Military Cargo and the Civilian Carrier: The Problem of Procurement
By James V. Day, Commissioner, Federal Maritime Commission
Civilian ships carry 85% of military cargo—a surprising, but necessary fact of life.
The fundamental procedures for obtaining military sealift have been in force since1966, with improvements made in the light of experience, shifting requirements, and the development of containership service.
Negotiations are conducted between the Military Sealift Command (MSC) and the individual carriers. Rates are negotiated individually; rates, and not frequency of service, are the basis for cargo location when two or more carriers are able to meet cargo requirements. They must stay in effect for a certain time period rather than being subject to renegotiation at any time, and there are no volume discounts.
The system begins with the issuance of a request for proposals, followed by submission and opening of offers privately. Next comes negotiations individually with each bidder within a competitive range, to refine the responsiveness of his proposal and secure his final price, and finally, the award. The cargo award is offered by MSC, first to the lowest cost carrier providing acceptable space and service which meet cargo requirements on a trade route, and then to other carriers in the ascending order of rates they propose.
MSC charter operations cover a broad range of operations by means of negotiated competitive procurement. The charter variations include (a) tankers and tank barges; (b) dry cargo ships (break-bulk, container, ammunition container, coal bulk vessel, roll-on/roll-off, barges, and ocean tow) and container leasing; and (c) specialized projects (submersible and support ships, cable laying, and the like, for oceanographic research, underwater radiated noise trials, and sediment movement monitoring). Other types of contracts have been negotiated such as Contractor Custody of Government Vessel (whereby the contractor brings the ship to a MSC-designated port, supplies the crew, and carries out all functions required to finish the voyage).
The particular types of contracts generally used are the Time Charter and Voyage Charter. Dry cargo and special projects usually have the Time Charter, while tanker procurement has been arranged by Voyage Charter.
The procedure is first to release a request for proposals to the merchant marine industry upon receipt of requirements by the contracting officer. When offers are received, they are evaluated, considering such matters as vessel availability, positioning, suitability, size, speed, fuel consumption, cargo capacity, number and size of hatches, and number and capacity of booms and heavy lift gear. For containerships, evaluation includes container-carrying capacity, size, speed, and availability of vessel. Additional factors pertaining to tankers include cargo tank coatings, cargo previously carried, number of cargo tank systems, and capacity of each system.
In the negotiations between the government and the carrier, such matters are developed as the charter market (i.e., prices being paid commercially, as well as shipping availability); terms and conditions required by the government; charter period; and ship delivery and redelivery points. Cost data is frequently used in evaluating how reasonable the rates proposed are, for various charter procurements.
The principal difference between each type of charter procurement is in the rate structure. For tankers, the common denominator is the cost per cargo long ton; for breakbulk, the cost per measurement ton; for bulk carriage, the cost per cargo long ton; and for container- ships, the cost per container. While Department of Defense needs for charter of commercial vessels are matters of continuing concern, in essence, chartering procedures have not changed significantly over the past few years. Charter procurement has not been the subject of such widespread controversy as berth line (common carriage) operations.
Following the institution of the berth line procurement system, certain dramatic and quite drastic events started to occur. There was a major change in the industry environment, a most significant generation of financial impact on the industry, and pressure on the carriers to bid noncompensatory rates for military cargo. All three events were interrelated and interacted.
The industry environment. The most significant change in the industry’s situation was the development and increasing use of the containership (as opposed to the traditional breakbulk cargo hold vessel). In concept, the container is a box which is packed at point of origin, placed on truck chassis or flatcar, and delivered directly to the ship with the process reversed at completion of the ocean voyage. Obviously, cargo handling is reduced and ship use increased with faster turnaround times. A large container ship can be off-and-on-loaded in one or two days, while a comparable break-bulk ship could be tied up at least a week. Many of the advantages—time and cost-wise—also apply to the lighter- aboard-ships (LASH). These rely on waterborne transportation of barges, which may often be loaded and unloaded at ultimate points of origin and destination. There are, of course, still many kinds of cargo which can best be carried via breakbulk. The container and barge, however, are now the major ongoing means of ocean transportation and the breakbulk fleet is fading because of the infeasibility of building new conventional breakbulk ships and the demise of the Victory Ship generation.
With the efficiency of the unitized concept becoming universally apparent, the decision to convert to container-type operations became practically a matter of corporate survival for the carriers. The rush to containerization resulted in an overtonnaging situation, and pressures to engage in a destructive rate-war for cargo became operative.
Financial impact of the new type ship operations. With shipping companies being forced, for competitive reasons, to invest in new unitized ships, whether or not a company had recently purchased breakbulk vessels (as had happened), the financial impact on the industry was severe. Vessel construction costs increased, and in the more competitive trade areas, expensive port facilities and inland distribution systems were required. The necessity to realize a return on such investment prompted the carriers to engage in fiercer carriage competition and rate warfare.
The DOD competitive procurement system. The third major ongoing event was the carriers’ tactics in seeking cargo pursuant to the competitive procurement system.
Generally, the carriers secured cargo (e.g., break bulk) at rates which were compensatory, but a significant amount of cargo was carried at rates which apparently were not. This latter situation was alleged to have occurred where there was a substantial introduction of the new containership technology and the consequent overtonnaging. Carriers needed to use the new unitized ship as much as possible.
