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The United States is entering a decade °fdecreasing foreign commitments. The “asis for this is the Nixon Doctrine "'hich requires the reduction of our presence in foreign countries, but reten- tl()n of control of the seas and the capacity to project U. S. influence abroad 111 support of foreign policy objectives. Maintaining U. S. naval power in a forward posture, while reducing our for- eign bases, requires evolutionary changes ln our modus operand/. The lack of overseas bases from which to deploy and support armed forces will require addi- honal capabilities and techniques for this decade.
Control of the seas requires that we Maintain superiority over opposing naval forces, and the capability to ensure Ccdom of passage for ships of all natrons through the straits and narrow seas which constrict naval movement, international sea lines of communi- eations arc increasingly threatened by extensions of national sovereignty over these restricted waters and narrow passages. Sea control requirements imply the ability to seize control of critical
points along these lines of communications, as well as the capability to seize and defend advanced naval bases should these actions be in the interests of the United States. Faced with these requirements and considering present budget constraints, one alternative is to base naval forces at sea. With present amphibious shipping, the sea-based concept provides an economical, credible, and readily-attainable means of decreasing U. S. presence abroad, while still maintaining naval power in a forward deployed mode.
Operating from a sea base, Navy and Marine amphibious forces can maintain freedom of action, while possessing the flexibility to project U. S. influence, protect U. S. interests, and/or support allies. The sea-based amphibious force can apply precisely metered power, balanced to meet specific requirements, while preventing embroilment in an escalating situation. These forces can provide a wide range of options to the national command authority, while remaining uncommitted in international waters until the decisive moment. Sea-
based operations directly support the Nixon Doctrine by reducing visible commitment of U. S. forces, by reducing the requirement for overseas bases, and by reducing or minimizing the presence ashore of forces involved in crisis control situations. The development of a capability to conduct sea-based landing force operations will enhance the readiness of the Navy and Marine Corps team for its traditional role of amphibious assault, while increasing the nation’s ability to ensure control of the seas.
The Marine Corps Development and Education Command at Quantico, Virginia, is presently conducting two projects to formalize sea-based concepts and doctrine. The first, the study of a Seaborne Mobile Logistic System (SMLS), is being conducted under a joint Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant, Marine Corps (CNO/CMC) charter for the purpose of developing organizational and operational procedures for logistical support of sea-based Marine landing forces. A second study is being conducted by the Development Center to develop a tactical doctrine for sea-
based landing force operations. Both studies will result in doctrine for operating a sea-based landing force under present amphibious shipping and budgetary constraints. Detailed results for the Marine Amphibious Unit/Amphibious Task Unit (MAU/ATU) level have been completed and are now being reviewed by the Commandant, Marine Corps. It must be stressed that these developing procedures are an evolution of present amphibious doctrine rather than a revolutionary concept for employment of the Navy and Marine Corps amphibious team. The following discussion presents the tentative concept for sea-based amphibious operations.
Sea-based amphibious operations arc defined as those operations that arc launched, commanded, controlled, coordinated, and supported, both logistically and tactically, principally from the sea. The purpose of such sea-basing is to provide flexibility of employment by selectively committing only those elements of the amphibious task force necessary to accomplish the mission ashore. Those forces not required will either not be deployed ashore or will be retracted to the sea-base when the requirement for their employment ashore no longer exists.
The concepts and tactical doctrine presently being developed at the Marine
Corps Development Center will be ap plicablc only at the ATU/MAU and Amphibious Task Group/Marinc Amphibious Brigade (ATG/M Alt) levels in low- to mid-intensity conflicts. The limitation to these levels and to lower intensity employments stems from the consideration of naval threats to the sea bast in higher intensities, and from the realities of current amphibious shipping availability. The greater flexibility necessary for employment of the sea-based forces is achieved by closer integration of the Navy and Marine Corps resources employed and by retention at sea of the command, control, and logistics elements and equipment.
107
Professional Notes
Our current doctrine for amphibious warfare concentrates on the traditional concept of amphibious assault operations at the amphibious task force/ marine amphibious force level against a relatively sophisticated enemy in mid- to high-intensity warfare. That level of force or intensity of combat, however, may not be in the best interests of the United States. Sea-based operations at the MAU/MAH level, arc designated to be employed in lower intensity crisis control situations, where combat power is selectively committed ashore in response to the requirements of each situation. Missions envisioned for a sea-based amphibious task force could include:
^ humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
^ influence projection, through goodwill visits, or through a show of force with variable visibility assets.
^ protection of U. S. nationals, installations, or evacuation in destabilized situations.
* provision of civil affairs or psychological operations (PsyOps) support to allies, r interposition of elements of a landing force between opposing forces to prevent or inhibit conflict.
^ conduct of amphibious raids.
^ conduct of amphibious assault operations of limited duration.
^ conduct of traditional amphibious assault operations and subsequent operations ashore, without creating an expectation of permanent U. S. commitment.
r conduct of traditional amphibious assault operations to establish a landing force ashore.
Inherent Flexibility— A major objective of sea-basing amphibious forces is to provide tactical flexibility and diplomatic maneuverability by the application of precisely metered response. Once tactical units arc committed ashore, their retraction may be ordered when the requirement for their employment no longer exists. Under the sea-basing doctrine, command, logistics, and air support facilities may be totally sea-based or deployed ashore at a reduced level. Small tactical command elements, a logistics facility to handle safety stocks and temporary sites for limited support V/STOI. aircraft operations and helicopters may be established if deemed necessary by the commander. This allows for relative ease
of retraction of the deployed force and increased tactical mobility, since only units necessary for mission accomplishment arc deployed ashore. Command installations and facilities for major logistics support and tactical air support during sea-based operations are not established ashore, but are provided by ships of the sea base. Under sea-based operations, the landing force may be held afloat for extended periods of time with varying degrees of visibility, but with the optional capability to establish a landing force ashore with the required support facilities. The capability to conduct sea-based operations, while still maintaining the flexibility for traditional amphibious assault operations, is a major advantage of the sea-basing concept.
