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JANE’S FIGHTING SHIPS 1974-75
EDITED BY )OHN E. MOORE Long regarded as the bible of the world's navies, this edition of lane's Fighting Ships contains over 3,000 photographs (more than 500 of which are new), silhouettes, and plan drawings, and l'st5 over 15,000 ships in more than 110 countries.
Several changes have been made to facilitate the use of information. All ships have been reclassified in a standard format making numerical comparison among the countries much easier.
Specific chapters of special note include: .
• U.S.A.—an imaginative program to replace 450 ships, the loss of which reduced the U. S. Navy's fleet from 9 to 508
• China—new construction of guided missile ships and new submarines
• Brazil—new frigates and submarines illustrate a determination to be the most modern navy in Latin America
• West Germany—interesting submarine program and export submarine building
• U.S.S.R.—new aircraft carriers, two new submarine classes, and a building program making this the most moder navy
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JANE’S WEAPON SYSTEMS 1974-75
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EDITED BY RONALD PRETTY AND DENNIS ARCHER World-wide and comprehensive in scope, this reference boo is edited and compiled by two leading defense equipment observers, who, in this survey of international weapon^ treat the subject from the standpoint of both systems and equipment. Regarded as the standard work of referent1 on modern military hardware, it is invaluable for all service men, military students, and defense procurement agenciC More than 1,000 photographs and drawings illustrate the text.
Almost every section has an appreciable input of new material in addition to the updating of all existing materi^ New entries for Soviet weapons indicate that Russia is intent on maintaining the pace of its advance in militaj I technology. This results in a corresponding need for weapons research and development in the West, particular in the U.S.A. which is responsible for many of the new entries in this edition. Examples are the new cruise miss' development programs for the USAF and USN and the Missile 'X' proposals for a new mobile ICBM system whk might be either land or air based. One result of this lesson is increased attention by the Pentagon to what are call® defense suppression weapons and systems. Approximately 30 to 40 percent of the text and 20 percent of 1 illustrations are new.
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JANE'S OCEAN TECHNOLOGY 1974-75
DlTED ROBERT L. TRILLO Oceanography is a new and rapidly developing science which, over the last twenty ars, has expanded to cover a vast field of scientific study. This development has been made possible by the immense gress 'n instrument technology, and by a rapidly growing awareness of the commercial potential of the oceans.
coverage includes submersibles, towed vehicles, seabed vehicles, underwater habitats, research ships, recording ne°ys> 0|l sPi• I control systems, tugs and supply vessels, oil rigs, drill ships, diving systems, survival systems, and aW developments. Additionally, there will be company profiles and specially commissioned reports on important th k°* 'nterest: In general, the fullest technical data is presented as obtained from the designers and builders of ^ardware. Costs will also be given whenever available. The hardware items considered tend to be those which et the special and particular needs of ocean exploitation, development of ocean resources, and preservation of Use 0 eco^°8y- Military vessels and facilities are incorporated where they have a direct possibility for commercial
bert l Trillo's early career was concerned with air and marine propulsion, and included six years of research and Fe|| °Prnent work oh underwater propulsion. Later, Mr. Trillo formed his own engineering consultancy. He is a the°W tEle lnstitution of Mechanical Engineers, Fellow of the Royal Aeronautical Society, Associate Fellow of e American Institution of Astronautics and Aeronautics, and Associate Fellow of the Canadian Aeronautics and
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Con °ne and 3 Ela^ m'Hi°n words announce exclusive news items about new Soviet combat aircraft, support the hydrC°rde as a true achievement in high-speed commercial flying, and emphasize the immense importance of liquid Rep °8en as the fuel of the future because of its great potential to eliminate today's pollution and noise problems, the r ed for tBe Brst time ar|ywhere is an entry on a new turbo prop built and test flown in Taiwan. Members of tireaVlation industry will find particularly useful the information, specifics and standards of noise control systems, 3nd electronic equipment, airliner turning circles and runway LCNs.
sta a!t0nishing accuracy in lane's. . . . unrivaled by any other publication throughout the world. Its reputation as ard work of reference is without challenge and it is used as such throughout every continent.''—Aerospace
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tion at the time of thejensen case. It cannot be gainsaid that in the past some line officers attempted to, and in fact did, influence the outcome in courts-martial because of their control over fitness reports of attorneys in their commands. Presumably this new system will have the effect of preventing many of the types of injustice which occurred in the Jensen case. However, if cases of injustice persist and are not corrected within the Navy, then the solution may come from outside the Navy. U. S. Senator Birch Bayh has for some time been proposing that virtually all contact with military justice be taken from commanding officers. Under his proposals, not only would commanders have no influence over the fitness reports of lawyers involved in military justice, but they would no longer have power to refer matters to courts, appoint courts, or review court cases, except within tightly circumscribed limits. Whatever the merits may be in Senator Bayh’s proposals, they evidence a concern from a powerful outside source over the manner in which justice is administered to those in uniform, a concern which will not be satisfied by such a sanguine approach as that of Captain Schratz, who finds no prejudgment in thejensen case and who concludes—on this premise— that there is no need for overhaul.
On one thing we can all, I am sure, agree: The U. S. Navy is one of the world’s greatest organizations—commanding the love and respect of those who go down to the sea in ships. The Jensen case is now only a bad memory — a melancholy tale of public disgrace and ruined lives. The fitting way to end such a chapter is for the defense to affirm, once more, to comrades and shipmates, our commitment to the ties that bind us from ancient days.
[Editor’s Note: The review in the December issue indicated that Chaplain Jensen had initially been passed over for promotion. A subsequent selection board has recently selected him for promotion from commander to captain, which must be viewed as a good system working well for a good man.] "The Military and the Media”
(See J. M. White, pp. 47-51, July 1974
Proceedings)
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Earl R. Schwass, Naval War College" With reference to Commander White* article, I should like to correct the impression conveyed by the article that the first significant confrontation between the military and the media at the Naval War College occurred in 1972. These confrontations or conferences date back to at least 1966 when Vice Admiral Charles L. Melson invited well-known media representatives and service infof' mation officers to a two-day conference which included lectures, panel discussions, and seminars. Every year since then, under the auspices of Admiral* John T. Hayward, Richard G. Colbert, and Benedict J. Semmes, Jr., a similaf conference has been held at the Nava! War College with steadily growing representation from the media. There is u° doubt that the 1972 conference was the largest of this series and was highly successful. In this sense it could truth' fully be called a landmark conference, but it was not the first.
c ?' Na/mi Das, New Delhi, India- tere°ne^ Jesse’s subject is of topical in- en a at ^east’ tn democratically ori- rel6 governmental systems. Many th,eVant *SSUes ^ave been highlighted in ls article *
tho
milit.
s General Omar Bradley has stated,
Naval Institute Acquires Our Navy’ Photo Collection”
ret)ry'S Notcs’ P- 3' September 1974
orman A. Algiers, Jr.— I’m very pleased at y°u have the entire photographic 0 action of Our Navy, and that it didn’t ^ st go adrift. I can’t think of anyone 5tter su*ted to have this collection than e Naval Institute. So many publica- 10ns ^ave ceased as times change and 0 lc'es and views change. Our Navy ^*agazine served its time, and I like to uk such publications are "retired” ^ not just gone. There will always be kn lflterest *n che past, and it’s nice to the°W C^at t^C Naval-Institute preserves past and at the same time prepares for the future.
