This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
NMHWK*.
| m | ||
|
| ||
3 | ft* | | MU a | m* V#. jsjjg |
biv
t<J!
Sec
Sox
19;
Sin
the
biN
the
Co
».r
:'SS
tra
4ti
be
On 8 March 1963, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Properties and Installations) assigned design and construction responsibilities for Southeast Asia Military Construction Programs to the Navy, thus establishing the Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NFEC) as the single executive agency for the design and construction of all facilities in support of U. S. military programs in that part of the world.
When in February 1965, the decision was made to commit U. S. tactical forces to Vietnam, the fat, of course, was in the fire. But the NFEC managed to maintain its customary composure, reacting, in many ways, as the country itself had reacted during the first, frantic 100 days of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s administration. Plans were calmly produced and efficiently executed; men and material were quickly assembled; enormous sums of money were briskly spent—and a whole, new abbreviated language was coined to describe what was happening.
F. D. R.’s NRA, AAA, PWA, TVA, and the rest of the river of alphabet soup which was concocted during that earlier era, are no longer relevant. And, perhaps the U. S. Navy’s WIP will one day be as passe as F. D. R.’s WPA. But, for now, if we are to keep this paper within manageable proportions, we must lean heavily on acronyms to tell what was done during the incredible 23-month period that began in April 1965.
Having joined the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954, the United States began providing military advisory assistance and hardware to Southeast Asia. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) assigned responsibility for construction to the Navy. Military construction in support of the Military Assistance Programs (MAP) in Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam thus became a
Within the one-year span of a Navy man’s tour in Vietnam, the Saigon-Newport site on the preceding pages had been selected for major deep-draft and shallow-draft loading facilities, and construction of deep-draft berth #1 was well along. The low bridge, the only landmark common to both pictures, had altered the land in the smaller photograph; but it, too, was dwarfed by the massive construction program that followed.
Navy responsibility. The Bureau of Yards ai'1 Docks—now known as the NFEC—establish# an Officer in Charge of Construction (OlCc in Bangkok in December 1955. By 1958, th* OICC had supplied eight engineers to tl* staff of the Military Assistance Advisof Group, Vietnam (MAAG Vietnam) and sign and construction supervision to thj Chief, Programs Evaluation Office, Laos, ad the MAAG Cambodia.
In 1961, a Resident Officer in Charge & Construction (ROICC) was established Saigon with a small staff to administer Arch'' tect and Engineering (A&E) contracts. Thj staff consisted of one Civil Engineer Corps ofl1' cer, one U. S. Civil Service engineer and t"1 Filipino nationals. On 19 January 1962, tb NFEC awarded a cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPH contract to a joint venture comprised 01 Raymond International of Delaware, Inc'' and Morrison-Knudsen of Asia, Inc., kno"'( collectively as “RMK”. This contract results from the escalating Viet Cong activity whio created an urgent requirement to construe two airfields (Bien Hoa and Pleiku) an facilities at the already existing Tan So'1 Nhut and Da Nang airfields at an estimate1 cost of $21.5 million. The ROICC was efc vated to Deputy Officer in Charge of Cofl' struction (DOICC) and his staff increased tf eight CEC officers, 12 U. S. civilians, and 6l third-country nationals, basically Filipino’ and Vietnamese.
Still with me? We’re getting to the Goo# Part (GP).
In April 1965, a Navy management teat1’ went to Vietnam and reviewed the naval an1 contractor organizations, staffing, plans" and their problems—to ensure that they couk meet the demands that would arise from the decision to commit U. S. tactical forces Vietnam. This review was prompted by thl realization that the joint venture contractor had the only significant construction capa' bility then in Vietnam, and that the buildup of troop construction capability would no1 occur in time to handle the imminent influ* of military construction requirements.