Command and Control— The Commander, Landing Force (CLF), will normally not displace his headquarters ashore and his command, control, communications, and support elements will remain in the sea-base, closely integrated with command and control elements of the Commander, Amphibious Task Force (CATF). The CATF remains in overall command during sea-based operations. The CLF may establish a small tactical command element ashore as the situation demands, but his major headquarters facilities and functions will normally remain on board the sea-base. The capability to establish the landing force headquarters ashore will continue to be maintained, should the situation dictate full-scale amphibious assault. The functioning of the MAU/MAB headquarters afloat is a major change from the traditional amphibious operation, where the CLF, his command, control, communications, and support elements establish themselves ashore as soon as practical.
Mobility and Fire Support—The mobility required to employ effectively landing forces ashore will be a critical aspect of the doctrine development. The required mobility will be provided by an integrated system of helicopter-borne and surface-borne means. The importance of tactical and logistical mobility will dictate the establishment of a central agency responsible for coordination of all forms of transportation. With the majority of logistical support remaining at sea, the requirement for tactical and
logistical helicopter support will be greatly increased.
Fire support requirements will be satisfied through a variety of means to include ships of the sea-base, artillery established ashore, and air. Naval gunfire and close air support will continue to be important fire support means for helicopter-borne operations and operations where artillery may not be established ashore, or until the artillery is established ashore. The aviation combat element of the MAU/MAB may provide close air support from ships of the sea- base or V/STOL aircraft operating from limited facilities ashore.
Logistics—Combat service support for sea-based operations will be provided by the Seaborne Mobile Logistic System. A Navy and Marine Corps-sponsored project is developing the combat service support organizations and operational procedures required to provide logistical support directly from the sea-base shipping to elements of the landing force ashore. The SMLS will provide a closely integrated Navy and Marine Corps logistics team, possessing the flexibility and responsiveness necessary to meet the requirements of the Commander, Amphibious Task Force and the landing force commander.
Specific advantages will include reduced construction requirements ashore, reduced security requirements for logistical installations, reduced vulnerability from enemy ground action and more rapid response for retraction of committed tactical units. Three control agencies are established for control of logistics functions under the sea-basing concept and the SMLS. The Logistics Support Center (LSC) is established in the flagship, and acts as the Navy and Marine logistic agency, executing the decisions of both CATF and CLF. The amount of control to be exercised by the LSC is determined by the CATF, in coordination with the CLF, in each operation. The functions which the tactical logistics (TacLog) performed in a traditional amphibious assault, are performed by the LSC, which is responsible for control and coordination of all movement between the sea-base and the area of operations ashore.
A Ship Logistic Control Center (SLCC), composed of Navy and Marine personnel, is established on board each
108 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1972
vessel of the sea-base that provides logistic support to the landing force. The SLCC is the agency in each ship that implements the logistics support actions directed by the Logistics Support Center. When a significant portion of the landing force is deployed ashore, a Forward Logistic Control Center (FLCC) is established with the landing force ashore, to receive requests and coordinate logistics requirements for each of the supported units. The FLCC will also maintain safety stocks ashore to ensure deployed elements receive uninterrupted support. The FLCC is the landward extension of the LSC for operations ashore.
Transportation assets arc coordinated through the Logistics Support Center. Control of helicopters is accomplished through the Helicopter Direction Center (HDC), whereas control of boats is accomplished by the Primary Control Ship (PCS). During a sea-based opera-
tion, there will be no general unloading phase, since the majority of the logistics support remains on board the sea base. The FLCC maintains some safety stocks ashore in the event that the sea-base is unable to provide continuous support because of weather or enemy activity. Maintenance support comes directly from the sea-base in the form of contact teams, individual item replacement from a maintenance float, or by evacuation of the equipment to the sea-base for repair and return.
Sea-based operations, supported logis- tically by SMLS, will require some changes from conventional embarkation procedures in the areas of space assignment, item identification, and organization for embarkation. Ship spaces necessary for maintenance and supply working areas must be identified, organized, and equipped to perform effectively in support of the landing force
requirements. Initial embarkation must be flexible enough to support operations ranging from civil disaster relief to full combat, without time or space for reloading.
As can be seen, the sea-basing concept is evolutionary rather than revolutionary. The two study groups are concerned with developing the organizational and operational procedures for logistics support and the tactical doctrine for sea-based landing force operations. Full development of this concept and the related doctrine will allow the Navy and Marine Corps amphibious team greater flexibility in meeting the demands of forward deployed naval forces. This concept emphasizes the four areas that the Navy and Marine team has been famous for in the past: readiness for any type operation, flexibility of employment, integrated sea/air/laml team, and amphibious orientation.
Ship-to-Ship Missiles
By Commander Christian J. Eliot, Royal Navy (Retired)
The weapon which will revolutionize naval warfare more than any other in the next decade probably is the ship- to-ship missile. Five years ago, such a missile had hardly been considered by the Western world; then came the sinking of the Israeli destroyer Eilath on 21 October 1967 by a Soviet-made Styx missile fired from an Egyptian Osa-class patrol boat. It was quickly realized that here was a weapon which brought a new element into naval warfare, and the NATO nations, with the notable exception of the United States and Great Britain, sat down to develop their own similar missiles.