Expansion of the Military Mind”
(See W/ t t
' L- J«se pp. 25-34 June 1974
Fr»ceedmgs)
which deserve serious sio Uf^C ^ n0t onl7 r^e tnhitary profes- ■^i^1 s but also by all those associated jn national defense policies. Hava graduated with military science as a sub)ect and being married to
Pass'’0 CSS*onal military man, I have a att ln^ *nterest in this study. I have 0nrnPted here to set forth my views thpS°me °f the aspects highlighted by c author.
cond* whh, the days when the
t0 ,Uct °f wars was to be left solely Senerals and admirals are, I think, Uj C~7*f che>' ever existed. Many people v|ew with distaste the saying that t0ls t0° serious a business to be left wa . 6 s°Niers,” but it is obvious that nati1^ War *n modern times is a total eCo °na^. effdrt—political, military and pects°rnic~'and leaving the military as- lesst0 tf*e military is just as meaning- cal aS eavmg the working out of politi- theCtIons solely to the politicians or theec°n°mic desicion-making only to
ec°nomists.
ary policy and included strategic planning can never be separate of distinct from foreign, economic, and other national policies. The handling of a tactical battlefield situation is a different matter but we are not discussing this aspect. Successive wars fought by India since independence have highlighted the necessity for a very closely coordinated control of the war by combined military-civilian effort and indeed, the success of the Indo-Pakistani conflict of 1971 is largely attributed to this kind of control. The organization and operation of the defense mechanism in this country are designed to insure such a functioning in war. I recall that this is also the concept so successfully followed by the Allies in World War II.
This brings us to the question of policy guidance. Alas, this must remain the weakest link in the planning and execution of defense policy—at least in democracies. While I am certain that this guidance has existed and will exist in war situations, it is open to question whether clear and unambiguous guidelines will ever be laid down in peace. This, perhaps, stems from a reluctance on the part of political leaders to make any firm commitments on matters which are assumed to be nonproductive in peace and which, in any event, are likely to lose validity rapidly and continuously with the shift in the political landscape. The experience of American planners in which coffee-table statements, TV and press interviews, or even office discussions are intended to serve as "political guidance” is perhaps not unique. It is an unfortunate situation which exists, I suppose, in most nations, and defense planners have to make the best of a bad job. One might even say that it is perhaps not necessary for this type of documented and formalized guidance to be issued in nonwar situations. As long as the general tenor of the administration is made clear, by whatever means, it should be possible to keep our plans going. Such a proposition is not entirely without substance.
A more controversial area is one in which the question of intentions versus capability has been raised and here I must admit to a feeling of disappointment and surprise at the stand taken by some eminent professional military men. Admiral Arleigh Burke and Admiral Thomas Moorer are stated to hold the view that intentions must play no part in military appreciations and analysis. Rather, the capability of potential enemies should be the sole basis of counter-action planning. It is further stated that military schools also advocate consideration of capabilities of an opponent and not of his intentions. Surely, such a supposition is not based on actuality. As I understood them, the processes of threat appreciation and of related counteraction are somewhat different.
Military analysis of any threat or situation is based on the, "appreciation” technique. This takes into account our possible aims, examines all the relevant factors including quantum of forces (capability?), deliberates on the various courses of action open to us, links this up with courses likely to be adopted by the opponent, and thereafter recommends a suggested line of action. It is important to note that our courses of action are linked to the courses likely to be adopted by the opponent. All military schools will surely agree that without considering "intentions” it is simply not possible to list likely opponent courses of action.
Indeed, the "appreciation” technique requires that while considering this the analyst should place himself in the shoes of his opponent and ask: "now what would I do if I were he? ” The elements of the enemy’s psychological leanings, his religious and ideological traits and the like are all essential ingredients of this estimation. It, therefore, makes no sense to say that the military professionals should base their plans or counterforce projections only on what the opponent can do and not on what he is likely to do. Such an approach can result in an exaggerated assessment of threats unsupported by the totality of opponent potential which has to be a sum of his capability and of his intentions. It nullifies the whole object of an "appreciation”—a most reasonable and pragmatic way of arriving at recommended solutions—whatever the magnitude of the problem.
I am of the view that the heavy buildup in military capability over the last two decades, and the exaggerated force projections which have been rather typical of American militarism, are largely due to capability-oriented analy-
ses in which a very important and relevant factor, namely intentions, remains unanswered, and, therefore, unaccepted. The British, on the other hand, appear to have paid much more attention to "intentions” and their cutbacks in force levels could not, obviously, have taken place if analyses of opponents’ intentions had not supported such a step.
It is true that today high level professional schooling gives more political and economic inputs to the military professional and provides him the type of overall education that is not, in most cases, matched by his civilian counterparts. This can, in some cases, result in situations where the civilian leaders may operate from a position of relative educational disadvantage. This is, once again, an inherent flaw of the democratic system, but in my view, is more than offset by the other overwhelming advantages that accrue from such functioning. In any event, just as military minds are put through political, social and economic acclimatization, so are the civilian brains being exposed more and more (though, by no means, enough) to military philosophy. Witness courses in military science offered in many universities as well as civilian association with military men and courses at postgraduate schools and war colleges—all designed to meet the common aim, which obviously is to produce efficient and strong links for the chain of national defense.
The military professional has no need to fear that the conduct of war is slowly being taken away from him. It never was his domain. Rather, he functioned as an important and essential element in that national activity. He still does. He always will.
"Last of the Four Pipers?”
(See W. H. Langenberg, pp. 79-81, October 1974 Proceedings)
Captain Richard Hammell, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—After reading Captain Langenberg’s interesting article, I was reminiscing about some four pipers that were intertwined with my teen years.
The airship Akron (ZRS-4) crashed 4 April 1933, with the loss of 73 lives, in a storm off the New Jersey coast. Among those lost was Rear Admiral
William A. Moffett, Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics. The only three survivors from the crew were brought ashore from the crash site by the Coast Guard destroyer Tucker (CG-23). She was then an old four piper (ex-DD-57) which had been acquired from the Navy in 1926 and was returned in June 1933.
Shortly before the airship crash, our
■A
Sea Scout skipper, Lieutenant Richaf Tucker Smith, U. S. Naval Reserve, ha^ a luncheon meeting with the Secretary of the Navy and persuaded him that a*1 old four piper would make an idc*j
camp for Sea Scouts. The Secretary
of
the Navy sent him a list of destroy61*
about to be decommissioned and invit^ him to pick one. Of course, he chose
one Ac J
■ « tew years ago, the Hunt's bell
ng over the bar of the Brooklyn offi- -’ub.
pipers were used for Naval Re-
^ cruises until the end of the 1930s. (-ey recall are the USS Badger
th °\35 ’ 2nd Leary (DDl58)- In 1937, i^6 h • 3Vy cou^ not afford ro have all in VPS runn'ng around with full tanks. ^ 1 e Leary, we had to sit at Charlotte Cat^a ’e untd the battleship Texas (BB-35) a ^addling up to transfuse us. In tjjc * that year, amid great secrecy, test rCaD',s ^rst seagoing radar was an(.C on hoard the Leary, with the 4_'r^r)na attached to the barrel of a eu C SUn so it could be trained and
elevated.
fhe Tucker, for she was named for one 0 his forebears.
Docked at Sandy Hook, New Jersey, ^ e old tin can was an ideal camp. We a whaleboat races against the Coast *jard and sometimes won. I had a ham ra io station on board and handled *?any messages between the boys and L e*r Emilies. Count Felix von Luckner, ommander Edward Ellsberg, and other 'nteresting men visited and shared in
°Ur fun. The Tucker was eventually scrapped in 1937.
