For most post-World War II Navymen of the Sixth Fleet, the image of Gibraltar probably is comprised of equal parts of gun-gallery tours and Rock ape photography, bargains in English shoes and tweeds, and a crowded multitude of Indian souvenir shops along the steep slopes. Still, for some military observers, the Rock remains a significant factor in the geo-strategy of the Mediterranean—certainly it continues to be a bone of contention between the British tenancy and the Spanish government next door.
The strategic importance of Gibraltar during the two centuries ending about 1945 can hardly be overestimated. These were the years of seapower in its greatest relative strength. They came after worldwide navigation was reasonably precise and year-around operation of men-of-war was normal for nautical nations.
During most of the 18th and all of the 19th centuries, Britain’s possession of the Rock cut the navies of both France and Spain in half. Later, Gibraltar did about the same thing to the Central Powers of 1914-1918 and to the Axis in 1939-1945. The rise and ultimate world dominance of the Royal Navy coincided with British tenure on Gibraltar.
The Rock is still the most important piece of real estate of its size anywhere. Its situation at the entrance to the Mediterranean, the only entrance since the closing of the Suez Canal in 1967, means that the guns still on Gibraltar can deny the most historically important of all seas to surface shipping. The R.A.F. airfield there is small and cramped, but still capable of handling combat aircraft. This bastion of empire may be an anachronism, but it is still strong, and so long as Britain holds Gibraltar, it will remain a Mediterranean power.
On the other hand, the importance of Gibraltar surely has declined since 1946. Gibraltar’s offensive capabilities probably could be neutralized temporarily by a single heavy air strike. Advances in destructiveness and range of weapons of war make the fortress less useful in situations involving a hostile Spain or even an unfriendly Morocco.
Britain has held the Rock in the past essentially because of the Royal Navy and the fact that artillery in Spain could not interfere with seaborne resupply. The present situation in regard to land-mounted Spanish guns is confused, but Spaniards now frequently shift powerful U. S. rockets about on the hills to the north. Spain surely still wants Gibraltar; so do some other countries.
The mass of limestone which constitutes the Rock is situated at the end of one of the two peninsulas extending south from Spain towards Africa and occupies almost the entire southern end of the more easterly one. Across the straits, Morocco projects north to within less than 27,000 yards, or about 13 miles. Rising almost 1,400 feet above the sea, this monolith is a long, narrow ridge, weathered in places almost to a knife-edge. It runs north and south for 3,560 yards, but is only about 800 yards wide. It is so precipitous on the eastern, or Mediterranean face, that it would be possible to toss a stone several hundred feet down the face before it would hit anything.
A town has existed at the foot of the western slope for more than 1,200 years. In places, the western slope is sufficiently gentle for soil to have built up. Parts of it could be farmed if this were necessary, but the total usable area is pitifully small for agricultural purposes. The distance from the east face of the Rock to the westernmost part of the detached mole is only 2,100 yards. Almost half this distance is harbor.
The modern airfield is to the north towards Spain and was built mostly on reclaimed land, in the old neutral zone between the British and Spanish lines. Access to Gibraltar from Spain has always been along a flat strip of sandy land which is no more than 600 yards wide in places. Before Spain closed the border on 9 June 1969, all traffic moved through British Customs and Immigration and then across the middle of the airfield before entering the old Gibraltar defenses.
The town, garrison, and most of the installations on the east side used to be either protected from, or out of range of, all Spanish artillery. This is no longer true because of increases in the range of guns. The entire western side of Gibraltar is exposed to fire from Algeciras across the Bay to the west; ranges are as short as 9,500 yards.
The history of Gibraltar extends back thousands of years. The Phoenicians used to make offerings in a sea level cave which has yielded a number of interesting artifacts. The Pillars of Hercules—Gibraltar in Europe and a similar mountain in Morocco—were well known to the Romans, who thought the world ended just beyond.