It seems odd that the two greatest maritime powers in NATO failed to start their own developments immediately. Indeed it might have been thought that, if the Soviets had already put such missiles in service, the United States and Great Britain should at least have had similar ones under development. The
reason why they had not was undoubtedly that both nations had powerful carrier-borne aircraft, capable of attacking ships with air-launched missiles and capable also of neutralizing potential missile-firing ships. In other words, they saw no need for the ship-to-ship missile when, in their opinion, anti-shipping attacks could be equally well delivered by manned aircraft.
While such thinking is understandable on the part of the U. S. Navy, it is completely incomprehensible on the part of the British Navy. Even as long ago as 1967, the writing was on the wall that Britain’s fixed-wing flying from carriers was fading out. One would have thought that, faced with the knowledge that, within a decade, Britain would have no carrier-borne strike aircraft, the naval planners would have seized upon the ship-to-ship missile as the answer to most of their problems.
In 1968 and 1969, the British naval
staff was talking in terms of ncutralidof missile-firing ships by ship-borne hell' copters, using the French wire-guided AS-12 missile, which had a maximum range of five miles. They considered that it would be possible to launch it outside the range of a patrol boat’s anti-aircraft guns or missiles, and that it would be possible to strike at such craft before they had time to launch their ship10' ship missiles. What was forgotten, ho*' ever, was that it was not only patrol craft that the Soviets were fitting wi1*1 anti-ship missiles, but also their mud1 more powerful destroyers and cruise1* that would have given short shrift t° any helicopter approaching within fr* miles.
It was not until 1970 that Gre*1 Britain faced up to the fact that the ship-to-ship missile was becoming j"*1 as essential to modern warfare as tl>( gun had been for three or four centurie* The naval staff then started looking f°r
Professional Notes 109
a suitable missile which they specified would have to be in operational service by the mid 1970s, when the last of Britain’s carriers would finally be faded out.
Hawker-Siddclcy Dynamics offered to adapt the air-to-sea, Anglo-French missile—Martel—to a ship-to-ship role, but a considerable amount of development was involved. An additional boost motor had to be fitted to get it off the deck and a new guidance system had to Be designed. The air-launched Martel has cither the British television guidance system or the French anti-radar horning head, neither of which was considered suitable for a ship-to-ship missile. Hawker-Siddeley could not guarantee to get the missile into service by the mid 1970s, so the British government began to look elsewhere. They eventually decided to take the French Rxocet.
In the United States, with far more carrier-borne aircraft, and less sign of a run-down in the naval air arm, there was less urgency to develop a ship-to-ship missile. As more nations acquired such J weapon, however, it became obvious ■hat the U. S. Navy could not be left Behind in developing what was rapidly Becoming the main naval armament of the 1970s. Approval was given to begin development of the Harpoon missile.
1 he Harpoon, however, will not be in service until 1977, so they are being forced to look around for an interim weapon. Both the Exocet and the Ital- ian/Frcnch Otomat are being studied at the present time.
Great Britain has not entirely forgotten the helicopter idea and so, with I rancc, they have realized that something more modern than the AS-12 is required. As a result, the British Aircraft Corporation, Hawker-Siddeley, and Aerospatiale of France arc all carrying out stud- ■es of a new helicopter-launched missile.
I he staff target is for a missile which ls self-homing, cither by its own radar °r by infrared. It must have a stand-off range sufficient to enable the helicopter to stay outside the range of the target ship’s weapons (a figure of eight miles 15 being discussed), and it must be light enough to be carried by a frigate-borne helicopter. Britain and France will jointly evaluate the completed studies Jnd will then select a contractor to supply both countries.
Methods of Guidance— Before going on to describe the various missiles available today, a word must be said on the methods of guidance available. Ship-to- ship missiles are, of course, a development of the ship-to-air missile, and the first method of guidance of such weapons was to illuminate the target by the ship’s radar and then to launch the missile along the radar beam. Sensors in the missile detect the radar beam and by delicate movements of the aileron and rudder, keep it on track. Such a system is known as beam-riding and, although it has been used for ship-to- ship missiles, it has largely been superseded by some means of self-homing. The cheapest way of doing this is semi-active homing. Here, the target is illuminated by the ship’s radar as before, but the missile is fitted with a radar receiver which detects the waves reflected from the target by virtue of the firing ship’s radar beam falling on it. The missile uses these reflected waves to guide itself onto the target.
Such a method presupposes that the ship can illuminate the target all the time, which may not be possible because of electronic countermeasures (ECM). Alternatively, the ship may lie outside radar range or want to launch the missile and steam away as fast as possible, switching off her radar to make any form of retaliation more difficult. This led to the development of active radar homing, in which the missile carries its own radar transmitter and receiver and illuminates the target as it approaches. The missile’s radar searches for the target, locks on, and then guides the missile to a hit. It is usually combined with a system of inertial navigation. Into this system is fed the firing ship’s position and the position of the target. On takeoff, the inertial navigator guides the missile to the vicinity of the target and then the missile’s radar takes over, searches, acquires, and finally guides the missile to hit. The advantage of an inertial navigator is that no transmission from the ship or the missile need be made during the approach flight, and thus there is nothing to jam. The missile’s radar is so arranged that it switches itself on at the last possible moment, thus allowing the target only a very short space of time to intercept the transmissions, identify them, and jam.
Another method which does not require any transmission from the missile is infrared (IR) homing. The missile is fitted with a sensitive IR receiver, which scans the sea and when it detects an object emitting infrared waves, locks on and guides the missile to the target. IR waves are emitted by any object which is at a different temperature to the sea and, since a ship is naturally much hotter than her surroundings, she is likely to emit considerable IR radiation.
