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task group. Further it was envisioned ^ at these V/STOL aircraft would quickly operated in the conventional mode rorn captured airfields.
/STol is an added capability not a
Dut his
view of V/STOL as a vehicle for
"Why V/STOL?”
($ee G. G. O’Rourke, pp. 39-45, January 1976; W. G. Carson and F. F. Palmer, pp. 79-80, June 1976 Proceedings)
Commander H. C. Boschen, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Captain O’Rourke indicated fhat: "For well over a decade, the advocacY of high-performance jet v/STOL (vertical or short take-off and landing) has been loudly voiced in the Pentagon ' ■ Personally, 1 wonder where all these advocates were in 1968 when I, along with a Marine lieutenant colonel, trted to convince the Navy that V/STOL ah a future. The Marines were the only group who even knew of the new ^bOOO-pound thrust power plant devel- °pments in Harrier.
Captain O’Rourke, however, apparently missed the point completely with the Marine use of V/STOL. I do not efieve that it was ever intended to be e primary attack aircraft in an invasion
Or P J
Europe. As it was conceived and as I recall, it was originally envisioned to Slve the Marines jet aircraft for ground SuPport where aircraft carriers requiring Sophisticated arresting gear, all weather nding aids, and catapults were not available—in short in the amphibious u stitute for something. I am a little o!pCar as t0 whether or not Captain ., °Ur^e's h°r or against V/STOL. Con- enng the fact that he is an aviator, he tainly appears to be trying to fit the 71 ^ operational V/STOL, Harrier, into a pu ^ ^ sh,ort> he continues to try to roun<h Peg 'nt0 the square hole! ere were many who talked against the ^manned helicopter in favor of a k ^noed helicopter on surface warships, be k*S equal]y difficult to accept. It may ^ e to work as Gary Cooper worked lJSS Teakettle, but we presently have
better means for ASW, not excluding the air cushioned vehicle.
I disagree with Captain O’Rourke that surface warfare officers have disassociated themselves from V/STOL. Most amphibiously-oriented officers will tell you that V/STOL is the added extra that makes the amphibious capability truly a worldwide reality.
"Surface Warfare Officers:
The Need for Professionalism”
(See R. J. Hart, pp. 38-44, June 1976
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander James C. Van Slyke, Jr., U. S. Navy, Executive Officer, USS El Paso (LKA-i 77)—As a surface warfare officer, I do not feel that I take second place (or third) to naval aviators and submariners. I have great respect for those who operate above and below the sea, but they stand no taller than I. Those officers wearing "wings” and "dolphins” are the warfare specialists in their environments just as the surface warfare breast device designates me a specialist in mine. I am proud of my qualifications, proud to be a SWO, and I do not believe the surface warfare officer has to take a back seat to anyone.
"High-Low”
(See E. R. Zumwalt, pp. 46-56, April 1976;
R. L. McIntyre, p. 76, July 1976; J. T.
Hayward, pp. 69-72, August 1976;
H. Sanders, pp. 75-76, September 1976
Proceedings)
Colonel R. D. Heinl, Jr., U. S. Marine Corps (Retired)— While the Proceedings deserves applause for giving us a sampling of Admiral Zumwalt’s well written, controversial memoir, it should in my opinion also be seriously faulted for including Zumwalt’s ad hominem strictures on Admiral Rickover.
Don’t get me wrong. There is no reason why Admiral Zumwalt, after all a
retired officer, should not vent his griefs and views with full freedom in his own book. He is not entitled, nor are members of the Naval Institute, to use Proceedings, a respected professional forum, for ad hominem criticism of one of the Navy’s most senior admirals who (whatever faults may sometimes be charged against him) has never been remotely accused of self-serving nor of resorting to ad hominem tactics against some pretty rough opponents, Admiral Zumwalt included.
"The Female Naval Aviator:
A Free Ride?”