Rather than have a vessel sail with unused space (e.g., with the expectation of using the space commercially on the return leg), obtaining military cargo just at a rate that met incremental costs (directly derived from handling the cargo) was apparently seen as better than nothing. The competitive bid system, moreover, allowed for a successful lowest bidder to capture most of the cargo. This situation, it was admitted, could lead to serious industry problems.
The viability of short run strategy based on incremental bidding has been recognized, but it has also been acknowledged that consistent incremental bidding could lead to ultimate financial destruction. Thus, it may be said that any berth line procurement system which allows for consistent incremental pricing, may be detrimental to the financial health of the industry. Likewise, military rates, which represent nothing more than incremental pricing, could possibly lead to an adverse impact on the U.S.-flag fleet inventory. The interrelationships between the procurement system, financial health of the industry, and the fleet inventory are critical to the preservation of a viable merchant marine in support of DoD peacetime and contingency requirements; thus, the ongoing need to evaluate the effect of procurement—and this need has been well recognized.
The Response program was instituted in 1968, with cooperation between DoD, the Maritime Administration, (MarAd), and the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) in an attempt to evaluate the cost of service and vessel features into a series of weighing factors for awarding MSC cargo. During this time, however, military carriage rates markedly declined, and allegations were made that procurement was depressing such rates to unreasonably low levels.
Early in 1971, two different studies—Sealift Procurement Analysis and Review (SPAR) Study and Sealift Procurement and National Security (SPANS) Study—were undertaken. The SPAR study, initially conducted by the Maritime Administration and later joined by the Maritime Commission, was to determine the financial situation of the industry as related to military carriage. The SPANS study sought to identify the best procurement system which would best preserve sealift capability at the best price. This was conducted by DoD in cooperation with the two government agencies and representatives of the steamship industry. Recognizing the adverse aspects of the competitive bid system, the study focused on various alternatives, and concluded with the need for changes in the present procurement system. The end-result however, was the continuation of the original 1966 basic competitive bid system, but modified with certain changes to reduce the raw competitive aspects, and promote reasonable (not cut-throat) rates.
These changes, currently in effect, included a semiallocation system (Max-Min system). The design of the changes were twofold. First, the Min (minimum carriage) provisions were designed to ensure that the carriers bid bona fide rates, based on the anticipation of providing substantial service (thus curtailing submission of "paper rates” and the practice of skimming). Second, the Max (maximum carriage) provisions were designed to spread DoD cargo, thus limiting a carrier’s incentive to bid on an "all or nothing” basis, as had originally occurred in the earlier implementation of the system.
There was some compromise, but it was recognized that changes were necessary in the competitive system procurement system, to ensure a viable, supportive commercial fleet serving DoD at an appropriate cost. The conclusions agreed that, as a result, the commercial and government-controlled fleets should be appropriately strengthened.
It was recognized that the current model of the basic competitive procurement system incorporated some safeguards (e.g., the Max-Min controls) and that the results of a continued use of the model should be studied.
Advocates of the present system were hopeful that the current safeguards would prove to be effective in curtailing any tendency to destructive rates. Advocates of a cost-based system (which would incorporate a rate floor) were not sanguine about the feasibility of preventing destructive rates through current modifications in a basically competitive bid system.
It was recommended, however, that the current system be studied; that the FMC define and publish, for guidance of all concerned, a minimum rate standard (floor) in specific accounting terms, for use in determining the level below which the FMC would declare rates invalid; that the FMC and the MarAd develop a standardized industry cost accounting system; and that a carrier cost reporting system be established to facilitate resolution of the procurement problem.
Consonant with the SPANS recommendations, the Industry Advisory Committee on Maritime Policy, an advisory group to the Secretary of Defense, continues to observe and consult with DoD regarding the procurement situation.
The Federal Maritime Commission has set forth a regulation concerning the level of military rates, not only in response to the SPANS recommendation, but also in the furtherance of its particular statutory responsibilities.
Considerable time and effort was consumed by the FMC in arriving at what it believes is a fair and reasonable minimum rate criterion. Having evaluated every' possible alternative minimum rate criterion in the light of the Shipping Act, it was the opinion of the Maritime Commission that any rate awarded by MSC for the carriage of Department of Defense cargoes must, at a minimum, recover "fully distributed costs” (i.e., all direct and indirect costs, plus depreciation and interest). Requiring that rates quoted for the carriage of military cargoes recoup all of a carrier’s cost applicable to the transportation of such cargoes is not only consistent with the mandates of the shipping law (1916 Act), but it will also help the objectives of the SPANS study.
Unless rates for the carriage of military cargo are pegged at a level that will ensure the carrier’s recovery of all of its cost of moving that cargo, one of two equally undesirable situations could occur—either the revenues generated will be insufficient to continue adequate service in that trade, or the burden of providing the additional revenues required by the carrier for transporting that cargo will fall on the shippers of commercial cargo, thereby exerting an upward pressure on commercial rates. Both these contingencies, the Commission believes would result in a detrimental situation.
The Federal Maritime Commission, in publishing its regulation, rejected, as a standard, any minimum rate criteria which would include an element for return on equity capital, i.e., profit, because such a standard would place the U. S. government in the position of guaranteeing a return to investors and would thereby, most probably, encourage carriers to place too great a reliance on military cargo, vis-a-vis, commercial cargo for their revenues.