qt
%
S5
kii
He,
He
(k
lit
tic
Sa
At the time of the review, the DOlC^ Saigon had a staff of 108, including 1,7 officers. The RMK workforce numbered less that1 12,000, which included 500 U. S. and 14(I third-country nationals. The DOICC’s m&'
11' a l >Imm ()]< 1 is. ib to tb< K
id clc lo tl'1
)S. :i!|C
U'gC 1 0(1 '' Airli
. Tliii
ps oil' id t"1 >2, tlif Cl’I’l
sed I nC’i urn"
■suite’
whit* lstru*' ) an^ i Sof mated is eR ' Con- sed to nd ^ ipinO5
Good
teaif il and ans-^ could n the :es t° y the actof :ap3" ildup 1 no* nflu*
'll c.c ofh' than 140 nia-
A graduate of Iowa State College in 1946, Captain Williams is the Assistant Commander for Construction, Naval Facilities Engineering Command, having recently completed an assignment as a Staff Assistant, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics), k. . Southeast Asia Construction
d 1Vlsl°n, where management of the Military Construc- jj 11 Programs in South Vietnam and Thailand at the J*retary of Defense level, is centered. Prior to this, he , ln the Office of Construction organization in „°Uth Vietnam during the period of build-up, August 6 to October 1966. Other assignments include entering and construction duties in Kwajalein, with ly ' Spanish Bases Program in Spain, with the Pacific lvision Naval Facilities Engineering Command and ^e Commander Construction Battalions Pacific, and °ntracting Offices and Public Works Organizations naval installations in the United States.
erial inventory was $5 million and equipment ^sets amounted to $10 million. The con- r4ctor was working at less than a dozen sites 5nd had little in the way of logistic support acilities such as warehouses, camps, and equipment maintenance shops. His monthly ork-In-Place (WIP) capability was less than ^ million. Total funding amounted to $130.5 Million.
Both the Navy and the contractor were j*eadquartered in Saigon with the Navy Resident Officers in Charge of Construction AOicCs) and contractor project managers the field. The contractor’s shipping opera- *°ns were confined to a small area at the ‘^igon commercial port.
U. S', support of the RMK operations conned of a recruiting and procurement office °cated near the Navy’s Resident Officer 1(1 Charge of Construction, Pacific (ROICC pac) office in San Bruno, California. Construction was under the management the OICC Bangkok, with the bulk of design, Accounting, and program management support provided from that office. The Deputy °ICC organization in Saigon, headed by a paptain of the Civil Engineer Corps was per- °rming on-site direction of the RMK conduction operations.
Analysis of the April 1965 on-site review of Navy’s construction capability led to
many actions to adjust to the new, incipient problems anticipated in Vietnam. A basic consideration—overriding the inherent constraints of remoteness, weather, difficult terrain, and lack of skilled labor—was the absence of deep water port facilities and inland lines of communications with which to support an accelerated construction buildup. Construction equipment and materials are bulky and place heavy demands on shipping and transportation systems. Construction resources would have to compete with the beans, bullets, and oil, for the shipping, offloading, and in-country distribution at a time when port and road facilities were practically nonexistent. The only deep water port worthy of the term was in Saigon, and it was already congested by normal commercial operations. The Vietnamese roads, railroads, and highways were inadequate and widely subjected to Viet Cong interdiction.
In view of this situation, the Navy and the contractor acted to establish an in-theater materials staging depot at Poro Point, north of Subic on the west coast of Northern Luzon, in the Philippines, and 750 miles from Vietnam. A commercial shipyard is located there and the staging area and waterfront facilities were leased by the Navy. In concept, materials were to be received via deep-draft ships at Poro Point, stored in the depot, and transshipped, via shallow draft vessels of the LST variety.
Direct discharge of contractor cargo from the shallow draft vessels would occur at a point at the locations nearest the potential job sites along the South Vietnam coastline where ramps and simple offloading bulkheads could be constructed. Through this scheme, the absence of deep draft pier facilities and suitable ground routes along the coast could be greatly circumvented.
The April review also indicated a need for an independent OICC Vietnam to replace the previous organizational arrangement whereby construction was managed by the OICC Bangkok. Thus, the OICC Republic of Vietnam (OICC RVN), was established on 1 July 1965, with his headquarters in Saigon.
