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At the end of the Napoleonic Wars, one of the most b. difficult periods in the history of the Russian Navy began, due to the economic and political backwardness of Russia, as well as underestimation by the Tsarist government of the importance of the Navy to her fate. The Navy Department was headed by Admiral Chichagov, a dull figure who considered the Navy an onerous, needless luxury for the State. His successors—the French emigrant reactionary, the Marquis de Traverse, and the German, von Muller—continued to dismantle the Navy.
President Theodore Roosevelt, friend of Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan and staunch advocate of Mahan’s theories of seapower, acted as mediator between Russia’s Count Serge J. Witte and Baron Roman R. Rosen, and Japan’s Count Jutaro Komura and Baron Kogoro Takahira in negotiations that ended the Russo-Japanese War.
The Decembrist [one taking part in the unsuccessful uprising against Nicholas I in December 1825-Ed.] Shteyngel’ characterized the state of the Navy at that time as follows: ". . . the most splendid creation of Peter the Great which the Marquis de Traverse completely destroyed.”1 Actually, whereas 58 ships-of-the line, 207 other sailing vessels and 439 rowed ships were built for the Baltic Fleet during the time of Peter I, in 1825 the Fleet possessed only 5 ships-of-the-line and 10 frigates capable of putting to sea. The warships almost never left port. The seamen were used for subsidiary chores. Russian admirals were replaced with foreigners. There was widespread embezzlement of public property. The distinguished admiral, V. M. Golovnin, wrote: "If rotten, poorly-equipped ships;
1From the letters and statements of Decembrists, edited by A. K. Borozdin. St. Petersburg, 1906, p. 61.
elderly and ailing naval commanders, without knowledge and spirit at sea; inexperienced captains and officers; and farmers, in the guise of seamen, formed into ship crews, can constitute a fleet, then we have a fleet.”[1]
However, the despotic leadership of the Navy Department, while almost destroying Navy materiel, did not succeed in finally liquidating the energy of the men and their love of the sea. Only this can explain the round-the-world expeditions undertaken at the initiative of progressive naval officers, including Decembrist navymen.
Discoveries by Russian seafarers during the first half of the 19th Century, comprising an entire era in the history of geographic discoveries and making possible the charting of a large number of previously unknown islands in the Pacific, Antarctica, and islands near it, served as a basis for major advances in oceanography and publication of the most valuable scientific works and atlases. It is a well-known fact that most of the islands in the Pacific discovered by our seafarers bear the names of distinguished Russian figures: Suvorov, Kutuzov, Vermolov, Rumyantsev, Lisyanskiy, Senyavin, et al, and that not only Alaska and contiguous islands and lands of northwest America, but also part of the present state of California were first explored by Russians and belonged to Russia. The remnants of Fort Ross, built by the Russians in 1812, have been preserved to this day near San Francisco. Not everyone knows that on 21 May 1816 the king of one of the Hawaiian Islands (the island of Kauai) became a Russian citizen.[2] Moreover, he also turned the island of Oahu over to Russia. Three Russian fortresses were established on that island: Aleksandrovskaya, Yeliza- vetinskaya, and Barklaya (true, they had to be abandoned later due to counteraction by the Americans). It must also be noted that a significant portion of the northern shores of Europe and Asia, as well as the coast of northeast Asia and northwest America, were first described and charted by our mariners.
The Russians completed their first circumnavigation of the globe in 1803 to 1806 on the ships Nadezhda and Neva, under the command of I. F. Kruzenshtern and Yu. F. Lisyanskiy. This expedition made many astronomical determinations of the location of islands and surveys in the north Pacific, collected a wealth of scientific material, and discovered an island west of
the Hawaiian Islands and named it Lisyanskiy Island. In 1823 to 1827 the Atlas yuzhnogo morya (Atlas of the South Seas) was published, containing verified charts of the Pacific Ocean. The atlas received broad distribution among seafarers throughout the world.
After the Nadezhda and Neva, the second circumnavigation was made by the sloop Diana, under the command of V. M. Golovnin. The great difficulties and failures accompanying this voyage did not frighten the Russian seamen. M. P. Lazarev (subsequently a distinguished admiral and seafarer) on a long voyage aboard the warship Suvorov in 1814 discovered a group of islands in the Pacific, which was named the Suvorov Islands. In 1816-1817, the men of the warship Ryurik discovered several islands in the Paumotu Archipelago and in the Marshall Islands, charted the Diomedes Islands, and described the coast of Alaska. In 1820, Lieutenant Z. I. Ponafidin—aboard the warship Borodino—discovered two islands in the western Pacific. In 1823-1829, O. Ye. Kotsebu, aboard the sloop Pred- priyatiye, and F. P. Litke, aboard the sloop Senyavin, discovered a number of islands in the Marshall and Caroline groups. A Russian Antarctic expedition aboard the sloops Vostok and Mimyy, commanded by F. F. Bellingshausen and M. P. Lazarev, discovered l4 islands in the Pacific and called them the Rossiyan Islands. On this same voyage, the Russians were the first to reach the Antarctic Continent and to circumnavigate it, charting new islands and lands. In essence, Bellingshausen and Lazarev can be called the Columbuses of Antarctica, and world science fully recognizes their service.
In subsequent years long voyages by Russian seafarers have continued. Of particular interest are the voyages of the corvette Vityaz’ and the clipper Izumrud, in connection with the exploration of New Guinea and the Indo-Malay Archipelago by N. N. Miklukho- Maklay.
Many islands and lands discovered by Russian seafarers in the Pacific were not added to Russian possessions, although as their first discoverer she was fully entitled to this right. Today they belong to the Americans, British, French, and Japanese.
