that they were manned by reserve and regular personnel.
Special legislation enacted in response to increase tension throughout the world resulting from the Berlin Crisis in 1961 witnessed the call-up of 6,400 Naval Selected Reservists on 25 August 1961 and an additional 1,957 on 13 September 1961. These personnel helped man the 40 destroyers and 18 anti-
Marine warfare air squadrons which were added to active fleet.
lO'
Sub
the
Two partial mobilizations occurred in 1968. Fol- VVlng the seizure of the Pueblo by the North Ko- feans 0n 22 January, six air reserve squadrons were ered to active duty on 26 January. It was not 25 April, however, that the Navy announced at these six squadrons would be transferred from eir reserve air stations to operational fleet bases on e East and West coasts. During this call-up, the lx squadrons were delayed because of reequipping an<J retraining requirements necessary to convert the Tr^s to the aircraft to be flown upon mobilization.
ese personnel were all subsequently released to inactive duty by 1 November 1968. The last instance Partial mobilization was virtually a joke. During e er>tire involvement of the United States in Viet- narn, the only mobilization of Naval Selected Reserve ‘n>ts was of two mobile construction battalions (Sea- ees) in April 1968 following the Tet offensive.
In September 1974, Admiral James L. Holloway > Chief of Naval Operations, directed the Navy’s
ffice of Strategic Plans and Policy (Op-605) to de- Vel°p fjrm
wartime mobilization requirements for every active duty ship, squadron, and station. The ass‘gnment also included the specific identification of Wartime billet requirements not maintained in time °f peace by the active forces.
This task of “reinventing the wheel” by once again faking the Naval Reserve, specifically the Naval ected Reserve, a component part of the Navy was assigned to Op-605E. This special office was to de- Yelop total force Navy mobilization requirements for IScal year 1977 and thereafter. Working with fleet c°mrnanders’ representatives, OpNav program element sponsors, and major military claimants in the epartment of the Navy, Op-605E carried out its Mission. The result was a detailed list of mobiliza- hon requirements for the first three months of a war- t,rne or contingency condition. Following a period of COrnputer-supported analysis, the “Op-605 Study" ^as issued in the fall of 1975 for review and further
Equipment operators of Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 12 level and grade a road near Danang during the Vietnam War. Reserve NMCB 12 was one of only two Naval Reserve units activated for service in the longest war in the nation's history.
analysis by program sponsors and the Chief of Naval Reserve.
Known as “Project Readiness,” this long-awaited realignment of certain Selected Reserve units to match specific mobilization requirements of the active forces is now being implemented. Thus, after a period of 55 years, the Navy is attempting to comply with the letter and the spirit of the Naval Reserve Act of 1925 which called for a Naval Reserve Force to function as a component part of the Navy. However, the important question is not: “How do we reorganize the Naval Reserve this time?” Rather, it is: “Is the Naval Selected Reserve necessary, even in light of‘Project Readiness?’ ”
In the event of a declaration of war by the Congress or national emergency by the president, the Navy can theoretically depend upon a trained military manpower pool to satisfy its mobilization requirements. This pool consists of personnel in three categories: Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, and Retired Reserve.
Within the Ready Reserve are the Selected Reserve and the Individual Ready Reserve. The Selected Reserve, which was established on 13 February 1958, consists of functional units and individuals. It is characterized by the following:
► It is composed almost exclusively of organized reserve units.
► All of its members drill periodically (generally one weekend per month and two weeks per year) and are paid.
► Its strength is authorized annually by the Congress. For fiscal year 1978, Congress authorized a Naval Selected Reserve strength of 87,000.
Personnel in the Individual Ready Reserve, on the other hand, are not members of units. Generally, they do not train, nor are they paid. The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 and the Military Selective Service Act of 1967, as amended, provide a complex patchwork of active and reserve options for fulfilling a six-year military service obligation. Among the available options are the following:
► Three years active duty, two years Individual Ready Reserve, one year Standby Reserve.
► Four to ten months active duty and the remainder in the Selected Reserve.
Contrary to widespread belief, the six-year obligation did not expire with induction authority. Male volunteers continue to incur this obligation.
The Standby Reserve consists of individuals who have served on active duty. It is comprised of enlisted personnel who have less than one remaining year of their initial six-year obligation and reserve officers who are beyond their sixth year of service. Like Individual Ready Reserve members, they generally neither train nor receive pay. Also, this category contains those civilians who desire to remain affiliated with the reserve but because of occupation, for example, congressmen, state and city officials, and senior political appointees, could not be readily mobilized. There is no legal limitation to the size of the Standby Reserve. Since this group has little impact on the budget, it has historically received scant attention in planning circles.