Since the standard promulgated merely established a minimum or a so-called floor, any carrier is free to include an element of profit in the rate it quotes to the military. The ceiling which is then placed on such rates, aside from any jurisdiction the FMC might have, is governed, assuming there exist comparable commercial rates, by the 1904 Cargo Preference Act.
It must be remembered that the cost rate review procedures established by the Commission are intended to be used on an interim basis. A long-term implementation program has been initiated in response to the SPANS study recommendation that Maritime Administration and the Federal Maritime Commission develop a standardized industry cost accounting system to be used by the FMC in its review of military rates. The objective of this joint effort is to prescribe not only a uniform industry cost accounting, but a uniform cost information reporting system as well. Several steps have already been taken toward the implementation of this program, but full implementation is expected to take at least 18 months.
What we have been continually faced with has reflected conflict, controversy, and often a deteriorating situation as regards military rates. The need for continued remedial action remains with us. The short-term program, now in effect, is an honest and valid attempt to provide protection from deteriorating influences. Our common goal is to preserve and promote our merchant fleet in its defense support role, but at a stair and reasonable cost to government. We shall achieve that goal with the cooperation of all who recognize the need for attention to this important matter.
Freedom of the High Seas: An Impossibility?
By Lieutenant Mark W. Janis, U.S. Naval Reserve, Instructor in International Law, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School
The Dutch jurist, Hugo Grotius, first elaborated on the freedom of the seas idea back in the 17th century. The rationale was that the ocean did not belong to one nation, and that it differed from the land because one nation’s use of the sea did not interfere with use by another. The philosophy was that the high seas were so vast, that even their use for transport, communication, and fishing by all nations, would never exhaust the resources. Since World War II, however, this is exactly what has happened.
When any resource is scarce, it must be allocated—and allocation means government control. But whose government or what government shall do the regulating?
The trumpet, signaling the new era for the high seas, was first blown by the United States on 28 September 1945, when President Harry S. Truman declared that America claimed jurisdiction over all the resources lying in or on its continental shelf. The Truman Proclamation’s notes echoed by other countries and, finally solemnized by the convention on the continental shelf, signed in Geneva in 1958, by the nations attending the United Nation’s first Law of the Sea Conference. What these nations said, in effect, was that the oil and gas lying beneath the continental shelf is a valuable, limited resource, and that they would decide for themselves who and for what price shall be charged for their exploitation.
The Continental Shelf Convention does not set a limit to the ocean bottom which a coastal state might claim. Instead, its outer limit is defined as merely "that limit, to where the depth of the superadjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said area.” That is, the nations may extend their shelf as far as the current technology permits them to exploit the sea bottom’s resources. In 1958, it was thought that 200 meters was an outer limit for exploitation, but this figure is already far too conservative. Coastal nations may not claim a "continental shelf” which runs to the middle of an ocean.
The Truman Proclamation and the Continental Shelf Convention excluded any claim to jurisdiction to the waters above the continental shelf. In this fashion, it was hoped that the traditional freedom of the high seas might be preserved. But other states with narrow or poorly endowed shelves were not content with excluding superadjacent waters if such were economically valuable. After all, such nations argue, since the United States took that part of international waters and ocean bottom that was valuable, so should we.
As early as 1947, Latin American states with only a thin continental shelf off the continent’s West Coast claimed a 200-mile jurisdiction over the ajacent oceans. This encompassed not only any oil and gas resources, but fish, and the result has been a continuing quarrel between the coastal states and the fishing states about who owns what fish, because there are only so many fish, someone has to decide who gets to catch them. The coastal states claim that they have the right to regulate fishing off their coasts, while the fishing states claim rights based on tradition and law to continue to fish in waters far from home and nearer the coasts of other nations.
The debate over ownership of the fish and other ocean resources will be settled peacefully, or it will be determined by force and conflict. This latter alternative is visible today in the Cod War off Iceland, where British fishermen, backed by the British Navy, resist the unilateral Icelandic claim to 50-mile territorial fishing waters—and the economic stakes are high. Iceland counts on fish and fish products for 85% of its foreign exchange, while Britain depends on the disputed waters for fully 25% of its catch. Thus, in the North Atlantic, two friendly countries, both members of NATO, both with long histories of democratic rule and civilized international behavior, have come to blows over the ocean’s resources.
There are three peaceful alternatives to a division of ocean resources. The seas can be ruled by the nations individually, by regional arrangements, or by an international arrangement. Rule by individual nations would mean that the present trend of unilateral declarations, beginning with the Truman Proclamation, would continue until all the ocean spaces have been claimed. This alternative has been called the "national lake” approach, because the oceans would be divided into more than 100 national bodies of waters.
The national lake alternative is probably the worst choice. It would mean fragmenting the ocean into so many regimes that using it for fishing, drilling, cruising, transport, and research would become hopelessly complex. Another disadvantage of the national lake alternative is that it penalizes those nations that have little or no coastlines. Only a few of the world’s nations would get a lion’s share of the oceans’ treasures. Further, the national lake approach would likely lead to numerous disputes over the proper division of ocean space. In a dispute about who owned what continental shelf in the North Sea, Germany, the Netherlands, and Denmark submitted their quarrel to the International Court of Justice at the Hague and all sides abided by the World Court’s opinion. But how many other states would be willing to abide by the World Court’s dictates?