Thus a love for the sea—inherent in the Russian people—and a striving for seafaring, even in the faee of the waning sea power of Russia in the early l9rb Century, were manifested in long and round-the-world voyages. In addition to priceless geographical discoveries, they saved the Russian Navy from total collapsC and fostered the education of an entire generation seafarers, who later brought glory to the Russian Navy- Kruzenshtern, Lisyanskiy, Kotsebu, Bellingshausen- Lazarev, Golovnin, Nevel’skoy, Litke, Ponafidin and many other names are now familiar to the whole world
Navies in War and in Peace 53
and symbolize the best traditions of the Homeland Fleet in the study of the World Ocean which are being honored and augmented by our Soviet seafarers.
Russian Fleet During the Industrial Revolution and the Transition From Sailing Vessels to Steam Vessels
In the middle of the 19th Century, the Industrial Revolution produced a technological revolution in naval affairs, particularly the transition from the sailing fleet to a steamer fleet.
Great Britain and France, continuing their policy of driving Russia out of the Mediterranean, sought to take over the economy and finances of Turkey, which in turn cherished the hope of restoring hegemony over the northern shores of the Black Sea. Hostilities were imminent; Great Britain and France, allied with Turkey and Sardinia, became the main belligerents, preventing by military force egress of Russia into the Mediterranean.
The Crimean War, 1853-1856. In this war, vast sea expanses separated the adversaries, and therefore navies played a significant role. However, due to the backwardness of Russia, her Navy consisted primarily of sailing vessels, whereas the primary combat power of the British and French Navies comprised steam vessels. Specifically, at the time of the war, they possessed 89 warships (54 of which were steamers) and 300 transports (many of which were likewise steam-driven). The Black Sea Fleet included 14 sailing ships-of-the-line, and 11 sailing and 11 steam frigates. It should be emphasized that with an overall 2 to 1 superiority in ships-of- the-line and frigates, the British and French had a better than 10 to 1 advantage in steamships, and screw steamers, not just paddle wheelers.
Due to the actions of Admirals P. S. Nakhimov and V. A. Kornilov, the Black Sea Fleet was at a high level of combat readiness, which ensured its success at the beginning of the war. But subsequently, due to the technological lag, the Fleet could not compete with the Anglo-French steam-driven fleet which had entered the Black Sea. The technological backwardness of the Russian Fleet engendered a defensive tendency with respect to its use, which under the circumstances was generally justified, although it contradicted the essence of the combat activity of this, most mobile, type of force designed for active operations at sea.
Combat operations commenced with the Battle of Sinope, in which a Russian squadron (six ships-of-the- line and two frigates, armed with 720 guns, including 76 bomb-throwing guns) destroyed the Turkish Fleet. Here the high leadership qualities of Admiral P. S.
Nakhimov, the squadron commander, were very much in evidence, as well as his creative approach to the execution of a difficult and dangerous mission: attacking large enemy forces (12 sailing and steam vessels, armed with 472 guns) standing in the roadstead, under the cover of heavy coastal artillery (38 guns). Nakhimov had faith in the high morale and excellent training of his subordinates, evidenced by his order to the squadron concerning the impending battle: "I am informing the senior officers that in event of an encounter with an enemy whose forces are superior to ours, I shall attack him, completely confident that each of us will perform his duty.” In the order issued before the Battle of Sinope, N. S. Nakhimov stated: "Russia expects valiant deeds from the Black Sea Fleet, justification of that expectation depends on us.”
The squadron commander objectively and thoroughly analyzed the enemy’s capabilities and decided to totally destroy him at his base. It was a new step in the development not only of Russian naval science, but of world naval science as well.
The battle strategy was to make full use of the advantage possessed by the squadron in gunnery and in the high level of readiness of the men, in order to close with the enemy as quickly as possible within effective gunnery range and attack him with all forces. Execution of the strategy required grouping the squadron in a combat formation consisting of two columns.
The Turkish Fleet ceased to exist 33% hours after the start of the battle (only one steamship escaped), and the coastal batteries were silenced.
The Battle of Sinope—one of the most brilliant pages in the chronicle of victories of the Russian Navy—was the last major clash between squadrons of sailing vessels.
The first battles involving steamships in which Russian navymen achieved significant successes occurred in this war. One of these was the capture of the Turkish armed steamship Pervaz Bakhri by the steam frigate Vladimir, commanded by Captain-Lieutenant G. I. Butakov (later admiral), creator of the tactics of the steam-powered fleet.
After the Anglo-French Fleet entered the Black Sea, our weaker Fleet was not in a position to continue the war at sea, and the command decided to disarm the warships and send their guns and personnel ashore for the immediate defense of Sevastapol.
The enemy, using his advantage in naval forces, attempted to geographically expand the war. The Anglo-French squadrons entered the Gulf of Finland, but encountered stubborn resistance from the substantially inferior Russian Fleet. The attack on St. Petersburg was disrupted.
In the Barents and White Seas, the British and
French, according to Engels, were engaged in intense attacks on the Russian and Lapp villages, and destruction of the property of poor fishermen,[3] and, of course, did not attain vital objectives. In August 1854, the Anglo-French squadron approached Petropavlovsk- Kamchatskiy, defended by a small garrison and two warships (the frigate Avrora and the military transport Diana). However, in the uneven battle the Russians, under the command of Zavoyko (later a rear admiral), displayed great tenacity and achieved victory, forcing the allied squadron to withdraw ingloriously.
Despite the heroism displayed by Russian navymen in this war, Tsarist Russia suffered defeat. The Crimean War, which cost the belligerents "incalculable losses and over a million lives,”[4] ended with the conclusion of the Treaty of Paris in 1856, in which Russia had to cede the mouth of the Danube and part of southern Bessarabia, and renounce her protectorate over the Danubian Principalities. The severest provision of the treaty—the prohibition against a Russian Fleet in the Black Sea—once again emphasized the particular importance attached to a fleet by the Western powers.
The Crimean War, waged during a period of technological revolution in military affairs, was one of the first wars in which broad use was made of steam- powered warships. This change in the technological base of the Navy also led to the most fundamental changes in the naval art.
