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Pictorial—"Our First Steel Warships”
CSee pp. 84-99, January; p. 106, May 1969 Proceedings)
Captain W. H. Galbraith, U. S. Navy (Retired)—After the old cruiser, USS Chicago, had ceased to be a barracks ship at Pearl Harbor and was merely a hulk awaiting sale to the shipbreakers, I had occasion to prowl through her with a flashlight one day. In a corner of a storeroom, I came upon the letters of her original name which had been stored there after removal when her name was changed to Alton, to make way for the new heavy cruiser Chicago.
Our officers’ club was in the process of expanding, and its members were casting about for suitable trophies with which to decorate the new building. I had the letters cleaned of their gray paint, and then polished. They were of cast bronze and were very heavy. I had them weighed, and, if my memory serves, the aggregate weight was 245
pounds. Apparently, in the 1880s, nonessential weight was of little concern to naval architects.
I had the letters mounted on a decorative . panel of teak and a brass plate applied, engraved with pertinent data from the old Bureau of C and R Ship’s Data Book. N° i ■ sooner had this ensemble been mounted over the club’s bar, than we were informed that the Alton had broken away from her towing , vessel, and had sunk in mid-Pacific en route , to San Francisco.
Since the manner of her demise was definitely an interesting item in her career, 1 had the name plate removed from the plaque, reversed, and re-engraved to include this information. Presumably, this plaque still adorns some room in the present club at Pearl Harbor.
(Ed. Note: A check was made in an effort 1° photograph the plaque. However, our photographers i could not come up with it. Perhaps our readers can shed some light as to its location.)
'568
pp. 116-117, February; and pp. 113-114,
speech Bureau publishes a Navy Speaker's Guide (NavSo P-3000), which, though designed Primarily for public speakers, also treats sPcechwriting and writing in general. A free ^°Py is available upon request to the Chief of Information (01-640), Navy Department, Washington, D. C. 20350.
Incidentally, the latest edition of the Navy Speaker's Guide lists five rules for better writing °ffered by Ted Fuj ii in the IRE Transactions on Engineering Writing and Speech for August
Effective Writing, Navy or Civilian”
(fe C. Blair, pp. 131-134, July; p. 110, December ^Pril 1969 Proceedings)
David L. Woods, Head, Program Support “ranch, Navy Department Speech Bureau— 1 he eight rules suggested by Ensign McNulty, should prove helpful. But to ensure accuracy '"another vital ingredient of effective Navy ^riting—one additional rule is needed: Always provide proper credit to sources.”
Four of Ensign McNulty’s eight rules are hsted in Strunk and White’s The Elements of Style (recommended by Captain Blair). Four °f the eight rules are also cited in Fowler’s The king's English; six are noted by Quiller-Couch lri On the Art of Writing, and virtually all are advocated in one or another of Rudolf Elesch’s many books—such as How to Write, Speak and Think More Ejfectively.
In any event, nearly all eight rules precede Ensign McNulty by at least 50 years—in c°mmon publications that should be familiar to anyone interested in better writing. Most °I us, however, tend to overlook readily available aids in many of our tasks, including 'Vriting. James M. McCrimmon’s Writing With A Purpose (3rd edition) is the current standard English textbook at the U. S. Naval Academy, and provides useful aid in virtually all Matters of basic composition.
At least two widely available official Navy Publications have also been designed to assist *u solving writing dilemmas. The Bureau of •'aval Personnel issues a Writing Guide for Naval Officers (NavPers 1009-A) periodically— Dst one in 1964. The Navy Department 1958: “(1) Use short sentences. (2) Use simple words. (3) Paragraph often. (4) Read it over for sense. (5) Write like you talk.
★ ★ *
John T. Gotjen—I applaud Captain Blair and Ensign McNulty for their concern for, and practical suggestions about, improving the level of literacy in Navy directives. However, it will take more than a clarion call from the pages of the Proceedings before anyone will respond.
I can remember remarking to my former commanding officer about the myriad of meaningless instructions, the impossibility of reading—much less ever collecting them all and the shabby language in which they were couched. For my trouble, I earned the gentleman’s undying enmity. I had defamed holy writ, you see.
His attitude, and that of many who clutch tenaciously at every visage of the Old Navy, will have to be suppressed by enlightened senior echelons before literacy will begin to creep into the Directive System or any of the other overdue reforms needed in the Navy are sanctioned.
★ ★ ★
Lieutenant Commander J. W. Corey, Jr., U. S. Navy—In the military, we are very susceptible to “bureaucratic jargonism.” In attempting to follow the few rules of Ensign McNulty, there is the pro forma type of correspondence, completely devoid of any warmth or conviction. Individual expression must be sacrificed at the altar of conformity. Eventually, we become victims of the word or phrase syndrome. Numerous roughs and countless smooths later, the finished product says essentially the same thing as the first rough. Rather than asking, “Does this say it like I would say it,” one should ask, “Does this say what needs to be said.”
