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In antisubmarine warfare, the submarine is supposed to be the prey. Yet, unless new tactics and an economical technology can be devised to cope with the nuclear submarine’s increasingly accurate wire-guided torpedoes and antiship missiles, things will continue to go the prey’s way, and wartime service in the merchant marine will be hazardous beyond measure.
W ith the appearance of two relatively new long- range submarine weapons, traditional ASW tactics for the protection of shipping appear to have lost much of their military efficiency and economical practicality. The accurate attack ranges which are afforded the nuclear submarine by its anti-ship missile and wire-guided homing torpedo are so great as to require excessive numbers of ASW units for protection of even a small number of merchant ships—with present methods. Changed ASW tactics and an economical technology to support such tactics are needed to meet the new threat.
Military history not only reaffirms Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan’s observation that changes in tactics take place after changes in weapons, but reveals that new technology responsive to such changed tactics also follows. What then might be the nature of the induced tactical changes and what sort of technology will make new ASW tactics effective and economically practical?
When the long-range, wire-guided, terminal-homing torpedo is coupled with the nuclear submarine, accurate hitting ranges on medium-sized ships are increased from about 2,000 yards to ten times the range. This torpedo—with guidance supplied from sound bearings on the propulsion noise of the ship attacked—can be used at deep submergence, never exposing any part of the submarine above the surface of the water. The torpedo can be programmed to stay deep for most of its run to reduce the chance of detection and it may be operated in mid-course at quiet speeds to increase its acoustic terminal homing capability. An accurate weapon even at ten miles, it can be preset to explode under the hull of a ship to maximize its destructive effect. It should be lower in cost than a missile and can thus be more plentifully stockpiled. One probable limitation, when wire-guided, is that only one or two can effectively be in the water simultaneously.
The submarine-launched anti-ship missile provides a different dimension of weapon capability. It can be fired from a semi-submerged submarine at ranges well over 100 miles, and on the approximate bearing of the target it wants to attack. Self-contained mid-course guidance in the form of either an auto pilot or inertial system keeps it on the course of a pre-set bearing. It begins a homing search, commencing at a pre-set range, using radar, radiation, or infrared detectors. The missile then sweeps the ocean ahead over a wide angle to correct for target movement since the time of firing. When locked on, the long-range missiles will tend to attack either from several thousand feet altitude at supersonic speed or skim along the surface at just under the speed of sound. A hit by the attacking missile is probably scored above the water line. For either type of attack, the problems of defense are quite similar in that warning time is measured in seconds.
The effects of these two submarine weapons (the missile and the torpedo) are looked at together rather than separately because of the highly complementary nature, in a devilish way, of these two weapons. In fact, the tactical response of surface units to one weapon can be inimical to a defense against the other. For example, spreading out a convoy’s columns of ships to reduce a submarine’s haven-effect under a convoy (to facilitate torpedo attack) seriously decreases the convoy’s protective area missile-defense. On the other hand, tightening the missile-defense perimeter by a close grouping of ships serves to facilitate long-range torpedo delivery.
How the missile and torpedo are used and the constraints on their use are as important as their performance characteristics.
The high cost of the long-range anti-ship missile, requires that targets be of high value. Since there are over 35,000 ocean-going fishing vessels, tugs, yachts, and small tramp steamers which might be encountered on the high seas in time of war, and an additional 17,000 Free World merchantmen of over 1,000 tons plying the oceans of the world today, only a very small percentage of surface targets would justify missile expenditure. Thus positive, long-range identification of targets is needed. Indiscriminate missile-fire will be impractical owing to the limited stockpile of missiles as well as the political constraints involved—certain to preclude the alienation of neutrals.
Not only must the missile be targeted on a valuable ship but it must be preset and fired so that only the selected target will tend to fall within its terminalhoming search limits. This may force the submarine to close with the target before firing, or to fire from a particular direction. If a barrage of missiles is fired at a group of ships, special efforts are required to avoid a concentration of missiles on any single target—antiship missiles tend to head toward the closest ship of at the one that provides the strongest return to the missile’s homing device. Rate of fire may be reduced to increase efficiency of homing selectivity at a sacrifice of attack saturation effect.
