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Iran employs the world’s largest fully operational hovercraft squadron to deter terrorism and to protect a diversified maritime commerce that ranges from the ancient dhow unloading at low tide in Hormuz Strait to the nearly 200 tankers per day that ply the narrow strait. But more than hovercraft are needed if Iran is to discourage Soviet adventurism and he prepared
Xn a short period of five to seven years, the Imperial Iranian Navy (IIN) is being expanded from a coastal force, oriented around patrol boats, to a “blue-water navy with some of the most modern and complex weapon systems in existence. It isn’t being accomplished, though, without a great many growing pains. Recruiting and training the added personnel are tough enough, and the problems are compounded by the acquisition of 30 ships and 40 helicopters of differing classes, builders, and countries of origin. The IIN is overcoming just such problems with the assistance of U.S. Navy advisors.
For centuries, Iran has been known as a land of legendary romance, immortalized in verses of Persian poets. Today, its appeal is that of a rapidly modernizing country where age-old institutions and modes of life are side by side with modern transportation, buildings, and industry. Iran is as large as that portion of the United States east of the Mississippi. But its population is only about 35 million since vast areas of central Iran are made up of two large, uninhabitable salt deserts. Tehran, the site of IIN headquarters and the center of the U. S. Navy advisory effort, has been the capital of Iran since 1785. With a population estimated at 4.2 million, Tehran is the country’s leading commercial center.
Long before the discovery of oil, control of Iran was considered of great strategic significance in the Middle East policies of a number of countries, particularly Great Britain and Russia. Since World War I, Iran’s importance has been greatly increased because it has been one of the world’s largest oil exporters. Therefore, to the European countries in particular, stability in the Persian Gulf ensures a continuous flow of oil and a stable economy.
In an interview published in the 20 January 1977 issue of the Tehran Journal, the Shah of Iran had the following to say to a Newsweek magazine correspondent about the threat to the Persian Gulf:
. . . the threat is obviously the continuation of the threat in the other theaters of the world. The threat to the security of the Persian Gulf is the continuation of the vacuum of the local powers being filled by the super powers. And the continuation of this into the Indian Ocean. Or vice versa. The Indian Ocean is an extension of the stability of the Persian Gulf. If the riparian states of the Persian Gulf can assure this security of the Persian Gulf, then the big powers will see that there is no need, no use, to get inside because they would be singled out and announced to all the countries of the riparian states. So it is the same in the Indian Ocean. If the countries of the Indian
Ocean can assure the stability and security of the region, there won’t be need for the Russians to say that you are going to Diego Garcia for Machiavellian purposes, and you saying that the Russians are in Berbera.
No Western or Communist-bloc country could take on the peacekeeping function to ensure the stability of the Persian Gulf for the same reasons that the Shah opposes the superpowers from filling this role. Moreover, the nature of the task, depending largely on the location of the authority concerned for its effectiveness, suggests that the authority be a regional power. Iran, possessing the most modern and capable military force in the region, is the most likely candidate to fill this role, and from all indications the Shah would like to have his country do just that. Iran has a stable monarchial government, maintains friendly relations with both the United States and Russia, engages in significant trade with them, and enjoys their technical assistance and other forms of support. It has demonstrated notable restraint, both in avoiding war with Iraq despite numerous border clashes and in renouncing its claim over Bahrain in 1968.
Any sustained threat to the passage of Iranian oil through the Persian Gulf would deal a serious economic blow to Iran’s aims for development. Protection of this vital sea-lane of communication is probably second in priority only to a Soviet threat to Iran’s political independence. Now, and increasingly so in the future, Iran can probably defend these waters against most hostile acts by any single Persian Gulf state or existing insurgent group. However, the destruction of even one loaded supertanker would pose an environmental disaster for the Iranian fishing industry and conceivably a hazard to continued navigation within the narrow confines of the existing chan- s nels. Prior to a 5 March 1975 boundary agreement between Iran and Iraq, one of the primary threats to Iran in the Persian Gulf had been the border disupte involving the Shatt-al-Arab, the estuary at the > mouth of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers through which flow the oil exports from southwestern Iran. It appears that the threat has been lessened since the agreement was reached.1 The threat of the spread of insurgency from the province of Dhofar in Oman, ' northward to areas that might affect passage in the Strait of Hormuz, is the reason the Shah in 1973
!The agreement was confirmed by a treaty in June 1975. It contained three protocols: the border was defined as the centerline of the main navigable channel of the Shatt-al-Arab (previously, Iraq had claimed sovereignty over all of the Shatt-al-Arab); the land boundary; and the border security and control arrangements. In return, Iran ceased support ing the Kurds in their rebellion against Iraq.
resorted to direct involvement of Iranian forces in trymg to stamp out this movement.