The military has a vocabulary of its own which is illustrated by some of Ensign McNulty’s examples. In place of “officer and enlisted personnel,” he would have us use “crew or staff.” In referring to a ship, “crew”
is usually restricted to enlisted men, whereas an aircraft “crew” may include both officer and enlisted personnel. “Preventive Maintenance” is equated with “upkeep.” Not true. Preventive maintenance is a much more technical term which applies to machinery or electronics, whereas upkeep is a general term which could include painting the sides or a good field day. The word combination “and/or” is said to be without meaning. Again, not so. This word combination describes two conditions, both of which or only one of which may come to pass. Last, but not least, Ensign McNulty would use “I see” in place of “It has come to the attention of this command.” While the latter expression is an overused cliche, it does serve a purpose. “I see” implies that the commander is personally aware of or has personally observed something. This is often not the case. The later cliche expresses exactly that situation. A preferred statement is, “This command notes. ...”
In short, we must not seek conformity for the sake of a few bureaucratic rules. Exotic or vogue words often convey a much more precise meaning than a common word. Short words are a must for messages, but are less important in a letter. What Anglo-Saxon word can we use for detente? Using few modifiers, one could describe winter as inclement weather. I’ll be damned if I’ll revere the simple English declarative sentence!
The Naval ROTC
Commander John D. Alden, U. S. Navy (Retired)—The naval ROTC is again under attack. It is fair to assume that the instigators of these actions are not motivated by a desire to improve the ROTC curriculum. Rather, they have seized on weak points in the program as a means of bringing about its downfall. There is ample reason to believe that the anti-ROTC agitation will not die down easily or soon. Under the circumstances it is important that the Navy take a searching look at its officer training programs, and the NROTC first of all. Let us look carefully at the weaknesses that have made some of these units vulnerable to academic criticism.
The downfall of the Corps’ programs has been brought about on the grounds that the courses taught are not worthy of being given academic credit, and their instructors are no1 entitled to the academic rank of professor- Are these charges justified? I am afraid tha* many would say that they are. There is, d course, no reason why courses in naval his' tory, military science, and technology, or the psychology of leadership should not be capable of holding their own with similar civilian- oriented studies. The fact that ROTC course5 are widely believed to be inferior in academ/ content is, I believe, a logical consequence of the Navy’s policy of staffing its college units with regular active duty personnel. The armed forces have many officers who are fully qualified to teach just about any subject, but teaching billets are simply not considered “career enhancing.” When the needs of forces afloat are as serious as they are today! it is unreasonable to expect that the best people will be assigned to NROTC units or that they will be left there long enough to match professional educators in effectiveness- The obvious solution is to start phasing retired regular officers into ROTC professorships after they have obtained the academic qualifications required of their civilian counterparts and after they have demonstrated the interest and ability needed for a teaching career. It is ironic that so many retired officers do go into college teaching in a civilian capacity. Would they not be even better qualified to teach courses in fields related to their previous experience? The Navy has thousands of retired officers with advanced degrees, excellent service records, and many years of productive activity still in front of them. Our “up-or-out” promotion system guarantees a constant supply of such people, and an increasing pool from which the best qualified can be selected. Second careers as Corps teachers would give these officers 15 to 20
ENTER THE FORUM
Regular and Associate Members are invited t° write brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also to write brief discussions °n any topic of naval interest for possible publication in these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Navy can be exchanged. The U. S. Naval Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion published, at the rate °* $45.00 per printed page in the Proceedings.
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years in which to develop challenging courses and hone their teaching skills. They could use leir summers and sabbaticals for research a.nd refresher duty with the active Navy. In hnie of emergency or limited war, there would e no need to pull them out of their jobs to fill j otical billets afloat, and the Navy would not . Ve to stretch its inadequate personnel ceil- lngs to keep the NROTC units manned. Be- Cattse these retired officers would be civilian ^ftiployees of their colleges, the institutions emselves would have academic control over e curriculum and could assure themselves at standards of content and presentation VVere fully comparable to other academic dePartments.
Finally, this system could be introduced ^dually and tested thoroughly in one or two nools to iron out the kinks and resolve any °ubts about its effectiveness. Many examples Can be cited of men who have combined naval and teaching careers, some as reservists and ^fne as retirees. Samuel Eliot Morison and • J- Holmes are cases in point.
us answer those who would tear down °Ur NROTC establishment by building it up strong they won’t find ready-made flaws ° attack. Let us make the NROTC professor- niPs career-enhancing positions for second Career Navy men instead of sidetracks or dead ends for active duty officers.