An alternative to the national lake approach is the international solution, wherein all the resources of the high seas would be held by an international body, representing all the world’s states, and spreading the profits of ocean exploitation among those nations which are most in need of additional income. As attractive as this may seem, it is probably impractical. A functioning international organization running 70% of the earth’s surface is an ambitious goal. Dissent among the world’s population is too great to permit such an organization to work effectively. It is unlikely that coastal states would yield any of their claims to such a group, since the benefits they would receive from such a large body would be far less than the values which they would forfeit.
The U.N. will convene the Law of the Sea Conference in June, and many hope that the Conference will construct an international ocean regime. Debates, however, about the oceans and ocean management have not thus far yielded a workable consensus within the United Nations. It is doubtful whether another conference or organization will be more successful.
The most hopeful solution to the problem of ocean resources is one midway between the national lake approach and the international solution. Regional organizations might be able to administer the oceans less confusingly and more meaningfully than nations and be able to muster a regional consensus when an international agreement is not forthcoming. The European Economic Community has, for example, begun to regulate fishing and the exploitation of undersea hydrocarbons, creating a European law of the sea. The Latin American countries have also adopted several similar standpoints. If the international approach fails, these regional groups will begin to exert control for regional ocean spaces.
Faced with some sort of governmental ocean control, either national, international, or regional, what is the future for freedom of the high seas? Seemingly, the first freedom which is likely to disappear is the right to exploit ocean resources. Within a decade, some government is probably going to claim the right to decide who shall exploit any ocean resource of any value. A second freedom which will disappear is the right to do anything to the high seas which pollutes the oceans or the ocean coasts. No longer can it be said that even simple ocean transit impairs no one else’s use of the seas. Those affected by ocean pollution will use the new ocean regimes—national, international, or regional—to control ships and any operation which pollutes the seas. From the erosion of these two freedoms, will perhaps come the erosion of others. Once it becomes established that a government or agency can control economic exploitation and pollution for a given body of ocean space, it is inevitable that there will be pressure to extend the authority of that government or agency over all ocean activities. Thus, freedom of transit, either to navigate on or fly over the high seas, will come into question, and will be subjected to increasing demands for regulation.
It is impossible that the freedom of the high seas be maintained in the form which it held during the past two centuries. The scarcity of ocean resources alone assures that some sort of regulation will ensue in ocean spaces. Quite apart from the question of whether the high seas will be carved into national lakes or put under some sort of international or regional regime, which will then allocate ocean resources and regulate ocean pollution is the question of whether the control over the high seas for economic reasons will then be extended to regulate the freedom of transit, so important for trade and defense. The answer to the second question depends, of course, upon the answer to the first. International and regional regimes are more likely to permit freedom of transit, while national regimes are the most likely to deny it. Thus, if the freedom of transit is to survive the battle for ocean resources, it seems imperative that some sort of international approach to ocean use be adopted.
Training and Education Subspecialty: A Reality
By Commander Claude C. Vernam, U. S. Navy, Formerly on the Staff, Chief of Naval Training
With the recent issuance of a new instruction by the Chief of Naval Operations, a subspecialty code for training/education management (9630) became a reality. With full recognition of the vital importance of the classroom instructor, the approved subspecialty emphasizes the need for effective, efficient managers to fill an equally vital function.
This subspecialty has broad application throughout the Naval Training Command and in those other areas of the Navy that are involved in training. Until now, the Navy has had no specific provisions to educate and prepare officers to fill training and education management billets, and as a result, they are often filled by officers who may have only general preparation for such assignments.
The Naval Training Command has approximately 6,200 officer billets, of which more than 1,350 are for lieutenant commanders and above who are directly involved in the management of training and education activities. The level of management performed justifies the designation of many of these as subspecialty billets. These officers are charged with the management of the training and education of officer and enlisted personnel, to prepare them to operate in the more sophisticated, demanding Navy of the future. In view of the increasing cost of this education and training, officers with subspecialties in training and education management are required to provide the necessary expertise in this critical area.
Five levels have been identified by the subspecialty system. These are: D (doctoral level), P (master’s level), E (baccalaureate level), S (significant level of experience), and T (trainee billets to provide significant experience). With the exception of the T, these level codes can be used to identify either billets or officers. For training/education management, only the P, S, and T codes are presently being used.
On the P-code level, these subspecialists primarily will be unrestricted line officers who have solid operational backgrounds and a master’s degree in management, with emphasis in the field of training and education. Officers who possess master’s degrees in education, and who also have training or education management experience in a Navy environment, may qualify for the 9630 P-code. Provisions will also be made to identify with the S-code those officers who have significant experience in training and education management.
Officers in this subspecialty will not be "professors in uniform,” but will primarily be officers who have fully developed warfare specialties and who will rotate from sea to shore in keeping with the normal rotation pattern for officers with their designators. Table 1 is an approximation of the 11XX and 13XX career rotation patterns now in use, with added notations as to how the subspecialist might be used on shore tours. The subspecialist, however, should not be eliminated from other desirable shore assignments.