In addition, this war demonstrated the importance of technological superiority in armed conflict, determined by the degree of economic and political development of States, as well as further expansion of the role of navies in wars. The coalition of countries possessing numerical—and above all, qualitative—superiority over the Russian Fleet, held the initiative for a considerable period, opening up new trends in armed conflict in various naval theaters. It was precisely with the aid of the Navy that the Crimean War was expanded along the entire perimeter of the maritime boundaries of Russia, although its basic missions were carried out in the Crimea, at the approaches to Sevastopol.
The significance of the Navy in this war was also determined by the extent to which its presence in a given theater could be used by diplomats of the belligerent states to support their positions at the peace talks. Russia, almost totally deprived of her Fleet in the Black Sea, was unable to oppose the fleets of the enemy States with her own naval power, and therefore had to accede to the provisions of the Treaty of Paris. Great Britain and France, having consolidated their position at sea,
acquired new possibilities for exerting pressure on Russia with the threat of attacks against her from the southwest, consolidated their control over the straits zone, and increased their influence in the Near and Middle East.
The Russo-Turkish War, 1877-1878. The Crimean War was an exceptionally important historical threshold, after which enormous changes in the socio-economic life of Russia occurred; she healed the wounds inflicted by the war, stood on the path of development of capitalism, and began modernizing her armed forces. In 1871 Russia finally achieved abrogation of the humiliating prohibition against a fleet in the Black Sea.
However, the Tsarist government did not take (indeed was unable to take) decisive measures to restore sea power in the southwest, and, when the Russo- Turkish War began in 1877, the Black Sea Fleet was very poorly prepared for it. Except for two round ironclads (so-called "Popovki”), the Fleet consisted only of several small obsolete warships. Necessity compelled it to arm and use, for military operations, steamships of the merchant fleet, as well as steam-powered boats and launches. Navymen under the leadership of young and energetic officers aboard such warships were able to paralyze the activity of the Turkish armorclads.
However, the British squadron entering the Sea of Marmora influenced the subsequent course of events: the Tsar prohibited the Army from marching on Constantinople and reaching the shores of the straits. The peace treaty between Russia and Turkey, signed on 3 March 1878 at San Stefano, was submitted to the international congress in Berlin for consideration, and the Tsarist government had to accede to it. At the Congress (June-July 1878), Russia had to renounce a number of provisions of the treaty and was deprived of a significant portion of the results of victory. And although her strategic position improved somewhat, the advantages which she acquired through the peace teaty were totally inconsistent with the effort expended. This occurred solely because Russia did not possess a powerful Navy.
Thus, once again, Russia had to bear the consequences of the fact that Tsarist officials continued f°r a long time to underestimate the importance of a Nav! in international relations and in warfare. The nation^ interests of the Balkan peoples were likewise sacrifice^ to Great Britain and Austria.
A major figure of the period, Russian War Ministet D. A. Milyutin, commented on the results of this in this manner: "Great Britain already effectively possesses Constantinople and the straits . . .. The Brlt” ish Fleet, though withdrawn from the Sea of Marmot'
Navies in War and in Peace 55
can return to the straits, and even the Black Sea, at any time. Nobody can prevent it.”[5]
Thus, Great Britain, and not Russia who won the war, established control in the Black Sea straits due to the power of her Fleet. Despite continuous efforts throughout the century to achieve freedom of maritime commerce with access to the Mediterranean, Russia was only able to consolidate on the northern and eastern shores of the Black Sea. She was unable to advance further, despite the victories achieved there by Russian forces.
Obviously, Peter I would not have been able to relentlessly pursue a policy of egress of Russia to the shores of the Baltic Sea without fearing the threat posed by other powers, reinforced by demonstrations of sea power, had he not created a huge army and powerful navy, satisfying the needs of the time.
The struggle for egress to the southern seas had another countenance. In the culminating moments of wars, when sea power on which policy could be based was particularly needed, the Russian Fleet was frequently too weak to compel the enemy and the powers supporting him to accept peace conditions essential to Russia. Though one of the strongest land powers, she possessed a fleet in the Black Sea sufficient only to combat with Turkey alone. Therefore, as soon as other powers, presenting primarily a naval threat, entered the war on the side of Turkey, Russia was compelled to abandon the fruits of her victories, and sometimes even suffer defeats.
Thus, tracing the role and significance of the Navy in the long struggle for outlets to the southern seas and freedom of Russian navigation on the Mediterranean, the following conclusion can be drawn. With the consolidation of Russia on the shores of the Black Sea during the period prior to the Crimean War, when the primary obstacle to the achievement of this objective was Turkey, the Russian Navy successfully executed its missions. Subsequently, when the question of a direct egress for Russia to the Mediterranean arose, affecting the interests of the major capitalist powers of Europe in their sphere of interest, the relative weakness of the Russian Navy was immediately manifested.
Navies at the Beginning of the Era of Imperialism
Spanish-American War (1898), Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902), the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), and the economic crisis in Europe in 1900 were the main historic landmarks of the new era in world history.”[6]
At that time, the major capitalist powers divided among themselves almost all the territory of the world. The nations which were first to start along the path toward capitalist development and which possessed powerful navies, succeeded in grabbing the lion’s share of the colonial possessions. Thus, beginning in 1583, England, making skillful use of her sea power, by various avenues and methods, was able to control, by the beginning of the 20th Century, colonies whose territory was 109 times larger than the area of the mother country, and in the process ranked first among the capitalist powers.
The center of conflict for the partition and redivision of the world shifted to the Pacific Ocean, on whose shores lay a China yet to be divided up. Squadrons with expeditionary forces from all the major imperialist powers were dispatched there in order to achieve expansionist aims. Britain was the first to pillage the Chinese people, followed by France, then the younger despoilers: the U.S.A., Germany, and Japan.
Irreconcilable differences between the colonizers gave rise to a number of armed conflicts in which navies continued to be an important means for achieving the objectives of the imperialist states, and in some of these conflicts even the main means.