Azimuth and Altitude Correction
Nomogram
t> F'aptain P. V. H. Weems, U. S. Navy (Re- «)-—While preparing the manuscript for e Line of Position book, which was published V the U. S. Naval Institute in 1927, Professor J°hn Tyler, of the mathematics department at the U. S. Naval Academy, was asked to de- Sl§n a suitable graphic solution for altitude ^rrections, and for azimuth, to go with . Sura’s altitude tables. Professor Tyler de- SlSned such a nomogram, which required an , agnment or parallel motion feature for find- lrig the azimuth.
Since even a straight-edge might be inconVenient in solving altitude and azimuth in the Pr°posed tables, Tyler’s diagram was replaced y Captain Rust’s azimuth diagram. The utude corrections were condensed into five Pages and included with Ogura’s altitude tables, which were published by the Naval
& PILOTING
DUTTON’S makes it easier.
Comprehensive in scope, this completely rewritten and reorganized edition offers instruction in the whole range of navigation from elementary concepts and terms to the most complex systems. Basic navigational methods, both piloting and celestial, are described in detail. In addition, chapters giving general background information on the latest, highly sophisticated navigational systems such as Omega and inertial are included. Over 500 new illustrations, many of which are in color.
758 pages. 500 illustrations. List Price, $15.00
Member's Price, $12.00.
A United States Naval Institute Book
(Please use order form in booklist section)
This small book was followed in the next few years by numerous so-called short methods and inspection tables for the convenience of the navigator. Some of these were HO208, HO209, H0211, H0214, H0229, H0249, not to mention numerous tables by private individuals and foreign governments. The Tyler azimuth diagram uses the principle of
muth may be written in the form of a straightline equation: y = mx+b, which equation may be solved by a nomogram called the Tyler diagram. The Tyler diagram has the merit of incorporating on one sheet, a means for graphically finding the azimuth and altitude corrections.
Professor Emeritus John Tyler has designed
r
jsUres now incorporated in slide rules and n n?te<^ ^or ^'s at>ility for the practical use of lathenratical concepts. More recently, he 0 e a paper on kinematic navigation, which ^einonstrates that for high speeds and under sCrta'n conditions, maximum altitude of ob- r *jVed bodies does not occur on the local me- ^ lan. In other words, the standard cosine- (, avcisine formula does not stand up under ^ertain conditions and at high speeds. Such ^aexpl0Jtecj items as these by Tyler should be arefully researched and due credit given to e inventor for any concept which he might have proposed.
°mbstone Promotions”
e M. S. Prince, pp. 115-116, February 1969 rROCEEDINGs)
Captain Arthur W. Winslow, U. S. Naval ^ Cserve (Retired)—The proposal appears to ave much merit because it would honor ^rmed Forces personnel who have persevered n? enough to accumulate 20 years of ac- redited satisfactory Federal Service, without v°lving an increase in retirement pay. Any gelation featuring increased retirement foaV> unless tied to a cost-of-living escalation r'nula, is almost certainly bound to be fj" eated, but a change in the laws providing ^advancement to the next higher rank on >e irement without advance in pay might well ave a chance of passage. to^h°se who have devoted 20 or more years active service have obviously spent a major P°rtion of their career or working lives in the ri'ied Services. These years are, in most Cases, determinative key years which pretty 'VeH delineate the career pattern of the indi- v‘dual. It is, for many on retirement, an exceedingly hard adjustment from a relatively ^ *?h military position of grave responsibility a civilian position of quite a different sort ai'd; in many cases, of lesser responsibility.
Uere is no question that a higher retirement rfuk may open the door to better initial Clvilian positions.
From the view of the reservist, there is also a,uple justification for this recognition. Most reservists who have been able to accumulate °Ver 20 years of satisfactory Federal Service Probably have from three to six years active uty during World War II or Korea, and in some cases, the Vietnam War. Only those who have done it realize the difficulties and complications involved in earning a satisfactory year of Federal Service on inactive duty, involving the compilation of at least 50 points through drill attendance, active duty training periods, and correspondence courses. All these activities are time consuming and directly competitive with time spent at home and with family, and night classes for graduate credits, not to mention civilian job performance and career which is apt to involve travel and other obstacles in the way of 50 points a year.
After World War II and until some time in 1959, I believe, those retiring with combat citations were advanced to the next higher rank with commensurate pay. I do not recall if this was owing to legislation passed or administrative action, but after a date in 1959, this practice was discontinued, thereby working an inequity on those with combat citations who remained active, were later passed over, and then retired after additional years of service. It would seem that this group of combat citation winners, whether attaining 20 years of accredited Federal Service or not, should also at least be honored by advancement to the next higher rank without any pay increase.