Initial inputs into the subspecialty P-code will come from officers who possess master’s degrees, and whose performance and experience indicate that they will be assets to the community- The subspecialty will be supported permanently by a Navy-sponsored postgraduate curriculum, in which the prospective training/education manager will receive instruction in management, with emphasis on areas which relate specifically to training. It is anticipated that when the curriculum is developed, it will provide the basic tools of management and courses which cover such areas as testing and test construction, curriculum development, training methods, media selection, learning theory, and motivation.
____________________________________________________________
Table 1: Proposed Career Rotation Patterns for Training/Education Management Subspecialists
11XX |
13XX |
|
SEA (ENS, LTJG) |
TRACOM/RAG |
|
|
1ST SQUAD |
|
1ST SHORE |
||
SEA (LT) |
1ST SHORE |
|
2ND SHORE |
SHIP/STAFF OR 2ND SQUAD |
|
|
2ND SHORE |
|
SEA (LCDR) / |
|
|
2ND SQUAD OR SHIP/STAFF |
||
|
||
3RD SHORE |
3RD SHORE |
|
SEA (CDR) |
SQUADRON COMMAND |
Notations:
1st Shore—Attain basic instructor skills. Do graduate work where available.
LT
2nd Shore: Graduate work, attain master's degree, assignment to billet involving training/education management (P-coded billet).
LCDR
3rd Shore: Command of training activity. Executive officer/school or department head. Training staff.
4th Shore and Subsequent: More than 350 training/education management billets in the grade of commander/captain.
________________________________________________________________
Postgraduate education is the keystone of this and any other subspecialty. Without it, no real subspecialty can exist. Graduate education provides officers with the inclination and the tools to be innovative and dynamic in the execution of their duties. Studies have ! shown that the retention of officers who are participants in Navy-sponsored graduate education programs is superior to that of officers not provided such education. In addition, promotion rates are also higher for graduate-educated officers. Historically, however, officers assigned to training billets have experienced a less than normal promotion opportunity. This has been interpreted to mean that assignment into the training community would result in a reduced promotion opportunity.
The personal rewards for being in training have always been great, but not always perceived as being professionally rewarding. This is a false conclusion, and the situation that creates this impression must be corrected if the training command is to attract quality officers. A visible, viable career must be offered to motivated junior officers who desire assignment into the training community, but who are reluctant to seek such assignments because of a supposed promotion risk and the lack of a defined career path. A subspecialty, with its attendant graduate education program, provides the necessary elements to attract and retain the kinds of officers the training community needs.
Too many Navy men—officers and colisted—see their assignments to training command billets as an indication that they have been relegated to a second-class status. What is most distressing is to hear senior officers express these feelings openly, particularly to junior officers. With the creation of a subspecialty will come a group of officers desiring assignment to training billets and who will approach their duties with a professional attitude.
This professionalism won’t just happen, but will be caused by officers who have the tools to do a job and are willing to apply themselves to their duties. Hopefully, this professionalism will have a positive effect on both staff and students in our training and education activities.
The development of a concept, the assignment of a subspecialty code, the creation of a postgraduate curriculum, the identification of varying levels of subspecialist billets, and the selection of officers to be subspecialists, are all functional steps that must be taken. They do not, however, create a true subspecialty. Since the inception of the subspecialty system, several have come and gone, and more are continually being proposed. So, the training community must prove that they can support a subspecialty. This will, of course, be determined by the cooperation of the Training Command to use these subspecialists, and the willingness of officers to become identified as members of the training community.
Assuming that the need for a training and education subspecialist is firmly established, where and how may the subspecialty develop. While the approved subspecialty is management oriented, it follows that the other aspects of training and education will be addressed eventually by subcategories of a general training and education subspecialty. A logical branch would be for academically- talented officers to serve as staff members for the Naval War College, the Naval Postgraduate School, the Naval Academy, NROTC units, and other classroom or academic research billets. There have been many proposals intended to resolve the problem of the academic qualifications of classroom instructors. To fill these needs, a teaching subcategory of the training and education subspecialty might evolve. These officers should not be "professors in uniform" who are removed from the sea/shore rotation patterns to devote their entire careers to academic pursuits. It is felt, however, that for the academically talented officer, sea duty would be voluntary after the first tour.
Another area that could support a subcategory of a broader subspecialty would be the general field of enlisted training. While many aspects of this critical area are management related, the special problems presented by recruit training and follow-on initial entry training provide fruitful areas for development and progress.
The Navy needs officers to work professionally in training and education. With the consolidation of the Navy’straining efforts under the Chief of Naval Training, astute management decisions are required at all levels of the command. If the Navy is to achieve its goal of increasing the efficiency of the training system, then the traditional approach of selecting officers for training/ education management billets must be reexamined. It must also be recognized that if significant improvements in training are to be realized, then officers that will make these improvements must be trained in the concepts and techniques of training/education management. It is anticipated that by upgrading the quality of management, there will be a resulting improvement in all phases of the Navy’s training system.
The Naval Training Command, A Report by the Naval Training Command Board, which is the basis for the establishment of a single Naval Training | Command, stated:
The future of our Navy depends upon the availibility of sufficient and properly trained manpower. The high cost of training in support of increasingly sophisticated new weapons systems and the increased reliance on shore-based training make it imperative that a higher priority be assigned to the manning of officer billets in the training establishment, with a concurrent increase in the quality of the officers manning the organization. As used herein, the term quality applies in equal measure to breadth of experience, past performance, and career potential.