The Spanish-American War. By the end of the 19th century, the U.S.A. had acquired all the characteristics of an imperialist power, and began to pursue a tough political course aimed at the seizure of colonies. Since a considerable portion of the world was already divided up, Spanish colonies in the Caribbean—as well as the Philippines—were the most appropriate for American aggression. Whereas "acquisition” of the former ensured American hegemony at the approaches to the designated area of construction of the Panama Canal, "acquisition” of the latter was an important step for subsequent expansion into China and Southeast Asia. It is quite obvious that a powerful navy could be the primary force in this struggle for overseas colonies.
At the first favorable opportunity, in 1898, the U.S.A. unleashed a war, the essence of which was stated with utmost clarity by V. I. Lenin: "They plundered Cuba and the Philippines.”[7]
In the plans for seizure of the Spanish colonies, the
7V. I. Lenin. Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy (Complete Collected Works), Vol. 30, p. 164.
8V. I. Lenin. Ibid, Vol. 28, p. 669.
primary role was assigned to the Navy, whose forces were to be used to deliver decisive blows against the Spanish Fleet, and thereby deprive the enemy of his ability to bring reinforcements from the home country by sea. Therefore, in preparing for war (whose theaters were sure to be the Caribbean Sea and the western Pacific), the U.S.A. created a Navy substantially superior to that of economically and politically backward Spain.
The U. S. war against Spain—the first imperialist war for redivision of the world—lasted less than four months. Taking advantage of their superiority at sea, the Americans landed in Cuba. When the Spanish West Indies squadron, consisting of obsolete warships, attempted to break out to the ocean from Santiago, it was defeated by technologically more advanced American warships. The garrison at Santiago, deprived of naval support, quickly capitulated. The war in the Caribbean Sea was essentially over.
The Americans also achieved an easy victory in the Philippines: the weak Spanish Asiatic squadron was destroyed in Manila Bay, and U. S. Marines entered Manila without a struggle.
The U.S.A. won the war at the cost of insignificant personal losses, but with great losses on the part of insurgents struggling against Spanish bondage. Local insurgent armies bore the brunt of the ground war against Spain, both in Cuba and the Philippines.
According to the Peace Treaty of 1898, Puerto Rico, Guam, the Philippines—and somewhat later, Cuba— became American colonies. The U.S.A. occupied a dominant position in the Caribbean, acquired advantageous positions in the Pacific at the approaches to the Asian mainland, and then annexed the Hawaiian Islands, which are of exceptional strategic importance in the central Pacific.
After the Spanish-American War, the U.S.A. entered a prolonged period of unrestrained rearmament. The Navy and Marines advanced to first place among the U. S. Armed Forces. It was precisely in naval forces that U. S. militarism discovered the instrument of its policy. The guiding principle of American military doctrine for many years became "a Navy second to none.” American military thought was essentially aimed at a resolution of the problems of naval warfare. Its ideologue was the creater of the "theory of sea power,” one of the greatest apologists for American imperialism, A. T. Mahan. His theory of the decisive influence of sea power on history is reflected to this day in the policy of the U.S.A.
The Russo-Japanese War. The history of Japan after the so-called Meiji bourgeois revolution is a history of continuous wars, serving as a basis for the development
of yet another young imperialist state, appearing later than the other imperialist powers in the arena of struggle for the seizure of foreign territories.
The intensive industrial development of Japan, occurring in the course of her transformation from a feudal to a bourgeois nation, and her dependence on shipping and related branches of industry, as well as the assistance and support of the major imperialist powers, enabled the island state to rapidly develop a powerful Navy. Utilizing her Navy, Japanese imperialism acquired the capability of directing her expansionist I aims toward the seizure of Chinese territories.
Brief respites between aggressive wars served only for the preparation of new wars. In the process, Japanese combat operations expanded each time. In 1874 she invaded Taiwan; in 1876 she occupied the Korean island of Changjiva Do; in 1876 she forced Korea to ratify an inequitable treaty, after which she quickly occupied Korea, which was under the control of China; and in 1879 she seized the Ryukyu Islands, one of the vassal states of China.
Japan’s advantageous military-geographical position vis-a-vis other powers played a significant role in the ’ development of her expansionist policy. She was situated close to a major target of expansion—Korea- which assured Japan of military superiority in this area over the other imperialist States. Moreover, Japan, being a protege of Great Britain and the U.S.A. in their struggle against other imperialist usurpers in the Far East, received economic, financial, diplomatic, and I military support from these powers. The invasion of Taiwan, for example, was prepared under the immediate direction of the U.S.A. and, encouraged by Britain, Japan seized Changjiva Do and penetrated into Korea. Both of these powers attempted to use Japan for the struggle against Russia in the Far East.
At the same time as the penetration into Korea, ruling classes in Japan demanded cultivation of the rich Chinese market, striving to achieve equal rights and privileges there with the Western powers.
All of this led to a sharp aggravation of relations between Japan and China, resulting in the Sino- Japanese War of 1894-1895. Ruling circles in Japan dared to risk this war only because they were assured of the support of Great Britain, and as soon as she confirmed this, Japanese warships attacked a Chinese squadron without declaring war.
The Japanese, transporting their forces by sea, were able to forestall the Chinese from concentrating their ground forces in Korea and invading southern Man- churia. Then the Army, landing on the shores of the Yellow Sea in the vicinity of Chinshien and Dairen- operating jointly with the Navy, seized the Liaotung Peninsula with the naval base at Port Arthur. The11
Navies in War and in Peace 57
the Japanese Army, having landed east of Weihai, occupied—together with the Navy—this major Chinese naval base.
As a result of the victory, Japan imposed an inequitable treaty on China, giving her privileges far exceeding those granted to the European and American imperialists. The Chinese island of Taiwan (Formosa) and the Liaotung Peninsula with the naval base at Port Arthur were annexed by Japan. Korea was completely wrested away from China. Moreover, Japan received an enormous indemnity.
