Proceedings Cover—“The American’s Creed”
(See February 1972 Proceedings)
E. R. Kingsbury—May I order, in large numbers, copies of this wonderful document? I would like to include a copy in all of my correspondence to let everyone know how I feel about my country.
Stephen L. Keleti—The cover . . . was outstanding. Is it possible to obtain a copy of this document—or a copy of the cover itself—suitable for framing?
Mrs. Vera Seter, John Marshall Junior-Senior High School, Milwaukee, Wisconsin—As a teacher, I am wondering if it would be possible to get some copies of this printed Creed for my students?
George K. Holland—The symbolism of the crumpled paper of this document, shows clearly the strain that our ideology has endured in recent times. No doubt, there are many civilians like myself, as well as Servicemen in all branches, who would be proud to display this Creed in your excellent portrayal, with all its subtle meanings. A magnificent job.
George W. Motherwell—I would like to know where I might obtain about 12 prints. My idea is to have them framed to hang in our local schools and some places of business where they might receive the attention that the content deserves.
Arthur A. Libby, Account Executive, Advertising Distributors of Maryland, Inc.—The American’s Creed renews our patriotism and reminds us of the simple standards for which our country was formed. Too many people have lost the real thrust of our heritage.
Theodore R. Blair—I am concerned about the February cover. The theme of patriotism is timely and well-chosen, but the quotation is co-saturated in both what Oliver Wendell Holmes called “sentimental goo” and in errors as to prevent casual readers from pursuing beyond the cover.
The high school and college population to which the recruiters talk are more literate and aware of subtle (and not so subtle) distinctions than their 1918 counterparts. The myths of 1918—war fever, an upcoming presidential election—are uncomfortably bathed in the glaring lights of better education and mass exposure to the news media. Hence, to put such things as “a democracy in a republic,” and “a sovereign nation of many sovereign states” on the cover is to invite the giggles and titters of those who seek ammunition to use against the military and undermine the confidence of those young Americans who are honestly patriotic, but skeptical.
In the Federalist Papers, we find the Founding Fathers deliberating the merits of a democracy, vis-à-vis, a republic. It does not take a great deal of time for them to dismiss the concept of democracy for the more tenable position of a republic. Unless he grows up in rural New England, with its town meetings, the young man uncertain about the Navy and thinking about all the propaganda he has heard from the far-left, who reads the February cover could easily be “turned-off” by the staleness of its language and the obvious errors in its context. For where but in the New England small town meetings do we find that “democracy in a republic?” City councilmen are elected to represent areas. Boards, chosen to represent cities, hire city managers. The cities are not examples of participatory democracy—they are examples of a representative style of government. So are the counties, the states themselves, and obviously the federal government by definition.
As far as “a sovereign nation of many sovereign states” is concerned, perhaps sovereign is one of those indefinable terms which may be used with impunity by those not wishing to make oneself clear. But the most swift gloss of high school civics—let alone college political science—cannot help but touch upon the Constitutional Convention and the Civil War. The Founding Fathers of our republic, became fathers when they found that separate and nearly “sovereign” states could not long survive. The governmental structure which flows from the Constitution leaves little doubt as to where the “sovereignty” lies—and it is not in the states. If this was unclear up to 1861, by 1865 the question of the sovereignty of the states was settled.
Patriotism, again, is a timely and a noble theme for the Proceedings. But using poor material such as the cover quotation, when so much better material is available—Lincoln’s Second Inaugural, Kennedy’s Inaugural, speeches from the Revolutionary War—tempts the skeptical to “throw the baby out with the bath water,” and not read the fine articles inside.
Editor’s Note: Reader Blair will be interested, if perhaps not reassured, to learn of the sources of the phrases he finds objectionable. See following Comment.
Captain William H. Gridley, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired), U. S. Naval Institute Golden Life Member—The following is a reproduction of a leaflet concerning the American’s Creed. A copy of this original printing is in my file, and upon inquiry I was told by the Government Printing Office that the leaflet is out of print and is no longer available.
It is believed that the story of the background from which the phraseology originated would be of interest to the readers of the Proceedings.
[FEBRUARY 1972 COVER]
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THE STORY OF THE AMERICAN’S CREED
The idea of laying special emphasis upon the duties and obligations of citizenship in the form of a national creed originated with Henry S. Chapin.
In 1916-17 a contest, open to all Americans, was inaugurated in the press throughout the country to secure “the best summary of the political faith of America.” The contest was informally approved by the President of the United States. Through Mayor James H. Preston, the city of Baltimore, as the birthplace of the Star-Spangled Banner, offered a prize of $1,000, which was accepted, and the following committees were appointed: A committee on manuscripts, consisting of Porter Emerson Browne and representatives from leading American magazines, with headquarters in New York City; a committee on award, consisting of Matthew P. Andrews, Irvin S. Cobb, Hamlin Garland, Ellen Glasgow, Julian Street, Booth Tarkington, and Charles Hanson Towne; and an advisory committee, consisting of Dr. P. P. Claxton, United States Commissioner of Education, governors of States, United States Senators, and other National and State officials.
The winner of the contest and the author of the creed selected proved to be William Tyler Page, of Friendship Heights, Md., a descendant of President Tyler and also of Carter Braxton, one of the signers of the Declaration of Independence.
[From the Congressional Record]
The complete proceedings in regard to the official acceptance of The American's Creed may be found in the Congressional Record, No. 102, April 13, 1918, from which is taken the following explanation of the doctrinal origin of the creed:
“The United States of America.”
—Preamble, Constitution of the United States.
“A government of the people, by the people, for the people.”
—Preamble, Constitution of the United States; Daniel Webster’s speech in the Senate, January 26. 1830; Abraham Lincoln's Gettysburg speech.
“Whose just powers are derived from the consent of the governed."
—Thomas Jefferson, in Declaration of Independence.