Th^n0t^er actave f°ur piper the early irties was the Hunt (ex-DD-194). Redesignated CG-is, she was operated by e Coast Guard in pursuit of rum run- ^ers from 1930 to 1934. Sea Scouts were come. Some of those one-day runs uCre rea!ly exciting. The crew had a ji^lclue mascot—a very busy leopard. On h uy’ tW° ^u&e coastguardsmen would ^d , tet^ers, with the leopard in the Th£y no trouble with any-
hun
Cers’ club.
Four serve u
I
Tattnall (DD-125). Tillman foatswain charles w- Bond’ u-s-
Lan^ ^eserve—it is well that Captain the ^en^er8 included a question mark at tjjeConclusion of his article title, for no Thompson (DD-305) was certainly deci C,e *ast of the four-piped, flush- paroV 1,20(i‘tonners. The West Coast tjar)sC laiisrn seems to affect even histo-
19^ Cape May, New Jersey in May shjp ’ t^lere was a sizable nest of these the S| j3t r^e Naval Section Base (now thc T, S‘ Coast Guard Facility). Since om.Pson was sunk in February 1944,
there were ships of that class still in operating condition some two and a half years later.
While I do not recall any of the hull numbers, these may have been some of the remnants of the Coast Guard four- pipers used during the prohibition period, as well as during the early days of World War II.
Commander Andrew Bennett, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—As a loyal Californian, let me be among the first to report an apparent oversight in an otherwise interesting article. The former USS Thompson is now resting in the mudflats off Redwood City in San Francisco Bay.
What is disturbing is the latitude, which is given as no less than 73 degrees. Does this indicate that the notorious San Andreas Fault has shifted our San Francisco Bay far to the north?
A quick location of the given position of the wreck, 73° North, 122° West, on H.O. chart 2560, "Arctic Regions,” places the wreck on Banks Island in the frigid north, bordering on the ice-locked Beaufort Sea.
By coincidence, only recently I obtained a celestial fix from lines of position of the sun. The latitude derived from my calculations was 370 16' North. Since our residence lies 17 nautical miles due south of the wreck, this would indicate that its actual latitude is about 37° 33' North.
[Editor’s Note: Commander Bennett is correct; 73“ was a typographical error.]
"Can We Really Afford Surface ASW Ships?”
{See R. J. Alexander, pp. 107-109, August 1974 Proceedings; pp. 103-104, November 1974; pp. 73-76, December 1974)
Lieutenant(N) B. F. Lake, Canadian Armed Forces—Captain Alexander’s resource consciousness could be applied to all types of warships. Basically, a ship must be able to equal or outgun any ship it cannot outrun. Both outrunning and outgunning require a ship to be able to reliably detect the enemy while still outside the range of his weapons. To outgun the enemy, a ship must then overpower the enemy in some way;
while to outrun the enemy, a ship must remain outside the range of his weapons. Captain Alexander has examined this process in the case of the surface ASW ship. It is possible to consider that problem and others more generally in terms of the above principles.
For example, it is quite wrong for the advertiser to claim, as he has, that the proposed surface effect ship will be able to outrun nuclear submarines unless he has also given the SES the ability to reliably detect submarines beyond their weapon danger areas, which he has not. In short, speed is not enough.
A ship used for defense is required to stand and fight. Since it cannot run, it must be at least equal to any opposition. Thus the most powerful ship possible is essential for defense, since the enemy may attack with such ships. While the capital ship is essential for defense against other capital ships, it may not be sufficient for defense against other forms of attack. Any special types of ship used to defend ships from attackers which could bypass the capital ship would themselves need protection if enemy capital ships appeared.
Ships designed to operate beyond the support range of friendly capital ships must be able to outrun more powerful ships. It would be necessary to add to Captain Alexander’s proposal to use destroyers as picket ships that these destroyers w uld need ASW protection.
The hodgepodge of ship types during World War II created many unnecessary deaths, since the obsolete ships had not been discarded. Battleships were sunk by aircraft and battle cruisers ended up fighting battleships they could no longer outrun. In the end, only the carrier-destroyer team and submarines remained valid for use in postwar fleets.
The improved underwater performance of the submarine by the 1960s was a fundamental change, for it meant the end of the carrier-destroyer team. The ability of surface ships to outrun the submarine was based on being required to detect the submarine only within the confined area of the limiting lines of approach. Now warships are required to detect submarines approaching the escorted force, and themselves, from all directions. Furthermore, as described by Captain Alexander, the weapon danger area beyond which detections must be made has expanded manyfold, but the vagaries of sound in the sea have prevented sonar ranges from keeping pace.
Surface ships cannot, therefore, now, either outrun or outgun submarines because of the detection problem— which makes the submarine the capital ship. We must abandon the obsolete carrier-destroyer team and concentrate on using the submarine as the Navy’s capital ship. The carrier-destroyer team is not valid for attacking enemy ships, since the carrier can no longer be defended from the enemy submarine escort by destroyers and aircraft. While a carrier-submarine team might be formed to do the job instead, it would be illogical. It would be just as well for the submarines involved to attack the enemy ships themselves and not have the carrier there. They would have to defeat the enemy submarines anyway or the carrier would be lost, and if they could do that, they could defeat the enemy submarine escort and attack the enemy escorted force.
However, since the submarine capital ship can still be bypassed by attacking aircraft, it is desirable to use this form of attack and avoid the necessity of engaging enemy capital ships. This should not be done with carrier-based aircraft; land-based aircraft should be used instead. This would reduce the number of submarines required in one’s own fleet, and would also save one from having to defend attack carriers. The only surface escorts needed are for air defense. These ships would carry aircraft for reconnaissance and air defense, and would require a submarine ASW escort.
It is possible to escort surface ships with submarines. For example, one team operating at quiet speed ahead of the escorted force would eventually be passed over, providing close escort until left astern to catch enemy trailers. The team would then proceed at speed to take up station ahead again. Thus there would always be one team ahead, one with, and one astern of the force, with the fourth team moving past to become the leaders again.
A modern fleet then, should consist only of submarines, air defense ships, and escorted forces of various types using the sea in spite of the enemy. Denying the use of the sea to the enemy can be achieved solely by one’s submarine capital ships, but could also be done for the most part with land-based aircraft.
Of course, the whole business of denying the use of the sea to the enemy is now optional. In previous intercontinental wars, it was necessary to "starve them out” by denying them the sea, but now it is possible to proceed quickly by attacking the enemy in his own country with intercontinental weapons. Since this option would be nuclear warfare, it would appear that the ability to conduct a war at sea might be one way avoiding the necessity of nuclear warfare. Accordingly, to maintain this option, and to save resources by having only valid ships, we should discard all our surface ASW ships and attack carriers. We should keep only those carriers required as air defense escorts and such other surface ships as are needed in the air defense role. We should build more submarines and practice escort tactics using them.
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^ew Tools for Crisis Management”
H. Ware, pp. 19-24, August 1974 Proceedings)
^utenant Commander D. J. Marshall,
■ S. Navy—There are several disturbing £‘atures about Mr. Ware’s article upon w >ch I feel obligated to comment.
What I consider to be the most criti- fa'l S^ortcom*ng *n his article is the ure to mention the monetary cost of 1 ^proving our supposedly wretched C3 system. Yet it is one thing to cry out r improvement and quite another to Pay for it. For example, let’s look at ^cure conferencing. A noble goal. One r which we all strive. But what is it S°lng to cost?