Three European powers—Russia, Germany, and France—uneasy over the Japanese conquests and expansion of her influence in Asia, demanded from Japan a change in the provisions of the Sino-Japanese peace treaty. At the time, Russia, together with France and Germany, possessed imposing naval forces in Far Eastern waters, capable of cutting the maritime communications of the Japanese Army. Forced to reckon with the real power of the opposing navies, Japan relinquished the Liaotung Peninsula.
Thus the Japanese victory gave her new possibilities for the most intensive economic development. Militarism became the essence of this development: expanding industry directed its main efforts toward equipping the Army and Navy with modern weapons.
The Sino-Japanese War demonstrated the unusually important role of navies in the achievement of political objectives of States in the struggle to divide and redivide the world. It was precisely the Navy which ensured the concentration and superiority of the Japanese Army in Korea and Manchuria, and also broad maneuvers by ground forces and the opening of new attack zones in the theater of combat operations.
A significant confirmation of the increasing role of the Navy was the seizure in 1897-1898 by the major imperialist powers of the Chinese ports of Ch'ingtao, Weihai, and Port Arthur to base their Fleets.
Thus the Sino-Japanese War not only failed to eliminate international conflicts in the Far East—on the contrary, it aggravated them. The opposition of Russia, together with that of France and Germany, to the provisions of the peace treaty concluded at the end of the Sino-Japanese War, laid the foundation for an open political struggle between Russia and Japan. With the acquisition of a lease by Russia in 1898 in Kwangtung Province and the construction of a base for the Russian Pacific Squadron at Port Arthur, the situation became even more complicated.
In connection with the so-called "Boxer Rebellion”, which broke out in China in 1900, all of the major imperialist rivals in the Far East sent troops there: Great Britain, Japan, the United States of America, Germany, France, and Russia—each striving, with the sacking of
China, to grab the lion’s share for itself.
After the occupation of Manchuria by Russia, the primary question in the Far East policy of Great Britain, Japan, and the U.S.A. became the ouster of the Russians from the regions they had seized and annexation of these areas. Japan, incited by Great Britain and the U.S.A., openly proceeded toward the unleashing of a war with Russia and intensively prepared for it. In 1902 Japan and Great Britain ratified a treaty aimed at Russia, clearly stipulating the obligation of the allies to maintain a fleet more powerful than the Russian Fleet in Far Eastern waters. Attempting to kindle a war between Japan and Russia, the U.S.A. hoped this would weaken them both, which would enable the Americans to seize key positions in the Pacific and in China. The U. S. President warned the Governments of France and Germany that if they rendered any assistance to Russia, America would enter on the side of Japan.
The Japanese Government laid great stress on the construction of a powerful navy, to which a major portion of the national budget and the indemnity received from China was devoted. The U.S.A. and Great Britain heavily subsidized Japan and in fact served as her arsenal. Specifically, practically all of the Japanese armorclad warships, possessing the best performance data and armament at the time, were built in British shipyards. The Naval and Army officers had had war experience in China and were quite familiar with the characteristics of the theater.
The preparation of Tsarist Russia for the impending war was viewed somewhat differently. Ruling circles in the country understood that their Far Eastern aspirations could only be realized through war. However, the strategic situation in the Far East developed unfavorably for Russia. The Siberian and Chinese-Eastern railroads still had not achieved full carrying capacity for continuous and rapid concentration and supply of Russian forces in the theater.
Despite the fact that the Russian Fleet was significantly numerically superior to the Japanese (in armor- clads alone, Russia had 20, whereas Japan had six), the Tsarist Government, due to shortsightedness and strategic blunders, did not deploy numerically superior forces in the Pacific at the proper time.
As is evident from Table 1, the superiority of the Japanese Fleet over the Russian Fleet in the Far East was beyond dispute. Moreover, Russian warships were deployed in various seas. Thus, there were a total of eight armorclad warships in the Yellow Sea, which was the primary naval theater. The Japanese Navy, relying on a developed system of bases, was able to concentrate its operations. And, above all, warships of the Russian Fleet were considerably less prepared than the Japanese for combat operations.
Table 1 Number of Warships in the Fleets in the Far East9
Types of warships | Russia | Japan |
Battleships | 6 | 6 |
Armored cruisers | 4 | 8 |
Cruisers | 7 | 12 |
Destroyers and torpedo boats | 37 | 47 |
9This and succeeding tables were compiled from data in Morskoy atlas (Maritime Atlas), Vol. Ill, Part I, Sheets 33 and 34.
The construction of bases for the Russian Navy in the Pacific was not completed, and Port Arthur was not a sufficiently reliable fortress, nor was it an equipped naval base. Individual progressive officers. (S. O. Makarov, R. I. Kondratenko, et al) understood the real state of affairs, but were unable to substantially alter it.
By early 1904, without preparing for war and without having concentrated her ground and naval forces in the Far East, Russia turned out to be isolated face to face with Japan, which was the strike force of the powerful bloc of international monopoly capital.
The immediate strategic Japanese objective in the war was to gain control of the sea, which presupposed the achievement of a surprise attack on the Russian Pacific Fleet and destruction of the squadron at Port Arthur and the Russian station ships in Korea and China. The landing of armies on the continent and the capture of Port Arthur, and defeat of the main Russian forces in Southern Manchuria, with the subsequent occupation of Manchuria and the Ussuri and Amur regions were also contemplated.
Taking advantage of a favorable situation, Japan launched a surprise attack on Russian ships at Port Arthur and Chemulpo during the night of 27 January (9 February) 1904 without declaring war. This attack significantly weakened the Russian squadron, but did not result in the establishment of Japanese domination of the sea.
Was it actually a surprise attack? Was there sufficient information on the Japanese preparation for war?