Submarine missile attack in shallow water (under 100 fathoms) is likely to be at shorter range due to the generally reduced ranges for acoustic information on typical high-value targets.
The ways in which long, missile-firing ranges can tactically benefit a submarine are manyfold. Fire control information can be obtained with little risk of detection by opposing forces. Firing can readily be delayed with little or no significance to ultimate results. A careful positioning for attack is possible to minimize
fi
counterattack possibilities. The submarine can attack a target from any quadrant, operate at best depth for receiving sonar information prior to firing, and coordinate «s firing with other submarines, surface ships, or aircraft. It is relatively free to take optimum evasive action after firing, even using noisy, high speed. It can make an approach in water strata that are sonically unfavorable, with little risk of detection. And the sub- tttarine is hardly threatened by counterattacking, long- tange weapons. Even the diesel-powered submarine, armed with anti-ship missiles, can be highly effective Ue to the great advantages which accrue to a sub- tt'arine using very-long-range missile attack.
The effect on nuclear submarine tactics from using ng-range, wire-guided, homing torpedoes is quite merent than for missiles. The firing submarine hold- *ttg the wire is locked into a generally slow-speed, °sing situation for many minutes of the torpedo run, and can initially do little about evasion. If the torpe- 0 s noise is detected by a surface target, a quick- resP°nse counterattack might be effective because the Submarine is immobilized temporarily during torpedo- rur>- Although the torpedo can be guided on the basis °f the acoustic noise of the target, the quieter the target, the more difficult is the guidance of the torpedo 'Trough its own noise.
Since there is an optimum torpedo depth-setting to Maximize torpedo blast effect for any specific ship- 'arget, it is necessary to have an exact estimate of target raft prior to firing. This might require periscope observations at ranges considerably inside the maximum ring range. But, in general, the increased torpedo- r’ng ranges permit discreet periscope looks and elec- ^r°nic observations with little chance of being detected y the ship under attack, and torpedo attack becomes Practical from well abaft the beam of the target. And,
e torpedoes tend to be covert throughout their attack
run.
Coordination of torpedo-firing between several submarines is difficult because of the likelihood of detec- tl0n of underwater communications at the ranges in- v°lved.
There are additional tactical considerations which aPply to the use of both weapons and which should e recognized. The long firing ranges of these new Capons permit quiet, deliberate submarine approach actics as well as careful evasion. The submarine has Sreat latitude in its operational depth and can use the fst depth for attack and evasion. In attacking mer- ant ships, the submarine is not constrained to press °n if the odds are poor. In exchange-rate warfare, which ^ rhe essence of a shipping interdiction strategy, many rps must be sunk for every submarine lost. The submarine tends to be considerably quieter than a surface
ship under similar conditions of speed and alertness. Submariners can readily recognize active ASW measures for detection, localization, torpedo-homing, and counterattack—and can rapidly institute effective doctrinal countering tactics. Against passive ASW measures, however, the submariner tends to be far more prone to make mistakes, and tends to be unnerved by such measures if he presumes them to be in use. For either active or passive measures, the submariner will have an advantage in being more alert (than the surface ship or aircraft) to the possibilities of ocean anomalies which can be tactically put into play.
There are other tactical considerations which need illuminating, in the determination of tactical response. The day of seeing the submarine before it attacks is over. With nuclear submarines operated efficiently and discreetly, there should be few opportunities of ASW forces spotting periscopes or masts—compared to past experience against conventional, diesel-driven submarines. The fact that surface warships will probably be considered high-value targets in a shipping interdiction war makes questionable their use as far-out pickets—a readily identified and vulnerable role. The value of moving ships at maximum speed versus the probable range at which a submarine can derive fire control information on ship propulsion noise indicates a favorable trade-off from the use of discreet speeds which offer the submarine relatively poor acoustic tracking ranges. Active sonar and radar ASW measures provide valuable information to the submarine at ranges where its own overt actions tend to be undetectable by the radiating ASW unit. Eliminating non-belligerent shipping and ocean-industry craft from the oceans to increase passive detection capability is probably impossible in this decade of greatly increased use of the seas by all maritime countries. Because new giant merchant ships are going to be extremely difficult to sink with anti-ship missiles, a torpedo seems better designed for doing the anti-shipping job than a missile.