We have, right now, a very effective, ecure conference setup with a total of n*ne high-level conferees. This is an c^Ce ent quality system, and it has a call completion rate. It costs well ^Vcr ®^0>000 per month. There would n° problem in providing this capabil- fort0 CVeryone^ we> or fhey, could pay
u fanning for Phase II Secure Voice is lar Cnva^' h will eventually replace a &e portion of the automatic voice l98^°rk ^a,jTovon) system, perhaps by are ' The initial implementation costs a .estimated at well over a quarter of AUr *°n ^°^ars' Europe, many of the ^ °vON switchboards are of German ^nufacture— taken over after World ^ Many of the cables and micro- Su^ systems were also captured and th SCC|Uently use<J- These facilities are thei^3t ^CaSt ^ fears °M- To replace tvoulj involve enormous costs.
Mr \v SecorM area of contention with st are’s article involves questionable
thaeiTlents °f fact. He asserts that "less pjet ,^a^ °h AUTOVON calls are com- tc eq an<i any AUTOVON user knows
sta„ jUa^T *s often not up to Ma Bell’s andardsxt u • • • •
ac JNow this is an interesting
graj^at‘on- American Telephone & Tele- AUt °Wns an<f operates 49 of the 60 n OI9 switches within the conti-
gjnta United States. The system is en- pracre<a to the same BSPs (Bell system Fj0^ICes) as the other Bell systems. Wj. , ’ t^en> can a system which is over- stand^^y AT&Ts not meet its own
Vcfseas, the problem is more complex. Although, with one exception, the U. S. government owns the switches and equipment, much of it, as cited for Germany, is old and inadequate. Also, in many cases, we are forced to use host country or other commercial company transmission media. Even so, AUTOVON quality is at least as good as most of the commercial systems overseas, and probably a good deal better.
We are talking, however, about command and control and crisis situations which assuredly demand more of a voice communications system than normal day-to-day living does. That brings me to that less than 50% completion figure that Mr. Ware tosses around so carelessly. Yes, there are studies which indicate just what Mr. Ware indicates. I can draw an analogous situation: I attempt to call my family long distance on the West Coast. The first time there is no answer, the second and third times the phone is busy, and the fourth time I finally get through. I can say, in all honesty, that I have completed only 25% of my calls through the direct distance dialing network. Is that an adequate explanation of the situation? I think not, but Mr. Ware would have us believe otherwise.
But more importantly we are talking about crisis management and command and control. And this is a completely different ball game. By definition, any subscriber in AUTOVON designated as a command and control subscriber is provided with at least immediate calling capability. And there are over 2,000 subscribers who rate flash or flash override calling capability. And the number of completions, whichever way completion is defined, changes dramatically. The call completion rate between Europe, the Pacific, and the United States for July, 1974, an average month, was 82.5% for immediate and higher precedence subscribers. And this is, more accurately, the rate for immediate since flash and flash override are engineered to be nonblocking. In other words, all calls placed should get to the intended recipient. In fact, every time a flash call is not completed for whatever reason (and the most typical is that the distant end is already talking on another flash call), it is investigated by the Defense Communications Agency.
Moving on to another area of disagreement, I find Mr. Ware’s discussion of technology confusing and contradictory. He believes that technology is the panacea which will eventually solve all of our problems. In reality, technological solutions to problems only partially solve those problems and create a host of new ones, themselves only partially solvable. Technology has created pollution, and crowded streets, and noise, but technology does not seem to be able to solve these problems.
It is time to wind up this polemic by commenting upon Mr. Ware’s "new” solutions to crisis management. Satellites have been around for many years. The Navy has been dabbling with them since 1954 when UHF signals were bounced off the moon. It has been ten years since the first ship-to-ship satellite communications were established. We’re putting up more and more satellites—both military and commercial—and there is still no indication that they have solved our command and control problems. We plan for exponential increases in traffic volume, and when they are realized, we are unable to cope with the increased loads. The technological improvements which enhance our communications capacity will, if nothing else, insure even greater volumes of traffic.
Finally, Mr. Ware proposes a positive- acknowledgement system during a crisis. This will have the immediate effect of at least doubling the traffic load. What if the receiving command repeats back the message to the originator and it is not error-free? Is the originator going to retransmit the message and the receiving command going to send it back once again for verification? How long will this process continue? If the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific transmits a message to 25 addressees, will he in turn receive back and review all 25 versions of the receipted message? This process could pyramid uncontrollably.
Surely, in a world where growth of any kind must be seriously questioned, our frenetic efforts to increase the number of messages, our reliance on automation, and our wishful thinking that technology will eventually solve our problems, must be seriously reexamined. Then, and only then, will we be able, perhaps, to develop workable tools for crisis management.
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89
®°ok Reviews
price: $8.00).
ans Por the U. S. Navy and Royal rabl'' ^csPectively, do their jobs admi- f0rke‘r works are required reading pCrs those who would gain a broad th0PCCt've °f the climactic events of War S1X years- Yet, to understand nevcr ^sPcc'ally for those who have go b °u£kt *n one—it is necessary to ^eyond the history books, tis ijS *nt° tk's area that Kennedy leads e concentrates on people rather
The German battleship Bismarck leaves Grimstad Fjord, Norway, on the morning of 22 June 1941■ From there, she proceeded to her clash with the Royal Naiy in the
i^suit: The Chase and Sinking ° tPle Battleship Bismarck
dovic Kennedy. New York: Viking
(Member' 2M PP' ^ ®la°°
Rev'
p le'ved by Commander Joseph M. TOer’ Royal Navy (Retired)
0,nmander Palmer served in the Royal navy from 1926 until 1962. His World War Atl^>er'enCe deluded five years at sea in the
1vhich'C’ ^ nt'C’ anc^ ^°rt^ ^ea’ during AlH Peri°d he commanded HM destroyers tinEglinton, and Zambesi. At the lie ° ®'smarck episode, he was first enant of an Atlantic convoy escort. He is m‘ly editor of Navy International.)
no^-l histories, even the best, do afeche whole story. Nor, indeed, e they meant t Those f w ld w u tell • ,
styleWlttl accuracy> detachment, and "tvhat happened and why, what concerned said at the time, some- fin I] nClr contemPorary thoughts, and sj0 I’ it all turned out. Occa-
the ^ they Pass judgment; more often father and relate the facts, allowing ^ to speak for themselves. aJTlUc^ Eliot Morison and Stephen Kosk‘H, official World War II his- than events. With skill and sympathy he brings before us the individual British and Germans, what sort of men they were and, to a remarkable degree, how they felt. In particular, he reveals the great difference between fighting on land (or in air warfare, from and to the land) and at sea. He writes of the lack of hate or even of dislike, the revulsion against pounding a gallant enemy ("I can’t say I enjoyed this part of the business much,” said Captain Frederick Dalrymple-Harriilton of HMS Rodney, "but didn’t see what else I could do.”), the rescue of survivors, the sadness at having to leave some behind.
The Bismarck operation of May 1941 is of special interest for a number of reasons, and thus Kennedy does a great service in describing this personal aspect of it. Although air reconnaissance and attack played a vital part, the final decision lay in the battle between big ships mounting big guns, differing only in degree from three centuries of sea war
Atlantic.
fare. It was not only the last of its kind, but also the last occasion on which Britain demonstrated the strength of her 200-year-old, worldwide sea power. The author brings out well the summoning of ships, squadrons, and forces from far and wide. If, for a little while, the Bismarck was mistress of the tiny circle of sea within range of her guns, Britannia still ruled the broad ocean. It was hit and run, even for the world’s most powerful battleship, and Gunther Liitjens, her admiral, knew it, even in the moment of fleeting triumph.