“A democracy in a republic.”
—James Madison, in The Federalist, No. 10; Article X of the amendments to Constitution.
“A sovereign Nation of many sovereign States.”
—“E pluribus unum,” great seal of the United States; Article IV of the Constitution.
“A perfect Union.”
—Preamble to the Constitution.
“One and inseparable.”
—Webster’s speech in the Senate, January 26, 1830.
“Established upon those principles of freedom, equality, justice, and humanity for which American patriots sacrificed their lives and fortunes.”
—Declaration of Independence.
“I therefore believe it is my duty to my country to love it.”
—In substance from Edward Everett Hale's The Man Without a Country.
“To support its Constitution.”
—Oath of allegiance, section 1737, Revised Statutes of the United States.
“To obey its laws.”
—Washington’s Farewell Address; Article VI, Constitution of the United States.
“To respect its flag.”
—National anthem. The Star-Spangled Banner; Army and Navy Regulations: War Department circular on flag etiquette, April 14, 1917.
“And to defend it against all enemies.”
—Oath of allegiance, section 1737, Revised Statutes of the United States.
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“Patriotism: The Self-evident Truths”
(See E. Mason, pp. 30-33, February 1972 Proceedings)
Neil Albert—I suspect that the average age of those with laudatory comments will approach 60. As Mr. Mason directs his remarks primarily at the generation about to undertake lifetime roles in our society, I feel that as a member of that generation, my remarks may have more relevance than the uncritical acceptances that those of his own generation will compose.
“One thing,” states Mr. Mason, “is painfully evident; in the absence of sufficient knowledge, an abundance of self-appointed experts will appear.” With this sentiment I agree wholeheartedly, and the best example I have seen in recent days is Mr. Mason himself, who sets himself up as an authority concerning the meaning of patriotism. Specifically, he derides Peace Corps and Vista service as not patriotic because they do not serve to defend our country. I charge the author with being unimaginative as well as naive. Does our country’s only defense consist of minefields, ABMs, tanks, and aircraft? For nearly three years, the war in Vietnam has been the struggle by both sides to manipulate the minds of the South Vietnamese populace, and I submit we have lost that war because of our inability to inspire trust in ourselves and our endeavors. Limited war in the 20th century is a war for the support of the Third World nations, and we are fighting this war in every village where a Peace Corpsman explains democracy or teaches school. A dozen Vietnams will never reach the shooting stage because of efforts by the Peace Corps, and Mr. Mason to the contrary, a war prevented on our terms is a war won.
Daryl P. Domning, Department of Paleontology, University of California—Thank you very much for giving us all a vivid and valuable insight into what I fear is the FBI mentality. We should all be grateful . . . that Mr. Mason’s version of patriotism does not (yet) have the force of law in this country.
A pleasant contrast to his views is provided by Lieutenant Katauskas’ thoughtful and well-reasoned article in the same issue on a related topic—written by a regular naval officer. I share his doubts about the wisdom (not to mention the workability) of an all-volunteer military, primarily for fear of increasing the military’s isolation from civilian society. A possible alternative which occurred to me, and which I do not think I have heard proposed in exactly this form, is as follows: a universal system of compulsory national service, for men and women alike, with an individual option for either, say, two years in the Armed Forces (active duty), or four years in the Peace Corps, VISTA, or a comparable program. This would preserve the “citizen soldier” concept and “civilian ventilation” of the military, do away with many inequities of the draft’s involuntary servitude, help recruitment for social action programs, and by its sharp differential in time of service, discourage mass enlistment for the social programs to avoid military service. It emphatically does not embody the silly notion that VISTA or Peace Corps service is intrinsically less valuable or “patriotic” than military service.
Captain H. L. Marr, U. S. Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Special Studies & Presentations Group (OP-09D)—We desire to include a copy of Ed Mason’s article in a future mailing of background material to some 500 members of the Chief of Naval Operations’ Sea Power Speakers Team.
Ensign James A. Noone, U. S. Naval Reserve—I would like to compliment Ed Mason for his appropriate and timely suggestions concerning our preparation for the 1976 bicentennial. The 200th anniversary of the United States should certainly be a time of rededication and recommitment to those principles that guided the development of our country. I am a bit mystified, however, by the author’s definition of “patriotism.” I am afraid he and I do not share the same “self-evident truths” regarding the concept of the term.
Mr. Mason gives his definition of patriotism: “Patriotism, in its most simple definition, relates to ‘love, support, and defense of country with devotion.’ ” He observes that, “Service in the Peace Corps is no more a defense of one’s country than is a study of music or veterinary medicine.”
Obviously, the issue at stake is the definition of patriotism. The author suggests that defense of one’s country is the controlling factor in the concept. Thus, anyone who has never been in the Armed Forces is presumably not a patriot in Mr. Mason’s eyes.
My Webster’s New World Dictionary (College Edition) defines “patriotism” as “love and loyal or zealous support of one’s own country, especially in all matters involving other countries.” My Reader’s Digest Great Encyclopedic Dictionary defines “patriotism” simply as “Devotion to one’s country.”
The author’s error, in my opinion, is that he artificially includes the criterion of “defense” in his concept of patriotism. Although service in the Armed Forces is admirable and desirable, there are other ways to demonstrate one’s patriotism (i.e., love of and devotion to one’s country), such as the Peace Corps and VISTA.
I might paraphrase the article: “one constantly encounters an attitude such as that offered by Mr. Mason. It is not at all unusual and may be rather widely accepted by older people. The author sincerely thinks that his thoughts relate to patriotism whereas, in fact, his outlook pertains to personal preference and has little to do with patriotism.”
I think we can all benefit from an occasional airing of concepts that tend to become rigid in our minds.
Lieutenant Michael T. Isenberg, U. S. Naval Reserve-R—It was with some anger and distress that I read [the article]. My anger was conditioned by the ignorance and gross assumptions running through the entire article; my distress was that you saw fit to let the article see the light of day.