The earliest surviving fortifications at Gibraltar were built by the Moors in 711 A.D. These were taken by the Spaniards in 1309, retaken by the Moors in 1333, and captured again by the Spaniards in 1462. The Rock was taken rather easily by the British and Dutch in 1704. A cannonade which lasted five hours was followed by an amphibious assault. Few Spaniards appear to have realized the enormous strategic importance that Gibraltar was to have in the future, for it was defended by only about 600 Spanish soldiers, militia, and sailors.
Britain and Holland immediately put in a relatively strong garrison which withstood a Franco-Spanish siege from October 1704 until April 1705. The treaty of Utrecht in 1713 confirmed British possession and permitted a free interchange of goods and people across the western Bay of Algeciras, which lasted 250 years until Spain “suspended” this service on 27 June 1969.
The value of a base in this area for naval operations against the Spanish treasure fleets has been appreciated by the British at least as far back as the early years of the reign of Elizabeth I. Nearby Tangier, for example, had been British from 1662 to 1684. But the British concept of dividing the Spanish and French navies by holding the Rock was new. The concept, of course, depended then—and continued to so depend for nearly two centuries—on the Royal Navy, not on the Gibraltar guns which, until about 1900, lacked the effective range to interfere seriously with ships that stayed close to Africa. Until the end of the smoothbore era, approximately 1860-1870, guns would reach out only about 2,500 yards.
On the other hand, a British fleet in the Bay could remain at anchor and have ample warning of the approach of an enemy concentration of warships. In effect, Gibraltar closed the Straits even when the Royal Navy had no adequate force anchored there, since enemy intelligence concerning the location of British naval units was usually poor and out of date. French and Spanish admirals did not like to sail past for fear a British fleet might have arrived suddenly.
Many 18th and early 19th century naval battles, including Trafalgar and St. Vincent, took place at, or close to, Gibraltar. In the days of sailing ships and smoothbore guns, possession of the Rock did not seal the Mediterranean, but it did give a distinct advantage to a succession of great British sailors who used it as part of their strategy.
Once Spain lost the Rock, she began to appreciate its importance and has continued to try to get it back both by force of arms and by diplomacy. A second Spanish siege began in December 1726 and did not end until May the next year. Negotiations for “restitution” began immediately following this effort and continued intermittently for half a century. In 1749, it seemed for several months that the Rock would return to Spain as a sort of bonus to that nation for abandoning her alliance with France. But this did not materialize.
In 1779, Spain and France took advantage of Britain’s involvement in the American Revolution to try again militarily. The Great Siege of Gibraltar lasted from June of that year until February 1783—45 months—and involved the most severe fighting that ever took place there. Britain’s enemies attacked by land and sea. The siege works of the enemy were advanced to within 50 yards of the British defenses along the tongue of land from the north. Floating batteries attacked the town from the Bay. The fate of the Rock hung in the balance several times, but the garrison won, and this successful defense of Gibraltar is one of the notable achievements of the British Armed Forces during the 18th century. British soldiers and sailors of all ranks demonstrated not only a stubborn courage and fighting efficiency, but also a genius for improvisation.
The besiegers failed because they were not able to maintain a blockade. On several occasions, the Royal Navy delivered both supplies and reinforcements. The garrison, in fact, was probably better supplied on the whole than the French and Spanish soldiers and sailors who were trying to capture the place.
The legend of Gibraltar’s invincibility began after the Great Siege, perhaps in part because galleries for cannon were cut out of the limestone in the north face of the Rock itself, high above the enemy siege works. Actually, although the advantage of batteries of this sort has always been questionable, they appeal to the imagination. The problem, of course, is to get an adequate field of fire without sacrificing security, and an embrasure big enough to be efficient is only marginally better than an open battery.
