In the past, the military man’s response to arms control has been an instinctive, negative reaction rather than an objective, thoughtful evaluation. Instead of pointing out practical dangers in the naively utopian schemes offered by idealists and providing constructive criticism to worthwhile proposals suggested by realists, we have chosen either to ignore arms control or to ridicule it, perhaps hoping that it would go away.
Arms control is properly a military subject. Plans and programs for it will be proposed, and, unless military men participate in the formulation of these plans, they will have no right to complain about the product.
But, just as a complete military program requires an element of arms control, arms control can succeed only if it is coupled with a sound military program. The formulation of a feasible arms control policy must begin with a careful assessment of the military environment in which it is to function. This does not mean, of course, that purely military considerations must forever remain as the fixed points about which arms control is draped as an afterthought. Indeed, in some instances national security may require the modification of existing military policies or force postures as a result of (or as a prelude to) arms control negotiations. But arms control measures which seek to force military policies and postures into preconceived disarmament schemes inevitably will fail to gain the necessary domestic and foreign support, or else they will not provide adequately for national security. After all, both armament policy and disarmament policy are different roads to the same destination—the security of the nation.
Unilateral disarmament obviously is not a militarily acceptable program because it would not contribute either to national security or international stability. But we should not despair of productive measures of arms control through co-operation among the nations, even if it is only a grudging co-operation between hostile states.
The formulation of a militarily acceptable arms control program will not be easy. Even if there were complete agreement that this objective was desirable (a most unlikely circumstance), there would still remain a great difference of opinion as to how it should be implemented. Still, if the armed services are to do their job, a start must be made.
Arms control concepts must be developed before arms control policies. If a conceptual framework is not developed first, some attractive options that could easily have been kept open had they only been recognized could inadvertently be foreclosed. The first task of the military, therefore, is not to propose any particular arms control program, either comprehensive or fragmentary; nor is it to evaluate specific proposals made by others. We must, however, appreciate philosophical principles and master their application before we are ready to address specific plans. Military men must understand arms control as a process before they can deal with it as a program.
Much of the arms control dialogue since 1945 appears to be the search for a treaty (or other international agreement) that, once found, would ensure a static condition called “peace.” It would be more helpful if our goal could be thought of as a continuous, dynamic process in which each problem solved gives rise to fresh problems and new difficulties. Thus, it would be recognized for what it is—a continuation of normal politico-military intercourse.
In fact, the passionate search for The Solution to all the international problems of the world is chasing after a will-o’-the-wisp; there does not exist in the real world any such single solution that could be found if we would only look hard enough. The problem must be understood, not so that it can be solved, but so that it can be managed.
There are many reasons to believe that fruitful cooperation between actual or potential enemies is possible. To begin with, unilateral armament programs, while necessary—at least at present—are not the only means by which we should seek to maintain our national security and promote our national values. In the past, unilateral armament policies alone have never led any nation to either peace or security. In a thermonuclear era, an unrestricted arms race is a particularly unsatisfactory way to provide for national security.
Second, our potential enemies are not madmen. They are, rather, quite logical—in the sense that they follow recognizable and hence predictable patterns of behavior. Similar situations evoke similar response. Once we comprehend their goals, values, and traditions, and are fully aware of the circumstances as they believe them to be, we will be able to anticipate their actions and reactions. Admiral Arthur Radford’s remark, “We cannot trust the Russians on anything,” misses the point. In this context, “trust” is irrelevant. But, significantly, we can trust the Soviet leaders to pursue Russian interests as they see them. We demand no less from our own leaders.
Common values and common interests do exist. In areas where we find common interests, we can also find projects where mutual co-operation can promote the interests of both without damaging the interests of either. International relations is not like matching pennies wherein a gain by one side requires an equal loss by the other side. A gain in the security of the United States does not necessarily imply a concomitant loss in the security of the Soviet Union (or of any third nation).
A careful reading of history since 1945 suggests that relations between the United States and the Soviet Union have been controlled by the mutual desire to avoid the kind of total war that would surely destroy both. Americans have been quite open in expressing this objective. Soviet leaders, on the other hand, usually acted as if they, too, desired to avoid war, but often spoke as if they might welcome it. This ambivalence probably stemmed from their belief that they could profit from the fear that such bluster would inspire. In this regard, a comparison of the invasion of Hungary in 1956 with the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 is instructive. In 1956, Khrushchev rattled his rockets with unrestrained truculence, and a nuclear confrontation seemed near. In 1968, under almost identical circumstances, the Russian leaders were quite circumspect, and not a rattle was heard. The Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, which occurred exactly six years after the one event and six years before the other, may have caused the change.
Perhaps the most encouraging reason to believe that co-operation between hostile states is possible is to observe that history shows many examples of this kind of behavior. Arms control is an attempt to manage violence among competing nation-states by encouraging the mutual observance of restraints. As such, it should not differ greatly from those instances of self-restraint that have been observed by opposite sides in international conflicts before. Restraints that have been recognized in the past include such things as: the rights of neutral states, freedom of the seas, geographic sanctuary, restraint in the use of chemical and bacteriological agents, recognition of open cities, the immunity of diplomats, and the rights of prisoners.
These restraints have been observed, not because they offered any advantages in themselves, but because each side has often found it advantageous to observe them in the hope that the other side would reciprocate. In other words, restraints do not offer a direct advantage (they may even be a handicap), but they may offer indirect advantages when they are observed by both sides. Since 1945, it has seemed wise to both the United States and the Soviet Union to exercise varying degrees of moderation in the hope that the other side would respond. However, to allow national security to become overly dependent on the restraint of the enemy would be as foolish as to depend entirely on unilateral armament programs. While history does show that these and other restraints have been observed in the past, it also shows that all restraints occasionally have been violated.