Mr. Mason apparently holds to the notion that there is something ephemeral yet tangible called “patriotism.” He asserts that what it is not is “pacifism,” for pacifists and patriots part over the issue of defense of country. This crude differentiation does a great disservice to the many degrees of pacifism possible, and it does a great disservice to some of our greatest “patriots”—those who do not wear military uniforms.
The article views patriotism as a timeless thing which can be “recycled” as the current crises permit. I submit that patriotism, whatever else it might be, is as relative a proposition as anything else. The overweening nationalism to which patriotism has ever been linked is most evident in the author’s comment that we “still act for the human race.” This chauvinistic boorishness is part of the worst face America can present internationally. . . .
An individual with Mason’s quasi-historical turn of mind should have noted that one of the strengths of our society is precisely that kind of criticism he derides. The criticism may be irrelevant or even damaging; the point is that the principle must be maintained. Knowledge and experience in national defense are not the sole prerogative of military men nor of their supporters.
Finally, Mr. Mason has presented us with some “history” which needs refuting. He asserts that this country finds “. . . nothing shameful in the 196-year winning streak its military arms have compiled.” Nothing shameful in the needless and futile War of 1812? In the prolonged agonies which our government called “Indian Removal”? In a protracted internecine war which claimed the lives of over half a million Americans? In the totally unnecessary Spanish-American War?
In summation, the author’s plea is well-founded, but his analysis and his methods are hopelessly inadequate. He rests his call for patriotic rejuvenation on the same trite manipulation of symbols, ceremonies, and rituals that have done mankind so great a disservice in the past. If defense be a proper issue, and it certainly is, then let us not equate it with hoary shibboleths that cannot be supported by historical evidence. Rather, let us employ the most precious American right—that of constructive criticism from all segments of the population—to give meaning to our own personal visions of patriotism. In this lies our strongest defense, perhaps our country’s ultimate salvation.
Editor’s Note: The unusual number of requests, representing a total of some 1,300 copies, for reprints of the February cover, prompted the special reprint described in Secretary’s Notes on page 4 of the April issue. A considerable, continuing reader response is also indicated in the number of similar inquiries received with regard to Ed Mason’s article, “Patriotism: The Self-evident Truths,” and the February pictorial, “Recruiting Posters—WWI.”
“A ‘Tin Soldier’ is a Good Soldier”
(See E. B. Strauss, pp. 94-97, February 1972 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Robert E. Serfass, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Admiral Strauss’s discussion on “spit and polish” certainly deserves consideration for our new military force, and our Navy in particular.
I served with then Captain Strauss in the USS Fresno (CL-121), and can report with firsthand experience that he ran a “taut” ship. The effectiveness of spit and polish and his leadership made this vessel one of the most valuable units of the Fleet, which men were proud to be a part of. It is rewarding to learn that Admiral Strauss has not compromised his convictions in the 26 years that have transpired.
Malcolm Muir, Jr., Assistant Professor of History, Middle Georgia College—I would like to dispute Admiral Strauss’s contention that “. . . there is a demonstratable relationship between spit and polish and combat ability.” I would submit that spit and polish cannot be correlated with martial excellence.
To counter Admiral Strauss’s examples, look at the record of the Confederate cavalry outfit commanded by Nathan Bedford Forrest. This unit was utterly ragtag, and yet at Brice’s Crossroads (1864) decimated a much more polished Union outfit over twice its size. The Confederate Army on the whole was never noted as being composed of “tin soldiers.” It is interesting in this respect that U. S. Grant, who finally defeated the well-turned-out Lee, was not particularly tidy, either.
During World War II, Captain T. L. Gatch, of the battleship USS South Dakota (BB-57), operated his ship in an unusual fashion. Samuel Eliot Morison states, “As a close student of the Civil War, Gatch had reached the conclusion that taut, spic-and-span units never fought well; so he let his men wear anything or nothing—‘They looked like a lot of wild men.’ He let his ship get abominably dirty and diverted all his men’s energies to perfecting their shooting.” As a result, during the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands on 26 October 1942, the South Dakota was officially credited with downing 26 Japanese planes.
In fact, polish has often been emphasized to the detriment of military efficiency. During the late 19th century, target practice was rarely held in some units of the Royal Navy because the powder smoke smudged the brasswork. It took years of hard work by Jackie Fisher and Percy Scott to eradicate this concern with the trivial and to restore the Navy to fighting trim.
It has been suggested (somewhat humorously) in Horizon, that the brilliantly dressed army will usually lose—the Sukhomlinov effect (after the impressively uniformed, but totally incapable Russian general of World War I.) To give a few examples—Gates vs. Burgoyne at Saratoga (1777), France vs. Prussia at Valmy (1792), Houston vs. Santa Ana at San Jacinto (1836), Germany vs. France at the Battle of the Frontiers (1914), Eisenhower vs. Rundstedt (1944), Mao Tse-tung vs. Chiang Kai-Shek (1949), and Giap vs. Westmoreland (1968). The first of each pair was sartorially inferior, yet victorious.
All this is not to suggest that spic-and-span units are necessarily inadequate, but just that there are other ways, perhaps ways more productive than an emphasis on spit and polish, to give men pride in their unit.
“Lieutenant General Lewis B. Puller, U. S. Marine Corps”
(See Notebook, pp. 121-122, February 1972 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral Carlton R. Adams, U. S. Navy (Retired)—The stirring article on the funeral of Lieutenant General Puller by Smith Hempstone was one of the highlights of the February issue of the Proceedings. Many of us must have missed it in The Evening Star of Washington, D.C. It is a thought-provoking masterpiece sketch of a great fighting military man, who was not given all the credit due him while living.