Within the Retired Reserve are the regular Navy officer retired, the regular Navy enlisted retired, the Fleet Reserve, and the Naval Reserve retired. By serving 20 or more years active service, a regular officer may voluntarily “retire,” that is, be placed on the inactive rolls and be paid a “retainer.” Also, such an officer may be involuntarily retired by reason of disability, by having completed statutory service, by having reached the statutory retirement age or by failing selection to the next higher rank. Regular Navy officers are never formally retired. They are liable to recall without their consent. Enlisted are retired after having served for 30 or more years of which a minimum of 19 years and six months must have been on active duty. They receive retired pay, not a “retainer.” Flowever, they too are subject to involuntary recall. Naval Reserve retired personnel may or may not be receiving pay. Retired pay for those reservists who qualify begins for an individual when he reaches the age of 60. Such personnel are subject to recall but only after the Secretary of the
Navy and the Secretary of Defense certify that a other Naval Reserve assets have been depleted.
According to the “Op-605 Study,” Navy require ments for selected reservists fall into three broa > force-related or operational categories and one a ministrative category. Category I units include Nav Reserve Force (NRF) ships, NRF destroyer squadron staffs, reserve tactical air wings, reserve patrol squa rons and wings, inshore undersea warfare units, re serve mobile construction (SeaBee) battalions, coastJ river divisions and squadrons, advanced base funC tional components, and Navy mobilization billets in the Fourth Marine Amphibious Force (the Marine Corps Reserve). Category II mobilization billets re quire augmentees for active duty Navy ships, squa rons, and mobile units. These billets reflect the 1 ^ ference between authorized (active duty) billets an organizational manning. That is, selected reservists would be used to raise the peacetime “condition* manning” of ships to the optimum fully combat ready level of manning called “battle manning- Category III reflects the need for augmentees for the shore establishment. These are the mobilization bi lets which bring the shore establishment to organiza^ tional or “battle manning.” Category F consists ° those non-prior service trainees (Ready Mariners) un dergoing initial active duty for training. This tram ing consists of four to ten months active duty whm r includes recruit training and, for most, forma A-school training.
Working together to perform a difficult missiorj and realizing the value of teamwork to a job we done builds a bond of mutual respect and under standing that can be acquired in few other ways. In my opinion, regular/selected reserve working reja tionships along this line have been less than satisfac tory. The situation has, however, become an ac cepted fact of life.
Many wrong assumptions and conclusions exisr concerning the Naval Reserve. There is a pressing need at all levels of the regular Navy for greater understanding of the role of the Naval Reserve. Peopk’ whose business it should be to know better are also
remiss in this area. Within the past 15 months, this vvnter heard a rear admiral make a statement to the effect that NRF oceangoing minesweepers (MSOs) were no use to the Navy because they were in mothballs.” He had no conception of the composi- tlon, use, or mission 0f the NRF! This is dishearten- n£ and unsatisfactory! The admiral is not alone, owever. There is probably no other unclassified naval program about which so little is known by so many. This attitude of ignorance, resentment, and apathy has historically contributed to “. . .a Naval cserve lacking direction, visibility and the resources to a viable and dynamic force.”[3]
Another major problem area is the equipment inVentory for surface training, particularly the World II Gearing (DD-710)-class FRAM I destroyers, hese vessels can best be described in one word— obsolete! They lack modern sensors and have lit- or no capability against modern, high-per- 0rmance aircraft and such vessels as nuclear-powered Submarines, surface combatants, and submarines armed with antiship missiles. Conversely, the ships which will replace these destroyers, the Forrest Sher- ">an (DD-931)-class destroyers with their 1,200-pound steam propulsion plants, will not be maintainable by NRf personnel as the Selected Reserve is now structured. The engineering department of a fully manned, active force ship encounters extreme diffiCulty in operating properly this 1,200-pound steam Propulsion plant. The consequences of anything less rhan a full-time, sustained engineering effort result- lng from an NRF reduced manning posture will prove
disastrous.
The aviation selected reserve community is doing Somewhat better regarding hardware. Improvements
The 31-year-old William C. Lawe (DD-763) is one of the Navy’s NRF destroyers. Will reservists he able to maintain the more sophisticated Forrest Sherman-c/ait ships when they take the place of the William C. Lawe and her contemporaries2
direct impact on the budget. Therefore, it is imperative that the Selected Reserve contribute positive tangible worth to the national security posture of the United States. To do less is intolerable.
The “Op-605 Study” establishes the Navy’s reserve manpower requirements from mobilization day to three months afterward. The net increase during these three months would be 303,780 personnel. Added to the fiscal year 1977 five-year defense plan force level of 547,020, the total force required would amount to 850,800, of which new accessions would account for 53,500. This would leave a requirement for 250,280 personnel with prior military service. Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, and retired personnel would be required to fill these prior military service billets. A Selected Reserve strength of 102,000 (actually 101,631) is the minimum requirement stated for the Navy in the event of full mobilization. These selected reservists would fill the Category I, II, III, and F billets identified above.