The establishment and implementation of a training/education management subspecialty certainly is a significant step in the right direction.
A Look at the Nikolaev
By Edward C. Fisher, Jr., Editor Warship International
When Captain 1st Range Ju Stadncenko, took the Nikolaev into the Turkish Straits on 1 March 1973, on his way into the Mediterranean, the West had its first real look at the latest addition to the Voenno Morskiy Flot. Indeed, she was quite an addition, packed with a vast array of missiles, guns, torpedoes, and electronics. As now seems to be the fashion in Russian naval thinking, the Nikolaev is equipped to fit into a strike fleet concept, equipped for a short, sharp overwhelming encounter. The missions of Kara-class cruisers (Kara is the NATO code name for this type) appear to be: attacking enemy surface targets at sea; protecting the Soviet fleet units that have antiship, antiair, and antisubmarine capabilities; showing the flag; and performing command ship duties.
Looking first at the Nikolaev's attacking power, on both sides of the bridge, one can discern quadruple container- launchers for the SS-N-9 surface-to- surface missiles. These containers are not big enough for the larger Shaddock SS-N-3S, and there does not appear to be any specialized electronic equipment on board for controlling them. They may be short-range, ship-to-ship missiles of a type similar to the Exocet and Otomat, now so popular in the West. If this is true, the American aircraft carriers with their protective air screens might still be safe from this ship. There is a good possibility, however, that these containers carry a missile of much greater range, as this represents the principal offensive weapon system embarked.
Defensive protection is provided against aircraft by two missile systems. First, there is the two "pop-up” short- range SA-N-4 antiaircraft launchers, situated in bins on either side of the massive pyramidal tower amidships. The SA-N-3 Goblet surface-to-air launchers are located forward and aft. The Goblet was derived from the earlier SA-N-i Goa, and is found on other major Soviet units such as the Kresta IIs and the helicopter carrier Moskva.
Besides this missilery, the Nikolaev carries a selection of conventional gun mounts. Two twin 76-mm. are located amidships, and because of their location, they are apparently for use against surface targets rather than aircraft. This type, however, has an 80° elevation and a range of about 16,000 meters. They are found on most modern Soviet warships such as the Kynda, Krivak, Kashin, Petya, and Mirka classes. In addition, there are four small 30-mm. twin mounts, located outboard of the funnel, two on each side. They are entirely automatic and are widely used on small units of the Red Navy.
For submarine defense and hunting, two quintuple banks of antisubmarine torpedo tubes of an unknown size are provided astern. They would appear to have a very good arc of train. Fore and aft are situated MBU-2500 and MBU-4500 antisubmarine rocket launchers. The forward launchers are a 12-barrel, 250-mm. type, and the aft a six-barrel, 300-mm. The operation of the forward rocket launchers might prove to be somewhat difficult in heavy seas. The Kara type comes prepared with a small helo pad aft and apparently a Kamov Ka. 25 Hormone helicopter for ASW operations.
Looking at the brains of this equipment, there is a staggering amount of electronic gear embarked in this design. But nothing visible from the outside is new to the West; since all the varied types of electronics have been seen before on other Soviet warships. Atop the massive pyramidal mast rests the Top Sail 3-dimensional air warning and search radar. For long-range and surface surveillance, the Top Sail is integrated with a Big Net (ex-Head Net) radar, which is located on the lattice work structure aft of the SS-N-9 bins.
This system consists of two back-to-back Head Net A scanners. For control of the Goblet antiaircraft missiles, there are two Head Light systems, one above the bridge and another aft of the funnel. Each Head Light group consists of four radars used in the aiming and in-flight control of the Goblet. The SA-N-4S are controlled by yet another system, to which no NATO code name has been assigned. These are small units, one starboard and one port. For control of the 76-mm. gunnery system, there is an Owl Screech radar, located on the wings of the bridge. Navigational radar is provided in the form of Sheet Screen, with its scanner to the rear and somewhat lower on the pyramidal mast. For submarine detection, there is variable depth sonar housed beneath the helo pad aft. The Nikolaev probably carries bow mounted sonar as well, but this is not a certainty. For electronic countermeasures, Side Globe electronic countermeasure (ECM) gear is mounted atop the mast, four Globes on port and a like number on starboard.
The Nikolaev at 10,750 full-load tons appears to be the largest Soviet warship propelled by an entirely gas turbine plant. This probably consists of four turbines and two shafts producing 140,000-150,000 horsepower and yielding a top speed of about 35 knots.
The interior of the Nikolaev must be cramped with all the room necessary for missile stowage, handling, loading gear, pre-tuning and launching facilities required, not to mention the extensive launcher control and monitoring areas. Therefore, this leaves little room for crews quarters and spaces, which leads one to assume habability must be at a very minimal level. This is generally true of all Russian warships, however, which do not measure up to western standards of crew comforts. In view of the port holes observed in the hull, many spaces may not be air conditioned.