(See R. P. Shipman, p. 84, September, 1975; J. S. Harmon and J. E. Burgess, pp. 75-76, December 1975; J. M. Drag and B. A. Rainey, pp. 76-78, February 1976 Proceedings)
Lieutenant (j.g.) Rosemary B. Conatser, U. S. Navy, Fleet Composite Squadron Tim— It had been a bad week. Besides having the Monday blahs (lasting through Wednesday), I was scheduled for that annual trial by fire—renewing the instrument card. Having recently acquired "jet”-aviator status, I was scheduled to fly the full TA-4J syllabus with VF-43, the instrument training squadron. Filled with my usual apprehension about walking into a ready room full of curious men, I appeared for my first flight.
Following an average first flight, the debrief went as usual until the instructor casually mentioned that my next
ENTER THE FORUM
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hop would be with Lieutenant Shipman. Not the Lieutenant Richard Shipman? Yes, that one, and 1 was told that he had been looking forward to flying with me! I cringed and restrained a strong urge to sigh. What more could go wrong this week?
Who is this sinister character who could make me so uncomfortable? As the author of the nocuous article, "Female Naval Aviators: A Free Ride?”, he is the self-proclaimed leader of the male chauvinist pig movement in naval air. Declaring the program as blatant reverse discrimination, his article precipitated a volley of letters on lady aviators. When I read his "masterpiece,” two things struck me. One, it was obvious he had no factual knowledge of what really transpired in the designation of a woman as a Naval Aviator, and two, the implication that women with wings had the world on a string. Of course, rather than make things equal, Lieutenant Shipman’s solution is to put an end to female naval aviators.
Wondering if Lieutenant Shipman’s plans to rid the Navy of "waviators” was to begin with me, I reported for our brief. Instead of the mud-hole resident I had envisioned, I met a soft-spoken gentleman. I managed to survive the first training flight. Then, we decided to combine the remaining hops and instrument check flight on a cross-country flight to my hometown, San Diego. San Diego is also the residence of Lieutenant (j.g.) Jo Ellen Drag, H-46 pilot and author of a letter eloquently rebutting Lieutenant Shipman’s article—even he had been impressed.
There are many important aspects to Lieutenant Shipman’s literary achievement. It exemplified the ignorance most Navy people have of the female naval aviator program. Unfortunately, it is correct that male and female naval personnel do not toss their names in the same hat for job assignments. This is not by our choice but because of the U. S. Code Ten, Title 6059, which states females cannot fly "aircraft engaged in combat missions” or be assigned to "vessels of the Navy except hospital ships and transports.” As for "ardous sea duty,” most men who choose to become Navy pilots want to carrier qualify (CQ) and go to "boat” squadrons. Surprisingly, the majority of female aviators want the same opportunities, for the same reasons. While men must worry about flight grades and face the possibility of being "stashed,” it would take literally an Act of Congress to assign women to seagoing units (squadrons or ship company billets). This is a very discouraging obstacle.
By stating that females had an unfair grade advantage, because they did not undergo CQs, Lieutenant Shipman again displayed his lack of knowledge on the subject. Had he researched this charge, he would have learned that neither prop nor helo students undergo carrier qualifications until they have received orders, thus these grades are not factors in detailing. On the issue of orders, he assumes that all females went to ideal squadrons. It is important to realize that none of these orders would be considered "career enhancing” for men. Males on sea duty in support squadrons have no careers unless assigned to warfare speciality communities their next tours. So, young men on board carriers, envious of C-9 pilots, should remember that at least they have a chance for naval careers. Pilots who remain in support squadrons do not. Lieutenant Shipman could have skipped several paragraphs d he had had the facts straight. Granted, all this does not make for spirited happy hour conversation.
The other important topic is equal opportunity. I agree that the present situation is as unfair to men as it is to women. But equal opportunity with qualifications is like being a little bit pregnant—either you are or you are not. Simply stated, there isn’t going to be any equality unless the legal restraints are removed. This is where Lieutenant Shipman and I disagree drastically. I say let’s make things equal, and he says no, only men should be naval aviators. Well, I’m not about to turn in my wings-
Despite my best efforts, I doubt d Dick Shipman thinks I should make his next Med cruise, all jokes about female roommates aside. I do believe I c°n' vinced him that: (1) he should do hi* homework, and (2) life is not all that great for men and women in supp°ft squadrons. Likewise, I understand how a young man who just made a nighc bolter—night landing—finds it hard to be objective about flying with a female no matter how good she looks. It5 even harder if he is stashed and reads about some girl flying his C-9.