★ ★ ★
Lieutenant Commander Paul W. Garber, U. S. Naval Reserve (R)—The suggestion of Captain Prince, that “tombstone promotions” be made for “all the Armed Forces personnel who retire with more than 20 years of accredited satisfactory Federal Service” is wrong. The Navy, of which we should be thinking first, would gain nothing—nor would those who stayed on for 30 years until they, too, retired.
Why should a reserve officer, who presumably has a civilian career, get a step up merely by drilling once a week and performing Active Duty for Training? If the rank, for whatever reason, wasn’t earned in the Navy, it shouldn’t be a sop for getting out of it. Rather than have retired captains running around under false flags, let the Navy concentrate on making the rank attained as meaningful as possible.
TORPEDOBOAT
SAILOR
BY C. M. BLACKFORD
The colorful account of a young sailor aboard a torpedoboat destroyer on convoy duty during World War I. He describes submarine sinkings, collisions at sea, and the resourcefulness of bluejackets, ashore and afloat. Here began the bitter lessons of modem submarine warfare that pointed the way for the remarkable destroyers of today’s Navy. 160 pages.
Illustrated with pen-and-ink drawings.
List Price $7.50 Member’s Price $6.00
A New Book About
"Our Other War In Korea”
(See W. M. Leary, pp. 46-53, June 1968; and pp- 112-114, February 1969 Proceedings)
William M. Leary, Jr.—Professor Karsten and Mr. Patterson state that the primary cause of the “punitive” expedition was the Sherman affair. This is not at all clear. Indeed, such a punitive expedition was proposed by Consul George F. Seward at the time. Secre- ' tary William H. Seward supported the pro' posal. However, Secretary Seward left office in 1868, and the project lapsed. In 1870, Secretary Fish did authorize an expedition- The correspondence between Fish, Minister Low, and Admiral Rodgers clearly states that the purpose of the expedition was to negotiate a treaty “for the protection of shipwrecked mariners,” and, if possible, a commercial agreement.
There is little doubt that the Americans acted in a belligerent manner upon arrival in Korean waters. This was believed to be the “correct” way to deal with Orientals. might also be noted that the Koreans, according to their own historians, believed that force was the only way to deal with the Barbarians.
Professor Karsten and Mr. Patterson, however, seem most exercised over my failure to draw historical parallels—to seek the lessons of history. The use of the past as a guide to, or criticism of, current policy seems, at least to me, fraught with danger. I no more see the relevance of the Korean expedition of 1871 to the seizure of the Pueblo than I do the pertinence of Munich to our involvement in ( Vietnam. Individuals, of course, will continue to draw historical parallels and derive lessons from history. I believe that I have presented sufficient material in my article to allow them to do this. But the lessons—and the errors—will be theirs, not mine.
_ \
"Arctic Passages of North America”
(See R. Boyle, pp. 48-55, January, 1969 Proceedings)
Four-Stackers
Commander V. O. Harkness, Jr., U. S- Navy—Humble Oil and Refining Company, together with Atlantic Richfield Company and British Petroleum, early in March an- ' nounced that a search will be undertaken to determine the feasibility of transporting oil via tanker from the North Slope of Alaska
(PLEASE USE ORDER FORM IN BOOKLIST SECTION)
trough the Northwest Passage to the East Coast of the United States. To accomplish this on a test basis, the 115,000-ton tanker SS Manhattan (the biggest tanker in the U. S. ^erchant fleet) is being equipped with a new lce-breaker bow, reinforced hull, and large screens to protect the twin propellers and fudders from ice damage. The Manhattan will also carry two Sikorsky model S-62 helicopters to aid in reconnoitering leads through the 1Ce pack. In addition, new sonar and radar equipments are being installed to facilitate the gathering of accurate soundings and the spotting of icebergs.
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A U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE BOOK Annapolis, Maryland 21402
The Ensign says, “One recommends it alike to the neophyte and the practiced sailor.
“The range of the book is remarkable------------
The text is sharp, common sense and never preachy.”—Rudder.
284 pages, 66 photographs, over 125 line drawings, charts and tables. $9.50
Widely-acclaimed as a singularly authoritative manual of small-boat handling and seamanship, Sail and Power is now available for the first time in a handsome, haid- bound format. Written in a straightforward manner, it covers the handling of dinghies, sloops, yawls, and single and twin-screw power boats as well as racing.
Illustrated by Richard Henderson
Richard Henderson and
Lt. Bartlett S. Dunbar, U.S. Navy
SAIL AND POWER
A Manual of Seamanship
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The SS Manhattan will venture northward from New York and force her way the 4,427 miles through Baffin Bay and the Beaufort Sea to Prudhoe Bay. Here, on the northern coast °f Alaska, she can take aboard black crude oil from the Trans-Alaska pipeline and, hope- fuHy, crunch her way back to an east coast refinery. This is the most ambitious venture 7et attempted to open up the Northwest Passage and, in the words of Humble, “if successful, it could lead to the establishment of a new commercial shipping route through the Arctic region with broad implications for Arc- tlc development and International Trade.”