The present response to the submarine-weapon threat has been to use the traditional concentration of force in the near vicinity of the shipping to be protected. This means retaining the convoy tactic as well as providing close-in perimeter defenses for protection against torpedo attack and destroying the incoming missile in an area or self-defense fashion.
Present tactical response to a submarine-launched missile includes disruption of the missile’s guidance or homing device through jamming or break-lock, deception of the missile by means of decoys and, if these fail, destruction of the missile itself. There have been no radical tactical innovations to respond to the antishipping missile threat; instead, we have seen only
minor adjustments to tactics plus a large number of incremental improvements to the technology of existing systems along with some innovative approaches to equipment. New jamming devices, chaff, flares, and barrage-type guns along with anti-missile missiles have appeared—without any basic change in the traditional tactics for the defense of shipping. Desmond Scrivener, writing in International Defense Review, December 1971, suggests additional innovations for this defensive
mode:
"Disruption—A more promising possibility might be to attempt to jam the radio altimeter (of a surface skimmer). Another form of disruption is the use of smoke against TV-aimed weapons.
"Deception—Deception and dilution offer perhaps the most profitable field for ingenuity. A useful expedient might be for each ship to tow one or more decoys at suitable intervals astern of her, rather as foxers were streamed against acoustic torpedoes. These could be arranged to simulate as large or larger targets than the towing ship and could include both radar and IR elements. Actuation could- be permanent or by the flick of a switch at the first warning. ...
"Destruction—It is hard to believe that any machine flying in such demanding conditions as a surface skimmer could stand up to the stresses of flying into the plume of a shallow burst depth charge or mortar bomb.”
Any one of these ideas might suggest subtle changes in tacitcs to optimize its effect, but none seem to suggest the kind of tactics which will greatly improve the chances of survival of high-value merchant ships in this new submarine missile environment.
This seems equally true for the long-range torpedo threat which has brought about extended and more all-around protective ASW screens for shipping. Like the missile threat response, technological effort has been towards incrementally improved ASW systems to be used with modest modifications of World War II pro- tection-of-shipping tactics. Captain Roland Bowling
The author envisions the convoy of the future being protected by a latter-day Q-ship which, to all outward appearances would be a tanker similar to the SS Joseph D. Potts with a long, unencumbered, flat topside. Such a floating Trojan horse would carry a number of concealed V/STOL aircraft that would be capable of dealing devastating blows to the unwary submarine.
USN, an operational ASW expert, argued persuasively in the November 1973 issue of Shipmate that:
", . . the best way to ensure that we can move easily and safely across the seas of the world in a hostile environment is by closely escorted man-o-war formations and mercantile convoys. For, although sensors and weapons have changed since World War II, the basic principle of concentration of force is still appb' cable.”
Bowling insisted that little modification of the traditional ASW escorting tactics is presently needed to do the job. But even if these tactics were highly effective, it is evident that such tactical use of present forces provides adequate protection for only a small percentage of the shipping which would be required by the United States and her allies in a large scale maritime war. Thus, with diminishing ASW forces, mainly the result of increasing cost of new units, this incremental approach to changed tactics does not appear to hold much further promise. For protection of shipping, the economics of concentrated force used in the traditional fashion seem close to bankruptcy.
What then do the economics for protection of shipping dictate as to responsive tactics against a nuclear submarine’s weapons and what is the indicated technology to support such tactics?