After flying 15 hours in the TA-4, some heated discussions, and name call' ing, I consider Dick Shipman a friend- Strangely enough, we probably havC more in common than not. Despite m) strong tendency to chase the TACAF1 needle on final approach, he renewed tttf instrument card. All things considered- it was a very worthwhile flight. Beside5
"Cruise Missile:
The Ship Killer”
(Set W. J. Ruhc, pp. 45-52, June 1976
Proceedings')
Rear Admiral W. E. Meyer, U. S. Navy, Naval Sea Systems Command— Captain Ruhe’s timely article is a helpful reminder that ship-to-ship missile combat has progressed from the 1967 harbinger to a basic mode of warfare in most of the navies of the world, including those of modest military power. He notes the advantage available to the attacker of using near-simultaneous missile strikes from a multiplicity of ships in diverse positions around the targets, coordinated with air- and submarine-launched missiles when needed. The emphasis is on surprise, saturation, and diffusion of missile-launching positions which might be subject to counterattack. On the high seas, at least, the advantage is credited to the offense, enhanced by a trend to mobility and concealment.
What is the answer to this formidable worldwide danger? Captain Ruhe touches on electronic deception, highspeed tactical maneuvers, and readiness for an almost instant return strike. The missing element which will mean life or death in the cruise missile duels is defense. (It is interesting to note that the collage on the title page recognized the defense need by the types of ships depicted.)
The naval force which can defeat the attacking missiles, or most of them, long enough to bring to bear an effective counterattack, will prevail. The defense required must overcome the essential advantages of the attacker—surprise, saturation, and diffusion of source— which will require new levels of quick response, firepower, and sophistication of battle control. The needed developments are well advanced, and the purposes are well understood. The various modern anti-missile systems now must be implemented in the Fleet. There is an answer to the cruise missile. A better sword calls forth not only a matching sword, but, just as important, a better shield.
The specifics of the new shield are as complex as the modes of attack. The F-14-Phoenix is a part. The AEGIS area defense and force control is essential. Several levels of shorter range "point defense” with advanced technology must be provided. Wide surveillance and control is required. This whole field of endeavor has been advancing every bit as dramatically as the cruise missiles, and the new threat need not swing the advantage irretrievably to the offense if we now build up the defenses in modern form.
Cruise missiles are worldwide. Modern defenses against them are a generation ahead in the U. S. Navy alone. We have an advantage to exploit.
"Employment Plan for U. S. Navy PHMs”
(See R. P. Rempt, pp. 93-96, June 1976 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Fred F. Furtek,Jr., U. S. Naval Reserve— It occurred to me after I read your excellent June Proceedings that there may be another role for the Pegasus (PHM-i) in today’s Navy. Commander Rempt describes the use of a squadron of PHMs to control a strategic area; my vision of the PHM is as a "Killer Tattletale.”
Why not assign a PHM to each major Soviet surface-to-surface missile- equipped platform which might threaten our carriers? With its superior speed advantage the PHM should have no trouble shadowing visually, by ESM, or by radar, its intended target. Should hostilities develop, the hostile force can be "Harpooned” by the already-in-posi- tion hydrofoil.
Such use of the new class responds to Captain Ruhe’s exhortation put forth on pages 45-52 of the same issue, that, ". . . every missile platform with lts potential of high weapon power must be a target for rapid destruction.” We have to eliminate the enemy missile platform and he has to eliminate ours. The presence of a Pegasus draws enemy attention away from the carrier to the tattletale. A first attack on the tattletale would alert the carrier; a first attack on the carrier would bring a missile salvo over the horizon from the tattletale. Neither option is an easy choice for those who would deny us the use of the seas.
Of course there are unknowns which could only be solved by experience- Would the PHM’s range and habitability limit its on-station time? How man)' hydrofoils would be required to achieve this role? Is the use of such a high-speed craft as a tattletale economical?
My solution to all of the above worn be to use the PHM as a random tattletale, keeping an enemy on his toes, never knowing when he is being watched.