During the 19th century, Gibraltar’s defenses became increasingly dependent on powerful pieces of artillery without overhead cover. An Armstrong rifled muzzle-loader—“RML” in British artillery jargon—was installed at Gibraltar in 1872. It is 17.72 inches in diameter; it fired a 2,000-pound projectile a maximum range of eight miles, and used a steam engine for traversing its 102 tons of dead weight. For its time and projectile weight, it had the astonishing maximum muzzle velocity of 1,548 feet per second.
For most of the first half of the 20th century, Gibraltar’s guns did control the Straits. During the 1914-1918 war, Gibraltar bristled with efficient breechloading rifles in the 13.2-inch to 16-inch class with ranges far greater than the distance to Africa. Most of these continued in service through World War II. So long as battleships might attack, these great guns were necessary for defense. The German Navy had capital ships with thick armor and enormous firepower in both wars; these could only be attacked successfully with projectiles capable of penetration of their protective belts and turrets.
Even though it might be argued that guns mounted in galleries were never really practical, the practice of tunneling into the Rock for other purposes has certainly added enormously to its strength in defense. These passages or galleries have been extended progressively for miles during this century. One can now be driven from end to end inside the limestone mountain on a two-lane road in a Land Rover at 25 miles per hour. During World War II, the Rock contained barracks, power stations, hospitals, explosive storage facilities, maintenance shops, and the like. All these were connected by tunnels which exceeded 30 miles in total length. Every accessible entrance to the labyrinth was guarded by concrete and steel pill boxes during World War II and could be so protected again.
One wonders if Gibraltar would have held out under a German attack in 1941. Hitler offered to take it for Spain in return for that country entering the war on his side. Could he have? Perhaps, but only during the period when the Luftwaffe controlled the air.
During the great wars of the 20th century, Gibraltar has had not only a strategic importance owing to its position, but also an operational naval significance as well. Its drydocks could handle the largest ships afloat. Both British and American men-of-war were repaired and resupplied there and were able to fight again without returning home.
One must not forget, however, that Gibraltar has been of importance primarily because it was held by a maritime power. If the Royal Navy had been unable to retain at least periodic command of the sea during, for example, the Great Siege, the Rock would have fallen. Its history, in fact, is almost a textbook example of the positive power of seapower—a secure base supplied by sea from which offensive naval operations can be mounted. And, although the ever-increasing significance of air power may have reduced the efficiency of Gibraltar, the Rock will doubtless retain some strategic significance so long as ships travel by sea.
Gibraltar’s 1,800-yard airstrip is often closed to traffic because of crosswinds. Gibraltar’s Royal Air Force facilities are top secret, but the Rock probably has internal storage facilities capable of handling as many and as large aircraft as can use this relatively small, narrow field. Whether or not they are actually there at any given time is not important. They would be brought in from Britain in hours.
The approximately 6,000-man British garrison at Gibraltar is small now compared to what it once was. The Gibraltar garrison normally is one battalion of infantry on a two-year tour; but, since the latest Spanish border trouble began, a second battalion deployed on a nine-months basis without dependents has been added. There are also some territorial militia (Gibraltarians with full-time British professional officers) and detachments from the Royal Air Force.
A small number of modern naval vessels are now based at Gibraltar, and of course, more would be quickly available in an emergency.
What about the big guns and their crews who were once so important? Most of both are gone because the battleships with which they were intended to deal are no longer in evidence. There are perhaps half a dozen 9.2-inch rifles, which are more or less openly displayed, but fired only once a year, with disastrous results to hotel windows. They have an extreme range of 30,000 yards and, so long as visibility is good, they can still close the Straits. Obvious radar installations indicate that they could do almost as well at night or in poor weather. Other artillery pieces are probably available for an emergency, especially for mounting at the northern end of the Rock overlooking Spain.