The full impact on construction requirements, reflecting the explosive buildup of military forces, began to be felt in the summer
i
of 1965. Since the contractor had the only significant construction capability then incountry, recognition was given to the fact that what was originally organized as a support effort to a Military Assistance Program would have to be escalated into the greatest civilian construction program ever attempted under combat conditions. To meet the acceleration of military requirements, construction of projects would have to proceed concurrently, rather than by the more economical, sequential system of scheduling which constitutes normal construction practice. The contractor’s efforts would require concurrent operations at many sites throughout Vietnam; duplicate equipment “spreads” —basic functional units for specific jobs—at various major locations; the establishment of a substantial camp, maintenance and supply capability; and creation of a large logistics pipeline with procurement, recruiting, storage, shipment and distribution capabilities extending from the United States to the numerous scattered job sites 10,000 miles away in Vietnam.
The management platform for undertaking this unprecedented task was itself extended through many actions. First among them was the augmentation of the OICC RVN staff and implementation of the Director of Construction (DirCon) concept. This concept involved the assignment of a senior officer to each of four areas, closely paralleling the four Corps Tactical Zones (CTZ) to act in the capacity of a DOICC for decentralized management and control of engineering and contract construction.
The DirCons were staffed with engineering and civilian construction inspector personnel and exercised direct supervisory control over the ROICCs at the job sites. Dircon headquarters were located at Da Nang, Cam Ranh Bay, and Saigon, and later at Qui Nhon, thus coinciding with what finally evolved as the basic theater logistical and operational areas.
The RMK joint venture was expanded in August 1965 to include Brown and Root and J. A. Jones. This new joint venture, known as RMK-BRJ, offered a broader base of construction management and expertise, and ensured that adequate numbers of top level engineers and managers were available in the fields of construction supervision, procure
ment, training, security, maintenance, aC' counting, engineering, and specialty coi>' struction.
A civil service cadre of experienced mat1' agement and engineering personnel "'aS established in the Headquarters, NFEC, an its world-wide field offices to be available f°r immediate response to requests for temporal! additional duty with the OICC RVN.
A rear admiral of the Civil Engineer Corps> was assigned as the OICC RVN, and add1 tional CEC officers of all ranks were ordered t0 Vietnam to assist with the burgeoning pr°' gram. Figures 1 and 2 show the growth 0 officer and civilian staffing of the OICC R^ in relation to the sharp growth of the progra111 funded for contractor construction.
Special teams comprised of data processing and construction management personnel we1^ sent to Vietnam to develop program contro and reporting systems and to establish n1' country capability for critical path analyst on projects at all major construction sites- These analyses established an understanding" between the OICC and the contractor, 0 what was to be done, when it was to be done> and in what sequence.
A special staff in Headquarters, NFEC WaS established to co-ordinate and direct the entire organizational effort in support 0 Southeast Asia.
By December 1965, the OICC backlog 0 construction had mushroomed to $310 million and the best estimate of facilities requirements at that time indicated that an additional $55^ million of construction would be assigned b> April 1966.
The urgency attached to the program die- tated that the $960 million in construction assigned to the OICC be completed within tw° years. Decisions were made to mobilize the essential construction resources which would enable RMK-BRJ to attain a monthly Wl? capability of $20 million by April 1966, $25 million by May 1966 and $40 million by October 1966.
i
I
\
i
s
I
\
I
1
1
1
i
(
Action was taken to increase the con' tractor’s work force, from the December 1965 level of 24,000, to 40,000 by May 1966 and 58,500 by October 1966. Close working relationships with the government of Vietnam I Ministry of Labor were established through
the
billed
workmen from other countries, prin-
sUrri
T A o
'v°rk force, plans were developed to con
camps at the major project sites. The
men. Planning also called for a medical
cli
e office of the Labor Attache, American oassy, Saigon. Procedures and agreements re developed for mass recruiting and train- i ? local nationals and the importation of
'Pally Filipinos and Koreans. The optimum ^°rk force combination was determined to be fo ^ nati°nals for all managerial, supervisory, reman and engineering levels; Filipinos, fo°rea?s> ancl other foreigners to fill the billets Jr skilled craftsmen, for such men were rce in South Vietnam, and Vietnamese Tk 10nak f°r semi-skilled and common labor.