The picture of “Chesty” with the pack on his back, accompanying the article, reminded me of the last time I saw him—in the early part of World War II in the Pacific. The two of us, with other Navy and Marine officers, were on a medical evacuation plane going to new duty stations. I remember what a startling contrast he made with the other passengers. All of us were in our best pressed uniforms, except for Chesty—he had on camouflaged battle dress, with a helmet on, opened collar, a pack on his back, ready to jump into the fray upon landing.
Chesty and I were shipmates in 1939 and 1940 on board the USS Augusta (CA-31), then flagship of the Asiatic Fleet. He, even then as a captain, was a hero with his Navy Cross, and idolized by his men. He was the Marine’s Marine. When he was OOD, the crew knew it; they seemed to look a little better when they left the ship. His presence did something—and I cannot remember him ever putting anyone on report.
Perhaps the Naval Institute could persuade Mr. Hempstone or an equally competent author, to write a more lengthy article on the General.
“The Only Option?”
(See G. E. Lowe, pp. 18-26, April; pp. 86-88, November; and pp. 88-89, December 1971; p. 94, January; and pp. 96-98, April 1972 Proceedings)
George Ott—There can be little question that the existing concentration of our land-based missiles is an open invitation to a Soviet first strike. Our fixed bases not only are easy to detect, but also are singularly vulnerable to Russian ICBMs. Until the ULMS becomes operational, our only alternative is to get our missiles mobile, place them on surface vessels, and disperse them over the oceans.
By moving Minutemen onto the sea, we would obtain the widest possible dispersal. Instead of being restricted to a limited number of readily targeted, fixed bases, confined within an area containing less than 2% of the earth’s surface, they would be on the move over the 71% of our globe that is water.
The shifting of a portion of our strategic nuclear deterrent onto surface vessels is a plausible interim option at least for most of this decade. And no technical problems stand in the way. A Polaris missile was launched from a surface vessel before the first ballistic missile submarine went to sea, and exhaustive studies have shown that surface ships are suitable as launching platforms.
Should missile-carrying vessels retain a degree of anonymity by being indistinguishable from the scores of thousands of other merchant ships that ply the sea lanes, no possibility exists for destroying them. And even though complete anonymity might prove unattainable, constant surveillance of such a force would be tremendously difficult, and instant targeting impossible.
Moreover, ships roaming all the world’s oceans can zero in on the enemy from all points of the compass, forcing him to employ costly countermeasures, and by multiplying his feelings of uncertainty and frustration, so undermine his confidence as to blunt his will to aggression.
Faced with a highly-mobile, hard-to-detect-and-destroy seaborne force, no enemy would dare launch an attack upon the United States or its allies.
The more credible our deterrent, the more tractable will be the Soviets in the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and elsewhere. Under the umbrella of an invulnerable strategic deterrent, our allies will be reassured, and neutral nations, ever sensitive to the winds of change, will rally to the side that is the stronger.
Then, as Mr. Lowe suggested, these mobile weapons platforms, married to other elements of his “blue water option,” would constitute a powerful force for peace, heralding the dawn of a more orderly and stable world.
“Communist China—Growing Seapower?”
(See R. W. Herrick, pp. 106-107, September 1971 Proceedings)
Commander Frederick T. Daly, U. S. Navy—Communist China’s development as a seapower will be slow indeed. The basic reason is that development of an extensive maritime presence is far down the list of economic priorities.
Militarily, China has no need of a navy beyond that necessary for minimal coast defense and security patrol. The great size of the country and its large and apparently mobilized population is China’s best deterrent against large-scale invasion, particularly in the populated coastal area.
The development of a merchant marine will come first, but not until made feasible by the growth of export industries. As China’s overseas trade grows, it will eventually become more advantageous for China to ship her own goods in her own bottoms, with the added advantage of possibly undercutting the Soviet Union’s extensive merchant fleet.
“A ‘New’ China Policy?”
(See E. B. Duffee, Jr., pp. 18-23, July; and pp. 90-91, December 1971 Proceedings)
Commander P. J. Doerr, U. S. Navy—Dr. Duffee’s first error is in denying that the political situation in East Asia has changed as described by Doak Barnett. The Sino-Soviet split is a well-documented fact of modern international politics. Increasing Japanese independence of the United States in Asian affairs is also a fact, though less well-documented in the popular press. The change from a situation of bipolar confrontation to a four-power balance seems to me, therefore, to be almost self-evident. All Dr. Duffee offers in evidence against such a change in the situation is a list of the existing conflicts between the United States and China; he completely ignores Japan and the Soviet Union.
Dr. Duffee’s second mistake is in first asserting a U. S. policy goal of maintaining a power balance in East Asia (by which I presume he means preventing any other power from dominating the area) and then, without argument or evidence of any kind, deriving from this goal what amounts to a goal of American predominance in the area. Balance of power politics are appropriate for our interests in East Asia, but they do not require American predominance.
The third error is in Dr. Duffee’s assertion that both the United States and China “. . . are ideological powers unalterably opposed to each other.” This is a gross oversimplification of the extent to which ideology influences U. S. and Chinese foreign policy. President Nixon’s policy as elaborated in the 1970 and 1971 “State of the World” messages to Congress has clearly rejected the kind of blind and total hostility to anything with a Marxist label that was “policy” in the 1950s. And the post-Cultural Revolution trend of Chinese foreign relations permits reasonably friendly and peaceful relations with non-Communist states. Ideology is one factor only in the complex of things which generate and influence a nation’s foreign policy. At the moment, it appears to be a factor of declining importance. Finally, no powers are ever “unalterably opposed.” Dr. Duffee’s call for preparedness against possible Chinese military adventures is sound. But military preparedness does not require that the political relations between the two countries be frozen in concrete until the millenium or Armageddon. The existence of conflicts of interest between China and the United States should be cause for efforts to settle the conflicts, not justification for a refusal to make such efforts.