Similarly, no transmission is required from the missile if anti-radar homing is employed. The missile is fitted with a radar receiver and simply intercepts the target’s radar transmissions and homes onto them. Such systems have been used with air-to-ground missiles in Vietnam with success, and at sea, it is probable that any ship, faced with a possible missile attack, will use her radar. Provided the enemy’s frequencies arc known, it is not too difficult for the missile’s receiver to search a band of frequencies and lock on when the correct one is found. There are a number of ways by which a missile can be deceived, and most modern navies have sophisticated radar designed to make homing difficult, if not impossible.
The only other way of guiding a missile is by commands transmitted by radio to the missile from the firing ship, or possibly from a cooperating aircraft. This involves the operator being able to "see” both the missile and the target, either by eye, television, or radar. The normal method is for the operator to have a small joystick which he moves in the direction he wants the missile to go—movements of the stick automatically transmitting radio commands to the missile. The system depends on the skill of the operator.
Most modern ship-to-ship missiles use inertial navigation, combined with active radar homing or infrared homing. With active radar homing, there is always a chance that the missile will select the wrong target to home in on and, of course, the radar can be jammed provided the target is sufficiently alert. Another possible defense would be to tow some sort of radar transponder astern of the ship which would give the missile’s radar a more attractive echo, thus ensuring that it homed onto the transponder rather than the ship.
EXOCET | Aerospatiale (France) | 1,600 |
OTOMAT | Matra (France) Oto Melara (Italy) | 1,400 |
SEA KILLER Mk II | Sistcl (Italy) Contraves (Switz.) | 600 |
GABRIEL | Israeli Aircraft Industries | 870 |
PENGUIN | Kongsberg Vapenfabrikk (Norway) | 727 |
RB-08 | SAAB (Sweden) | 2,475 |
HARPOON | McDonnell Douglas IBM | p |
STYX | Soviet | 3,000 |
STRELA | Soviet | p |
SHADDOCK | Soviet | p |
Table 1 Ship-to-ship Missiles
20 to 25 | 0.96 Mach | Inertial nav. and active radar homing |
40 to 50 | Subsonic | Inertial nav. and active radar homing |
12 | Subsonic | Beam riding or visual |
12 or 24 (two versions) | Subsonic | Inertial nav. and active radar or IR homing |
12 | Subsonic | Inertial nav. and IR homing |
150 | Subsonic | Inertial nav. and active radar homing? |
Over horizon | p | Inertial nav. and active radar homing |
12 to 24 | Subsonic, but some versions may be supersonic | Inertial nav. and self-homing |
100 | Subsonic | Command guidance and self-homing |
350 to 400 | Supersonic | Inertial nav. and active radar homing Mid-course command guidance |
110
Weight Range in
Missile Manufacturer in Pounds Nautical Miles Speed Guidance
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1972
Inertial navigation systems are immune from jamming, but the missile is kept in level, usually low trajectory, flight by a radio altimeter and it might be possible to jam this.
An IR homer could also be deceived by towing a device which gave off stronger IR waves than the ship. Any form of towed device would have to be permanently streamed and actuated by a switch as soon as the missile was detected. It would not be known for certain what type of homing was to be employed, and it would probably be necessary for both the radar transponder and the IR device to be towed, a situation which few captains would enjoy. A more sensible solution would appear to be some form of decoy that could be fired out of a gun, or otherwise launched, to get it away from the ship.
Another idea is to put a wall of water between the ship and the missile, per
haps by firing a depth charge set shallow. This might upset the missile’s radar and possibly fox an IR homer. Undoubtedly, however, the best defense would be to shoot the missile down if it is not possible to prevent it from being fired.
We have, so far, only considered comparatively short-range missiles, fired from not more than radar horizon distance. With good inertial navigation, however, it should be possible to develop a missile that could be fired well outside radar range. The target’s position would have to be obtained, either by aircraft reports or possibly by accurate fixes on its electronic transmissions. The missile’s homing device would have to have a wide arc of search to allow for errors and the missile would have to fly very low to avoid alerting the target too soon.
The Soviet Union has its Shaddock
and Strela missiles, both of which havC ranges well beyond the radar horizon, in some cases as much as 400 mib With such long ranges, it seems very unlikely that their inertial navigator* could get them close enough to a ship target for the missile’s homing system to pick it up. It is thought that the)' must rely on some form of mid-courst guidance.
The generally accepted idea is that an aircraft would be in a position so it had an enemy ship on its radar and that i[ would either direct the missile onto the target by radio commands, or the missile would use the aircraft’s radar returns m order to home, i.c., semi-active homing
The mid-course guidance aircraft would appear to be very vulnerable in the presence of a carrier or long-range ship-to-air missiles, and so there is J school of thought that mid-course gui<f‘ ance could be carried out by a sub-
Professional Note* 111
marine. Another possibility is that the Soviet trawlers, which so often shadow NATO ships, might be capable of guiding a long-range missile to hit, and would be used for pre-emptive strikes before war was declared. That would, however, be the only time that they would be so used.
Western Missiles— Let us take a look « the ship-to-ship missiles in service or under development in the West. Their main parameters are shown in Table 1. It is not proposed to discuss the very short-range, wire-guided missiles, such as the French SS-u, or those missiles that arc primarily designed for ship-to-air use, but which have a limited anti-ship capability.
Exocet— Made by Aerospatiale of France, the Exocet was originally known as MM-38. The name is singularly appropriate since it is French for flying fish, and the missile skims the tops of the waves in a similar manner.