Whatever their use, the Pegasus-class missile boats will bring our Navy ne^ potential and flexibility—but only 1 they’re built.
"Cinderella Carriers”
(See Pictorial, pp. 54-65, August 1976
Proceedings)
Chief Aviation Structural Mechanic &0 Wall, U. S. Naval Reserve [Retired), EtHt°r of the "Natoma Bay Association"—"OP derella Carriers” is an excellent accounr of the planning and building of c^e escort carriers. However, those of uS who served in them think more of great job that they did and the acti°^ that we saw. It is true that many 0
them were used in the jobs that they Were designed for, ferrying and replen- 'shment, and they performed a most necessary and useful function. There tvere a good many that turned out to be ■warships in the best sense of the word.
In the Natoma Bay (CVE-62) we made several ferry trips from San Diego to earl Harbor. We carried trucks, buses, !eeps, and all types of military vehicles, as well as a good number of personnel nm all the services. At the conclusion the second trip, we went into the yard 3t Pearl and underwent modifications to ^eommodate an admiral and his staff. e knew then that we were headed for
the war. The Natoma Bay got into action in the Marshalls in February 1944, and we missed only one major invasion during the rest of the war. (We had a Stateside yard availability during the invasion of Palau).
On 25 October 1944, we—like the Gambler Bay (CVE-73)—came under attack by the Japanese central force off San Bernardino Strait in the Philippines. During the Okinawa operation in April 1945, we went into the harbor at Kerama Retto to refuel and rearm every five or six days. As we pulled out each time, there would be an air attack about sundown. Several ships in the harbor were hit and damaged during the raids, but as far as is known none of the CVEs was hit.
On 7 June 1945, our luck ran out. In previous months we had survived bombing attacks with no hits scored and kamikaze attacks which were either shot down or deflected. This one made it all the way in—through the forward end of the flight deck onto the forecastle. After the fire was put out, the damage control boys went to work and bridged over the hole and put plates on top and we launched a flight an hour and 30 minutes after being hit. There was only one fatality and a few shrapnel injuries. From what we could salvage of the Japanese plane, we cast over 1,000 small aluminum horseshoes which were distributed to the men of the ship and the squadron—a memento of our memorable, but busy, days on board a jeep carrier.
The CVEs are no more, but they will live forever in the hearts of the men who went down to the sea in them.
The CV: A Survivable Concept?
Richard Borges, Jr., formerly a CIC watch officer on board the USS John F. Kennedy (CF-67)—Can the CV perform her many assigned missions? Theoretically, the CV should be able to handle the load. She has VS (air antisubmarine) and HS (helicopter antisubmarine) squadrons in the air wing. The ship has a computerized Tactical Support Center (TSC)—or, in the case of older ships, an Antisubmarine Classification and Analysis Center (ASCAC)—and officers expert in the field of ASW. In theory, the CV should be able to conduct ASW, AAW, airborne strikes, and any other missions assigned to her. However, in reality, the process of turning an attack carrier into an attack/ASW carrier is not as easy in practice as it is in theory.
As an example, I’ll use the USS John F. Kennedy (then CVA-67) which underwent CV conversion in 1974. TSC was given two compartments, one for computers and one for analysis. ASW could not be run from TSC due to lack of required equipment. Command and control of ASW was run from CIC on a DRT plot due to lack of an NC-2. Surface and ASW plots were combined into the same plot, causing both of the original plots to suffer. A destroyer runs ASW on an NC-2 because of the different scales required for the two plots, yet an aircraft carrier with a command and control mission must use one plot. The space provided for surface/ASW is so small that carrier group staff" officers and ASW officers tend to crowd out the watch team and watch officer.
The air ASW picture also suffers. Controlling SH-3Ds in close ASW and S-3As in medium range ASW is difficult using one NTDS (Navy Tactical Data System) console and one controller. An ASCAC cannot adequately control S-3As 40 or 50 miles from the CV and SH-3Ds ten or 20 miles away. Other consoles are used for interceptor control and cannot be used for ASW. Attack aviation is still first and foremost. Information the controller needs to help the ASW aircraft classify and prosecute a contact is often delayed due to inadequate communications. TSC
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does not receive NTDS information on its consoles and so does not have the full surface and subsurface picture it so vitally needs.