Lieutenant Eugene P. Sullivan, Supply Corps, U. S. Naval Reserve-R—The American predilection for spectacular gestures in foreign policy may easily obscure the fact that beneath the surface of visits by ping-pong players and presidents, there will continue to exist the sharp conflicts of national and ideological interests which Professor Duffee has outlined.
The existence of such conflicts does not, however, mean that some improvement in Sino-American relations is out of the question. Limited improvements in Sino-American relations are possible within the restrictions of each other’s national interests and on a purely quid pro quo basis. To expect an improvement on any other basis is naive, as is any belief that the basic points of conflict described by Professor Duffee will disappear within the foreseeable future.
“The Royal Navy”
(See J. Morris, pp. 62-73, March 1972 Proceedings)
Chief Warrant Officer Volna O. Marcum, U. S. Navy (Retired)—For those officials with wrinkled brows and scalded ulcers, derived from the burning issues of an all-volunteer military force for the United States, I recommend James Morris’ rare philosophical treat. The centuries-old esprit of the Royal Navy sailorman, fo’c’s’le or wardroom, is reflected in every navy of the world to some degree. It is a necessary ingredient in the crew of every ship that goes to sea—a brotherhood common only to that strange breed of man who forsakes the land for his natural birthright: “. . . as a boy and man with the salt o’ the sea in his blood.”
As for the U. S. Navy, I feel that the fears of a separate “enclave” of militarists are unjustified. For the years following World War I and late into World War II, we had an all-volunteer Navy. And, in every period of doldrums following our every conflict, men have come forward to man the sentry posts of a peacetime Service—all volunteers.
Perhaps these men have a survival instinct not common to all; they are an uncommon breed who sense, in some primordial way, that survival depends on their collective effort, even though no danger is apparent.
We need have no fears. Men have always defended their lands—and they always will.
Mrs. Winifred L. H. Dodge—The article is so impressive, so informative, of real interest, and especially exceedingly well written, that I, as a Navy wife, feel impelled to write to you my commendation and thanks.
Pictorial—“Submarine Memorials—‘For Those Who Served’”
(See G. M. Hagerman, pp. 77-92, March 1972 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Colonel T. N. Courvoisie, U. S. Army (Retired), Administrative Staff Assistant, The Citadel, Charleston, South Carolina—You make no mention of the Seraph Memorial on the campus of The Citadel. This monument is unusual in that it is in memory of a British submarine and, that it is the only place in the world, outside of British territory that the Royal Navy ensign is flown every day. The monument, which was dedicated on 2 November 1963, consists of relics from HMS Seraph, including the periscope. Both the American and British flags fly from the structure to symbolize that this British submarine was placed under the command of an American naval officer for a special mission during World War II. The Seraph also secretly landed General Mark Clark, U. S. Army, in North Africa for an intelligence mission.
In addition, we have a Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps unit at this military college.
“Retention: The Talk and the Deeds”
(See C. McIntosh, pp. 58-63, September 1971 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Richard M. Hixson, U. S. Navy—One point in particular that I find disturbing is the subtle double standard that Commander McIntosh uses in comparing motivational factors in private industry as opposed to military organizations. He alludes to the nuclear submariner’s retention bonus as a bribe. If a certain type of individual is vital to a company’s operation, and the type is in short supply, what inducements are offered to retain that individual; certainly not a “believable ideal?” The $15,000 bonus is an imperfect attempt to improve upon an imperfect pay system, but it does allow the Navy to compete with private industry for the services of these individuals. Nuclear qualified submariners are vital to the Navy’s strategic forces, and the bonus is a means of acknowledging their importance in quantifiable parameters relevant to modern American society; to wit; money. Commander McIntosh’s derogation of the bonus reveals that he believes in the myth that every officer in the Navy is doing a job just as important as those being done by each of his contemporaries. The effective performance of department heads on board nuclear attack or ballistic missile submarines is far more important to the security of this country than is the work of their contemporaries on board destroyers or guided missile cruisers.
From personal experience in dealing with nuclear qualified submariners (I am a DD and CG(N) sailor myself), I know that money is not an immediate factor in most of these officers’ decisions to leave the Navy. I believe that monetary considerations will not play a very important role in the decision of enlisted men or junior officers to ship over or take their discharge. But I also wonder how much of a role more dynamic leadership will play. The simple matter is that many people do not enjoy being separated from their loved ones for long periods of time. Many people do not enjoy standing weekend duties, or having someone tell them they need a haircut, or that their shoes are not adequately shined. Only a very small percent of our liberally-oriented society finds the military a satisfying way of life. Retention programs can only expect to enhance the prospects of their deciding on a military career. For the other young men who enlist—for the education, patriotism, or for the lack of anything better to do—more pay and cosmetologized leadership techniques will only make the military a “nicer place to visit” and not a more attractive way of life.
“The Frustration Factor”
(See F. B. Shemanski, pp. 27-33, April; and pp. 91-92, September 1971; p. 110, March; and pp. 95-96, April 1972 Proceedings)
Commander A. Chertavian, U. S. Navy—Commander Shemanski says that he would desire another command only on the condition that he not have it manned by “. . . boot seamen and firemen and the discouraged remnants of a hard core few . . .” from the good old days. Now, just when were the good old days? Oh yes, they were there for a few of the newly-commissioned ships in the late 1950s, and the missile ships of the 1960s. However, the majority of the ships of Uncle Sam’s Navy were scrounging around for any talent available; and, many of these old weary World War II ships, with their makeshift crews who could do anything, quite frequently outperformed in all respects the classy ships with their air-conditioned spaces and full complements. The old ships knew that they must try harder than their sisters afloat.