4
1
4
4 18
Repeated reports from the Russian naval representative in Japan concerning the preparation of the Japanese Fleet provided a thorough basis for anticipation of an attack. Thus, in early January he reported that reservists had been called up in Japan; steamships capable of taking on board two divisions of troops had been chartered; long-distance steamship runs had been suspended; and the Japanese Fleet was steaming to the shores of Korea. On 18 January, our representative reported on the laying of defensive mine fields by the Japanese, and on scales of military preparations which
indicated Japan’s ambitious plans. On 24 January he telegraphed news of the general mobilization occurring in Japan. On 26 January Vice Admiral S. O. Makarov conveyed his views to the Naval Minister concerning the danger involved in deploying the Port Arthur squadron in the outer roadstead. But all of these warnings were ignored.
When the situation at sea became critical for the Russians, Vice Admiral S. O. Makarov was named CinC of the Pacific Fleet. He was well acquainted with the enemy and the theater of combat operations, and was a recognized authority on naval tactics. However, the Tsarist Deputy in the Far East and the new CinC Pacific Fleet differed on the role of the Fleet in war, as well as on its use in developing situations. Despite the fact that Makarov’s proposals to increase the combat readiness of the Fleet encountered insuperable obstacles, he continued to energetically prepare the Fleet for battle, and achieved a certain measure of success. But on 31 March (13 April) the flagship Petropavlovsk was blown up by Japanese mines. With the loss of the CinC, active operations of the Port Arthur squadron were suspended.
At the end of April, the situation at Port Arthur significantly worsened: the Japanese Second Army, which landed at Chinhsien, cut the base off from the Russian Army in Manchuria, and advanced to the fortress, acquiring the capability of shelling Russian warships with siege artillery. Therefore, the command decided to have the squadron break through to Vladivostok.
The relative strength of the forces (Table 2) in the battle, with the breakthrough on 28 July 1904, afforded some basis for hope of success, biit due to the lack of initiative on the part of the Russian command, the Russian squadron did not execute the m*s' sion, and returned to Port Arthur in a weakened condition. In the unsuccessful military encounter, the slowr speed, poorer armor plating, and poorer quality of the Russian naval guns played a role.
The Vladivostok cruiser detachment continued it* operations, but this could not significantly affect the
Table 2 Number of Warships Possessed by the Belligerent When the Russian Squadron Attempted to Break Through From Port Arthur to Vladivostok
Types of warships Russia
Battleships Armorclads Armored cruisers Cruisers Torpedo boats
Battleships | 7 |
Armorclads | — |
Armored cruisers | 4 |
Armored warships, coastal defense | — |
Total no. of armored warships | 11 |
Cruisers | 7 |
Auxiliary cruisers | — |
Destroyers and torpedo boats | 37 |
Table 3 Number of Warships in the Naiies in the Far East In Event of Timely Arrival of the Second Pacific Squadron
Russia
Port Arthur and 2nd Pacific
Types of warships Vladivostok Squadrons Squadron Total Japan
course of the war at sea.
Thus, six months after the beginning of the war, having lost altogether only one of seven armored ships, the Russian Pacific Fleet practically ceased to represent an organized force capable of exerting a significant influence over the future course of the war. The Japanese acquired the capability of shipping by sea without interference, replenishing their forces operating on the Liaotung Peninsula and in Southern Manchuria with men and materiel. Meanwhile, the Russian Army, although well replenished but deprived of naval support, retreated to the north under Japanese attack.
On 24 August 1904, at a meeting with the Tsar, the belated decision was made to dispatch the Second Pacific Squadron from the Baltic. A timely linkup with the Port Arthur squadron could have given the Russians a numerical superiority in naval forces (Table 3) and could have radically changed the situation throughout the theater of combat operations in favor of Russia.
The Japanese command, foreseeing this, concentrated its main efforts against Port Arthur, in order to break the resistance of its defenders and destroy the squadron before the arrival of reinforcements from the Baltic. The Japanese siege group was reinforced and led a fierce attack against the fortifications at Port Arthur.
Rejecting the use of the still rather powerful forces to engage the enemy’s naval forces, when the Fleet, through its operations, could have rendered maximum assistance to the besieged Port Arthur, the inept Tsarist generals decided to remove armament and men from the warships in order to use them directly for the land defense of the fortress. On 2 January 1905 they surrendered unconquered Port Arthur, although the possibilities for defense had not been exhausted.
On 2 (15) October 1904, the Second Pacific Squadron, under the command of Rozhestvenskiy, began the
8 | 15 | 6 |
1 | 5 | I 8 |
3 | 3 | — |
12 | 23 | 16 |
8 | 15 | 15 |
1 | 1 | 24 |
9 | 46 | 63 |
transfer from the Baltic to the Far East. The history of the Russian Navy, and indeed of the navies of other States as well, has never known such a long and protracted voyage of an enormous force, consisting of various types of warships, whose crews had had no experience in steaming in company over great distances. The majority of coastlines followed by the squadron belonged to hostile Great Britain. With increasing distance from their western bases, the danger to the Russian warships of a surprise encounter with enemy naval forces increased, which significantly complicated the passage. However, the heroism of the Russian seamen enabled them to overcome all difficulties.
While the squadron was off the shores of Madagascar, they were informed of the fall of Port Arthur and the loss of the Port Arthur squadron. But the Tsar and his entourage, recognizing in the Second Pacific Squadron the last hope for victory in the war, did not revoke their decision to dispatch it to the East.
Having completed the unparalleled seven month voyage without loss, the Russian squadron entered Korea Bay on 14 May 1905. Here it was met by a Japanese Fleet which was more sophisticated, had prepared a long time for battle, and which relied on a system of nearby bases. The opponents had numerical parity in armored warships, but the Japanese Fleet had a considerable advantage over the Russian squadron in light forces (Table 4).
Moreover, the Japanese warships had an advantage over the Russian ships in the quality of their armament, armor, and speed (Table 5). The superiority of the Japanese Fleet naturally required a high degree of skill on the part of the Russian ships in order for them to achieve success. However, the squadron commander, Rozhestvenskiy, with no faith in his own forces, even failed to develop a plan of action and left the initiative to the enemy.