Of first importance is the recognition that ASW forces, in exchange-rate warfare, need not attempt to provide absolute protection of their shipping except where the shipping is militarily critical. Their job is to exact a heavy toll on the submarines which attack the protected shipping—either before or after attack. And the job is greatly complicated by the 360° attack
r provides a favorable opportunity for coordinated fire rom several missile-firing platforms and simplifies submarine attack and evasion tactics. It provides a form °f haven for the nuclear submarine. From under a con- v°y> attack and reattack with torpedoes can be carried °Ut in comparative safety. Massed shipping allows long- range alerting to the presence of an ASW umbrella, fusing the submarine to operate quietly and carefully.
uriching of ships, moreover, tends to eliminate effec- tlve response to close-in submarine datums. If passive acoustic measures are used to redetect a submarine, the n°ise-field created by many ships traveling close to- S^ther tends to drown out submarine-radiated noise.
^h.
of
probability inherent to the submarine’s mobility and Weapons. Under such conditions, an ability to destroy submarines after they have attacked shipping may assume a greater importance than being able to eliminate fhem before their attack. Reactive tactics (response to good datums provided mainly by submarine attack uucumstances) become of increasing importance bemuse of the great ranges involved which make offensive ASW measures extremely costly.
These considerations raise two tactical questions. Does the sailing of shipping in close proximity, as in c°nvoys, economically serve to maximize ASW protec- tton? And, is protection of shipping best effected in rhe traditional active, overt mode of operations?
To the first question, the disadvantages of bunching uigh-value ships in the anti-ship missile environment are uiany—the advantages, few.
In favor of a close grouping of merchant ships while jn transit is the likelihood that incoming missiles are table to cluster on a particular target, preventing effi- C]ent dispersion to many high-value ships. If incoming rn‘ssiles have to be destroyed before they hit particular targets, only through tight formations of merchant j*hips can an adequate degree of area missile defense e provided. But the high speed of the missile and lts flight characteristics provide so little warning time that little more than self-defense appears practical, nooting down a low-flying missile headed for a merchant ship several miles away requires a level of anti- ttUssile capability which can hardly be afforded for the Protection of merchant ships.
Against the bunching of ships are many arguments, provides ready, long-range identification of targets.
en active acoustic measures are used, the multitude near targets and their wakes create a host of false anfl confusing targets—hindering rapid localization of . submarine contact at the longer follow-up ranges lnvolved. Hence, dose grouping of shipping will not Produce the lethal pursuit of close-in datums which Seated the greatest number of submarine kills in °rld War II. Then, reactive tactics of escorting warships although limited to about five to eight miles separation from a submarine’s reported position, proved effective. Today, with far greater submarine attack ranges involved, an extension of an escort’s ASW capability through VTOL aircraft should obtain a similar reactive response capability out to 40 miles. On this basis, ships can be sailed almost randomly with large separations of 15-20 miles and still keep exchange rates low through the use of aircraft in reactive tactics. With wide separations of merchant ships in transit, there is less cumulative acoustic noise produced, providing a more favorable acoustic environment for reactive tactics. Whether tightly grouped or widely separated, shipping protection may still be provided by acoustic barriers. But the distances now created for effective use of such ASW barriers, particularly against the missile threat, force a conservative use of such offensive ASW. Protecting the several thousand friendly merchant ships, which might be involved in a maritime war, mainly by far-out acoustic barriers seems prohibitively costly.
The second question as to the viability of active, overt measures (which would include readily identifiable formations of ships) in the protection of high-value shipping, elicits many of the same arguments which were noted for bunching of shipping as a best economic protective measure. Active, overt ASW measures tend to identify to the submarine high-value targets at great ranges of separation—handing to the submarine a preponderance of advantage, as shown previously. For torpedo fire there is not the same level of advantage. But the submarine skipper’s alerted status and precise knowledge of where acoustic detectors happen to be, encourages his use of a stratum of the oceans which minimizes active acoustic detection along with least favorable submarine aspects. He can also carefully predicate his evasion tactics on the nature of the sound paths in his part of the ocean, the position of interfering wakes, and the susceptibility of active acoustic detectors to false contacts from countermeasures or from ocean anomalies. However, with positive identification of high-value targets required by both the countering the long-range missile becomes meaningless ing, for example, that a lone ship being attacked is belligerent and not neutral may force the submarine into modes of operation where it becomes far more susceptible to active ASW measures. As for the likelihood that submarines will soon become so quiet that active acoustic measures will be required, this appears unlikely.