As for the “Can Do” spirit—don’t knock it. The moment we say that we “Can’t Do,” we may as well secure. Nor should we strive for the day when a commanding officer can stand on his bridge and exclaim, “Give me a fast ship, a firm schedule, and 100% complement and repair parts, for I intend to sail.” Good luck to such a skipper, he will need it, for he will never make it once away from the pier.
I am sure that our Navy leaders (past, present, and future) know the desired corrective measures; obtaining the resources is another thing. Yes, I agree that we “must make a beginning.” The question is, where do we make the first step? Hopefully, the new Navy pathways for personnel will take us in the right direction.
Pictorial—“The Soviet Submarine Force”
(See R. D. Wells, pp. 63-79, August 1971 Proceedings)
Commander Tyrone G. Martin, U. S. Navy—The cover of the August 1971 Proceedings must take the prize as one of the most eye-catching and ominous to appear in a long time. The somewhat phantom image of the Soviet ballistic missile submarine prowling off Hawaii, presented on a background of somber, arterial red, should disturb many a good night’s sleep. Lieutenant Commander Wells’s pictorial on most elements of the Soviet Submarine Force does nothing to make one less concerned about the threat it poses.
In the data about the Y class, submerged speed is given as 36 knots. A submarine of the size of the Yankee would require a tremendous power plant to drive her at such a speed, Lieutenant Commander Wells’s comment notwithstanding. I believe 26 knots may be a more realistic figure, and even that is quite remarkable.
The G-class ballistic missile submarines were built at both Severodvinsk, on the White Sea, and at Komsomolsk in the Soviet Far East, illustrating the tremendous effort involved in producing the world’s largest underseas fleet. The former port is just below the Arctic Circle, and therefore has very short periods of weather Americans would consider as acceptable for human endurance, let alone the construction of complex naval weapons. The latter port is located more than 300 miles up the Amur River from the Sea of Okhotsk and, although in a more southerly clime than Severodvinsk, still suffers long periods of river freeze annually. The G-class SSB also represents a major unit of the Red Chinese Navy, one unit reportedly having been built by them, presumably from Russian plans and with some assistance.
A significance of the now obsolete Z-V class is that one of these first fired a ballistic missile in 1955. This has been reported by several authorities, and so it should be assumed that these units were converted from hulls within the Z-class construction sequence rather than being a later development. Thus, the first Z-V must have been laid down in 1953 and certainly no later than early 1954.
It is hard to accept the statement that either the E-I/E-II or J-class units are “analogous” to the now-decommissioned U. S. Regulus submarines. Whereas the American ships were designed as strategic weapons (and therefore lost out to Polaris), the Soviet boats appear to be tactically oriented and fitted with systems that permit the faster launching of weapons than the rather rudimentary means provided in the USS Halibut, (SSN-587), USS Growler (SSG-557), USS Grayback (LPSS-574), and their converted sisters. Had we not stopped the development of the Regulus series, we might not be scrambling so hard in this field today.
An interesting item appeared in the 30 April 1970 issue of the Soviet newspaper Izvestiya, which may have relevance to the C-class submarines (which should be classed as SSGN vice SSN). In the item, report was made of a 30 to 50 nautical mile missile launched from a submerged submarine. The C units, with their smooth lines and lack of apparent missile installation (unlike the surface-launching Es and Js), I believe could well be the carriers of such a weapon. Such a system, to project still further, would obviate the need for a mid-course guidance vehicle (perhaps such as the W-Canvasbag Lieutenant Commander Wells mentions) and the possible loss of surprise, and might be deliverable fired on the basis of passive sonar bearings alone. That is an ASW problem, indeed.
Lieutenant Commander Wells refers to “the diesel-powered Bravo class” as a possible successor to the Foxtrot class. The March 1970 issue of the German periodical Soldat und Technik contained an article which reported the Bravo to be “rather small” and intended for coastal operations. It went on to state that the design was a possible counterpart to current West German U-boats or the Swedish Sjöbjörnen-class. If correct, then the successor to the Foxtrot (and November, as well) must be the nuclear-powered Victor, which the same German magazine reported as displacing “between 4,000 and 5,000 tons.”
The R-class submarines, besides being present in the Soviet and Egyptian navies, also constitute one of the newest elements of the Red Chinese Fleet. Four are reported to exist there.
The Whiskey class must stand, not only as the most numerous design in the Soviet inventory, but also as the largest single submarine class ever built anywhere: 236 units are said to have been commissioned over the 7 to 8-year building span. Thus, this one class approximated the size of the entire Soviet submarine force at the outbreak of World War II—when it was, even then, the world’s largest.
“Authority: The Weakened Link”
(See B. C. Dean, pp. 48-52, July 1971; and p. 101, April 1972 Proceedings)
Commander M. A. Quartararo, U. S. Navy—The author perceptively described a problem we have faced in the Fleet for some years; however, several of his recommended procedures could harm our retention program, because these measures could tend to stultify fulfillment of the individual emotional and intellectual goals of our modern Navyman. I feel he has erred by overemphasizing the sanctity of the chain of command to the detriment of recognition of the individual, his potential, and need to achieve.
The very strength of our Navy can, in large measure, be traced to the individual intellectual superiority and creativity of the American Navyman and Americans in general. Modern management uses the term “participative management” to describe the process whereby members of an organization contribute their individual skills, knowledge, and experience in the formulation of decisions. This procedure is self-reinforcing in that one of man’s highest needs, that of creativity and recognition thereof, can be fulfilled, and fulfillment of this need encourages further interest, enthusiasm, and initiative, thereby providing additional contributions.
The Z-grams provide positive indications to the Navyman that the Navy cares for him. His long hair, beards, mufti privileges, and beer in the barracks permit individuality and greater freedom than in the past. However, a neglected area, which has considerable effect on retention, is providing the highly intelligent modern Navyman with the opportunity to participate in management’s decisions, plans, and policy. America’s youth demands recognition and participation in their environment.