Table 4 Numerical Strength of the Russian Squadron and Japanese Fleet in the Battle of Tsushima
Types of ships | Russia | Japan |
Battleships | 8 | 4 |
Armored cruisers | 1 | 8 |
Armorclads, coastal defense | 3 | - |
Total armored warships | 12 | 12 |
Cruisers | 8 | 16 |
Auxiliary cruisers | 1 | 24 |
Destroyers and torpedo boats | 9 | 63 |
Table 5 Performance Data of Warships of the Russian Squadron and Japanese Fleet
Characteristics of warships | Russia | Japan |
Total No. of artillery rounds/min | 134 | 360 |
Total weight of metal (kg) fired per minute | 8190 | 21,949 |
Armored surface, % | 40 | 61 |
Maximum speed, knots | 17.5 | 20 |
Using their advantage in gunnery and speed, the strategy of the Japanese was to capture the leader of the Russian squadron using their main forces, put the flagships out of action and, thereby depriving the squadron of leadership, complete its defeat with subsequent night torpedo attacks.
Despite the heroism of the men of the ships of the Second Pacific Squadron, it suffered a cruel defeat. The majority of Russian ships were lost, and a small numbef of them were interned in foreign ports.
Thus Japan achieved control of the sea in the Far East. V. I. Lenin wrote: "The Russian Navy was finally destroyed. The war was irrevocably lost . . . We were confronted not only with a military defeat, but also a complete military breakdown of the aristocracy.”
After the defeat of Russian naval forces in the Batik of Tsushima, the question of peace between Russia and Japan arose. At that time, the severe defeats in war weighed heavily on the Tsarist government, as did ^ rise of the revolutionary movement in the country- 1[ was convinced that to continue the war would bc senseless, since it could result in the downfall of the aristocracy.
A
10V. I. Lenin, Ibid, Vol. 10, p. 252.
Granted, the possibility still existed of gradually creating a superiority in ground forces in the Man' churian theater; it did not offer any promise for 3 victorious conclusion of the war, since without a flee1 Russia could not count on the return of Port Arthrb and the transfer of combat operations to the JapancsC islands. The development of hostilities on the Korea*1 Peninsula without naval support likewise promised n° success. The situation with respect to the defense 0
the Russian Pacific coast was even worse—it was defenseless against attacks and landings by the Japanese Navy. There was an imminent danger of a Japanese invasion of Russia.
This was the effect of the loss of the Russian Fleet on the overall strategic situation in the Far East.
It should be noted that at this point Japan had likewise exhausted her resources and had to turn to the American President for mediation.
The degradation of Tsarist Russia, her governmental, economic, political, and military backwardness and a complete lack of understanding by ruling circles of the importance of sea power (which was the basic reason for the weakness of the Navy)—all of these factors brought Tsarism to military defeat. "The connection between the military organization of the country and its entire economic and cultural structure has never been as close as it is now . . . This time, as time and time again in history, war between an advanced nation and a backward one has played a great revolutionary role.”11 The true victors in this war were the imperialists of the U.S.A., Great Britain, and Germany. Their rivals in the Far East and Pacific were significantly weakened
uv. I. Lenin, Ibid, Vol. 9, p. 156.
and mired down. Russian Tsarism became a tributary of the Anglo-French bloc.
Under the Treaty of Portsmouth, Japan was awarded a concession in Kuantung, including Port Arthur and Dairen, and privileges in Korea. She was also awarded the southern section of the Manchurian Railroad, the southern half of Sakhalin Island and all of the Kurile Islands.
—
As a result of the grave lessons of war, broad sectors of Russian society were beginning to understand the importance of a navy. Here a significant role was played by the so-called "youth group,” which was a mouthpiece of the huge bourgeoisie, displeased with Tsarism, and, yet, at the same time, fearful of revolution. The
new spirit infused by naval officers from the "youth group” fostered the interest of the general public in the Navy.
Only the Tsarist government, as demonstrated by subsequent events, failed to draw the necessary conclusions from the bitter experience of war and did not change its attitude toward the naval component of the armed forces of the country. The construction of the Navy proceeded basically from considerations of prestige, and not from the true interests of the State. Therefore, they tried to build warships similar to foreign warships, without taking into account the conditions under which they would operate, and ignoring the requirements, unique to Russia, stemming from her geographical location.
One of the most important characteristics of the employment of the Russian Navy was the need for intertheater maneuvers, governed by the absence of the necessary quantity of naval forces in individual theaters.[8] Execution of the indicated maneuver necessitated overcoming a number of difficulties (the absence of bases, fortified points, etc.). A similar situation developed in large measure as a result of the loss by Russia
12 Russia was forced to have a separate fleet on each sea, which was usually weaker than the fleets of potential opponents in the given theater.
of a number of islands and overseas territories first discovered by Russian seafarers (incidentally, these losses likewise occurred because ruling circles in Russia failed to understand the importance of sea power).
From the aforementioned, it is obvious that resolution of the problem of intertheater maneuvers by naval forces required the construction in Russia of warships possessing great cruising range. Exceptional strategic foresight on the part of government officials was required in order to ensure a timely concentration of forces in the required theater.
It is indisputable that had the Rozhestvenskiy squadron arrived in the Far East at the proper time (if only before the fall of Port Arthur), the war would have broken out later or its course would have been different.
It is evident from the above that every time ruling circles in Russia failed to properly emphasize development of the Navy and its maintenance at a level necessitated by contemporary demands, the country either lost battles in wars or its peacetime policy failed to achieve designated objectives.
However, the ruling circles of Tsarist Russia, despite repeated grave lessons demonstrating the absolute need of the State for sea power, still did not understand the importance of a navy in the achievement of political objectives.
Commentary
A 1931 graduate of the Naval Academy, Vice Admiral Hooper served on board the Pensacola (CA-24) and the Cushing (DD-376) prior to earning an MS degree from MIT. From 1941 to 1944 he served aboard the Washington (BB-56) and then became gunnery officer on the Alaska (CB-1). From 1945 to 1949 he served first in the Operational Readiness Section of the CNO, then with the Atomic Energy Commission.