Hie missile is 17 feet long, with a body diameter of 1.1 feet and a wingspan of 3.3 feet. It weighs 1,600 pounds at launch. It has two solid propellant motors—a booster to get it off the deck lnd a sustainer to keep it in flight. Fixed fins are fitted to the after portion of the body to help stabilize the missile during lift-off, and there arc four movable coni'0! fins. The sustainer motor will get 11 up to Mach 0.96 during the final s’ages of the flight. Its range is about 20 to 25 nautical miles, but the exact rangc has not been revealed for obvious reasons.
The missile is divided into six compliments. Forward is the homing head, wbich contains a radar, known as AI5AC.
‘s of a novel design in that it com- b|ncs in it the proximity fuze. The radar "or only homes the missile, but it meas- Ufes the rangc of the target and when 11 gets to a pre-set distance explodes the r-harge. It is specially designed to cope W|'h "sea clutter,” and it is claimed that 11 will operate satisfactorily in Sea States UP to 4 or 5. It is also fitted with anti- fimming devices.
Abaft the homing head is the forward ’'luipment compartment, then follows ‘be warhead, which is either exploded v the proximity fuze or explodes after 11 bas penetrated the ship’s side. Next c°mes the sustainer motor, then the D°ostcr, and finally there is a rear equip
ment bay. The two equipment bays contain the inertial navigation system.
The missile is in a container mounted on the launcher. It is controlled initially by the ship’s fire control system, which consists of a coordinate change device. Into this is fed the bearing and rangc of the target, plus own ship’s position, course, and speed, and the true vertical. A computer in the coordinate change device works out the impact point for the missile, and this is fed into the inertial navigator inside the missile. The enemy’s position is normally obtained by the ship’s radar, but the missile could be fired without the use of radar provided a reasonably accurate position of the target can be obtained by other means—such as an airborne visual or radar link.
On launching, the missile rises to nearly 200 feet and then descends to a very low level (about 10 feet) by a radio altimeter. The homing radar is not used until the last moment to avoid jamming and then is automatically switched on when the missile has traveled to a pre-set distance. It is estimated that it will only be on for the last 30-to-40 seconds of flight. The radar searches an arc ahead of the missile and, on acquiring the target, locks on, and the missile is then guided by using the radar returns.
The fire control system is arranged so that, having fired one or two missiles at a particular target, it is available to program a second missile, or batch of missiles, onto a new target, thus permitting multiple engagements to be carried out almost simultaneously.
The Royal Navy hopes to start fitting the Exocet in 1973. Most frigates and all larger ships are to be fitted, and existing ships will be retro-fitted. It can also be fitted in patrol boats.
Olomat—Oto Mclara of Italy and Engins Matra of France are jointly developing the Otomat, a missile whose range is considerably longer than a ship’s radar. It is, in many respects, similar to the Exocet. It has inertial navigation, active radar homer, flies low over the water controlled by a radio altimeter, and its size and weight are similar, but slightly smaller.
The missile’s radar will search an arc which covers a ship crossing at up to 40 knots at whatever the range, i.c., at short ranges, the radar searches a wider
arc than it does at long ranges.
The Otomat has two properties, however, that are not possessed by the Exocet. It has a turbine for cruising and two solid propellant motors for boost at launch, which give it a range of 40 nautical miles. It also rises at the end of the flight and attacks the ship in a steep dive during which it attains supersonic speed. The object is to penetrate through the more vulnerable decks. For this reason, it is not fitted with a proximity fuze and has a semi-armor piercing warhead.
The Otomat was first fired at the end of 1971, with further trials presently taking place. It is expected to be operational in 1973. The Italian Navy will fit one ship for evaluation firings and then fit it in a number of fast patrol boats. It will be possible to fit the naval version of the Otomat in helicopters, and will also be available for fixed-wing aircraft, without the booster motors, making it lighter.
Sea Killer— There are two versions of this missile—Mark 1 and II—made by Sistcl of Italy. The Mark 1 is presently operational in the Italian Navy, but it has a rangc of only about five nautical miles. The Mark II, by the addition of a booster that is jettisoned after launch, has a rangc of about 12 nautical miles.
No self-homing is fitted and the missile is a beam rider. If the ship’s radar is jammed or put out of action, however, the missile can be guided visually by means of radio commands. A television system is provided to aid the operator’s vision. The warhead is semi-armor piercing and is fitted with cither an impact or influence fuze.
The missiles are normally mounted on a quintuple, rotatable launcher, although a fixed, single-launcher can be provided. Two radars are necessary, one for search and the other for control of the missile.
Gabriel— The Israeli Gabriel was the first ship-to-ship missile to go to sea outside of the Soviet Union. Manufactured by Israel’s largest armaments firm—Israeli Aircraft Industries—it is smaller than Exocet, and slightly larger than Sea Killer Mark II. There are two configurations, one with a rangc of 12 nautical miles and the other with a rangc of 24 nautical miles, but the warheads are identical. The missile comes
in a fiber glass container which is placed on the launcher.
Guidance is by inertial navigation with what the Israelis call "automatic homing.” It is not known what method is used, but it is obviously either active radar or infrared. The Gabriel, which is subsonic, has been fitted in ships of the Israeli Navy.
Penguin— In 1962, long before the sinking of the Eilath, Norway made up its mind that, for it at least, the best weapon for its small navy, and particularly for its fast patrol boats, was a ship- to-ship missile. The Norwegian Defense Research Establishment, working in conjunction with A/S Kongsberg
Vapenfabrikk, and assisted by the United States and Germany, began development, and the Penguin became operational about a year ago.
The Penguin uses inertial navigation and infrared homing, the only missile in the NATO armory to do so. The homing system guides the missile to hit at the waterline, so as to inflict maximum damage. The maximum range is 12 nautical miles and propulsion is by solid propellant boost and sustainer motors. Height above the water is controlled by a laser altimeter, but the missile is not a wave skimmer.