Command and control personnel on board the CV are attack aviation oriented. ASW is viewed solely as the province of the ASW operations officer and his staff. A CV will launch every cycle, even if a submarine contact has been located on fox corpen*. When the best measure a CV could take would be to steam away from the datum, even though not having the right wind over the deck would preclude a cycle on time. A CV would provide the type of fire control solution that is the dream of every sub CO if she is on fox corpen. What evasive action could she take in that situation?
Air ASW cannot be conducted neat the approach pattern or within visual range of the CV due to flight safety- Helos or S-3As trying to do close-in ASW are out of luck. If they are not allowed to do it, the ship just may be out of luck. Rather than surrendering the waters close to the carriers, as we often seem to do, the CV should clear the area for an ASW helo to safely prosecute the contact. ASW helos are among the best platforms for ASW. Let’s use them f°r that purpose, rather than rating plane guard and logistics missions higher pfl" orities than ASW.
Training is another CV problem. CVAS were previously oriented toward forC*j defense and strike missions. Comman and control personnel thought in terms of these missions. Conversion to a cV’ means that officers and senior enlisted m CIC now receive ASW training. Bridge personnel do not, in many cases, get t0 go to the ASW Training Center for AS^ courses. Without ASW training, c^e bridge watch does not understand the CIC recommendations made in accot ance with ASW doctrine. Consequent!)’ the bridge watch often does not foil0" ASW recommendations.
The CV concept must precipitate major change in the attitudes of decl sion-makers so that they will think AS as well as attack aviation. The CV muS also be given the equipment necessary do her ASW mission properly. Otbej. wise, the CV will never Live up to her f capabilities.
•Launch Course
The Beachcomber and the Beachhead”
(&e N. C. Vanzant, pp. 64-71, June 1975; T. Stone, p. 126, March 1976 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral 1V. E. Lamed, U. S. Naval Reserve {Retired)—The photograph of the French aircraft carrier Beam in the March 1976 issue brought to mind the story of President Roosevelt’s covert transfer of 50 Navy SBC-4 aircraft to the
French.
It was 6 June 1940. I was in my office as Assistant Superintendent of Flying for United Air Lines in Chicago, when the telephone rang. The commanding officer °1 the Naval Reserve Aviation Base at Glenview, was calling. "Slim,” he said, tve have just received orders to fly all of °Ur SBC-4s to the Curtiss factory at Buf- a °- I don’t know what’s up or why, ut they have to go today. I need some fjuadron pilots right away. Can you help?”
I ran through the list of U. S. Naval eserve pilots who were flying for mted at the time and was able to round up only two besides myself. Lieutenants (j.g.) Douglas Wilson and I. E. °rnrnermeyer volunteered to go.
After picking up our uniforms at °rne, we hurried out to the air station ^ here the SBC-4s were in the process of be>ng readied for ferry. All we were told Was Get them to Buffalo as fast as you
can. We collected our orders and took off.
Gn arrival at the factory late that day, Found that other SBCs from all over e United States were dropping in two r three at a time. That evening, the , Aero Inspector called a meeting of e ^0 pilots. The essence of his talk to3 K The President has ordered all SBC-4S he turned over to the French Gov- rnrnent. We want you to take these ^lrcraft to Halifax where the French ^ trier Beam is waiting for them. But, °tn Buffalo to Halifax and return, you e * bave to be officially classified as ^Ployees of the Curtiss company. They te ^°U ^50 plus your rail fare back Ur nffalo. This operation is extremely ^8ent, and very much on the QT. All avy insignia must be removed from nUr flight gear, or taped over. From . °n the airplanes will be French ‘rcraft. On your return to Buffalo, you
will go back on Navy orders for your return to home base.”
Meanwhile, Curtiss employees were working overtime removing .30 caliber guns and installing AOs; removing all instruments and gear marked with BUAERO, BUSHIPS, or BUORD and effacing the identifications. All USN or anchor marks were obliterated. The aircraft were repainted with camouflage paint and the French tricolor on the rudders.
No doubt because of all the haste, many of the flight instruments and radio equipment were replaced without adequate care or check-out. More about this later.