. e planned total work force of 58,500 thus ^eluded 5,500 U. S. nationals, 8,000 third- ^Untry nationals, and 45,000 Vietnamese. , ecruiting offices were activated in Seoul, g anila, and the U. S. cities of San Bruno, y0lSe, Houston, New York, and Charlotte. l(‘tnamese were to be recruited from the
ounding environs of the project sites, process, house, and care for this sizeable
duct
^mps would range in size from 100 men to 1,000 • .. - - - .• .
, nic and 33 dispensaries to tend to the nealth of the men.
g _he bulk material inventory would have to /e increased from the $44-million value on and in December 1965 to $185 million. The VaW of equipment and plant available in- c°Untry would have to increase from $41 ^Uion in December 1965 to a total of $118 ^ffilion, an increase of 4,000 pieces of equipment. In addition to purchased equipment, ased and rented equipment—such as barges, '§s, dredges and pile drivers—would be
requjred.
The makeup of personnel recruitment, bulk ‘'Jaterial procurements, and equipment and 1 ant acquisition would be on the basis of establishing a balanced contractor construc- l0r> capability in keeping with the then Vaguely defined gross facilities requirements, ‘e;> so many ports, airfields, depots, roads, uhlities, structures, and the like. These gross requirements were translated into the broad types of construction capability needed, such as carthmoving, paving, pile driving, dredg- In&> aggregate production, carpentry, struc- Ltral, electrical, and mechanical. This broad Categorization of functional requirements and
$900 I
$800 I
$700 I
$600 I
$500 9
$400 I $300 I
$200 I
$1°° m
0
J
types of construction capability was carried a step further by developing equipment “spreads” which formed the basis for ordering specific equipment. These spreads were for asphalt laydown, concrete paving, crushing, earthmoving, and building. Each of them included the basic types and quantity of equipment to ensure a given functional capability. An earthmoving spread, for instance, was composed of five 24-SY scrapers, seven D-8 dozers, two graders, one dragline, three rollers, and two water trucks. Special additions to, or other modifications of the basic spread could be made to accommodate unusual site conditions. For sandy sites, two 834-tractors were added to the earthmoving spreads.
The production rates of a spread were estimated, using varying factors, such as soil condition, weather, down time, operator efficiency, and hauling distance. Since all work had to proceed concurrently, where possible, and completion dates were to be the soonest obtainable, over-all procurement and distribution of equipment became a matter of evaluating the optimum use of spreads, to obtain production rates in keeping with the estimated construction requirements at each site. Spread composition and the production rates expected were changed as experience was gained. Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the use of the equipment spread concept.
To increase the bulk material inventory, from $33 million to $185 million, in the shortest time, a monthly shipping rate of 100,000 tons valued at $8 million was established as a target. Special task forces to expedite shipping were established at the ports in Davisville, Rhode Island; Gulfport, Mississippi; Port Hueneme, and Oakland, California; Taipei, Taiwan; and Poro Point, Philippines. Taipei was to be the principal source of Portland cement. Procurement research had disclosed that a consortium of four Portland cement manufacturers in Taipei could meet the cement specifications and produce, at lowest cost, the 50,000 tons N month, which was estimated to be require during the peak periods of paving operations’ Engineering studies on the stabilization of the sandy soils at Da Nang, Chu Eai, Qui Nhoni and Cam Ranh Bay; and the paucity 0 available quality aggregates led to the deci' sion to employ soil cement stabilization to the maximum degree feasible. This decisio11’ coupled with the extensive airfield pavements contemplated, accounted for the unusually extensive cement requirements. Taipei’s conn parative proximity to South Vietnam further enhanced its use as a cement source.
It was obvious from the outset that the con' tractor would have to be logistically sen' supporting since the heavy demands 0 construction resources would only overburden further the then limited military logisticS capability. In fact, the urgency attached roads, ports, airfields, and depots demanded concurrent construction, with the contractor undertaking “boot-strap” operations at the same time.