Primarily designed for small craft, the total all-up weight of a system, includ
ing four-to-six missiles, is three-to-four tons. It is being fitted in the Norwegian motor torpedo boats, also the Oslo-c\ass frigates.
Rb-08—Made by Saab of Sweden, the Rb-08 is a large cruise missile with a range of 150 nautical miles. It uses inertial navigation and active radar homing, and it is the largest of all the non-Soviet missiles. Primarily designed for coastal defense, it has been fitted in two Swedish destroyers, that apparently use it only to radar range.
112
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1872
Harpoon—The last of the Western ship-to-ship missiles is the American Harpoon. The missile is being developed by McDonnell-Douglas. It is said to
have "over-the-horizon” range, about 30 nautical miles, hew other details have been released, but it is known to have an inertial navigation system and believed to have active radar homing. Its sentially, an air-to-surface anti-ship mis sile, it will also be fired from anti submarine launchers on board the DE-1052-class ships. In addition, it will be capable of being launched from helicopters. It is expected that the Harpoon will begin production stage in 1975 and become operational in 1977.
Soviet Missiles—Tbs Russians have three main missile types which NATO has termed Styx, Strela, and Shaddock. In addition, there are probably many
variations to these missiles.
Styx— Because it sank the Eilath, the Styx is probably the best known Soviet naval missile. Primarily designed for small craft, it is fitted in the Komar and Osa class of patrol boats of the Soviet Navy, and probably in similar boats supplied to Poland, Indonesia, and Egypt.
The original Styx was a ponderous, slow missile, but later versions are reported to be capable of reaching Mach 1. It is thought to be fitted with an active radar homer, but here again there are also reports of infrared homers. Its range has been given as between 12 and 24 nautical miles probably because of the
different versions of the same missile. While the Styx constitutes a threat, it is not a wave skimmer and it should not be too difficult to shoot down the slow version.
Strela—The next Soviet missile, according to range is the Strela.
Professional Notes
The Strela, a fairly old missile, is said to be radio-command-guided, and to have some form of self-homing device, possibly infrared. Its range is about 100 miles. Mid-course guidance is probably necessary when it is fired outside radar range. It is fitted in the Krupny and Kildin-class destroyers, using single launchers. For firing at long ranges, it is possible that mid-course guidance is
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provided by the helicopters carried by these ships.
Shaddock—This missile first made its appearance as a land based, ground-to- ground cruise missile, but it was subsequently adapted for naval use. It is thought to be between 30 and 40 feet long, and is fitted in Kresta 1 and Kynda-class cruisers. In the Kresta 1 class, there are two twin launchers, but the Kynda class has two quadruple launchers, one forward and one aft.
The Shaddock in its main version is reputed to have a range of 350 to 400 miles, but there are probably smaller versions with considerable less ranges. Like the others, it probably has inertial navigation and self-homing. The long- range missiles undoubtedly require mid-course guidance, either from an aircraft, ship, or submarine.
The Shaddock is also fitted in a large number of submarines of the E-l, E-2, J, and W classes, with from two to eight missiles each. It seems likely that the submarine missiles are of the shorter- rangc type and ranges as low as 25 miles have been mentioned. While it is diffi-
cult to guess the Soviet tactics, it would appear that the type of missile required by a submarine is one which could be fired while submerged outside the screen at a target whose position had been reasonably accurately established. The lone submarine would be unlikely to be able to establish his target’s position from more than about 25 miles away, thus a missile range of about this figure would seem logical. Certainly such a missile would constitute a grave threat to surface ship operations.
A new Soviet missile was seen in a ship of the Krivak class, when she passed through the English Channel in the fall of 1971. It is small and is fitted in a quadruple launcher forward in the ship. It is thought to be a ship-to-ship missile, probably with a horizon range only. The same missile has been seen in the Kresta II class.
If the Soviets really have developed a horizon range missile, it would serve to support the contention of many NATO naval staffs that the great long- range missiles, such as the Shaddock, are not really viable, because of the prob
lems of mid-course guidance and target identification.
The Sixty Second Problem—While ship-to-ship missiles undoubtedly pose a problem in naval warfare, it is one that is not entirely new. In World War II, the Japanese employed similar weapons with their Kamikaze bombers. Even a conventional air attack is not dissimilar to a missile attack. The main difference lies in the speed of modern missiles, far greater than that of an aircraft, and the sophisticated homing methods employed are far more efficient than a Japanese pilot or a bomb aimer.
Defense against missiles can be compared to that against aircraft, but the whole problem of acquiring the missile target, identifying it, and taking the necessary action is condensed into seconds instead of minutes. It takes the Exocet (or perhaps the Shaddock) only two minutes to travel 20 miles from launch to hit. If the target ship detects the missile at ten miles, this allows her 60 seconds in which to destroy or divert it. It is these 60 seconds which may well decide the naval battles of the future.
Derelicts of the Sea
By J. Warren Giles, Member of the Bar of New York, Chicago, and Washington, DC.
Roll on thou deep and dark blue Ocean— roll! Ten thousand fleets sweep over thee in vain; Man marks the earth with ruin; his control stops with the shore; upon the watery plain the wrecks are all thy deed, nor doth remain a shadow of man’s ravage, save his own, when for a moment, like a drop of rain, he sinks into thy depths with bubbling groan, without a grave, unknelled, uncoffmed, and unknown.
George Gordon, Lord Byron
Who has rights in, and ownership of, wrecked or derelict vessels and their contents which are not cast up on the shore?