The weather soon deteriorated, with low ceilings accompanied by rain and fog over most of the northeast. The route that had been laid out for us was Buffalo to Burlington, Vermont to Augusta, Maine to Houlton, Maine to Halifax.
It had been planned to dispatch the SBCs in three-plane sections in the order of their arrivals at Buffalo but, due to the weather and the many mechanical problems that were developing, this plan was soon discarded. The sections were to be sent out whenever any three aircraft were ready to go. One aircraft immediately had trouble with the weather between Buffalo and Albany and crashed, killing the pilot. This accident, plus the common realization that the replaced avionics and flight instruments were not to be depended upon, caused the naval inspector to halt any further take-offs until the weather improved enough to
President Roosevelt’s order to transfer SBC-4s to France in 1940 brought Navy aircraft from all over the United States to the Curtiss factory in Buffalo for quick conversions. Below two SBC-4s sport their new colors.
permit the flights to be made under visual flight rules.
After a day or two of waiting in Buffalo, the weather showed little signs of improvement. Having requested, and obtained time off from our civilian jobs for what we thought would be a one-day trip to Buffalo and back, Sommermeyer, Wilson, and I felt that we must get going and get the trip over with, or else pull out of the operation and return to Chicago. After a little arm-twisting and
The flight (and tow) to Halifax was no joy ride. Pictured is a SBC-4 morning take-off from Augusta.
wheedling, we obtained a reluctant approval to go.
By this time, the weather was somewhat better, with ceilings around 800 feet, light rain, and a mile or so visibility. We got our three SBCs ready and took-off.
Surprise! My airspeed indicator hand spun around to the peg and stopped. So, back to the field. The mechanics changed airspeed indicators and we took off again. Still no airspeed indication! Another return to the field to learn that Sommermeyer’s radio range receiver had failed completely, and Wilson had no directional gyro and an erratic artificial horizon. Inspection revealed that the pitot and static lines to my airspeed had been reversed! With the latter remedied, and realizing that we probably never would get all three aircraft in perfect condition for instrument flight, we left again, the third time, resolving to stay out of the clouds as much as possible and try to make it to Burlington by flying "contact.”
The flight to Burlington was uneventful, notwithstanding several detours from the prescribed route in order to stay out of the overcast. Fortunately, the engines ran perfectly.
On arrival at Burlington, we faced another problem. The ceiling there was not particularly low, being about 1,000 or 1,200 feet, and the forecast for Augusta was for a ceiling of about 500 feet. How were we going to get over the White Mountains and Mt. Wilson which lay between us and Augusta? We decided to take a crack at it by flying a tight V in the overcast, with me, the only one whose instruments were operating, leading the formation. I might say that Sommermeyer and Wilson really hung in close! It seemed as though I could reach out and touch their wings with my hands. They had to stay in tight!
We made our approach and let down on the Augusta range, in formation, landed, and decided to remain overnight.
The next morning, Sliney and his section having caught up with us, we all took-off for Houlton. In their wisdom, the powers that be at that time had decreed that no military aircraft could be flown across the U. S.-Canadian boundaries. But there was nothing that said we couldn’t push or tow them across. And that was the way it was. We landed at Houlton and had the airplanes towed down the road and across the boundary, after going through a "customs inspection.” The take-off point on the New Brunswick side was a farmer’s pasture—turf and quite soft.
There, with some little difficulty, we departed for Halifax. This final leg, crossing the Bay of Fundy, was routine except for my perplexity in trying to reconcile the landmarks with the chart I was using. Belatedly, I remembered the 50-foot tides and realized that the high- water shore lines did not necessarily bear any resemblance to the contour lines on the chart.
On arrival at Halifax my orders were to look up a Commandant Brun on board the Beam, which was tied up at Dartmouth, turn the aircraft over to him, and—standard Navy procedure- get a receipt.