High Price of Success”
R. J. Hanks, pp. 26-33, April; pp. 109-110, pePtember 1968; p. 109, February 1969 roceedings)
R
Captain Roy C. Smith, III, U. S. Naval eserve (Retired)—Captain Hanks’s comments on the threat to NATO should bring to mind the classic signal made by Admiral Sir Havid Beatty upon the surrender of the Herman High Seas Fleet in 1918:
From: Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet
To: British Empire
Britain has this day witnessed a
demonstration of sea power that
she will forget at her peril.
It is notable that Beatty did not address his signal to the Fleet nor to the Navy, but to the British Empire. He was talking to all the People, to remind them that the “rusty merchant ships, slogging up and down” had kept the Empire lifeline open and that they, together with the Royal Navy, formed the backbone of that seapower.
Jf
112 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, July 1969
His warning is even more important today, when the once mighty strength of the Royal Navy and the American merchant marine have both been reduced to a perilous degree. NATO is- completely dependent upon the democracies maintaining control of the sea, to which the Soviet threat increases daily. The United States, which witnessed a far greater demonstration of seapower in 1941-45, appears equally forgetful of its own dependence upon the sea lanes for existence as a great nation.
Beatty’s message deserves repetition today, but with the addressee corrected to read “Free World.”
"Portrait of Proficiency: USCGC Dallas (WHEC-716)”
(See S. A. Sup, pp. 137-139, February 1969 Proceedings)
Commander James R. Kelly, U. S. Coast Guard, former Executive and Commanding Officer, USCGC Dallas (WHEC-716)—The Dallas is not equipped with a (CODAG) (combination diesel and gas turbine) plant, but rather with what is sometimes known as CODOG (combination diesel or gas turbine) plant. The gas turbine and diesel engine that are geared and clutched to the same shaft cannot be used simultaneously. This, however, does not preclude using a gas turbine to power one shaft and a diesel to power the other. In
fact, there are those who claim that this is a good way to operate, thereby giving some of the best of both worlds—relatively high speed and reasonably good fuel economy. The Dallas’ main diesel engines are rated at 3,500- h.p. each, for a total of 7,000 main propulsion diesel horsepower.
With regard to the bow propulsion unit, n should be noted that this unit is trainable , though 360 degrees, thus the bow unit is capable of exerting force in an infinite nu®' ber of directions. It is a very handy gadget when, during an oceanographic cast, it is desired to hold the ship’s head into the wind- Almost every shiphandler has, at one time or another, wished that he had available a “1 or 2 sideways bell,” and by using the bow propulsion and a proper combination of ahead thrust on one main shaft and a stern thrust on the other main shaft, this is available in the Dallas.
The main and bow propulsion can be , controlled from the pilothouse and from either bridge wing. Propulsion instrumentation on the bridge includes indicator lights to show which main propulsion system (gas turbine or diesel) is clutched in on each main shaft, shaft r.p.m. indicator, propeller pitch indicators for the main propulsion, and a direction and r.p.m. indicator for the bow propulsion.
There are also indicator lights to show that power for the bow unit is available on the
U. S. Coast Guard
USCGC Dallas (WHEC-7ld)
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fridge, and whether the bow unit is in its down” (operating) position or in its redacted position. The helicopter control °fficer can see what is happening, and can talk to the landing signal officer through the Phone circuit, between the helo deck and *'dge talkers. The damage control assistant Can> should a mishap occur, provide immediate damage control assistance. He also has j,ound-pC)wered communications between the 'ght deck and damage control central.
The Dallas is also equipped with dial telephone and sound-powered systems, which Permit communications to many of the ship’s sPaces. The old standby 21MC “squawk box” Provides a third method of talking between he bridge and other stations.
The Dallas' oceanographic area includes arhple laboratory space, a hydrographic Nv'nch with 30,000 feet of wire, and the necessary Nansen bottles and reversing thermom- '-ters to enable her to conduct Nansen casts. n inductive salinometer is used to determine he salinity of the collected water samples.
' he is also equipped with a bathythermograph winch. The Dallas presently does not ave instrumentation for recording current Section and velocity. She will soon receive a Salinity-Temperature-Depth (STD) sensor systern which will permit real time measurements of temperature and salinity throughout he water column from the surface to a depth of 9,840 feet.