It is clearly established under American law that the owners of a wrecked
or derelict vessel do not cease to be the owners until they have abandoned their property in the vessel or her contents (229 Fed. 2nd 153). Wrecks and property lying at the bottom of the sea, which can be identified by the owners remain their property, provided they appear within the statutory period after recovery to make their claim. The vessel and the cargo belong to the owner until there has been a definite abandonment, and the wrecked vessel is still subject to bargain and sale. In a Federal case, we find that the owner of a scow which had been wrecked and sunk during a storm, but subsequently was raised, towed away, and repaired by a stranger, who acted without permission of the owner and in defiance of the express
prohibition of the owner, was allowed to recover the vessel, in spite of the fact that the value of the vessel had been greatly enhanced by virtue of the repairs.
In another Federal case, a stranger placed a buoy, made of a barrel, over a wrecked vessel lying partially submerged in the shoal water off Vineyard Haven, Massachusetts. The hull was completely submerged but two masts appeared above the water. The barrel contained a formal document reciting an intention to seize and take possession of the wrecked vessel because of the alleged abandonment by the owner. Bm the court held that such a marking of the wreck with this buoy conferred no rights on the one so placing the buoy- The court also found that the owner
Professional Notes 11)
had shown a constant intention, since the sinking, to salvage the vessel and its cargo. The court observed that there was no principle under which one could stake out a claim to a derelict by floating barrels over it and depositing in one of them a statement that he claimed the wreck.
In a more dramatic case, a whaling ship was wrecked and went to pieces on a reef near a small Pacific island. The crew, under the leadership of the captain, manufactured tools, reworked the timbers from the wreck, and built a small schooner in which they made their escape with a portion of the oil and remnants saved from the wreck. The court held that, in spite of their heroic efforts, the remnants of the wrecked ship still belonged to the owner. Hut since the wreck, as it lay, was of no value to the owner, he owned no part of the small escape vessel constructed by the crew. Hardly a great concession. Thus, it is very evident that the finding of derelict property at sea is not sufficient to give title to the finders.
An English case, in 1924, involved two rival salvage companies removing the contents of a torpedoed vessel lying in deep water in the North Sea and thought to contain a large quantity of gold specie. In this case, the court pointed out that property may be derelict on the seas without being abandoned, and indicated that the intention °f the original owners to abandon the shipwrecked gold would have to be clearly-proved before ownership of the gold at the bottom of the sea could be determined.
How do you show that a vessel has been abandoned by her owners, and must the abandonment be voluntary? What arc the factors in establishing abandonment? Under general principles °f law, abandonment of a vessel consists of two elements, the act and the intention, and the paramount inquiry is directed to the intention. Naturally, this question of abandonment is a question of fact to be determined by all the circumstances.
In a Maryland case, a salvage company eeased salvaging scrap metals from its vessels submerged in Chesapeake Bay, near Sandy Point, Maryland. It sold its salvage equipment to outsiders and, for over two years, permitted persons living
near the Bay to sell scrap from such vessels without compensation or permission. Here, it was held that the company had abandoned the vessels. The court stated that property is abandoned when the owner walks off and leaves it, with no intention of claiming it again, or exercising any rights of ownership over it. It then belongs to anyone who takes possession of it.
In an Alabama case, the courts said that a jury might properly find that a wrecked barge had been abandoned when such parts of its machinery and appliances as could conveniently be removed, had been removed, and when no buoys or lights bad been placed on the wreck. In addition, persons who had last been in charge of the wreck, had stated that it had been abandoned.
The most significant factor indicating abandonment appears to be the passage of a considerable length of time, without any effort on the part of the owners, to secure repossession of their property. In Arkansas, a cargo of lead was sunk in the wreck of a Mississippi steamboat. For two weeks after the sinking, efforts were made to remove the contents of the vessel, which terminated when the river rose, and these efforts were no longer resumed. Two years after the sinking, an island formed on the wreck and remained for about 20 years, before washing away. A total period of 28 years intervened between the sinking and the operation which recovered a portion of the cargo. Here the court, holding that there had been an abandonment of the cargo, laid stress on the long period of time during which the wreck had been left undisturbed in a shifting river bed. By the same token, a British frigate sunk in the territorial waters of New York during the Revolutionary War was regarded as abandoned property after 40 years had elapsed. On the other hand, a vessel laden with petroleum which had been scuttled and sunk in 35 feet of water to extinguish a fire on board, was not shown to have been abandoned so as to justify a wreckmaster in taking possession of the vessel under a statute authorizing him to take possession of wrecked property. It appeared that the owners of the vessel promptly made contracts for the purpose of raising the vessel and had men and equipment alongside the vessel at the time the
wreckmaster forcibly took possession of her. Hence, the owners of the vessel recovered her from the wreckmaster.
Sometimes when a vessel has been abandoned, and another has taken possession of her, he may have to prove that his possession has been continuous.
In 1968, the U. S. District Court considered a case involving the propeller of the Acura which had been abandoned in 1902, following her having been stranded and sunk off Point Lookout, Long Island, New York. It appeared that Robert Rickard in the summer of
1962, while diving off Point Lookout, came in contact with the derelict Acara, commonly known as the "Tea Wreck.” Rickard dived to the scene of the wreck, and ascertained that the propeller of the derelict was of great size and weight, and that it bore the imprint "manufactured by Stones Bronze Company of London, England.” Rickard contacted the successors to Stones Bronze Company and was advised that this company was willing to purchase the propeller as an antique, and as an example of the company's early propellers, providing said propeller could be removed from the Acara. Rickard also ascertained that the propeller was of such a nature as a marine antique that its salvage would be an exciting event in the marine world; that a marine museum would be interested in its display, and that marine engineers and naval architects would also be interested because of the propeller’s ancient design and metallic composition, which had resisted the ravages of time and of the sea. So Rickard commenced salvage operations in 1962, and worked during the entire winter of 1962 and 1963. He placed floating buoys on the scene of his operations, never abandoning bis task from its commencement. He purchased special machinery, equipment, and supplies to carry on his work, and succeeded in detaching and removing the propeller from the wreck. Rickard then left the scene of operations to make arrangements to engage machinery for the purpose of lifting the blades of the propeller to the surface.