On arriving at the brow, we three, in Navy khakis, carrying our parachutes under our arms, but sans any Navy markings, wings, rank insignia, or any other ID, were stopped by a sentry. He said something that sounded like "Non, non, soulement pour les offciers.” In my high-school French, I said, "Nous sommes officiers et nous voudrions voir le Commandant Brun.” With no more ado, we got a "Passez.” But then what a shock! No O.D., no escort, enlisted men walking around in officer’s country with their hats on the backs of their heads, cigarettes dangling from their mouths, no salutes, and, believe it or not, livestock on the hangar deck. Chickens and goats! Shades of Noah’s Ark!
A few days later, the Beam, with her deckload of 49 good Navy SBC-4S, and escorted by the cruiser Jeanne D’Arc, shoved off for France. While she was en route, France capitulated. The Bearn turned south to Martinique, then under command of Vichy Admiral Georges Robert.
The SBCs were offloaded to a hillside near Fort-de-France. There, in the humid Caribbean climate they remained and rotted for the rest of the war.
"Tactical Development in the Fleet”
(See R. H. Smith, pp. 18-23, April 1976;
R. A. Komorowski, pp. 80-81, August 1976. C. H. Johnson, p. 76, September 1976 Proceedings)
Captain K. 0. Ekelund, Jr., U. S. Navy, Chief of Staff, Commander Sea Based ASW Wings Atlantic— Several articles in the Proceedings during recent years have touched on naval tacticians, or the lack of them. Generally these articles make the same point, i. e., we in the Navy have become oriented to hardware and money management matters at the expense of the naval officer’s first calling m life which is that of the sea warfare tactician.
Captain Smith accurately points out the major role that the Operational Test and Evaluation Force (OpTEvFor) plays in tactical development and makes a convincing case concerning the finite limits of OpTEvFor’s capability to carry this burden all of the way. The fact that OpTEvFor plays such a major role i° tactical development tells a story in it' self. Too often an OpTEvFor project officer designing a test to operationally evaluate a new system is unable to utilize fleet approved tactics because none exist. It is then necessary for this offieet to fill the vacuum.
Every weapon system is, or should be. developed to fulfill a requirement, pre' sumably established by the Fleet and not in Washington. The fact that the ne^
wheedling, we obtained a reluctant approval to go.
By this time, the weather was somewhat better, with ceilings around 800 feet, light rain, and a mile or so visibility. We got our three SBCs ready and took-off.
Surprise! My airspeed indicator hand spun around to the peg and stopped. So, back to the field. The mechanics changed airspeed indicators and we took off again. Still no airspeed indication! Another return to the field to learn that Sommermeyer’s radio range receiver had failed completely, and Wilson had no directional gyro and an erratic artificial horizon. Inspection revealed that the pitot and static lines to my airspeed had been reversed! With the latter remedied, and realizing that we probably never would get all three aircraft in perfect condition for instrument flight, we left again, the third time, resolving to stay out of the clouds as much as possible and try to make it to Burlington by flying "contact.”
The flight to Burlington was uneventful, notwithstanding several detours from the prescribed route in order to stay out of the overcast. Fortunately, the engines ran perfectly.
On arrival at Burlington, we faced another problem. The ceiling there was not particularly low, being about 1,000 or 1,200 feet, and the forecast for Augusta was for a ceiling of about 500 feet. How were we going to get over the White Mountains and Mt. Wilson which lay between us and Augusta? We decided to take a crack at it by flying a tight V in the overcast, with me, the only one whose instruments were operating, leading the formation. I might say that Sommermeyer and Wilson really hung in close! It seemed as though I could reach out and touch their wings with my hands. They had to stay in tight!
We made our approach and let down on the Augusta range, in formation, landed, and decided to remain overnight.
The next morning, Sliney and his section having caught up with us, we all took-off for Houlton. In their wisdom, the powers that be at that time had decreed that no military aircraft could be flown across the U. S.-Canadian boundaries. But there was nothing that said we couldn’t push or tow them across. And that was the way it was. We landed at Houlton and had the airplanes towed down the road and across the boundary, after going through a "customs inspection.” The take-off point on the New Brunswick side was a farmer’s pasture—turf and quite soft.
There, with some little difficulty, we departed for Halifax. This final leg, crossing the Bay of Fundy, was routine except for my perplexity in trying to reconcile the landmarks with the chart I was using. Belatedly, I remembered the 50-foot tides and realized that the high- water shore lines did not necessarily bear any resemblance to the contour lines on the chart.