The Future of the Coast Guard”
| W A. A. Heckman, pp. 60-72, April; pp. 105 -106, 7i pp. 114-115, September, 1968; and 109-111, ^htrch 1969 Proceedings)
E. Kaiser—I suggest Captain read Captain Heckman’s article again and consider the circumstances and the htne it was written before he goes off the deep erid. If; jn the future, the Coast Guard were to take over some of the additional functions mentioned, I doubt if the maritime industry atl<i the merchant marine would be in any 'v°rse shape than it is at the present time.
The Navy—A Retention Gap”
J. G. McGarry, pp. 105-107, February 1969 roceedings)
R. G. Moody—I have some ideas that may °elp retain more career officers and close the Mention gap discussed by Lieutenant Commander McGarry in his recent article.
If the maximum age of entering the Naval Academy was raised two or three years, it would give some good young men a chance to obtain appointments if they were delayed, for various reasons, in making a career decision.
If the quota for the appointment of Navy enlisted men to the Naval Academy were increased, I feel that many men would remain in the Navy as career officers. There is also a need for better publicity concerning the Naval Academy. It would be surprising to know just how many people really know about the Academy. The readers of the Proceedings know, because they are involved, but there are a great many more who do not know.
Another idea is to give a chance to the officers who have resigned from the Navy. A man who has resigned and has time to see that the grass is not always greener on the “outside,” will probably make a fine officer after regaining his commission.
The Soviet Man in the Sea
Commander T. G. Martin, U. S. Navy Not surprisingly, the Soviets are actively engaged in scientific programs to develop man’s capability to live and work far beneath the surface of the ocean. While not as widely publicized as the American Sealab series, some articles do appear periodically to give some hint of their efforts. The following material from a recent issue of the Soviet magazine Sudostroeniye (Shipbuilding) provides information on one such experiment.
As the second phase of an otherwise unspecified series of experiments, the Leningrad Hydrometeorological Institute, in collaboration with the Acoustic Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, in the summer of 1967 built an underwater laboratory designated Sadko-2. It consisted of two spheres, ten feet in diameter, joined together with a vertical cylinder or tube fitted with an airtight hatch. The upper of the two spheres is outfitted for work and sleep, while the lower one contains auxiliary equipment. Ten bottles containing the breathing mixture are located externally below the lower sphere, around the extension of the vertical tube. In addition, provisions were made for the supply of air from ashore, and so arranged that either or both systems could be used as required.
1. External lighting fixture | 17. | Manometer-type depth |
2. Sanitary facilities |
| gauge |
3. Electric water heater | 18. | Ultraviolet lamp |
4. Middle hatch | 19. | Bunk |
5. Filter-absorber | 20. | Outside ladder |
6. Control console | 21. | Air regeneration and |
7. Microphone for shore |
| purification installation |
communications | 22. | Electric heater |
8. Bathythermohygrometer | 23. | Portable diver’s light |
9. Refrigeration installation | 24. | Shore telephone |
10. Inner hull of laboratory | 25. | Lower porthole |
11. Rubber coating | 26. | Aqualung |
12. Ceiling lighting fixture | 27. | Electrical distribution |
13. Manometer |
| box |
14. Upper porthole | 28. | Lower hatch |
15. Upper hatch 16. Lifting device | 29. | Bottles |
The upper chamber, which contains two bunks and the scientific equipment, is fitted with air purification and circulation devices, and an electric heater. The outer surface of the sphere is covered with a rubber sheath for insulation.
The lower sphere holds the sanitary facili' ties, a shower, electric water heater, auxiliary telephone for communication with the shore, and stowage for diving gear. Airtight containers were used to transfer food and equipment between the surface and the sealab.
Sadko-2 was linked to the shore, some 338 feet away, by the emergency air supply hose and two multiconductor electrical cables. One of the cables was for power supply and communications, and the other for transmitting TV pictures and instrument readings. Interior lighting was limited to three 40-watt lights and a desk lamp in the work space, and a portable 50-watt lamp in the lower sphere. Experimental 90-watt iodine lamps were employed in the three external lighting fixtures.
The first dives of Sadko-2 were made in the summer of 1967. Held in the vertical position by ballasting, the sealab was towed to the desired location. Using a combination of ballasting and winching from the shore, the spheres were lowered to about 82 feet and shackled to a prepositioned anchor block- Ballast weights had been used in the positioning of the laboratory to ease the strain on the winch gear ashore. Two oceanauts spent si* days on station, undergoing daily medical checks in the process. The scientists required three days to acclimatize to the new environment. In addition to making regular observations of installed instrumentation, the men conducted investigations of the sea area around their “home” to a depth of approximately 148 feet.
When the program was completed, the oceanauts were sealed in the sealab and it was brought to the surface. It was then towed to a sheltered area, and the inhabitants decompressed for 70 hours before returning to their natural habitat. The experiment showed that the underwater laboratory was quite reliable and showed good possibilities for long-term use in underwater scientific investigations.