Apparently, one Jay E. Porter in July
1963, with full knowledge of this salvage operation, transported other persons to the scene of this salvage operation and, while Rickard was temporarily absent, dragged part of the propeller by means
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of a winch on board his vessel, along the bottom of the waters of the Sound to Freeport, New York. Porter and his associates sold part of the propeller for its metal content, and divided the proceeds of the sale. In granting judgment for Rickard here, the court said that Rickard, as the first salvor to commence salvage operations on the propeller, had a right to do so, since when a ship or property has been abandoned, or when she has been temporarily left, and is in a disabled or damaged condition, one who, in good faith, takes possession as a salvor, is not an interloper or trespasser. Since the Acara had rested on the ocean floor in an abandoned state for 60 years, ownership of the salvaged propeller would vest by operation of law in Rickard, as the first finder lawfully and fairly appropriating her, and reducing her to possession with intention to become her owner.
Those beginning a salvage service, and who are successfully prosecuting it, are entitled to the sole possession of the property. If they are interrupted or intercepted in their work by others who complete the salvage service and bring in the salved property, the first salvors will, nevertheless, be regarded as the meritorious salvors.
The English courts have taken the view that abandoned vessels and cargo belong, on recovery, to the sovereign, subject to the timely assertion of rights by the owners. This British view was carefully considered and used by the Florida court in a case decided by the Supreme Court of Florida, involving the U. S. battleship Massachusetts. This ship, after being used for Army Coast Artillery practice, was scuttled and sunk in the Gulf of Mexico approximately 1.2 miles off the entrance of Pensacola Bay in 1922. She has remained there ever since, largely undisturbed except by action of wind and water, which have gradually caused her to sink deeper into the sandy bottom. A portion of the gun turret is still visible above the surface of the water. The sunken battleship was in such condition that she could not be restored for use as a vessel. She is, however, now a haven for small marine life, and therefore attracts larger fish that feed upon such organisms. This, in turn, has made the site where the vessel lies a favorite fishing spot, so that she has,
over the years, attracted, and still does attract, large numbers of anglers. During the past few years, at least, relatively small parts of the ship’s brass and fittings have from time to time been removed by individuals.
There have also been efforts to organize the salvage of the sunken ship at times in the past. In August 1956, the defendant in the lawsuit, after preparations extending over two years, secured a navigational permit from the U. S. Corps of Engineers and commenced salvaging the battleship. The defendant took possession of the ship by marking her with buoys and lines. A telegram from the Secretary of the Navy announced that the United States had abandoned the vessel. The question which the Florida Court had to decide was whether Florida, in its sovereign capacity, has a possessory right or title to the wreck that could not be lawfully interfered with by the salvage company. The American court took the view that the wreck here was a "derelict” which, at common law, would belong to the Crown in its office of Admiralty at the end of a year and a day under the authority of the English cases. Since the property was resting in the territorial waters of Florida and within the boundaries of Escambia County, it was within the purview of the Common Law, and belonged to the state of Florida in its sovereign capacity. Hence, the state could enjoin a private association from conducting salvage operations on the vessel. The Chief Justice dissented, saying that the rights of the salvage company, the finder, were superior to the rights of the state.
This same philosophy appeared in a 1968 decision of the Supreme Court of North Carolina, involving diving and salvaging operations being conducted by the defendants upon the submerged hulks of certain Confederate blockade runners sunk in the coastal waters of North Carolina during the Civil War, and in similar operations by the defendants upon the wreck of a Spanish privateer sunk off the North Carolina coast during the early years of the 18th century. These old derelict vessels lie beneath the surface of the ocean within the territorial waters of the state. The injunction sought asked that the defendants return to the state of North
Carolina the various artifacts and objects of historical significance which they hat! wrongfully taken from these wrecks. The state itself had already commenced diving operations on these hulks and had removed from them certain cargo, furniture, and tackle for display at its restoration center at Fort Fisher. The court held that, inasmuch as North Carolina, in its sovereign capacity, had a possessory right or title to sunken vessels and their cargoes, which had lain unattended and abandoned for more than 100 years beneath the surface of the ocean, within the territorial limits of the state, the defendants were trespassers when they went on the hulls and removed any objects from them, and therefore, the defendants were required to return the historical artifacts which they had removed. These included bars of lead, files, copper tubing, and 19 silver-plated spoons. These blockade runners were some of the most beautiful ships that ever shaped a course for the North Carolina coast in the days of the Southern Confederacy, and represented an epoch that is unusual in our country’s history. In the modern art of war, the conditions which then prevailed can never occur again. Consequently, this decision by the North Carolina court is of particular significance in saving for posterity these irreplaceable relics.
We have been discussing rights in abandoned vessels, and the writer leaves with the reader the rule that personal property of any kind, on being abandoned, ceases to be the property of any person and thenceforth is no man's property, unless and until it is reduced to possession with intent to acquire title, or ownership of it. It may, accordingly, be appropriated by anyone, if it has not been reclaimed by the former owner, and ownership of it vests, by operation of law, in the person first lawfully appropriating it and reducing it to possession with an intention to become its owner, provided that the taking has been fair. One so appropriating abandoned property has a right to the property superior even to that of the former owner, and may hold it against him. This is the general rule which applies in American law to derelicts and is the fundamental rule which guides the courts in deciding the ultimate ownership in derelicts of the sea.