The author very correctly referred to the “psychic income” some men seek who aspire to work directly for officers, thereby eliminating their senior petty-officers’ supervision. The astute leader will observe the chain of command while concomitantly encouraging the man who seeks psychic income. The man who seeks psychic income is a leader’s greatest potential asset. This psychic income is the very thing which men need to feed their ego and to spur them toward greater achievement and performance. Every effort should be made to foster and encourage ego-satisfying relations as they occur. The author decried the Conference Syndrome as a destroyer of authority. Quite to the contrary. The conference with a wide range of attendees and vigorous participation by attendees will emphasize the collective concern, enthusiasm, and team aspects of an evolution, whether it is a shipyard overhaul or a Fleet exercise. I cannot agree with the author that there would be an obfuscation of the head of department’s responsibilities.
Further, I take issue with the author on the capability of each head of department to “report technical matters and stand ready to amplify them.” I contend that the increasingly technological complexities of our modern Navy ships do not always allow time for the average head of department to master all the aspects of a problem and stand ready to play “20 questions” thereon with his commanding officer. Also, a splendid opportunity to give the leading technician (petty officer) a chance to demonstrate his knowledge (with beneficial ego boosting) in the presence of the CO may be lost if the head of department reports on all matters.
The author proposes that “All praise and chastisement should come from . . .” an immediate superior. I would counterpropose that all praise and chastisement be administered with the advice and concurrence of immediate and other intermediate superiors. Praise from, “on high” is traditional and has salutary effect on men, their motivation, and performance. It is readily apparent that, although participative management can be practiced in many situations, there are command areas not conducive to its use: Commence Firing! Let Go the Starboard Anchor! and the like. Increased use of participative management poses a great challenge to naval leadership, but in actuality, limited reflection will indicate that we have used this management tool in the Navy for years. Completed staff work and the interaction between members of the Planning Board for Training are examples of well established participative management practices in the Fleet.
The chain of command is as important today as ever, but let us not sacrifice the benefits accruing from an enlightened leadership which encourages subordinates to think, act, propose, create, and fulfill their ego by participating in the management of their unit.
“The Quiet Crisis in the Silent Service”
(See T. B. Thamm, pp. 50-58, August 1971; p. 85, January; and p. 98, April 1972 Proceedings)
Commander Stanford N. Levey, U. S. Navy, Director, Officers Training Department, Naval Submarine School—Captain Thamm has written a very provocative article in which he presented some facts, many opinions, a great amount of misleading information, and no proposed solutions.
Having spent 14 years on board submarines—including two diesels, two nuclear attack, and two Polaris, having commanded the two Polaris—I have lived through the changes described by the author, and agree with him on the one basic point that a nuclear submarine is different than a diesel. Not only are they larger, and have bigger complements, but are more complex and require a greater amount of knowledge, skill, and detail to operate.
The tempo of operations is also greatly different. All Polaris submarines and most nuclear attacks are carrying out wartime missions in a non-war atmosphere. World War II lasted four years, during which time the morale and cohesiveness not only of our submarine crews, but also of the whole country was maintained. Recognition and prestige for submarine crews was obvious and factual, and high morale was normal.
Polaris submarines have been conducting deterrent patrols for over ten years in a non-war atmosphere and have received little recognition or prestige. The continuing good morale which has been sustained on board these ships under these circumstances is, in large part, based on the cohesiveness which Captain Thamm, perhaps because of his duty outside the submarine force for the past six years, has not been able to observe.
In his article, Captain Thamm attempted to compare retention in the “Old Force” and the “New Force.” This is like comparing apples and oranges, because “Old Force” officers served in the surface fleet for at least a year before volunteering for submarine duty, and came into submarines with the intention of staying, while the “New Force” officer is a direct input, and does not know whether or not he will stay in.
Captain Thamm states that “. . . many corrective actions [to improve retention] are under consideration.” This was true about three years ago. He then mentions two recommendations that were implemented: continuation pay and the spot promotion of engineer officers. He neglects to mention many other changes implemented, including the creation of a viable sea-shore rotation, a completely new training program, spot promotion of navigators, augmentation of wardrooms, more personal detailing, a large reduction of collateral duties, and many others. The sum of all these has been a positive approach to the problem—Captain Thamm’s total approach is negative.
Captain Thamm has essentially written about a very special sociological problem. A basic premise in sociology is that every change imposed on a group will produce predictable and unpredictable results. He has enumerated some of the results of the submarine forces’ great technological changes in a most negative manner. The submarine force has approached these unpredictable problems as they arose, in a positive manner and is achieving positive results.
While no longer serving in submarines, I am now at the Naval Submarine School and have daily contact with new submariners, crews of many submarines (diesel, nuclear attack, and Polaris), and I am in a good position to observe the effects of the many efforts to increase retention over the past few years. It is obvious that we are succeeding. The “lemming” effect Captain Thamm spoke of has been reversed. There is no longer talk among junior officers about “getting out.” Many more nuclear submarine officers are being assigned to shore billets, postgraduate school, and the like. Pride in self and ship is manifest. The total atmosphere is positive.
The “New Force” will never be the same as the “Old Force,” but it will be a better force if detractors would attempt to solve the problems, not increase them.
Lieutenant Commander J. A. Matais, Supply Corps, U. S. Navy—Captain Thamm’s article postulating the Submarine Force duality of “Old Force” vis-à-vis “New Force” cannot be allowed to portray technology as the villain. A driverless automobile rarely causes an accident. In my opinion, the root cause of the large numbers of Submarine Force resignations is a myopic personnel policy engaged in too long without serious and higher level dissent.
When the Submarine Force allowed dilution of the command position through continued Washington headquarters involvement in the daily operations of nuclear ships, it bought into a continuing retention crisis. Directives from the top made the command position that of middleman—a foreman—rather than the top management of a ship. Similar top level involvement is alleged to have precipitated the resignation of Admiral George Anderson as Chief of Naval Operations.