"I should like to pay the highest tribute for the most gallant fight put up against impossible odds,” Admiral Sir John Tovey, Commander-in-Chief, British Home Fleet, signaled immediately afterwards. It was, he later added, "worthy of the old days of the Imperial German Navy.” Perhaps his thoughts were running back—a quarter of a century, almost to the day—to Jutland where he himself had commanded a
VIKING PRESS
Admiral Sir John Tovey on board his flagship, King George V
destroyer in the thick of the fight. Needless to say, these sentiments were far from welcome to the politicians.
There are many such telling glimpses of men on both sides, of all ranks. Undoubtedly, though, the portraits of the two commanders, Liitjens and Tovey, are the fullest and most fascinating. Both are revealed as the brave, skillful, and non-political men they were. Kennedy tells us the former gave Hitler the naval, not the Nazi party, salute and especially reminds us of the latter’s moral courage, cool judgment, and tenacity of purpose. Admiral Tovey did what he thought right, and he stood firm under attack by his own superiors. Incredibly, he was told to bring the cruiser admiral and the captain of HMS Prince of Wales to trial by court-martial for failing to re-engage the enemy after the loss of the battle cruiser Hood. He flatly informed the Admiralty that, with serious trouble in the Prince of Wales’ brand-new turrets and the cruisers hopelessly outgunned, they were doing "precisely what he wished” by keeping in touch until reinforced. When further pressed, he is reported to have slung back the clincher that, should their lordships order courts-martial, he himself would haul down his flag and act as friend of the accused. "After that,” Tovey records laconically, "I heard no more about it.” It is instructive to compare Kennedy’s treatment with that of the official history, which says: "The difficult decisions taken. . . by Captain Leach and Admiral Wake-Walker were later fully supported by the Admiralty.” *
The author was himself at sea in HM destroyer Tartar on this operation. A third of a century later, we are fortunate in having this accurate, authentic, and totally enthralling account of a unique event.
Jane’s Fighting Ships: 1974-75
Captain John E. Moore, Royal Navy (Retired), Editor. New York: Franklin Watts, 1974. 670 pp. Illus. $65.00 (Member’s price: $58.50).
Reviewed by Inspector Thomas S. Hoback, U. S. Customs
(Inspector Hoback, who graduated from Memphis State University in 1970, has been a customs inspector assigned to the Port of Miami since 1971 after attending the inspector’s course at the Customs National Training Center, Hofstra University.)
The 77th edition of the world’s best- known naval annual has been edited for the second year by Captain John E. Moore. For those who were disappointed with his first effort, the results are much closer to the standards expected of the Jane’s organization. This year’s volume is the same size and price as the last work, but there is at least much more value, particularly in view of the high price.
The most important single feature of the work—and the main reason for acquiring it—is the abundance of new information contained on its pages and in its photos, many of which are new and larger than in last year’s edition. Captain Moore has managed to introduce a wide range and depth of previously unavailable information concerning new ships and building programs such as those of the Spanish, French, Dutch, and Italian Navies.
One of the improved features is that of introductory notes (especially for the Soviet Navy) given at the head of each section. Among other things, these notes indicate the strength of each fleet and what is planned or under con-
*S. W. Roskill, The War at Sea, Vol. 1, The Defensive (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1954), p. 407.
struction for it. The smaller nations of the world, for example, are undertaking vigorous building programs, indicating a new level of naval activity. River forces are also receiving increased coverage) including the Austrian and Swiss "navies”.
Among the most interesting sections are those depicting the French and Chinese Fleets. The French section has been completely updated with new photos of most of the newly completed or converted warships. While the photo coverage of the Chinese as well as data on the new building program remain inferior to that for other nations, there is a significant amount of data on the new vessels of this re-emerging naval power-
Among the many changes is expanded coverage of para-naval forces such as civilian chartered vessels, police> service, and scientific vessels. While there has always been some selective listing of these, it has become more widespread, and their relation to the main naval force has been explained- The recognition silhouette section has been completely redrawn and is °f higher quality than last year’s. A large number of the poorly drawn individual vessel elevations have disappeared, except for some in the British section- Captain Moore has also begun listing each country’s naval air arm and, >n some cases, its bases. The headnotes on some countries include interesting commentary on problems peculiar to them- He has continued to expand the coverage of the electronics aspects of each vessel—listing more of its radar, sonar- communications, and electronic countermeasures gear. There are also very inform' ative addenda that chronicle some important late developments.
While there is much improvement in the new Jane’s, there are still some definite problems. The most important Ha'*' is the increasing number of missing ships, vessels which were listed in previous editions but omitted from this edition without any kind of explanation These include HMS Puma, the U- - Mitscher class, the Italian Albatros cla*5 and the Enrico Fermi. Also missing are a large number of vessels under construction or planned for various countries. The wide fluctuation in coverage also detracts from the book’s usefulness- It appears that in order to save paper-
91
Book Reviews
ne^ e dropped coverage of the various j electronic warfare programs the i vy bas in the works for its ships and
Action
could then concentrate on de-
parts °f certain countries’ fleets are merely listed instead of properly described. This listing without details also occurs in the coverage of many of the auxiliarly vessels of both the Russian n Chinese navies, despite the increas- og importance of these vessels. It would so help if there were uniformity in the lngs so that bases and naval air arms Werc listed for every country. Also all ^^time-related government activities as coast guards, customs, research jn nav'gation support vessels should be to U<^ w*tb tllelr parent organization provide a complete picture of a na- ■ °n s naval capability. For example, it
s strange that the excellent U. S. section QOesn V ■
11 mention the extensive fleet of dessds belonging to the U. S. Army QSP'te coverage of both the Coast ^Uard and the National Oceanic and j tIjn°spheric Administration (NOAA), nc uding their smallest vessels, edi °f the U. S. section, it is still
a Norman Polmar who has done
it °k op updating and expanding ' r' Polmar has provided the most ha aUSdve study of any of the fleets and is prov'(lecl more critical analysis than ad(<j°rnrnon In the rest of the work. In Sec *t'0n to new information, the U. S. illul0n ^aS a wea^b °P new photos and tlla^t|'at‘ons- However, it is regrettable
N;
aircraft.
Th ’ *
ov u aircraPt section needs a complete Th1 aUpn8; *t is dated and confusing. l0n_nUmbers and types of aircraft be- ^ “ m the headnotes along with the air S ft^at botb naval and Air Force Cra 1 support the fleet. The aircraft
Us j1*015’ including Air Force aircraft or naval missions.
there W°U^ also be very beneficial if Co |'vei’e coverage of such items as Vcdl^a and harbor defenses, fixed sur- rej ”ce networks, mines, and other of activities so that a complete view
SCdhb^aVy *S £'ven' Nore advantage whichbe taPen of available information seis *b°ws internal views of new ves- Uch more attention must be paid tvhich racbcai new surface skimmers Ca be Part op tbc new fleets. CaPabj3tain ^oore bas shown that he is e °f producing the needed coverage of the ever-changing naval scene. Even with the problems listed, this edition is outstanding and shows promise of an even better future for Jane’s Fighting Ships.