Clearly the design of naval forces adequate to resist political pressure, convoy maritime commerce, deter rerrorism, and, if necessary, fight a conventional war ar sea is complex and ambitious. Iran’s naval expansion may be viewed, first, as a general indication of fhe Shah’s determination to defend his own interests; second, as an instrument to discourage the applica- rion of pressure on Iran in peacetime; third, as a balanced force to protect his growing maritime interests ln peacetime; and fourth, in the event of regional hostilities, to defend Iran’s own (and perhaps neutral) shipping. The achievement of these goals is uncertain, but clearly it will take the better part of the next ten years.
The Imperial Iranian Navy’s initial effort to assume the Persian Gulf peacekeeping role has been a sutveillence effort. This has been limited to the iden- f'fication of shipping, the reporting of suspicious rriantime activity, and the control of arms flow to subversive elements inside Iran. One minor exception to this was the 1971 occupation of the islands of Abu s^usa and the two Tunbs, where the IIN used hover- Cruft to land the troops. The purpose of the operation Was to control militarily strategic islands in the strait. It is now rumored that a military base exists |here. The only opposition to the landing on the is- a°ds consisted of a handful of rifle shots. There were j?° casualties since the only opposition came from a evv fishermen. The entire Persian Gulf area is vulnerable to sea-based acts of sabotage of the facilities
and installations associated with the oil industry. Iran’s refinery at Abadan, one of the largest in the world, is within mortar range of Iraq, and the major offshore oil port on Kharg Island can easily be reached by a raiding party from that country.2
Having no access to pipelines, Iran depends on sea routes for the export of oil; therefore, the Hormuz Strait, less than 30 miles in width and with an even narrower deep-draft ship channel, is the choke point or jugular vein of the Middle East oil trade. Approximately 200 tankers per day pass through the strait bound for Europe and Japan. Should the shipping channel be closed as the result of some hostile act, the Western world’s economic stability and some weaker governments would rapidly disintegrate. To protect this vital strait, Iran has built its naval forces accordingly: with minesweeping ships and helicopters; with antisubmarine destroyers, submarines, helicopters, and fixed-wing aircraft; and with surface-to-surface missile equipped destroyers, frigates, and patrol boats.
As the IIN grows with the new ship acquisitions and becomes more confident in its role as the Persian Gulf defender, the Shah would like to extend his influence to the Indian Ocean. One of the Shah’s plans is to form an alliance with the nations controlling the choke points to the Indian Ocean. This would include South Africa once its government renounces apartheid. In this way the regional powers will be capable of handling any threats within the region, thus eliminating any excuse for the superpowers to build up naval and military forces within the region. In order to implement this grandiose plan, the Shah has been looking at acquisitions of larger ships, including numerous rumors about aircraft carrier inquiries,'* in addition to the acquisitions already planned.
The Shah is now building a modern navy headed by four Spruance-class destroyers (DD-993). These ships, to be built upon completion of the U. S. Navy’s 30-ship program, will be fitted out with antiair, antisubmarine, and surface-to-surface weapon systems. Given the slippage in both construction and support, these ships are not likely to begin operating until the mid-to-late 1980s. The DD-993S will be backed up by nearly a dozen destroyers and frigates of U. S. and British construction. Included will be
cruiser.