In furtherance of the Poro Point staging and shallow draft shipping concept, action was undertaken to develop shallow draft off' loading facilities along the South Vietnam1 coast. This included the construction of eigh1 LST ramps at five sites and sheet pile bulk' heads for barge offloading at six sites.
Material management planning called f°r contractor depot facilities consisting of ^ warehouses located at 20 sites, providing a total floor space of 800,000 square feet. Major depots would be located at Saigon, Card Ranh Bay, and Da Nang.
To tie together what eventually resulted d1 over 40 separate project sites, a contractor transportation system was developed, through the lease, purchase, and charter of ten tug' boats, 30 barges, 16 aircraft, two commercial LSTs and ten LCMs. Voice communications between project sites and the Saigon head' quarters of the OICG and the contractor were installed. A teletype circuit was installed be'
Less than two years of dredging and heavy pier construction produced the dram^ changes seen in this pair of pictures of Da Nang’s port facilities, where manpo^jl and machinepower constructed a new bastion for seapower by linking two poin*5 land that had once been separated by open water.
tween Saigon and San Bruno to expedite procurement and personnel processing.
Formal training programs were initiated for Vietnamese workmen and on-the-job training was accelerated at all work sites. The contractor’s capability in specialty work was increased through subcontracts with specialized firms in the fields of stevedoring, electrical power and distribution systems, pile driving, dredging, high capacity cooling plants, electronics, data processing systems, and management information systems.
The bulk of design and engineering was performed by U. S. firms in Vietnam. Normal contracting for design and engineering services was effected by the OICC with the firms, but contracting procedures were greatly accelerated. Standard designs were stressed as well as simplicity, austerity, and the “quick and dirty.” In almost all cases, construction was initiated on the basis of preliminary designs with the final design of the facility and its construction proceeding simultaneously. Field changes under the supervision of the DirCons and in consort with contractor and A&E representatives became standard procedure.
The contractor established the permanent executive position of Resident Partner in Vietnam as the top manager and assigned a vice president and director of the Morrison- Knudsen Company to fill the job. Each of the joint partners of the RMK-BRJ combine assigned top people from their permanent organizations to undertake resident managerial and supervisory responsibilities. The construction combine was organized into four geographic districts interfacing with the four Corps Tactical Zones and the OICC DirCons. A fifth district was also organized exclusively for marine and waterfront operations. District managers and project managers were assigned from the roster of top level personnel from each of the joint ventures in accordance with the particular construction capabilities required by the program and possessed by the individual companies making up the joint venture. Morrison-Knudsen spearheaded earthmoving and paving in addition to its role as senior partner and executive manager. District V, the marine and waterfront organization, was managed by Raymond International. Brown and Root undertook design and construction supervision of heavy structural work, i.e., piers and bridges. J. A. J°n^ was instrumental in building construction- • separate and distinct division of responsibility and performance was not intended nor did d occur since the joint venture was organize0’ staffed and operated as a single entity.
Individual company managers and super" visors were intermixed and shifted fm"1 district to district as construction require* ments and capabilities dictated. Intermixing of the joint venture talents and efforts ",|1 Seabee and Army Engineer construction 'va* commonplace and successful. Seabees a,lC i other military engineers most frequent augmented the contractor’s efforts in remote areas and during periods of labor strife am civil unrest, such as occurred with the Bud" dhist upheavals in 1966 which resulted 111 sporadic strikes and work boycotts by contractor’s Vietnamese workforce. In add1' tion, curfews imposed by the military baSe | commanders before, during, and after energy ; attacks restricted the use of the Vietnamese workforce.
The minimum work week was established at 60 hours and two 10-hour work shifts we1" employed. This meant that shifts of men an0 equipment were operating 20 hours a daf’ six days a week. Seven-day work weeks were not uncommon.