The Awesome Power:
Harry S. Truman as Commander in Chief
Richard F. Haynes. Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1973.
359 pp. $12.95.
Reviewed by Professor Richard S. Kirkendall, Indiana University
(Dr. Kirkendall was educated at Gonzaga University and the University of Wisconsin.
He served in the U. S.. Navy from 1950-52 as an enlisted man, including duty in Korean waters. He received his Ph.D. from Wisconsin in 1958. His teaching experience has been at Wesleyan University, the University of Missouri-Columbia, and Indiana University. Dr. Kirkendall is now executive secretary of the Organization of American Historians. His publications include The Truman Period as a Research Field (1967) and The Truman Period as a Research Field: A Reappraisal, 1972 (1974). He has been at work for more than a decade on a biography of Harry Truman.)
This is a valuable survey of a major subject. In it, Richard Haynes, a member of the history department at Northeast Louisiana University, draws together the information available in the early 1970s on Harry Truman’s performance as Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. armed forces and uses it in a judicious and intelligent way. The subject is significant and has not been explored so extensively and systematically by anyone else.
As Haynes demonstrates, this was one of Truman’s major roles from the beginning to the end of his Presidency. We cannot understand and appraise the significance of his Presidency without examining his conduct in military affairs.
The author recognizes that he cannot deal in a final way with all of the issues. He does draw upon many sources, including a substantial number of unpublished documents from the Truman and Eisenhower libraries and the National Archives. But other relevant collections, such as the George Elsey papers, have become available since he completed his work, and restrictions on access, including Truman’s papers, hampered his research. Haynes indicates, for example, that the question of Truman’s motivation in the decision to use the atomic bomb cannot yet be answered satisfactorily. Although they have not yet done so, the author implies that revisionist historians may "succeed in proving that his motivations were entirely political.”
The book takes a stand on Truman’s performance, and Haynes concludes that Truman played his role rather well. This is not a revisionist account. Although familiar with Truman period revisionism and influenced by it in some ways, the author does not endorse the thesis that the atomic bomb was used against Japan in order to intimidate Russia, does not accept any of the plot or conspiracy theories that have been advanced to explain the outbreak of the Korean War
92 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1975
and American intervention, and does not share the new left’s predominantly negative appraisal of military power and the containment policy. Assessing the President’s impact, Haynes writes, "Through his efforts as commander in chief, Truman made the military establishment over, generally, for the better.”
Haynes’ admiration for Truman appears very clearly in the discussion of one of the most controversial parts of the story: the firing of General Douglas MacArthur in April of 1951. Truman, the author is convinced, "was amply justified in removing MacArthur from command.” The general’s "paranoidal assault on civilian authority . . . struck at the very base of the system to which he had devoted over fifty years of his life.”
The President had a very high regard for some military men, especially General George C. Marshall, whom he appointed Secretary of State in 1947 and Secretary of Defense in 1950, but Truman believed that military men must be subordinate to civilian authorities. In his view, this was a fundamental requirement of a free society, and MacArthur’s actions, in taking his case for a wider war to the public in clear and open opposition to the Commander-in-Chief, endangered the principle of civilian control. "Had MacArthur first retired and then opposed Truman’s policies in the political arena (as Eisenhower did), he would have been beyond reproach,” Haynes writes. "But by attacking from within, he forced his own dismissal.”
"Dear Ike,” the President wrote to another general on 12 April, "I was sorry to have to reach a parting of the way with the big man in Asia but he asked for it and I had to give it to him.” And Haynes adds with obvious admiration: "And so he did.”
This is not to say that the book is uncritical in its interpretation of Harry Truman or of containment and the military. The author finds mistakes in the record. He even suggests that Truman’s "performance . . . was often unequal to the task at hand.” On specific issues, Haynes concludes that "one of Truman’s most serious errors as commander in chief was allowing the success of the Inchon invasion to influence a departure from the original objective in Korea;” he also maintains that in the decision to use the atomic bomb Truman "was not wise enough to see that a test demonstration in an unpopulated area would have been a far more humane means of obtaining the same objective,” and he indicates that the sending of four divisions to Europe in 1951 was influenced by "the mistaken belief that the attack in Asia was simply a feint by the Soviet Union.” Yet the book ends on a positive note concerning Truman: "Whatever his shortcomings, the nation has never known a more dedicated or faithful servant.”
Perhaps this should have been a bolder book. The author could have made a greater effort to sort out and weigh the different parts of Truman’s record. Although Haynes calls attention to Truman’s enlargement of the Commander-in-Chief power, chiefly by taking crucial steps without the prior approval of Congress, and criticizes this in a mild way, the author does not suggest that this or any other aspect of the story was the most important part of Truman’s performance as the top official of the armed forces.
Haynes’s failure to be bolder, however, does not rob his book of usefulness. Stru dents of the Truman period, the Presidency, and military history must now turn to this volume when looking for a substantial study of one of the major aspects of Truman’s very significant career.
Admiral William Veazie Pratt,
U. S. Navy: A Sailor’s Life
Gerald E. Wheeler. Washington, D.C.:
U. S. Government Printing Office, 1974. 456 pp. Ulus. $8.50.
Reviewed by Captain Paolo E. Coletta, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired)
{After receiving his Ph.D. in history Dr. Coletta was commissioned in the Naval Reserve and served for three wartime years on active duty. In 1946, he joined the teaching staff of the Naval Academy, where he is now a professor of history. He is the author of four books, co-author of several others, and has written numerous articles.)
William Veazie Pratt (1869-1957), who served the Navy from 1889 to 1933, aspired to the leadership of men and to the derivation of doctrine for operating forces. Following graduation from the
Naval Academy, he interspersed duty afloat with three tours at Annapolis- When ordered to the teaching staff at the Naval War College in 1911 as a commander, he had garnered a string of outstanding fitness reports. A skillful shiphandler, he became a staff man pdf excellence.
Naval officers particularly will be greatly interested in Wheeler’s account of the War College training in preparing estimates of the situation upon which operation plans and orders are based. Indeed, he makes it clear that Pratt’s ability to think logically derived great benefit from such training.
One day William S. Sims, then a captain, was a student of Pratt’s. Soon Pratt—as chief of staff to Sims, who became Commander, Atlantic Torpedo Flotilla—was being hammered with others into Sims’ well-known "band of brothers,” who provided the fleet with a destroyer doctrine. Pratt learned much about tactics and leadership from Sims, especially that a leader should derive and manage broad policy, choose responsible subordinates to carry out policy, and let them exercise initiative in how to carry on. He chose his own staffs with great care.
A tour at the Panama Canal Defense Board (1915-1916) and at the Army War College (1916-1917) broadened Pratt’s view of joint military matters. As Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, 1917-1920, he served extremely well a5 a buffer between his chief, Admiral William S. Benson, and Sims as Com' mander, U. S. Naval Forces Operating
ln European Waters. He was instrumental in creating the War Plans Divi- Slon‘nthe Office of the CNO. When 3 ^enate committee investigated Sims’ £ arges on the misconduct of the war y the Navy, Pratt supported Benson Secretary of the Navy Josephus aniels. Serving with Benson had been ^an-killing but noncombatant work.
flowing that promotion depended ™Uch upon command at sea, he ob- air*ed command of the battleship New Y°rk (BB-34).