2See Colonel Victor J. Croizat, USMC (Retired), "Stability in the Persian Gulf,” United States Naval Institute Proceedings, July 1973, pp. 48-59. 3The aircraft carrier rumors were very real. The U.S. Navy was approached more than once about the possibility of the Iranian Navy buying one of the carriers we were retiring. The inquiries have subsided, but I expect them to come up again along with discussions of a through-deck
four British-built Vosper Mk 5 frigates, and two Allen M. Sumner-class (DD-692) destroyers converted by the U. S. Navy to DDGs for the IIN in the early 1970s. The Iranians have purchased three Tang-class diesel-powered submarines, the Trout (SS-566), Wahoo (SS-565), and Tang (SS-563), all built in the middle 1950s. Current plans call for the overhaul of these submarines in the United States prior to delivery to the IIN in 1979-1981. The first of the overhauls has already begun. Newly built supply and logistics ships have also been purchased from German and British shipyards. An IIN strike force equipped with British SR.N6 and BH-7 hovercraft (armed with light automatic weapons) forms the world’s largest fully operational hovercraft squadron. These craft help defend Iran against intrusion by their ability to navigate shoal waters and otherwise gain access to unapproachable coasts.4
IIS Faramarz
COURTESY P. B. SMITH
USS Tang (SS-563), one of three submarines to be transferred to Iran
MK III Patrol Boat
U.S. NAVY
4See U.S. Military Sales to Iran, A Staff Report to the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, July 1976, pp 19-25.
The future should see the acquisitions of missilearmed fast attack craft from France, more supply and
Ship Type | Ships of the Imperial Iranian Navy Length Number Displacement in feet | ||
Sprnance (DD-993)- Class Destroyers | 4 First delivery 1982 in U.S. | 7,800 | 563.3 |
Ex-British “Battle” Class Destroyer | 1 Converted in 1967 in U.K. | 2,352 | 355 |
E*-Allen At. Sumner (DD-692)- Class Destroyers | 2 Converted in 1971 in U.S. | 2,200 | 376.5 |
V°sper Mk 5 Frigates | 4 Completed in 1971-72 in U.K. | 1,110 | 310 |
£x-PF- 103-Class Corvettes | 4 Completed in 1964 and 1969 in U.S. | 900 | 275 |
Tang (SS-563)-Class Submarines | 3 To be overhauled in U.S.—first delivery 1979 | 2,100 | 287 |
I-a Combattante II Fast Attack Craft-Missile | 12 Built in France to be delivered by 1979 | 249 | 154.2 |
Wellington (BH.71- Class Hovercraft | 6 Built in U.K. in 1970-75 | 33 | 76 |
Winchester (SR.N6)- Class Hovercraft | 8 Built in U.K. in 1973-75 | 10 | 48.4 |
Fleet Tanker | 1 Delivery in 1979 in U.K. built by Swan Hunter | 20,000 | — |
Ending Ships logistic | 2 Completed in 1974 in U.K. | 2,500 | 300 |
Fleet Supply Ships | 2 Completed in 1974 in Germany 1 Under construction | 3,250 | 354.2 |
E*-Amphion (AR-13)-Class RePair Ship | 1 Built in 1946 in U.S.—manned by U.S. contractor personnel used as permanent repair facility | 7,826 | 456 |
4-40-mm. guns
2-3-inch/50 guns
Weapons
2-Standard SS/SAM 2-5-ineh/54 guns
1- ASROC
2- Triple Mk 32 torpedo tubes
4-Standard launchers with 8 missiles 1-Quadruple Seacat 4-4.5 in. guns
1- Squid 3 barrelled DC mortar
4-Standard launchers with 8 missiles 4-5 inch/38 guns Depth charges
2- triple torpedo launchers Mk 32
1-Quintuple Seakiller 1-Triple Seacat
1- 4.5-in Mk 8 gun
2- 3-inch/50 guns 8-21-inch torpedo tubes
2-Twin Harpoon launchers
1- 76-mm. Oto Melara
2- Browning machine gun 4-craft fitted for but not
with, SS missiles
1 or 2 .50-cal. machine guns
logistic ships from Britain and Germany, and perhaps guided-missile frigates from the United States. There is also some speculation that the IIN is interested in an Invincible-class through-deck cruiser with short/vertical takeoff and landing aircraft of British design.