Today, Gibraltar’s defense capabilities would depend on who was attacking. Spain is the only possible local enemy at present. As noted, the British garrison is weak in troops, guns, and aircraft. Local units of the Royal Navy are smaller and less numerous than the overage ex-U. S. submarines and destroyers now under the Spanish flag. But the present British garrison could probably hold out against a Pearl Harbor type of attack. The Royal Navy and R.A.F., although weaker relatively than they once were, are much more powerful than similar Spanish organizations. If Franco would not join Germany and Italy against Britain when it fought alone in 1941, he is not likely to attack it now. Britain is an atomic power; Spain is a very long way from becoming one and has no allies save for the United States and perhaps Portugal. Neither would be likely to support Franco against Britain.
Spain continues its diplomatic efforts to get back Gibraltar. It negotiates whenever it can directly and hopefully through the United States. More to the point, Franco and his people continue to try to disturb the relationship between the Gibraltarians and the British garrison.
There are about 25,000 Gibraltarians. Their status is still that of a Crown Colony, but they have their own local government. Immigration and naturalization have been almost impossible since 1925, which has made the population extremely stable. Although predominantly Spanish in origin—Gibraltarians still speak mostly Spanish among themselves—they are more loyal to Britain than Londoners and exaggerate their British citizenship. On 10 September 1967, they voted almost unanimously in a U.N.-controlled plebiscite—12,762 to 44—to remain as they are.
This loyalty to Britain when almost all other colonial possessions wanted to become independent is interesting. The Empire has disintegrated since 1945. English-speaking colonies older than Gibraltar have severed most or all of their connections with Britain. Why hasn’t Gibraltar?
Gibraltarians want to remain as they are for two reasons: first, they see practically no chance of becoming a sovereign nation, and secondly, having lived for so long under British democracy, they do not want to join a large fascist nation that would absorb them immediately into a less vigorous economy. They may be Spanish in language and culture, but they want to remain British politically. Their reaction, however, is not quite unique; most of those living in Hong Kong prefer Britain to China.
The Gibraltarian response disappointed the Spaniards. Franco closed the border to all tourists on 6 May 1968. When this did not work—people with cameras slung about their necks came by sea and air—he closed it to all traffic, including about 7,000 Spaniards who worked on the Rock, but lived in Spain.
So far, these things have done the Gibraltarians little harm, but they have ruined the lives of the inhabitants of a Spanish community who depended on wages that were earned on the Rock, but spent their money mainly in Spain. Franco also put an end to the profitable sale of fruits and vegetables grown in Spain, and sold in Gibraltar. (Fresh vegetables and fruit now come in from Morocco.) The Rock is now, economically and commercially, an island, but it would appear likely that Franco has hurt mainly his own countrymen in making it so. The Gibraltarians are actually more prosperous than ever, because wages have risen to meet the demands for labor to support both the tourist industry and the garrison.
One wonders what is behind the continuing unfriendly attitude of the Spaniards. It would seem that when the plebiscite went against them so conclusively they would have given up, or would have tried to win over the people with friendship. Spain is not sufficiently popular internationally to put much “public opinion” pressure on anyone. Historically, the country does not have too strong a case for possession of the Rock, either. Since it was first fortified by the Moors, the Spaniards have held it only from 1309 to 1333 and again from 1462 to 1704, a total of 264 years. The British have now held it continuously for 267 years.
Perhaps Franco just can’t stand the idea that Britain has given up almost everything else, but continues to hold on to Gibraltar. His government—any government—would want something as dramatic as the Rock, which seems to fall within Spain’s natural boundaries, to fly the Spanish flag. There are practical advantages as well. All the Rock’s strategic importance would remain the same under Spain as under Britain. Military facilities at Gibraltar are better than those in Spain.
On the other hand, colonial empires have practically ceased to exist in the 20th century. Colonialism is an anathema to liberals everywhere now, especially those in Britain. And Gibraltar is still a colony, although a most vociferously loyal one. The Gibraltarians are obviously more Spanish than they like to admit publicly, but, almost surely, their present love for Britain is based mainly on a dislike for present conditions in Spain.