There are widely differing opinions on the need for and thus the worth of the Naval Selected Reserve. There are those who do not feel that the ‘‘Op-605 Study” Selected Reserve requirement of 102,000 paid drilling reservists is valid. For Fiscal year 1977, former President Ford and the Department of Defense originally requested a strength of 52,000. This number was based on a Department of Defense “Total Force Study” released in March 1975. The Senate first voted for a strength of 79,000 for the Selected Reserve. The House of Representatives voted for a strength of 102,000. After a conference, the final, approved Naval Selected Reserve authorized for fiscal year 1977 was the 96,500 mentioned previously. For fiscal year 1978, the Department of Defense first issued a program decision memorandum in September 1976 calling for 79,500 selected reservists. Then in early 1977, DoD recommended a fiscal year 1978 Selected Reserve strength of 52,000. The final compromise figure for fiscal year 1978 is 87,000.
Therefore, we see those such as former President Ford and former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, as well as a majority of the Senate, believe that the “Op-605 Study" figures are not valid. Also, it is now apparent that President Carter and Secretary of Defense Brown do not feel that 102,000 selected reservists are necessary. Others, such as Senator Robert Dole of Kansas, Representative Bob Wilson of California, members of the Reserve Officers Association, the Naval Reserve Association, the Naval Enlisted Reserve Association, and many other members of Congress believe that the “Op-605 Study” is valid. Some even consider 102,000 too small a number and feel that more selected reservists are needed. At least one other legislator, Representative Bill Chappell, Jr., of Florida, cannot seem to make up his mind. In September 1976, he agreed with the need for a minimum drill pay strength of 102,000- However, the following month, Chappell said:
“. . . the plan being ‘sold’ is a restructuring
based upon the so-called ‘605 Study.’ Not really a study, it was nothing more than a computet printout of unevaluated requirements estimates, arranged in ‘first cut’ order. Those who produce it in Op-605 readily admit that it is riddled with errors—omissions and inconsistencies—and that the individuals who developed the original inputs lacked the essential guidance and knowledge o war plans. It therefore comes as no surprise that people in Op-605 find it incredible that anyone would use their new requirements data to structure the Naval Reserve.7
The purpose of the Naval Reserve, particularly the Selected Reserve, as a part of the “total force Navy concept, is to serve as a viable member of the national security force. The Naval Selected Reserve, at the present time and in the recent past, has not been such a force nor has it been effectively utilized. Only 8,357 selected reservists of surface and antisubmarine warfare aviation units were mobilized for the Berlin Crisis in 1961. No reservists were ever mobilized l°r the Cuban Missile Crisis. The six Selected Reserve aviation squadrons mobilized for the Pueblo situation in 1968 were woefully ill-prepared to respond rapidly or effectively. Finally, one can hardly argue that the politically motivated, token mobilization of tw° small units, Reserve Mobile Construction Battalions 12 and 22, during the Vietnam War—the longest and perhaps most difficult war in U.S. history—has made the Selected Reserve a valuable, cost-effective investment. Rather, it and the limited use of the reservists mentioned above raise strong doubts ana serious questions about the future role of the Naval Selected Reserve in national security.
It is essential that our planners distinguish among missions which can be performed only by active-duty forces and those, if any, for which an active/reserve mix is necessary, practical, and cost-effective. The intensity and length of such possible encounters are crucial elements. The prospects of involvment in a prolonged, low-intensity conflict appear remote particularly in view of the recent Vietnam experience. Likewise, the lethality of modern technology s new weapons would appear to render equally remote the prospect of a lengthy, high-intensity war. Therefore, it would seem the most probable conflict would be a short, intense war—possibly designed for only limited goals.
abi
Today’s reserve would probably respond ,clequately to large, protracted, global conflicts such as World Wars I and II, or even a limited war such as Korea. It is necessary to keep in mind though that Was only as ships and aircraft were removed from ?°thballs that reserve personnel were used in Korea, e ever-dwindling size of the mothball fleet and the ngth of time required to recommission such vessels , er decreases the probability as well as the possi- ^ [4][5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] ty of utilizing these assets in future confrontations p t^1's type. However, the Soviets and their Warsaw act allies are making preparations for a violent, c°nventional war of perhaps 30 days and certainly no m°te than 60.
Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, Chairman of the nate Armed Services Manpower and Personnel Sub- c°rnmittee and a strong proponent of an efficient, C°st~effective U.S. military, has also questioned the Strategy of making preparations for protracted war j^'th plenty of time to mobilize. In October 1976, asked, “What is the point of building into our .j. ce structure expensive deterrent against a long war ln the process we deny our forces the capacity to ^dure a short war?”[11] He too was addressing the estern European scenario when the foregoing ques- t‘°n was asked. The fact remains that application of e essential element of the question to other Scenarios does not lessen its impact or its relevance, this light, a fundamental question is raised °ut the wisdom or cost-effectiveness of maintain- lri8 Selected Reserve forces that would have little if any effect on the outcome of such a short war in Ur°Pe or elsewhere. Thus, there is reason to doubt c at the U.S. Naval Reserve is configured adequately to ^eal with our most credible threat. It is impera- tlVe that those programs which contribute little or P°thing to national security be eliminated. I, there- °re, recommend that:
The Naval Selected Reserve, as now structured, be 'Established over a period of five years. Concur- rcntly, the manpower strength of the Navy should be Proportionately increased until all active units in existence are at their “fully combat ready” level, i.e., ully ‘battle manned.”
k Qualified members of the Naval Selected Reserve e afforded an opportunity to become part of the regular Navy, if they so desire, as total strength is
1 "creased.
^ Those selected reservists who do not desire to join regular Navy or who are not qualified to do so should be paid an equitable lump-sum payment. (A cutoff date for full retirement/partial retirement °hgibility would have to be established for those personnel already ' ‘career” designated.)
► All personnel, male and female, entering the Navy after a stated date, 1 January 1984, for example, would incur a ten-year obligation—four or six years to be served on active duty with the remaining time spent in a non-drilling but “immediate mobilization pool” status of the Individual Ready Reserve. It would be necessary for those individuals to keep the Navy advised of their current addresses during their “pool” years. They would receive a nominal annual payment during such time.
► Those officer personnel who are now entering the Navy with reserve commissions would either have to augment to the regular Navy by the end of their fourth year or go into an “immediate mobilization pool” of the Individual Ready Reserve for the remainder of their ten-year obligation.
We must stop paying lip service to the notion that our separate and certainly unequal regular and reserve components constitute a “total force Navy. This country’s naval needs of the future will not permit us to fall back on practices which have proved to be of little utility in the recent past. It’s time to retire the Naval Selected Reserve.
Lieutenant Commander Lyons graduated from the Naval Academy in 1963 and has served in three destroyers, the USS Strong (DD-758), USS Floyd B. Parks (DD-884), and USS Harold J. Ellison (DD-864), the latter as executive officer. In 1966-67, he served with Coastal Division Eleven, operating out ot An Thoi, Phu Quoc Island, South Vietnam, as officer in charge ot a Swift boat (PCF) and as division operations and training officer. In 1972, he received an M.S. degree in meteorology from the Naval Postgraduate School and then served a tour at the Fleet Weather Central, Norfolk. This article grew out of a study he did while a student at the Armed Forces Staff College in 1977. He is now serving on the statf of the Commander, in Chief Pacific as airborne command post battle staff emergency actions officer.
[1] p
0r footnotes, please turn to page 51.
One area in which reservists and regulars certainly differ is the manner in which their pay is computed. The former rely on the RESFIRST attendance reporting system, shown above, which was instituted in 1977.
have recently been made in the operational readiness of first-line units. Reserve fighter squadrons have made the transition to the F-4 Phantom, and fixed- wing patrol squadrons have experienced a change from their old P-2s to the newer P-3A/B aircraft.
Is the “Op-605 Study,” which is the Navy’s latest statement on its “total force” concept, realistic? The bottom line of this document, as well as the major concern of the other services for their reserve programs, is the number of selected reservists needed. This is because these are the people who must be “. . . highly trained, physically capable and dedicated individuals.”(> These selected reservists are the ones who drill and are paid. Their numbers have a
'"Reserve—Essential to Our Way of Life," Naval Reserve Association News, January 1977, p. 4.
[5]United States Statutes at Large: 1952, Vol. 66 (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1953), pp- 495, 498.
[6]The Statutes at Large of the United States of America from December, 1915, to March, 1917, Vol. XXXIX (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1917), p. 587.
[7]J. A. Furer, "Naval Reserve," The Encyclopedia Americana, 1975 edition,
Vol. 20, p. 1.
“Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), A Study of the Management Structure of the Naval Resene, Department of the Navy Naval Reserve Management Study, Draft Study Report, Volume IV—Functions/Field Command Level, no date, p. IV-7. “Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Structure and Size of the Naval Reserve for Fiscal Year 1977 (U), (Washington: October 1975), p. 22.
[10]Paul Smith, "Rep. Chappell Raps NR Revamp Plans," Naty Times, 1 November 1976, p. 10.
"Phil Stevens, “Nunn Sees Soviet 'Blitzkrieg' in Europe," Navy Times, 4 October 1976, p. 12.