A Sadko-3 sealab was planned for 1968, but the outcome is not known. Other sealab ex-
in TnentS mentioned by the Soviets have ^ uded Chernomor, which is known to have laen acdve 1968, using a progressively numder °1 habitats and oceanauts. The d , Plans called for four or five habitats at at^K a^out feet, and two or three more n,a. out 75 feet. One interesting aspect of the
handr program is the inclusion of women
°ceanauts.
Quite noticeable among the various Soviet ^ogranis revealed to the West, is that living lfj,Peking depths have been no more than s- eet- A Benthos-300 ten-man habitat, de- fe®ned to work in depths of up to about 950
nrti- 8 *3een discussed> but there has been te° to indicate that it ever has been
ed~ or even built. With the great Soviet 0 .erest >n submarines over the years, one can
y speculate on the apparent Soviet backless in this field.
°°k Review of Soviet Naval Strategy
102 o' G‘ GhaPman> PP- 109-112, July; pp. 101— tl4-lict0^er’ pp‘102-103, December 1968; and pp.
~115> February 1969 Proceedings)
Captain William C. Chapman, U. S. a avy (Retirec[)—Carl Amme and I are in r§reernent on more points than he chooses to ac°Snize. Herrick’s book is an outstanding th *nvaiuable study of the naval strategy of <t 6. ^oviet Union. That strategy has been ^Primarily deterrent and defensive.” The °viet Union cannot contest for command of c seas without attack aircraft carriers.
Pin aPpears’ however, that we have a basic Nv1 °Sophic argument. I would suggest that isC d'ffer on the value of history—and history aVvhal Herrick has perforce interpreted—as wVa: 'd basis in itself for the kind of prediction uh which responsible military planners must °accrn themselves.
T' .
§ o wit, I do not deny that historically the eviet Navy has been oriented primarily to t).C defeuse of the Soviet Union. One could u e a case that the Russian Imperial Navy ^ ore 1917 followed the same basic strategy ah °nC woldd have to overlook occasional sj derations. Peter the Great created the Rus- jj n Navy to wrest Azov from its Moham- QC<an khans, then used it offensively in the t(,reat Northern War, landing his Russian °°Ps on Swedish soil at one point in the °uflict. Later, Catherine the Great declared
her purpose to “set the Ottoman Empire aflame from four sides,” and it was her Mediterranean Squadron that was to land troops in the Peloponnesus, the Aegean isles, and to destroy the Turkish fleet off present- day Izmir. All in support of a defensive strategy?
What Soviet and Imperial Russian naval strategy has been is important, but it is at best only a partial guide to what actions injurious to American interests the Politburo can—Amme seems to think I am saying “will”—decree tomorrow. The limitations on that action are not strategic concepts. They are Soviet capabilities. And the capabilities of the Soviet Navy are on the rise, while ours in the Mediterranean have concurrently declined under the calamitous policies of Mr. Robert McNamara.
Only the wistful reader of Herrick’s book can take comfort from Herrick’s thesis, however ineluctable. Too many took comfort from a thesis generally accepted in the more cerebral circles that the Cold War in Europe had run its course—and then came Czechoslovakia, another example of the danger of predicting Soviet actions from past policy or from public statements. And so history is not enough.
My review did note that current Soviet operations in the Mediterranean, Soviet construction of helicopter carriers—and naval actions associated with the Soviet introduction of missiles into Cuba—conflict with the idea that Soviet naval strategy is defensive and deterrent. Amme contradicts me on the first two points, while avoiding the third.
Perhaps the idea of “defensive” is the point at issue. Certain historians (Clark G. Reynolds’ The Fast Carriers, page 6) treat of the Pearl Harbor attack as part of a strategic defensive, and in a way it was. But the Japanese were defending their opportunity to acquire new interests not formerly within their grasp, even as one can—and Amme does —interpret Soviet actions in the Mediterranean today.
As regards my citation of the helicopter carriers, I would yield on the point that ASW carriers are compatible with a defensive strategy. The point is equally valid that they have added significantly to the Soviet capability for offensive action. It was an ASW
Victory ships (available to 1975) 1® '
Victory AP-2 troopers (available to 1975) 1®
Cl-A and Cl-B (available to 1969) 3l
C1-M-AV1 (available to 1971) 3?
Liberty ships (available to 1971) 18?
Victory AP-5 troopships
MarAd retention (available to 1974) 2l
Navy retention (available to 1977) 83
Naval auxiliaries (available until 1969,
then phasing out 25 per year) 200
carrier that we held ready for air cover and possible ground support at the Bay of Pigs. One exploits the capabilities in hand.