Inordinate emphasis on the nuclear propulsion area worked its own dysfunctional magic on wardroom/ship cohesiveness. A submarine was no longer a closely woven fabric of nearly equal parts. Now the nuclear area was just a bit more equal. Once this inequality was entrenched, cohesiveness was forever lost as a practical matter. The extent Captain Thamm has internalized this disparate emphasis is evidenced in his remarks concerning the responsibilities of the engineer officer of a nuclear submarine. That is, the engineer is responsible for safe reactor operations and failure in this role could result in possible, though improbable, “. . . biological damage to a large population . . .” Recognizing that nuclear weaponry and nuclear reactor plant operation differ appreciably, I submit that the weapons officer of a submarine, charged with the care and feeding of 16 Polaris missiles, may also be in a position of possibly, though improbably, causing this same “biological damage.” Cohesiveness can again be realized by the Submarine Forces. On a relative basis, submariners remain loyal to ship and submarine service. The cornerstone for retaining a strong force and building a better one is still there. Given the sunshine of honesty, the rains of an enriched command tour, and the usual fertilizer from NavPers, the force can blossom once more.
“Junior Officer Retention, A Lot of Little Things”
(See M. S. Harris, pp. 26-31, March; pp. 97-98, August; and pp. 96-97, September 1971; pp. 90-91, January; and pp. 100-102, February 1972 Proceedings)
Commander A. D. Wood, U. S. Naval Reserve-R—Fresh out of Yale, Lieutenant Harris ran into the realities of life in a modern, large organization. With some change in wording, the article could be that of a new corporation executive or even a novice priest. Let us not blame the Navy for all the ills he ascribes to it.
Lieutenant Harris found the Navy a cultural wasteland and an insular society. He deplored the lack of varying political views. He should try a large organization—a Wall Street law firm if he prefers. It is a rare business executive who reads more than four or five books a year. Conservative politics are as much a way of life in the board room as in the wardroom. When he deplores the lack of culture in his fellow officers, he is observing life—not just the Navy. In fact, most naval officers are more aware of their surroundings and of the world than are many corporation heads.
I note with interest that his last assignment was a CLG. I cannot help but wonder if his tours of duty had been reversed—CLG first and DD second—if the article would have been written. It will be a long time before he again knows the excitement of feeling the deck plates of a destroyer under his feet. He accurately observes, “The fantastic responsibilities of the OOD underway are perhaps the greatest trust bestowed upon 23-year-old men anywhere.” In fact, for many men, it is the greatest responsibility they will bear in a lifetime. To trade off as OOD of a destroyer to some obscure CLG junior officer position is, of course, discouraging. Custodian of the pubs, movie officer, are duties to drive anyone out of the Service. The Navy should take careful note of Lieutenant Harris’ comments here. He is demonstrating what modern behavioral scientists are discovering. Men work best when given full responsibility. It comes with all kinds of names—“job enrichment,” “work itself”—but it all adds up to trying to make every job as exciting as OOD of a destroyer.
There are some minor points in the article I would agree with. Is a bachelor’s life more burdensome in the Navy than in a Second Avenue apartment in Manhattan? Unfortunately, both civilian society and the Navy work against bachelorhood. It is probably a conspiracy, but the victims seldom complain. He is critical of the officer candidate school, but OCS is not an academic school. It is a trade school. Of course, the transition from a senior year in an Ivy League school to Newport is a shock, but OCS has only one objective—to make you a sailor. “How to tie a square knot” does not lend itself to seminar discussions. In fact, in the February 1971 issue of the Proceedings, in an article entitled “The Silent Vote,” a junior officer goes so far as to propose that officers should attend enlisted schools to get personal experiences in the skills where they are most needed, at sea.
The major disagreement I have with Lieutenant Harris’ article is the author’s failure to see the Navy as it really is—a large complex organization with all the attendant problems—but with exciting opportunities for a young man and peopled by some outstanding officers. Of course, it is not the author’s failure to see this, it is the Navy’s failure for not showing him. He is far too severe on the regular Navy and its officer corps.
When Lieutenant Harris completes his studies at Michigan State Law School, he will probably end his formal education. His counterpart in the Navy will have hardly started his. Senior officers for the most part have had exciting, rewarding careers. Commands, foreign travel, postgraduate study have all been theirs. I know of no career that offers such diversity as the Navy. But did the Navy try to show this to the lieutenant? Of all large organizations, the Navy has the most to attract modern youth and does the least with it. Outstanding young officers must be placed on the deck plates of a destroyer’s bridge, in command of small ships, in underwater demolition, submarine, or flight assignments, and exposed to other young aggressive officers. No officers of Lieutenant Harris’ quality should leave the Navy without exposure to the young group of commanders and captains now ascending in the Navy.
The Navy should select a group of outstanding junior officers in their third year of service. To wait longer is to work against a predetermined decision. These officers should receive temporary additional duty (TAD)—to the War College for a two-week seminar or perhaps attendance at the annual Global Strategy discussions. From there, they should get a tour as thorough as those we give distinguished civilian guests—the flight deck of a carrier, the war rooms of the Pentagon, a visit to one of the many postgraduate programs, and finally a two-day civilian-military career discussion in Washington, where they can meet both civilian and military dignitaries in an open discussion of career patterns. This TAD, about a month in length, might give the outstanding junior officer a perspective he now misses. This indoctrination program could end with a tentative ten-year career plan offer to the junior officer.
The Navy has a saleable product, but they do not sell it. Hard to do? An expensive program? You bet it is, but the message of Lieutenant Harris is very clear. Benefits, pension, and security do not interest him. He wants responsibility, opportunity to grow intellectually, and above all, freedom to tackle big important assignments on the way up. To survive, the Navy must provide them to the junior officer.