In this age of self-determination, if the Spanish government should be replaced by one with a more popular base and if the standard of living rose in Spain, Gibraltarians might change. If they thought there was a chance for independence as a sovereign country, they surely would feel differently. Given the choice, Spain also would prefer to have Gibraltar an independent small state rather than a British colony.
If the Gibraltarians should decide that they wanted Britain to go, the British probably would depart. In recent times the very proper British rarely have remained in an area where even a vocal minority doesn’t want them. Meanwhile, however, British dominion continues, based on long-range power and an unassailable local position of righteousness.
The Gibraltarians get along well with their “guests.” Many British servicemen and their families occupy barracks in the middle of the old town and in other places. The Rock appears to be a reasonably popular assignment for the troops who are sent there with their families for two years—but not for men who come out alone for nine months. The main trouble is boredom, but poor weather is also a factor. Gibraltar in sunshine is glorious, but under a damp, cold cloud during a Levanter, it is unpleasant.
The British official position, “We will stay as long as the people of Gibraltar want us here” is not just talk. Britons know that, if the troops should go home, millions of pounds sterling would be saved each year. And the Gibraltarians know that the British know this.
Britain’s willingness to give up the Rock, if the local people want them to do so, spikes the guns of the 44 Gibraltarians who want them to go now, or a larger number who might want them to go in the future, perhaps because of payments or promises from Spain. Gibraltar’s small size both in area and population and the British mania for police efficiency means that radicals or professional troublemakers—the type of people who have taken other colonies out of the Empire against the collective desires of the people in them—cannot cause trouble here. Any efforts towards intimidation by terror would run into British justice, pompous but effective. Infiltration across a border only 620 yards long is near impossible.
The Gibraltarians do not have as high a standard of living as Americans, but they do well compared to Spain and even to Britain. With a few exceptions, only those born in Gibraltar can reside there permanently. Their near-total dependence on the outside world for food and most other material things is unfortunate, but not calamitous. Even though the “locally made” souvenirs come from Morocco, the economy of Gibraltar is presently sound. It is based on taking care of the garrison, handling ships, and catering to a relatively large group of middle-income tourists, mostly British.
Worldwide tourism is on the increase, and Gibraltar will probably flourish in this respect, although its transportation problems are serious. With the border closed, only the air and the sea entries remain. Cruise ships still come in, but people don’t travel by sea as much as formerly, a trend that is likely to continue. Air service is dependent on the single narrow runway and the weather. Crosswinds or fog often prevent commercial airliners from landing at Gibraltar. They must go on to Tangier instead, or back to Madrid. But prices are below world standards. The best hotels are comfortable and uncrowded. Good days are truly magnificent; the Rock is an attraction in itself and photogenic. Trafalgar is only miles away in distance and closer in time as well, and one can examine the tiny Rosia Bay where the Victory came to repair battle damage before taking Nelson’s body home.
Militarily, the Rock is less important than it once was, but the position of the U. S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean would be weakened if Gibraltar were in hostile hands. Gibraltar still closes—or keeps open—the Mediterranean and may be the only fortification in the world capable of resisting a hydrogen bomb.
The days of battles between fighting ships and shore fortifications may be over. The great drydock at Gibraltar will probably never be used to capacity again. The guns that were capable of smashing the battleships of the German High Seas Fleet of 1914-1918 are gone. Still, the Rock is surely worth its keep; and it is not likely that Britain will abandon a colony in which almost nobody wants to see her go.
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A graduate of Princeton University in 1936, Mr. Weller has long been employed in connection with weapons and is currently a civilian consultant to the U. S. Army Small Arms Systems Agency at Aberdeen, Maryland. The author of more than 300 articles and eight books, his ninth—the third and last on the Duke of Wellington—is being published this year. Appointed an Honorary Curator of the U. S. Military Academy in 1952, he was recently appointed to the same position at the British School of Infantry Museum at Warminster, England.