On arrival at Halifax my orders were to look up a Commandant Brun on board the Beam, which was tied up at Dartmouth, turn the aircraft over to him, and—standard Navy procedure- get a receipt.
On arriving at the brow, we three, in Navy khakis, carrying our parachutes under our arms, but sans any Navy markings, wings, rank insignia, or any other ID, were stopped by a sentry. He said something that sounded like "Non, non, soulement pour les ojficiers.” In my high-school French, I said, "Nous sommes ojficiers et nous voudrions voir le Commandant Brun. ” With no more ado, we got a "Passez.” But then what a shock! No O.D., no escort, enlisted men walking around in officer’s country with their hats on the backs of their heads, cigarettes dangling from their mouths, no salutes, and, believe it or not, livestock on the hangar deck. Chickens and goats! Shades of Noah’s Ark!
A few days later, the Beam, with her deckload of 49 good Navy SBC-4s, and escorted by the cruiser Jeanne D’Arc, shoved off for France. While she was en route, France capitulated. The Beam turned south to Martinique, then under command of Vichy Admiral Georges Robert.
The SBCs were offloaded to a hillside near Fort-de-France. There, in the humid Caribbean climate they remained and rotted for the rest of the war.
"Tactical Development in the Fleet”
(See R. H. Smith, pp. 18-23, April 1976;
R. A. Komorowski, pp. 80-81, August 1976, C. H. Johnson, p. 76, September 1976 Proceedings)
Captain K. 0. Ekelund, Jr., U. S. Navy, Chief of Staff, Commander Sea Based ASW' Wings Atlantic— Several articles in the Proceedings during recent years have touched on naval tacticians, or the lack of them. Generally these articles make the same point, i. e., we in the Navy have become oriented to hardware and money management matters at the expense of the naval officer’s first calling life which is that of the sea warfare tactician.
Captain Smith accurately points out the major role that the Operational Test and Evaluation Force (OpTEvFor) plays in tactical development and makes a convincing case concerning the finite limits of OpTEvFor’s capability to carry this burden all of the way. The fact that OpTEvFor plays such a major role if tactical development tells a story in it' self. Too often an OpTEvFor project officer designing a test to operationally evaluate a new system is unable to uti' lize fleet approved tactics because none exist. It is then necessary for this office1 to fill the vacuum.
Every weapon system is, or should be, developed to fulfill a requirement, pre' sumably established by the Fleet and not in Washington. The fact that the ne"'
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cal equipment and fire-fighting chemicals.
To view the Belknap in her damaged condition was awesome. Very little retrained of the above decks structures, ne looked as if someone had applied a can opener at the bridge and peeled back
superstructure. The port wing of the
Proceed to Assist. . . .
The Belknap Ablaze”
(See R. C. Powers, pp. 100-103, August 1976
Proceedings)
Midshipman l/C Mark L. Sobczak, Editor, The LOG—As editor of The LOG, I had the opportunity to visit and tour the battered, burnt hulk of the USS Belknap (CG-26) at the Naval Shipyard Facility in Philadelphia. Nearly three months had passed since the collision occurred, yet the remains of the superstructure still retained the smell of burned-out electri-
the
ridge was open to the sky. Most of the Port side was damaged or missing.
The scene in combat was perhaps the tr°st striking. The compartment was 'ttered with the remains of NTDS conics and piles of flooring debris and cables. The overhead had been comP ctely destroyed and the midday sun 1 orninated the wreckage. Melted masses ? aitiminum that had been part of the tnkheads bore witness to the intense eat the fires had generated.
Commander Powers’ article provided a valuable source of information to fill the gap between the facts released at the time of the collision and the nearly wrecked ship I viewed in Philadelphia. The impressive damage control effort described in the article was evident while viewing the Belknap. Although the superstructure was a complete loss, the below decks compartments suffered only minor smoke and water damage. Effective and coordinated damage control measures kept the incident from turning into a full-scale naval disaster.
The real tribute to those who took part in the struggle to save the Belknap is the fact that as a result of their efforts and sacrifices the Belknap was saved and will one day return to duty.