What seems to evolve from an examination of the above two questions is that bunching of ships and active, overt ASW measures are less favorable for the protection of merchant ships than widely separated transits protected with passive quiet measures. Whereas active acoustic measures are plagued by false contacts, passive acoustic systems tend to provide a rapid and reliable classification of a contact as a submarine. There may be times when "going active” will be required for tactical efficiency, but as a general mode for merchant ship protection it appears less efficient.
Since the traditional overt, noisy measures for safe movement of shipping across the oceans allow effective submarine missile-launching ranges well beyond escort capability to exert any significant level of sea control, and since the close-in defense of large amounts of shipping against incoming missiles appears to be economically impractical, the missile threat alone tends to force shipping movement tactics toward quiet, covert passive measures. But a quiet, passive approach to countering the long-range missile becomes meaningless if the ships in company are so overt as to numbers, character of formation, and radiated propulsion noise as to produce an excessively large and unprotectable missile-attack area in the oceans. Just the 360-degree nature of possible missile attack has expanded the necessary sea control area around shipping to a seemingly unmanageable degree. Hence, decreasing the area of required sea control (in the relative sense of exchange- rate warfare) to manageable proportions, indicates a need to sail high-value ships quietly, covertly, widely spaced, in random formation and with protective measures primarily quiet and covert in nature while increasing the use of deception. The ships in company would then maintain a high degree of electronic silence and move at speeds which are non-identifying in nature and relatively quiet. (A 24-knot ship is acoustically detectable at very long ranges and is obviously a high-value ship; 15-knot movement for most merchant ships produces little acoustic noise and is non-identifying). With wide spacing of 10 to 20 miles between randomly spaced ships, and with small numbers of high value ships in company—eight could be the equivalent of a 100-ship convoy of World War II—this sort of movement of ships can be protected by V/STOL aircraft based on a variety of platforms running in company, or with the aircraft on the high-value ships themselves. It would be advantageous for some of the aircraft to have a passive early warning capability for the early detection of enemy overt efforts designed to aid the submarine in the efficient long-range delivery of its weapons. A demonstrated early warning capability would then tend to force submarines in to closer ranges in order to maintain their covertness of attack, and put the submarines under the umbrella of concentrated reactive air ASW which can be mustered to medium ranges by a few ship-based V/STOL aircraft.
Covert ship sailings should greatly reduce missilefiring opportunity by making long-range identification difficult, and force submarines into closer ranges fot torpedo fire. With widely extended movements of shipping preventing torpedo attack on more than one ship at a time, and with V/STOL aircraft configured for reactive ASW tactics and used in multiples rather than singly, the odds of a submarine getting a favorable exchange rate become poor. A single V/STOL aircraft in the reactive role is likely to have only a small Pk (probability of kill) against a submarine detected at more than a few miles away from the aircraft’s seabase. But two aircraft with mutually supporting tactics should produce, by the author’s calculations, something in the nature of six times the eventual kill effectiveness of one. And three aircraft should be more than double the effectiveness of two.
Aircraft may provide, in addition, acoustic detection barriers far out ahead of transiting shipping, alerting and possibly diverting ships from a submarine threat area. However, a more economical use of air-projected ASW with a greater pay-off in exchange-rate warfare seems to be created with reactive air ASW tactics, since such response keeps flight hours low and hence keeps aircraft maintenance at a more manageable level than using sustained on-station operations. The response by two or more V/STOL aircraft to a positive submarine contact (a fired torpedo, a sighted mast, etc.) with passive redetection systems in a spread-out situation will generally not alert the submarine to the imminence of counter-attack. This handicaps the submarine skipper in taking the proper evasion tactics. The chances of the submarine being redetected by the aircraft are thus considerably increased. A widespread movement of ships also limits a submarine’s torpedo attack to a single ship—for which he pays the price of providing a reliable datum.