Deterrents also depend on the recognition of an advantage in restraint. Deterrence is the art of posing the maximum credible risk. It is a psychological, not a military undertaking, and the power necessary to deter will depend on the psychological characteristics of the opponents. Power in any form—moral, economic, diplomatic, military—which is capable of creating a psychological impact can deter. However, to deter a major world power from an action that it would find highly desirable will almost certainly require the threat of military force.
Whether or not the potential consequences of a threat will deter depends upon the other courses of action that are open to the enemy. Such additional courses of action include political and economic response as well as various forms of limited military action. Thus, the sufficiency of a given threat to deter will depend upon factors that transcend military considerations alone.
The threat that will be effective in any given instance will depend upon the character, intentions, and values of the protagonists and on the nature of the act to be deterred. Threats that may deter one nation at a particular time may prove ineffective against another nation at a different time. If the action threatened is too mild, it will not intimidate; if it is too violent, it will not be believed. A nation cannot fashion a credible deterrent out of either a trivial threat or an incredible action.
Deterrence needs to be distinguished from counterattack on the one hand and retaliation on the other. The counterattack is the use of military force to block and throw back an enemy offensive thrust after he has attacked, and must be aimed at the attacking military force itself. Retaliation goes beyond counterattack and is more comprehensive. It involves punishing the enemy by hitting him where he is both exposed and vulnerable.
It need not be aimed at his military forces (even liberally defined) at all. It only need be as hurtful and distasteful as possible; in some cases it may be little more than revenge. Both counterattack and retaliation represent the active use of military power, and occur after the opponent has struck.
Deterrence, on the other hand, represents the passive use of military power. It is a psychological relationship, and attempts to make military action seem unattractive. A strategy of deterrence attempts to prevent an attack before it is launched by making it appear less desirable to the enemy than some peaceful alternative. This can be accomplished by making the attainment of his objective appear doubtful (deterrence by denial), by making success appear too costly (deterrence by an undesirable exchange), by threatening him with retaliation (deterrence by punishment), or by proffering a reward (deterrence by inducements). The psychological incentives differ among these methods, but the purpose of the deterrer remains the same: to dissuade rather than to repel or to defeat.
Perhaps the most startling difference between deterrence and traditional military methods is found in the change in outlook of the strategic planner. Traditional military plans have been concerned with the enemy’s capabilities, and the primary object of the planner has been to devise methods to destroy the enemy’s military forces. Deterrents, however, make their impact on the enemy’s intentions, and principal attention must be given to influencing the state of mind of the potential antagonist. Furthermore, the true capabilities of deterrents are irrelevant. Since deterrence is the passive use of power, the deterrent value of military forces derives, not from what those forces really can accomplish, but from what the enemy believes they can accomplish. The significance of this subtle shift in emphasis may not have been fully appreciated by some military planners. Deterrence, like arms control, is an attempt to persuade the enemy of the desirability of exercising restraint.
The psychological unity of deterrence and arms control, when seen side by side, is startling. In the long run, deterrence cannot be successful without some measure of arms control, tacit or formalized. When the full impact of the dependence of both deterrence and arms control on restraint is clearly appreciated, it will become apparent that arms control is in fact an integral part of any successful national strategy that is based on deterrence.
Like deterrence, arms control depends on factors that transcend purely military bounds. Since military policy does not exist in a vacuum, non-military factors must always be considered. War, after all, is nothing but the continuation of state policy with other means.
War is never an end in itself, and victory—however victory is defined—is not enough. Behind the victory lies a political goal, and that goal, not the victory itself is (or at least should be) the true object of military operations. If a war is to be “won,” we must appreciate the political reality implicit in the conflict. If a war is to be avoided, we must have an even clearer appreciation of that reality. An appreciation of the political reality that lies behind a conflict, together with an insight into its relationship to our national goals, might disclose that at times arms control could provide a more direct route to those goals than armaments.
Military power is but one of the elements of national power. National security depends, not only on military power, but also on a whole complex of interdependent elements. To evaluate the acceptability of an arms control program solely upon military grounds would be to present a falsely simple picture of an extremely complex problem. In arms control the simple answers are almost certainly wrong, and their pursuit is an obstacle to substantive progress. The world today is vastly different from what it was prior to World War II.
Arms control is much more than a military strategy. Although it must be coupled with a sound military program, it is truly national in scope. Because of its complexity, the study of arms control will inevitably lead into unexpected areas. And yet, upon examination, these topics will be found to be relevant. Consider, for example, the following:
- Since arms control involves international competition, the existing world order must be considered.
- Since arms control involves international cooperation, efforts to create a better world order must be borne in mind.
- Since arms control seeks to limit war, the nature and purpose of war must be understood.
- Since past mistakes should be avoided, a knowledge of history is necessary.
- Since arms control must contribute to national security, the sources and purpose of national power must be examined.
- Since arms control should exploit mutual interest, the goals, values, and traditions of other nations must be recognized.
- Since arms control evokes great popular sympathy, public opinion cannot be ignored.
Arms control cannot resolve all of the international tensions that bedevil our age; it cannot eliminate all interstate conflict; it cannot make possible the disestablishment of armies and navies; it cannot save all the billions of dollars that go each year for defense budgets.
But, because it cannot do everything, do not think that it cannot do anything. It can reduce the danger of living with today’s tensions; it can assist in the management of international violence; it can provide the hope of a better tomorrow; and it might even reduce national budgets. It can promote—although by itself it cannot ensure—national security.