^heeler deals at length with Pratt an officer-diplomat during his last ^ars of service, 1920-1933. To Pratt, life ^^ competition, and he worked strcnu- s y in order to reach the top. No one ^ matched his record of fleet com- s- As Commander, Destroyer • rce> Pacific Fleet, he suggested a rotaS reserve so that all his men would some operational training. As a cernuer of the General Board and as the ^ urntander of battleship forces, of the e Elect, as Commander-in-Chief, tj ' Eleet, and Chief of Naval Opera- °ns> he tried to have Naval War College experience count toward the promotion of flag officers and for assignment to billets. While president of the Naval War College, he tried to create a mix of its theoretical studies and practical fleet operations, added the study of logistics to its curriculum, and stressed joint planning. In the meantime, he opposed an independent air service, unified defense structure, and a national general staff. He would reorganize the fleet to include type as well as operating commands. Though the battleship continued to be its backbone, he wanted both naval air and submarines properly integrated into the fleet. He also provided much of the naval input for the American delegation to the Washington Naval Disarmament Conference of 1921-1922 and to the additional naval limitations conferences of the later 1920s and early 1930s.
Throughout the years 1921 to 1933, under Republican Presidents, the United States sought economy—some of it at the expense of the Navy—and world peace through international agreements and arms limitation. Pratt simply never found an opportunity to act in a prominent manner during these years of peace. Caught between loyalty to the Navy and to the administration, he gave too much credence to his friend Herbert Hoover. The President would disarm, yet not build the Navy up to treaty strength or even modernize its battleships. As CNO (1930-1933) during the depression, Pratt had no choice but to let the Navy make do with what little it had, which was not enough to provide support for national policies.
This is a first-rate biography of one who formed numerous close personal friendships and was a team player but was never in a billet long enough to create a band of brothers. Although he would not have the United States join the League of Nations, he was an Anglophile and an internationalist in outlook. Therefore he was seen as second- rate by many of his more nationalistic and isolationist colleagues.
Wheeler has delved deeply into primary sources. His writing style is clear, his well-proportioned organization easy to follow, and his index complete.
TiRjrr
cyCRQSS!
The U. S. Navy’s Transatlantic Flight of 1919 By Richard K. Smith
Winner of the 1972 History Manuscript Award presented by The American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
^ f\l J ’
sejp ■ eight years before Charles Lindberg secured him- ttiat'w0 cockP't °f The Spirit of St. Louis for a flight c0m ,as to change history, the U. S. Navy had already I>ortf. eted an air voyage from Newfoundland to Lisbon, harts' 1 ^‘rst Across is the exciting story of that first tnanat ant'c flight. Made in 1919, the flight took a six- desc •?rew nearly three weeks to complete. This book rrtert * 6S *n ^etafl the entire operation, the planning, the Cati0nan<^ t*le’r a*rcraft, the primitive radio communi- p anc* method of air navigation.
the'pE^d by an offer of 10,000 pounds to be paid by Atiam°n<^on Mail to the first plane to cross the
thoy /c’ aviators everywhere prepared for the test. Al- § excluded from the prize, the U. S. Navy was in
a unique position to win the honor. Three big Navy Curtiss flying boats were readied for flight and took off from Newfoundland, but engine trouble and bad weather forced two of the craft to land at sea in the vicinity of the Azores. There were later unable to take off and both planes were lost.
The remaining NC-4 finally completed the unprecedented flight on 27 May 1919, after the twenty-day up-and-down-and-up-again voyage to Portugal.
1973. 279 pages. Illustrated. Appendices. Index. List price: $10.00 Member’s price: $8.00 Add 50c to each order for postage and handling
(Please use book order form in Professional Reading section)
Books of Interest to the Professional
Compiled by Robert A. Lambert,
Associate Editor
NAVAL AFFAIRS
S The Battle of the Coral Sea
Bernard Milot. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1974. 166 pp. lllus. $8.50 ($6.80).
The author blends technical information on the planes involved and a discussion of the strategic aspects of the world’s first all-carrier battle.
l-t-1 The Battles of the Malta Striking Force
Peter C. Smith and Edwin Walker. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1974. 120 pp. Illus. $7.00 ($5.60).
The Italians seemed to have the naval and air superiority needed to neutralize Britain’s vital base at Malta, and this brief history shows how the Royal Navy, though strained to the limit, overcame the odds.
Ghost of the Java Coast
Captain Walter G. Winslow, U. S. Navy (Ret.). Satellite Beach, Florida: Coral Reef Publications. 1974. 184 pp. Illus. $7.95.
The USS Houston (CA-30) was the best ship
BOOK ORDER SERVICE
Members may order books of other publishers through the Naval Institute at list price. The postage and handling fee for each such special order book of a United States publisher will be 50C; the fee for a book from a foreign publisher will be $1.00. When air mail or other special handling is requested, actual postage and handling cost will be billed to the member. Books marked (31 are Naval Institute Press Books. Books marked @ are Naval Institute Book Selections. All prices enclosed by parentheses are member prices. Please use the order blank in this section.
in the U. S. Asiatic Fleet following Pearl Harbor, and along with some old four-stack destroyers and a poor mixture of Allied warships she did her best against overwhelming Japanese odds before going down. The author was a pilot with the Houston’s aviation unit and tells of his and the ship’s experiences in World War II.
S In the Presence of Mine Enemies Howard and Phyllis Rutledge. Old Tappan,
New Jersey: Fleming H. Revell, 1973. 124 pp. Illus. $4.95. ($3.95).
A U. S. naval aviator tells of his seven years as a prisoner of war in North Vietnam, including his captivity in the infamous "Hanoi Hilton.” The book is illustrated with drawings by fellow POW Gerald Coffee.
Make Another Signal
Jack Broome. London: William Kimber, 1973. 253 pp. Illus. £3.95 ($9.88).
Better than its predecessor, Make A Signal, which was published nearly 20 years ago, this second version repeats much of the earlier material and has added some new words and illustrations, all of which maintain and continue the irreverent flavor of the author’s earlier history of communicating at sea.
l-t-1 Operation Neptune
Vice Admiral B. B. Schofield, Royal Navy (Ret.). Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1974. 168 pp. Illus. $7.95 ($6.35).
The title comes from the codeword applied to the naval portion of the Normandy invasion of June 1944. In addition to the normal concerns of an amphibious assault unprecedented in scope, there were such novel tasks as positioning artificial harbors and laying an underwater pipeline across the English Channel.
Royal Navy Ships’ Badges
Peter C. Smith. London: Balfour, 1974. 96 pp- Illus. £3.00 ($7.50).
This attractive album illustrates the badges worn by 13 of the Royal Navy’s famous ships and includes 27 smaller and lesser- known vessels whose badges are examples of good design.
[S Ships, Seas, and Scientists
Vincent Ponko, Jr., Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1974. 283 pp. $17.50 ($14.00).
Using personal diaries and official records, the author tells of the U. S. Navy’s frequent, but relatively unknown, involvement u1 world exploration and scientific expeditions in the 19th century.
MARITIME AFFAIRS The Articulate Sailor
James Tazelaar, Editor. Tuckahoe, New York: John de Graff 1973. 189 pp. Illus. $9.95.
This anthology brings together short quotations from more than 70 writers, mostly sailors, on such topics as life at sea, the frustration of being becalmed, the excitement of departure, and the anticipation o( landfall. Gleaned from the editor’s reading, these selections are often only a sentence of paragraph in length as they reflect the flavof of seafaring.
Heritage of the Sea
Peter C. Smith. London: Balfour, 1974. 96 pp-
Illus. £3.00 ($7.50).