How did this type ship come about? The Nikolaev could be called the third-generation Soviet missile cruiser. We can trace her lines directly back to the Kresta I and II. In fact, the Krestas appear to have been direct successors to the earlier Kashins and Kyndas. Each in turn grew more sophisticated, and the following capsule description of armaments carried show this: Kresta I (6,500 tons full load): two twin SS-N-3 SSM, two twin SA-N-i SAMs, two 12-barrel ASW rockets, two 6-barrel ASW rockets, four 57-mm. (twin) guns, eight 30-mm. (4 twin) antiaircraft guns and helicopters. Kresta II: (7,500 tons full load) two quad SS-N-10 SSM, two twin SA-N-3 SAMs, and all the same armament as the Kresta I, except they do not have 30-mm. mounts. The Kresta II type carried a greater complex of radar, such as Top Sail 3-D, Nead Net C.3-D for search, and the Peel Group (2) for fire control of SAMs, and Drum Tilt for the 57-mm. gun system.
Nowhere in the West are there any warships built or under construction which carry such an array of weapon systems. In the United States, there is the 10,150 ton California class under construction, which will carry only two single Tartar SAMs, two 5-inch guns, ASW torpedoes, and one eight-tube antisubmarine (ASROC). The Spruance-class DX guided-missile destroyers, at 6,900 tons, will carry one Basic Point Defense Missile (BPDM) system for the Sea Sparrow, two 5-inch guns, ASW torpedoes, and one 8-tube ASROC. Neither the nuclear-powered DLGNs or the conventionally powered DX destroyers would be a match for the Nikolaev. In England, the only large warship under construction is the 6,750 ton Bristol, which carries one twin Sea Dart, one Ikara ASW, plus one three-barrel Limbo ASW systems, one 4.5-inch gun, and one helicopter. She has been described as an escort cruiser and guided missile destroyer, and her Sea Sparrow system does have some antiship capability.
Is the Nikolaev overgunned? Have the Russian’s reached a point in complexity where size and costs become intolerable or where too many eggs are in one basket? One thing is certain: the ingenuity of Russian designers in getting so much offensive and defensive firepower into this hull, as compared to what the West is doing, certainly commands our admiration.
The emergence of the Nikolaev would seem to exemplify the Red navy’s desire to tell the world: "We have the biggest, the strongest, the most warships, and we will rule the waves.” In the Nikolaev, the Russian’s have another superb vehicle with which they can show their flag as they continue their quest for preeminence on the oceans of the world.
A Ship Aground: The Do’s and Don’ts
By Commander William I. Milwee, Jr., U. S. Navy, Force Salvage Officer, Service Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet
"I’ve spent 40 years learning how not to run aground; no one ever told me what to do if I did.” This complaint from the master of a stranded merchant ship represents a condition common among seaman of the world. While mariners dread grounding, and exercise prudence to avoid going ashore, ships do ground. Immediate action taken by the ship’s company before the arrival of salvors can have the same effect as first aid at the scene of an accident. If properly carried out, the effects can be mitigated; if not, a serious situation can turn into a disaster. Unfortunately, in the confusion of a grounding situation, the action which is instinctive is normally the worst possible thing to do. The possibility of grounding and the proper action to be taken in the event it does happen, bears as much consideration by commanding officers as other hazards of operating at sea.
Perhaps the most common error made by the commanding officer of a stranded ship is to attempt extraction by lightening ship and backing full on the high tide. This is seldom successful. Ships screws, by themselves, are useless in getting vessels off the beach, in all cases, except those in which the vessel is very lightly grounded and the weather is dead calm. If the initial attempt to back off the strand is not successful, this approach should be abandoned immediately. In fact, whether it should be employed at all is a matter that warrants serious thought by the commanding officer. The most prudent course is gem erally to place the ship in a more secure position and await the arrival of a salvor properly equipped to deal with the situation.
Lightening of a newly stranded vessel is one of the worst and, unfortunately, one of the most common actions that can be taken. Weight removal undertaken in the early hours of a stranding has, in many cases, resulted where salvagable ships have turned into constructive total losses, and many more where the salvage operation has been more difficult and more expensive.
It is easy to understand why ships are lightened on grounding. When a ship strands, there is confusion and an urge for action. The easiest thing to do is not to make a careful survey to determine how much buoyancy has been lost, or whether the ship is aground over the entire length or only on one end. In fact, it is much easier, and a more fervent display of action to begin to get rid of cargo or stores and to discharge fuel and water over the side, usually keeping little record of how much weight is removed and giving little consideration to the effect of its removal on trim, list, stability, or to the tidal conditions at the time. The removal of weights can be of great benefit in refloating a vessel, but the removal should never be attempted until the grounded condition is fully understood, and the effect of the removal on the ship in all conditions she may encounter upon her strand are defined.
To fully understand why lightening a vessel is usually poor practice, consider what may happen when a ship goes aground. There are three prevalant dangers for a grounded ship—pounding on the bottom, being driven further ashore, or broaching.
If a vessel grounds on one end, the changing buoyancy which occurs as succeeding troughs and crests of swells pass the vessel may cause the ship to pound upon the bottom. Regardless of whether the bottom is sand, mud, rock, coral, or a combination, the introduction of inordinate stresses by pounding will result in hull damage, ranging from the opening of seams to serious holing and bilging. Indiscriminate or ill-considered height removal can result in changes in buoyancy, which can increase pounding with a concomitant increase in damage incurred.