The monthly WIP for January 1966 vrzs $16.5 million compared to the established goal of $15 million. The April 1966 Wff amounted to $21.9 million versus the $2® million target and the May 1966 WIP of $27.1 million exceeded the targeted $25-millior>' WIP. The ultimate goal of $40 million WIP peI month construction capability by Octobef 1966 was surpassed in that the September
1966 WIP amounted to $41.4 million and the October 1966 WIP totalled $46.1 million. The highest WIP achieved was during February
1967 when $58.2 million of construction was placed.
Oddly enough, the highest employment reached was 51,721 in July 1966, after which 3 gradual reduction of the contractor’s work force (mostly local nationals, the unskilled) took place, reaching a level of 40,586 during February 1967, when the highest construction rate was achieved. This apparent anomal) resulted from several factors. By tailoring the work forces to fit the workload mix more
closely, and by capitalizing on the extensive training initiated early during the build-up, more productivity per man was achieved. In addition, the dollar value of equipment on hand had reached the $115 million peak (5,560 pieces); thus more mechanization was employed and the material inventory was at its highest level of $185 million. The much- needed depots, camps, overhaul, and maintenance shops, transportation systems, computer systems offloading facilities, and port operations were in being. The OICG staff numbered 590, including 90 Navy Civil Engineer Corps officers. The contractor was working on a total of 782 projects at 47 sites throughout South Vietnam.
Having opened this discussion in a light vein, may we close, not in solemnity, but with due respect for the magnitude of the accomplishment? At the outset of the period under discussion, the country we had pledged to support was tottering on the brink of defeat; it was 10,000 miles away; and the kind of facilities necessary to support the extensive military operations envisioned did not exist.
It would be necessary for us to transport men and materials over a vast ocean and, when they arrived, to have on hand the necessary ports, waterfront facilities, airbases, living quarters, and lines of communications. To the fainthearted, it must have sounded as impossible as duplicating the Pyramids on a weekend, or the Great Wall of China in a fortnight.
But, it was done. In less than two years’ time, six ports with a total of 29 berths for deep draft ships were constructed; 26 million cubic meters of dredging was done; eight jet- capable air bases with 10,000-foot runways were built; 10.2 million square feet of covered storage, and 2.5 million cubic feet of refrigerated storage were erected, and 4 million square yards of open storage was formed; ’ million square feet of maintenance facility* and 5,000 hospital beds became available housing for 300,000 men was built and ov'er 200,000 kilowatts of electric generating ca' pacity was emplaced.
But, these figures become meaningless 111 their enormity. Perhaps they would be bettd understood if we realized that a $40-millio>1' WIP—$18 million less than the peak montlW could pay for enough dredging to fill football fields to a height of 12 feet; pluS enough asphalt paving to pave a four-lari'- highway 235 miles long; and enough Portia^ cement to pave a similar primary highway miles long: and enough crushed stone to n* the Pentagon courtyard to the roof over tw° and a half times; and enough earthmovin? to bury a football field under a mountai11 1,500 feet high.
There are two more lessons that must n0’ be overlooked. First, this seemingly impossible task was accomplished without a single enenrV submarine interdiction of the thousands shiploads of combat supplies for our force5 and the construction materials necessary t0 support and sustain those forces. We may no' be so fortunate the next time.
Just as what was done was done so that v*'e would not let down our 500,000 troops and their allies, we must not let our ASW cap®' bility down. A continuing deterrent to the possible enemy use of submarines against us >s a must.
And, finally, none of us who were so inti' mately involved in this undertaking should forget what a vindication it constituted. Fob while manpower and machine power labored to construct the facilities for us and our sister services, it was seapower—specifically, carrier-based airpower—that was already there and fulfilling its mission.
— ——★ “ ------------------------
S.O.S. in Reverse
As the well deck of one of the first LSDs was flooded during an early amphibious exercise, a frantic message was received from a nearby ship:
“You are sinking, we are sending help!”
------------------------------ Contributed by Lieutenant Nat B. Read, Jr., U. S. Naval Reserve (R)
(The Naval Institute will pay $10.00 for each anecdote published in the Proceedings.)