This book describes and gives the historic* of 22 old ships which are preserved or afe being restored in England, Scotland, an^ Northern Ireland; all illustrations are in colon
How to be a First-Rate First Mate
Gloria Sloane and Phyllis Coe. New York: Quadrangle, 1974. 156 pp. Illus. $6.95.
This handbook on boating for women >*
21 mak'n8 life afloat easy, efficient and a e- It includes basics for newcomers, as well as shortcuts for more experienced boaters, m°stly *n the form of checklists.
The Mayflower
Taffrey. New York: Stein and Day, 1974.
2 PP- Ulus. $10.00.
F •
r °Cus^ng on the people involved, the writer structs in human terms the intrigue of t^anning the voyage, the hardships encoun- m the crossing, and the eventual settle- ent of the Plymouth Colony in 1620.
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^ n ^^^Crs- New York: Scribners, 1974. 310 PP- Ulus. $7.95
^cw introduction, covering ships lost add rtraCC s*nce tbe 1956 edition, has been ^ e t0 this current one; otherwise nothing la/ C^an8eh except the type size—now
nderstanding the Chesapeake
Tid Uf ^ Sherwood. Cambridge, Md.:
(Pape )'" Publishers- 1973. 114 pp. Illus. $3.50
'J’h' .
hlacb ^°0^’ hlustrated with excellent pQ.^ anh white photos, expresses eight ts of view—sailor, consumer, economic,
businessman, geological, oceanographic, biological and learner—which, taken together, represent the bay’s peculiarities, charm, productivity, strength and susceptibility to damage.
MILITARY AFFAIRS
Battle for the Bundu.
Charles Miller. New York: Macmillan, 1974.
353 pp. Illus. $9.95.
German East Africa was definitely a sideshow campaign in World War I, but it was a bloody business in the African bush and not without its humorous aspects. The author neatly catches the flavor of the area and the spirit of the combatants as he shows how a small band of German-led native troops tied up a considerably larger number of British and Imperial troops that might otherwise have been available for use on the European Western Front.
Breakout
Graeme Cook. New York: Taplinger, 1974. 189 pp. $7.50.
These five tales of POW escapes come from both world wars and range geographically from England and Germany to Singapore and Arctic Norway.
Coast Defences of England and Wales, 1856-1956
Ian V. Hogg. North Pomfret, Vt.: David & Charles, 1974. 264 pp. Illus. $17.50.
With many photographs of the installations as they presently exist and diagrams showing construction details, ordnance, and areas being defended, this monograph describes the principal coast fortresses and provides a history of their building and use.
Focke-Wulf
J. Richard Smith. New York: Arco, 1973, 112 pp. Illus. $4.95 (paper).
Focusing on the aircraft that were designed and built since 1908 by the Focke brothers, later joined by Georg Wulf, this pictorial tells the history of this pioneer aviation firm that still enjoys remarkable success.
Hitler’s Generals
Richard Humble. New York: Doubleday, 1974. 167 pp. Illus. $5.95.
This superficial review of battles and campaigns focuses on the clashes between the Fuhrer and his army commanders rather than analyzing their personalities or military competence.
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r°m Tripoli to Tarawa, the j^°dern fleet passes in review in he Pages of the U. S. Naval institute's 1975 calendar and PPointment book. Carefully °sen photographs and brief uts-and-bolts text depict oper- ^onal types of combatant q.^Ps’ auxiliaries and aircraft. *8gest ship in the fleet? Enter-
staff 86,000 tons- Fastest? Flag- a* 52 knots. Largest submarine class? Sturgeon, 37 of arri- There are 44 ships and
a rol craft, and 11 aircraft as Well ' i
as adequate space for otes. 6x9. 128 pages.
p
Per 30 a^^'fe°na^ cost °T $1-50 r calendar, we will stamp a one lin ^
fr me personalization on the
th°nt c°ver in foil. Please print cj name of the recipient 6arly. and order now.
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Price: $4.50
prober's price: $3.50
50<t to each order for post- _!f*a«d handling
U. S. Navy Ships and Aircraft 1975
Begin your year with the 1975 U. S. Naval Institute Calendar and Appointment Book
(Please use order form in Professional Heading section)
96 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1975
The Maori Wars
Tom Gibson. Hamden, Conn.: Shoe String Press, 1974. 271 pp. Ulus. $13.50.
The 19th century. New Zealand colonial wars were among the most savage fought by the troops of the British Empire as they battled with native tribesmen and encroached on their preserves.
No Time for Geishas
Geoffrey Pharaoh Adams. London: Leo Cooper, 1973. 217 pp. Illus. £3.75 ($9.38).
A British POW in the hands of the Japanese after the fall of Singapore tells of his harrowing experiences in various prison camps, including work along the famous River Kwai.
Origins of Intelligence Services
Francis Dvornik. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1974. 334 pp. Illus. $15.00.
Good roads and speedy postal services were as important as secret police and spies in this history that traces the development of intelligence services in the ancient Near East, the Persian, Greek, Roman, Byzantine, Muslim and Mongol empires, China and Muscovy.
The Rise and Fall of the Luftwaffe
David Irving. Boston: Little, Brown, 1973. 443 pp. Illus. $12.95.
This biography of Field Marshal Erhard Milch details the career of the man who transformed Germany into a formidable air power despite the restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles. He, more than Hermann Goring, was responsible for the emergence of the Luftwaffe and spent 10 years in prison as the result of the Nuremberg trials.
The Short Victorious War
Donald Walder. New York: Harper & Row, 1973. 321 pp. Illus. $10.00.
Russian domestic politics and international diplomacy play large roles in this military history of the Russo-Japanese War. Though interesting, it suffers from a convoluted writing style.
SS Regalia
Jack Pia. New York: Ballantine, 1974. 158 pp. Illus. $2.95 (paper).
Decorations, symbols, badges of rank, collar runes, cuff bands, and other uniform accoutrements are shown in more than 100 color photographs.
The U. S. Intelligence Community
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr. New York: Hill and Wang, 1973. 212 pp. $7.95.
An appraisal of the intelligence apparatus as it functions in foreign and domestic activities and the problems that arise in the latter as a result of alleged violations of the principles of U. S. constitutional government.
War in the Aegean
Peter C. Smith and Edwin Walker. London: William Kimber, 1974. 304 pp. Illus.
£3.95 ($9.88).
The authors present a complicated account of this sideshow campaign by which Britain hoped to tie down a disproportionate number of German troops while maintaining her own influence in the Aegean for its intended postwar value. Britain failed in both goals-
A World Atlas of Military History
Arthur Banks. New York: Hippocrene, 1973200 pp. Illus. $12.50.
This first volume in a new series covers ancient campaigns to the year 1500 and provides as support to the maps four indexes for locating any individual, location, battle, or race of people of the known world during the period encompassed.
GENERAL:
The Atomic Energy Commission
Corbin Allardice and Edward R. Trapnell. Ne®' York: Praeger, 1974. 236 pp. Illus. $10.00.
A history of the agency since its informal creation in 1939 as the result of a letter from Albert Einstein to President Roosevelt.
High Politics, Low Politics
Roger P. Morgan. Beverly Hills, California: SAGE Publications, 1973. 65 pages. $2.50 (paper).
The ambiguities that sometimes occur between "high politics” (diplomacy) and "low politics” (economics) present within the European Economic Community are studied in an attempt to determine whether that group of nine nations will become a superpower or remain essentially a "civilian power” more interested in trade than force or defense.
Price
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