What is important about such tactics is that the ocean’s acoustic environment is made favorable for passive acoustic and electronic measures. Under these tactical conditions submarines are forced to take overt actions (high speed, mast exposures, etc.) to increase their sinking rate, and this creates a tactical advantage not only for protecting ASW units, but for broad ocean "indirect” ASW forces—fixed surveillance systems and supporting long-range ASW aircraft.
In a new sense, a convoy of high-value shipping becomes only a few ships moving tactically to prevent recognition at long range. Without the obvious label of "belligerent” on shipping as represented by large convoys, the enemy is forced to fight a far more inhibited, discriminating war—or pay the price of escalating to a war against virtually all maritime nations, an escalation far beyond the scope of the necessarily limited objectives which could logically evoke a conventional interdiction of maritime shipping strategy.
tQWed
array.
The changed tactics described are dependent upon c°nsiderable numbers of aircraft on numerous platforms carry out the protective measures for large amounts dipping, sailed in small increments. This suggests need for low-cost, simple-function V/STOL aircraft— Which can be based on unsophisticated platforms in many types of ships —in addition to the costly, short- SuPply ASW escorts available.* Since the long-range early detection of submarines is tactically valuable for srupting attack, considerable endurance of the low-cost aircraft at 100 miles or more from its sea base seems curable. For the reactive role, speed to datum is of t importance in order to minimize time late. Hence, STOL aircraft faster than the present VTOL ASW air- c^ah are incqcatecp anq appear t0 be within the state j. existing technology. Additionally, the aircraft’s nctions should be kept simple to minimize electronic Tuprnent in the aircraft and hence reduce maintenance a relatively low level—a necessity for a wide dispersion of such aircraft to a variety of ships, possibly 0(1 rhe high-value ships themselves. This implies a teehnological approach similar to the Arapaho concept ^ jeh would use modular portable maintenance units lch can readily be put on a ship to provide the total SuPP°rt of a few V/STOL aircraft at sea.
Since passive, quiet operations are indicated, the Passive acoustic detection sensors for V/STOL aircraft improvement. More figure-of-merit (FOM) must Pm into the water both for datum response tactics ^ for distant early warning and offensive ASW. One . evc'lopment which can provide a more than ten-fold ^provement in passive detection FOM, the linear array, ^eeds developing into an aircraft utilizable buoy or
towing linear arrays would require more aircraft ^mtenance than would recovery of costly, non- s- Pendable linear array buoys. To keep the aircraft ^Pw, the signal processing of buoy information should be done back at the aircraft’s ship-base. Hence an aircraft relaying system for passing large amounts of buoy information back to a ship would be required. The ship-base need not break its silence except to send evaluated submarine contact information back to the aircraft.
For "quiet” operations to the maximum extent feasible, a relative navigation system for the aircraft is needed to eliminate the now noisy, positive control of aircraft from a ship-base. This would not preclude, however, some form of electronic emanation from the ship-base from time to time to ensure the safety of the aircraft. But as a general operating mode, electronic silence is tactically desirable.
The aircraft suffers a considerable penalty in endurance and tactical flexibility by having to carry its ASW weapons in flight. A hand-over weapon technique would increase endurance and simplify flight operations. An ASW weapon can be developed which can be fired from a ship-base to the vicinity of the aircraft, with the aircraft guiding it to its water impact point, (a form of artillery call-fire). The added aircraft equipment to terminally direct the hand-over weapons could be traded off against the equipment now required for ASW weapon control.
In the passive, quiet environment, decoys and deception devices come into considerable tactical play. Long- range decoying seems better understood than the use of deception in reactive response. In pursuit of datums, the use of a device to cause the submarine to make more noise or commit another type of overt act can be effective. A simulated torpedo noise in the submarine’s near vicinity may cause the submarine to turn radically, change depth, speed up or use countering measures which can be picked up by an airborne passive detection system.