In order to assist in protecting the Persian Gulf and its approaches from submarine attack, the naval air arm is also expanding. P-3F Orions combine with SH-3D and RH-53D helicopters to provide airborne surveillance, antisubmarine warfare, and minesweeping capabilities. In addition, Bell helicopters and Fokker F-27 Friendship turboprops provide logistics mobility. The U.S. Navy is also involved in an advisory and support effort with the Imperial Iranian Air Force (IIAF), since that service has recently added the F-14 to its inventory which also includes the F-4, F-5, and P-3.
A major base, maritime headquarters, and shipyard are in use at Bandar Abbas, just inside the Strait of Hormuz. Further inside the Persian Gulf at Bushire are a naval air station, a small naval base,
and a repair facility. Smaller naval bases are in opera- j tion at Khorramshahr, and the island of Kharg in the Persian Gulf. A new major base and shipyard are being planned for Chah Bahar on the Gulf of Oman, which permits access to the Indian Ocean even if the Strait of Hormuz should be blocked off by some hostile act. A naval training center on the Caspian Sea is • in operation. When the expansion is completed if the next two to three years, the quality of equipment available there will be as high as that in U.S. Navy j training centers.
governmental agencies in Iran, continually experi- e°Ces shortages, particularly in the areas of labor and c°ncrete. A current bottleneck is being experienced n the construction of housing at the Bandar Abbas ar,d Bushire naval bases. In fact, the housing shortly is so acute that the Iranian Navy has purchased JVo Italian passenger liners, TSS Michael Angelo and Raffaello, to serve as interim barracks ships, nother growth pain occurred at the shipyard in . andar Abbas. Originally scheduled to have opened n July 1975, it went into partial operation late last ^ear. In this case the foreign contractor had difficul- es in clearing materials through Iranian customs,
The IIN is now heavily dependent upon the U.S. avy schools in order to train the prospective DD-993 and submarine crews. However, some of the burden °n U.S. Navy schools should be removed with the recent opening in Iran of many of the class A schools required for the Imperial Iranian Navy. U.S. Navy trainers have been active in the planning and implementing of in-country training using the A school training plans translated into Persian.[1] Evaluations of e quality of training being provided the IIN show results comparable to those obtained in U.S. Navy Scho°ls- These positive results should reduce the nurnber of IIN trainees, about 1,000 per year, who attend U.S. Navy schools now. The British also ad- v<se the IIN in the operation of a fleet training center at the Bandar Abbas Naval Base.
With the newly acquired oil wealth, the country fesembles a boom town, experiencing the same conduction pains as would be expected from a boom atrnosphere. The IIN, as with all other business and
thus resulting in construction delays. Brown and Root of Houston, Texas, the contractor for Chah Bahar Naval Base and Shipyard, has applied for a provision for customs exemption in the contract in order to avoid a repetition of the Bandar Abbas delays.
When a nation has a great many petro-dollars available, it is relatively easy to buy equipment and facilities. However, it is infinitely more difficult to recruit and train qualified personnel to operate all of the sophisticated hardware associated with these purchases. In 1975, the IIN had 13,000 officers and men and expected to quadruple in size within five years. Some of the problems that must be faced:
► A limited population base to recruit from
► A literacy rate estimated at 40%
► Lower educational requirements for enlistment (a high school education is required for officers and an average of a ninth grade education is obtained for enlisted)
► Lower pay than comparable civilian rates in the booming economy
► Long enlistments—an 11-year initial obligation with little hope of getting out before 20 years’ service is completed
► A historical reliance on the army to defend the country, implying little exposure to naval affairs
Obviously the magnitude of the present and future major U.S. systems delivery programs is ambitious. These programs support the Shah’s overall aim for eventual industrial independence by stimulating the growth of an industrial base capable of producing military equipment. Still, very basic problems exist in the lack of education and skilled manpower, and as in industry, the naval establishment leans heavily upon foreign technicians. It is estimated that upward of 40,000 Americans are in Tehran, along with large contingents of other foreigners. The infusion of mili-
tary technology is a heavy drain upon the trained manpower base. The Imperial Iranian Navy is faced with significant shortcomings which can prevent it from becoming operationally effective in a battle of any duration. New equipment will continue to arrive before the maintenance facility construction is complete, creating problems of critical shortages of warehousing and storage space and lack of inventory control. Thus, long-lead-time equipment may not be available to provide support when required. Another significant shortcoming is the reluctance of senior officers to change traditional attitudes and procedures. In addition, in December 1975 the Imperial Iranian Navy’s Commander in Chief and Deputy Commander in Chief, one other admiral, and another 20 officers were jailed for corruption and graft. In spite of the upheaval, the IIN continues to advance and assimilate new equipment and technology.