After command of the IVaccamaw (AO-109), he went to BuOrd, and then attended the National War College. Command of the Sierra (AD-18) was followed in 1945 by a tour as assistant chief of BuOrd for research. Later commands included Destroyer Squadron 26 and Amphibious Group One. After service as Deputy CNO (Development), Admiral Hooper served as Navy Member, Joint Logistics Board. Upon retirement in 1971 he became Director of Naval History and Curator for the Navy Department.
By Vice Admiral Edwin B. Hooper, U. S. Navy (Retired)
Navies in War and in Peace 63
vict readers, "repeated grave lessons demonstrating the absolute need of the State [Russia] for sea power.” This he accomplishes by explaining what he sees as historical consequences to Russia of the "complete lack of understanding by ruling circles of the importance of sea power;” of their alleged failure to exploit technological advances in propulsion, armament, and armor; of the lack of a system of world-wide bases; of insufficient cruising ranges of Russian warships; and of deficiencies in training and preparation for war. In contrast, he highlights the benefits to Britain, France, the United States, and Japan of superior naval power during this period of history.
Admiral Gorshkov’s overall appreciation of the roles of naval power is revealed by his emphasis on the "importance of a Fleet in international relations and in war.” In regretting the defensive tendency of the Russian Navy in the Crimean War which "contradicted the essence of the combat activity of this, most mobile, type of force designed for operations at sea,” he recognizes the importance of offensive naval operations. He supports a strong Army but points out that successful employment of the Army was largely nullified by superior enemy seapower during the Russo-Turkish and Russo-Japanese Wars. He stresses the extent of use of the presence of a Fleet by diplomats at peace talks.
As in an earlier article, Gorshkov attempts to demonstrate that the Russians do have a naval tradition. Claiming that the Russian people have an inherent "love of the sea” and make excellent "seafarers,” he draws inspiration from the memorable voyages of exploration by Russians in the early 19th century. Writing for an internal audience, he does not place these accomplishments in perspective with the voyages of discovery of other nations.
Perhaps in consideration of aspirations for naval capabilities in the present era, Admiral Gorshkov particularly stresses the importance of technological superiority for the armed forces. Concentrating on the backwardness of the Tsarist Navy, he fails to mention that, as early as the Crimean War, Russia used shell guns in ship-to-ship engagements, that they planted electrical and chemical-contact mines in this war, or that they employed self-propelled torpedoes in the Russo-Turkish War.
The senior officer of the Soviet Navy is thinking in world-wide terms. He expresses regret that Russia did not gain possession over the islands and overseas territories discovered; that positions were lost in such far-flung areas as the Pacific Northwest, Hawaii, and New Guinea; that Russia lacked suitable bases for the Russo-Japanese War; and that "nations with
powerful navies grabbed the lion’s share of colonial possessions.” Sensitive to relative military-geographic positions of the naval powers and the separated maritime frontiers of Russia, he stresses the importance of intertheater operations. As might be expected, Admiral Gorshkov highlights the importance of control of the Turkish straits, "the struggle for egress to the southern seas,” "freedom of Russian navigation on the Mediterranean,” and the influence of seapower on the Near and Middle East.
The main thrust of the article is summarized by the statement that, every time Russia "failed to properly emphasize development of the Fleet and its maintenance at a level necessitated by modern-day demands, the country either lost battles in wars or its peacetime policy failed to achieve designated objectives.”
Of course, readers in the West will note many distortions or downright inaccuracies in the general history of the article. Gorshkov stresses European and American expansion in the 19th century, but he does not note the remarkable eastward expansion of Russia in the same period that resulted in the seizure of the entire northern portion of the Eurasian continent and the imposition of Russian culture over numerous national groups in that area. Britain, France, Japan, and particularly, the United States are painted as imperialists, aggressors, pillagers, despoilers, and plunderers. To this reader, the future seems ominous as long as Soviet leaders continue to reiterate such inflammatory interpretations to their people.
[1]Z. Yc. Pavlova. Decembrist N. Bestuzhev and his Opyt is torn Rossiytkogo flota (Experience in the History of the Russian Fleet), in the book by N. A. Bestuzhev. Opyt istorii Rossiyskogo flota (Experience in the History of the Russian Fleet), Sudpromgiz, 1961, p. 9.
[2]L. S. Berg. Ocherki po istorii russkikh geograficheskikh otkrytiy (Sketches on the History of Russian Geographical Discoveries), 2nd Edition, revised and supplemented. Publishing House of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, 1949, p. 161.
[3]K. Marx and F. Engels. Socbineniye (Works), Vol. 11, p. 522.
[4]Ibid, Vol. 22, 2nd Edition. Gospolitizdat, 1962, p. 39.
"Imperialism, the highest stage of capitalism in America and Europe, and later also in Asia, was com
pletely developed by the period 1898 to 1914. The
[7]Onevnik D. A. Milyutina Diary of D. A. Milyutina), Lenin State Order of Lenin Library of the USSR. Manuscript Division. Vol. Ill, Moscow, 1950, P- 127.
In his third article, Admiral of the Fleet Gorshkov summarizes selected historical events from early in the 19th century to 1905 in a fashion appropriate for convincing naval officers, the command level of the armed forces, and other Soviet leaders of the importance of a powerful, modern, and well-prepared Navy in peace and war.
Although more narrowly oriented and nowhere nearly as rigorous, the approach of this particular article is somewhat reminiscent of that of Alfred Thayer Mahan in his The Influence of Sea Power upon History. Admiral Gorshkov does credit Mahan as the creator of the "theory of sea power,” which he concluded is "reflected to this day in the policy of the U.S.A.” Rather than directly addressing such a theory, the Soviet admiral uses historical cases of sea- power’s influence to derive, for his present day So-