Ship-towed acoustic linear arrays for early detection of torpedo firing or for detection of noisy submarine approach can be a valuable tactical-technical development for an environment of low sea-noise. The giant tanker with its single, slow-speed (about 90 rpm.) propeller set deep in the water, provides an excellent acoustic platform for towing the linear array. Such towed arrays need only be designed for merchant ship transiting speeds of about 16 knots. Modular support packages for merchant ship usage would be readily transferable to other ships. For reactive ASW tactics, the early warning of submarine attack which numerous ship-towed arrays would offer should provide rapid aircraft response to datum and increased protection.
Inherent to all of the above-suggested technological developments is the description of a ship-base which tends to optimize the exchange-rate tactics described. Such a ship—a warship in a new sense—would be a base for V/STOL aircraft. It should be expendable, hence low-cost and not readily recognized as a unique target among the types of shipping it will escort—in fact, it would be like the Q-ships of the past, steaming covertly in convoy with a devastating punch for the unwary submarine.[1] Evidently it should not be unlike some type of merchant ship. Its aircraft would be sufficiently concealed or camouflaged to prevent ready recognition from satellites, long-range aircraft or covert enemy craft on the high seas. Small compared to many of the ships it was running with, it should be evaluated by the enemy’s long-range surveillance as a less than high- value target. At the same time, it would be a less likely target for a missile to home on. V/STOLs could be used advantageously on a ship of this sort whose long unencumbered flat topside (a flight deck) would resemble the usual medium tanker tops. Its propulsion system should be nondistinguishing as to emitted acoustic noise, probably a single-screw, steam turbine-
As for the shipping itself, the "armed guard” in a future maritime war might be no more than a team to keep fires under control after missile hits. The strut- tures of the very large ships of today should be highly resistant to missile hits but the secondary effects, mainly fire, might destroy them. Hence, improved fire fight' ing/fire-reduction technology for the big bulkers lS indicated.
The anonymity of the merchant ship on the high seas presents an opportunity to neutralize much of the long-range advantage held by the submarine. The "changed tactics” would capitalize on this anonymity while remaining within the economic boundaries and definitions of merchant shipping exchange-rate warfare- Such "changed tactics” appear applicable for the protection of maritime shipping across a wide spectrum of sea wars, ranging from a low-key interdiction campaign by a third power, to a full-scale war at sea involving a major submarine power. Even a low-key, selective, shipping-attrition strategy seems better met with quiet, covert movement of shipping—protected as described- If only a few submarines periodically sank a few selective ships over a wide area of the ocean, because of the large number of ships which could be possible targets, it would appear that the using of traditional ASW protective measures would be both economically and militarily unsound.
Since exchange-rate warfare is difficult to simulate in the operational testing of new tactics, it is unlikely that the real advantages of the recommended tactics can be shown while using present technology. But this should be no bar to further developing the technology which is available today to achieve the quantum jump in capability inherent to those tactics.
Captain Ruhe, a graduate of the U. S. Naval Academy, class of 19^’ served in submarines throughout World War II and until 1952. Next, -1- had a mix of sea duties involving several destroyer commands, a submarinc division, and, finally, a cruiser command, the Topeka (CLG-8) in 1964. Lat£t shore assignments involved major ASW studies and his last Navy assignme0t was as Deputy Director of Program Planning in the Office of the CN^- After a year on the staff of the President’s Commission for Marine Science Engineering, and Resources, Captain Ruhe joined General Dynamics -1’ director of Marine Program Development where he has been assessing r impact of developing naval technology on new naval programs and the efl*et:C of our energy shortage on new commercial energy opportunities.
[1] Q-ships were armed merchant ships disguised to entice submarine attack, and the same principle of using adapted merchant ship hulls may apply. If such a ship were sunk its V/STOL aircraft could fly to other ships in company, minimizing economic loss,—an important element in exchange- rate warfare.