Since World War II, the United States has been assisting friendly foreign countries in establishing and maintaining adequate military forces consistent with their economic stability and growth—to maintain internal security and resist external agression. The reason for furnishing such assistance is based upon the tenet that the security and economic well-being of friendly foreign countries are essential to the security of the United States. This principle is inherent in the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the Nixon Doctrine.
Security Assistance, the program under which the U.S. Navy is in Iran, comprises the sale of defense articles and services, the grant of such articles and services without reimbursement in appropriate cases, economic supporting assistance in exceptional cases to offset costs of maintaining armed forces, and grant assistance to public safety forces such as police. Iran comes under the first category, foreign military sales, which is administered by and the responsibility of the Department of Defense. Under the direction of the President, the Secretary of State is responsible for continuous supervision and general direction of foreign military sales, including but not limited to determining whether there shall be a sale and, if so, the amount.[2]
Not all of Iran’s neighbors are pro-Western. Iran is bordered to the north by the Soviet Union, to the west by Iraq, and to the east by Afghanistan, all Communist-oriented countries to one degree or another. For this reason, it is important for the United States and other Western powers to maintain a friendly ally in this area. In the past three years, Iran has committed itself to spending more than $10 billion for defense-related articles from the United States. This represents a sizable assist to the U.S. balance of payments problem. During a period of high unemployment in the United States, foreign military sales to Iran represent jobs to Americans. Besides jobs, the sales keep open production lines that might otherwise close down, and, by increasing the number of units produced, they reduce unit costs of weapons being purchased for our services. Selling American equipment to Iran helps continue Iran s dependence upon the United States to provide replacement parts and associated specialized training, thus reducing the possibility of losing Iran as an ally.
Training students to operate the sophisticated hardware purchased in the United States has important side benefits. Training in U. S. Navy schools exposes young Iranians to the American way of life and thought processes and also advances the use of the English language in another segment of the world. English is the second language of Iran. The training also raises the education level of these sailors, who have at best the equivalent of a ninth- grade education before enlisting in the IIN. Ideally, these factors will all contribute to promoting a continued stable, friendly government in Iran.
After the unpleasantness resulting from the American involvment in Vietnam, the U.S. national defense policy has shifted to that of supplying weapons and technology to build up a friendly foreign government’s defense posture, thus reducing the possibility of Americans becoming involved in skirmishes abroad. Therefore, it is important to the United States to build the IIN into a self-sufficient and capable fighting force.
This country has maintained a military mission in Iran since September 1941. Its original concern was with lend-lease assistance to the Middle East, but in 1943, by formal agreement between the two governments, a U.S. Army Mission (ARMISH) to the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces was established and has continued ever since. The U. S. Navy was not involved until the Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG) was established in 1950. The separate organizations were consolidated in 1958. In 1969, a contract was signed adding a Technical Assistance Field Team (TAFT) to ARMISH-MAAG. About one quarter of the approximately 100 U. S. Navy advisors are MAAG, acting as a headquarters advisory component, and the remainder are TAFT, acting as one-on-one field advisors with an IIN counterpart. All advisors are chief petty officers or above.
The Department of Defense attaches sufficient im-
C0 take
er>t is granted by default. Finally the LOA is forwarded to the MAAG to present to the IIN for signa- tUfe. Once signed, the Navy Section begins advising n the specialized areas pertaining to the equipment einS purchased. This entire process of obtaining a Slgned contract takes a minimum of three to four months, depending on the size of the purchase.