A grounded vessel is acted upon by a number of forces not encountered by the same vessel operating in the open sea. While the effect of wind and sea can be compensated for by a ship navigating in deep water; the effect on a vessel aground is always to drive her further ashore. The effect is countered only by the friction between the wreck and the bottom. Both ships that are lively and those that are hard aground may be driven further ashore by the action of wind, surf, and tide. Lightening a ship only reduces the buoyancy required to float the ship. The reduced buoyancy acting in concert with the natural forces invariably result in the ship being driven further ashore, becoming harder aground, and a more difficult salvage case than she was in her initial condition.
A position that is particularly dangerous and likely to result in a worsened condition is that of a ship grounded by the bow in surf. As the force exerted by the surf moving toward the shore is seldom exactly down the center line of the ship, a moment is created equal to the product of the shoreward component of the force of the surf and the distance between the stern and the center of pressure located in the grounded portion. The effect of the moment is to pivot the hull about the center of pressure, so that she goes broad to the sea. As this happens, additional area is exposed to the force of the sea so the wreck is driven harder. Lightening can cause movement of the center of pressure which amplifies the dangers. A peculiar danger can occur when a ship is fully broached, in that normal beach current patterns in way of the bow, and the stern will be modified. The result is always higher current velocities which, on sand and gravel beaches, produce a scouring effect, resulting in erosion of the support at bow and stern, leaving the ship supported only amidships. When support becomes sufficiently localized, the ship, in an unnatural hogging condition, will break in half. Broaching can occur rapidly; preventing it requires prompt and proper action by the ship’s company.
Pounding, being driven further ashore, and broaching are the three major dangers faced by ships in the early hours of stranding. The dangers of each can be substantially increased by improper action. The obvious question is what can the victim of a grievous accident do to mitigate the effects until the doctor—in this case, the salvor—arrives and applies his professional skill. Each salvage case is different, so that the Most important consideration is to quickly assess the conditions of the grounding and take intelligent action. In general, the following form the basis for action in most strandings: unless the weather is dead calm and no possibility exists that the ship can be driven further ashore, broach or pound, no attempt should be made to back off; all effort should be devoted to making the ship secure.
Under no conditions should the ship be lightened. Lightening ship will only, in the rarest of cases, do other than aggravate the situation. By far, the sounder practice is to weigh the ship down by filling all tanks from the sea. In the event the added weight is insufficient to hold the vessel solidly, holds, double bottoms, or compartments low in the ship should be flooded. It is an easy matter for a salvor to pump out an unflooded hold or compartment. If no means are available for flooding the ship, a hole opened in the side of the ship will do the job. Patching of underwater hull holes is routine for salvage crews. While this action may seem drastic, consider the possible consequence of not taking it—a ship broached and broken on the beach.
One of the best actions which can be taken is to quickly lay an anchor to seaward. This should always be done if it is possible. The anchor will hold the ship against the seas, driving her shoreward, and will counter the moment which tends to broach the ship.
Another factor that often comes into play in the early hours of strandings is the use of tugs. The natural tendency is to "pass a line to a tug and let him pull us off.” Tugs have an important place in salvage operations, but it is not in pulling heavily grounded ships off the beach. If a ship is only lightly aground, or if the rise of tide is expected to be enough to restore the lost buoyancy, the use of tugs is justified. Tugs are also useful in holding the ship in her grounded position or in holding her stern into the sea. The reason tugs are ineffective, is the relatively small towline pull they develop. Tests made with tugs pulling against dynamometers have shown that the maximum towline pull developed, is only one ton per hundred horsepower. This means that our newest and largest salvage tugs (ATS), the Edenton class, can develop a maximum of only 60 tons. A well laid and grounded set of beach gear (a system of anchors and hauling gear) can develop up to 50 tons pull. The Edenton class carries eight sets of beach gear. A rough idea of the pull required can be obtained from comparing normal load waterlines with possible post grounding waterlines and entering the curves of tons per inch immersion (TPI) to obtain the tons aground. The pull required varies, depending upon the coefficient of friction of the bottom, from 30% of lost buoyancy for a smooth sand beach to a maximum 150% of lost buoyancy for rock. It can quickly be seen that the towline pull entered by most tugs is of little use in freeing the ship from her strand. Pulling with tugs, like backing, is usually futile and should be avoided.
In the event a high-powered ship, particularly a warship, is available at the scene, there is a strong temptation to attempt an initial pull using the high-powered ship. This resulted in the loss of the cruiser Milwaukee during the salvage of the submarine H-3 in 1916. High-powered warships are ill-suited for use as salvage ships; they lack proper points of attachments for wire, usually lack wire of the proper size and length, and may quickly find themselves in irons attempting to pull while dead in the water or moving ahead very slowly. Another consideration is that the warship attempting salvage may be of much greater value than the stranded vessel, and so the warship should not be hazarded needlessly.
It has not been the intent of this Professional Note to encourage poor seamanship or careless navigation, but to point out that even the most prudent seaman may find himself ashore. Rather than ignore the possibility, the wise seaman will discipline himself to be mentally prepared to deal with grounding in an intelligent manner, much as he does for a fire or collision. It is intended to point out a few dangers and often repeated mistakes, so that a proper course of action to prevent worsening conditions will be taken before the salvor who, like the doctor, is a skilled professional, trained and equipped to deal with emergencies when they arise.