he question that each individual involved in arms j es to Iran must answer in his own mind is this: “Is k morally right to expand the proliferation of arms y selling and providing instruction in the use of eapons to the developing nations of the world?” Arms sales to Iran are related to sustaining the s°ncinued free flow of Persian Gulf petroleum re- j rces to the United States and our allies, particu- . y Western Europe and Japan. Our interests also 0,Ve keeping Iran favorably disposed to the sia-d States as a strong friend and ally in the Per- an Gulf and Indian Ocean area. A result of congres
action within a specified number of days, con-
portance to the advisory effort in Iran that it assigns an Air Force major general to command the ARMlSH-MAAG. The Navy Section MAAG, which is headed by a rear admiral, acts as a clearinghouse for foeas, requests, and communications between the hhS. Chief of Naval Operations and the IIN. The Navy TAFT furnishes advisors for each of the directorates, e.g., Personnel Directorate, and advisors t0 the fleet, to the training centers, and to each tnajor equipment project.
When the IIN requests information from the MAAG concerning the possible purchase of a new piece of equipment, the Navy Section must staff it prior to forwarding the request to CNO. The plans advisors look at how the new equipment fits in with c e overall growth plans set by the IIN. The operations advisors put together recommendations for the use of the equipment. The training advisors establish e training requirements to operate the new equipment and along with the planning advisors ascertain e impact on the IIN personnel strength requirements. The logistics advisors determine the price and ^variability of the new equipment along with the 0 fow-on support requirements.
Once this package is assembled, it is forwarded to P e cNO. A letter of offer and acceptance (LOA), a ttnal government-to-government contract, is prePared and sent to the Defense Security Assistance gency of the Department of Defense. Next, the ecretary of State’s office will determine whether the Saie falls within their dollar guidelines. If the amount of the sale exceeds $25 million or if the end ^ern appears on the major defense equipment list, ngress must be notified. Should Congress fail to
sional decisions barring arms shipments to Turkey may be to increase the importance of Iran to the United States if Turkey should turn away from its strong pro-United States position. At the same time, the United States does not desire to alienate the Arab nations by showing too much favoritism toward Iran.
Two factors, economic and military in nature, seem to have the greatest influence on the existing status of the relationship between the United States and Iran. The economic factor centers on oil. The oil demand income is of such importance to Iran that its present policy is to sell oil to any country. The United States is among Iran’s oil customers and will continue to require oil from the Middle East until alternate energy programs are developed. Oil prices could cause, at some time, a deterioration in this relationship. The sale of oil for high prices is vital to Iran’s pace of development, but the economic influence of these prices creates inflationary havoc in the Western world.
The military consideration centers on the massive U.S. sales of highly sophisticated military equipment to Iran. These sales are designed to strengthen Iran’s position in the Persian Gulf. They also strengthen the U.S. position there and prevent the Soviet Union from filling the vacuum left by the withdrawal of the British naval forces from the Persian Gulf in 1971. This massive military buildup will result in a stronger Iran and a deterioration of the relationship between the United States and the Arab countries should Iran employ her armed forces in an aggressive manner. At some future point, it is possible that Iran may demand that U. S. naval forces stationed in the Persian Gulf be withdrawn. There are some indications that Iran may have lost some confidence in the U.S. willingness to protect it from the Soviet Union or perhaps India. Hence, Iran may be seeking to balance its international relationships by promoting closer relations with the People’s Republic of China. Therefore, as long as Iran needs U. S. weapons and weapons support, a continued mutual dependence will result, and the Imperial Iranian Navy will continue to grow in a hurry.
After six years of enlisted service during which he rose to ETl(SS), Lieutenant Commander Green was commissioned in 1967 through the NESEP program. He received his B.A. in mathematics from the University of Kansas and his M.S. in computer science from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. He has served in the USS 1 Dale (DLG-19) and USS Downes (DE-1070) and in the diesel submarines Spinax (SS-489) and Raton (AGSS-270). From 1975 until 1977, he was the MAAG submarine training advisor to -the Imperial Iranian Navy as part of the ARMISH-MAAG. He is now a student at the Naval War College in Newport.
[1]'J’h
ere are many difficulties in this regard because Persian is not a lan- ^ a<^aPtec^ t0 t^ie technical nature of the training course. One of WhetaS^s *s to Pr°duce a file of “acquired” technical terms so that n a term is assimilated into the language, it is standardized.
[2]See Military Assistance and Sales Manual (DOD 5105.38-M), pp. B1-B2.