Amme relates these factors of operations and carrier construction somehow to “intentions.” They are, rather, realities, as is a Soviet presence at Mers el Kebir—and our absence from that base that once promised to anchor the southern flank of NATO.
Even such Soviet progress—“deliberate advance” is what I had termed it in my review—could perhaps be considered as part of a defensive strategy if one could credit the Soviet Union with limited overall objectives. Unfortunately for the history of the 20th century, Communism has addressed itself to unlimited objectives. The recent enunciation of the Brezhnev Doctrine asserting a “right” to intervene in the internal as well as external affairs of all “socialist” governments everywhere openly extends previous commitments.
Finally, Amme got off a salvo also at my contention that the Soviets may possibly be able to make effective use of the seas without a carrier striking force. If one needs command of the seas to use them effectively, I bend to the argument. But my original point remains, and that is that we must consider that the Soviets can use the seas to advantage —without carriers—if there be none who will challenge them. That an amphibious assault could be conducted by the Soviets in the face of the Sixth Fleet seems unthinkable, but is it any more unthinkable than Soviet rockets in place 90 miles from Miami?
Effective use of the seas is what the Soviets have already attained by expanding their navy. Command of the seas is a war-time concept. Important as that concept is in peace, it may be somewhat irrelevant. The traffic in and out of Hanoi is testimony of a sort.
"Flags of Whose Convenience?”
(See J. J. Clark, pp. 50-59, October 1968; pp. 108109, January; pp. 109-110 April; and pp. 103-105, June 1969 Proceedings.)
Colonel Lane C. Kendall, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve (Retired), Commercial Shipping Advisor to Commander Military Sea Transportation Service—It is shocking to read a statement by one who has studied the American merchant marine picture that “the United States possesses a large government
owned reserve fleet, counting some 1,300 ships'
. . . Adding the reserve fleet to the active fled ^ the U. S. Merchant Marine ranks first in number of ships. ...” The clear implication of this statement is that there are 1,300 ships in the reserve fleet which are fit to be reactivated should the need for them arise.
The facts are very different, and are readily accessible both in the daily press and in the , official documents of the Senate. The Acting Maritime Administrator, the Honorable James W. Gulick, testified before the Subcommittee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries of the Senate Committee on Commerce on 10 April 1968 that the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) consisted of 1,128 ships on 31 December 1967, and gave the following listing of ships, types, numbers, and the beginning of the fiscal year when these ships would be transferred to the list of candidates for scrapping:
MarAd miscellaneous ships
Tugs (available to 1971) 1'
Tankers (available to 1971) 3
All other ®
Special Program
Ship exchange candidates ^
Reduced operating status ships I -
Navy salvage ships -
GAA potential scrap candidate Scrap ships 475
Grand Total 1 ,128*
Dr. Clark also comments that American “maritime policy should comprehend the concept of a controlled fleet comprising active flag ships plus those units under PanLibHod —Panama, Liberia, and to a lesser extent) Honduras—registries having special agreements with the Department of Defense. The Department of Defense has no agree* Hearings before Committee on Commerce, United States Senate, on S.3016, Serial 90-66, p. 13-
f °ts with shipowners, either of American or re‘§n nationality, of this nature. The Mari- q e Administration of the Department of C()0,n,nerce is the agency which holds the with owners of ships flying the flags Seese ^ee countries. It is pertinent to ob- (j Ve that there are only 13 ships of Hon- j? ran registry, ten of which are owned by the ia^^ Hondurena de Vapores, a subsidy of the United Fruit Company. rjj n PaSe 57 of Dr. Clark’s essay is found the ^Jcussion that the flags of necessity ships ^ S t not be available because the govern- thCnts of Liberia and Panama might “ally int IT*Se^VeS nati°ns antagonistic to U. S. a *'rests and in the maritime area vitiate that^311 policy‘” Further, he postulates . the states in question have interests With WiP °n occasion lead them into conflict an other nations.” He does not suggest how A y natlon offering registration under the WilT f^ conven‘ence concept can enforce its if these ships never put into their home °f th reS*stry’ ar*d there is no naval power to h 6 registerinS nation to patrol the seas and cjj ,r*ng the wayward ships under the juris- ^hon of the home country. r . r‘ Clark then raises the doubt that ships re®lstered in Panama and Liberia can be j yarded as being available with full crews.
support of his thesis, he quotes part of a y faSraph from S. G. Sturmey’s British k lidJing and World Competition as his authority, ut fails to quote the full sense of Sturmey’s Paragraph.
. Actually’ Sturmey, whose book was pub- jtj by The Athlone Press in London in 2. is wrong in his basic position, set forth n Page 226, that
he alleged basis of American shipping policy is the Provision of an adequate tonnage of ships for war- lmf feeds. This requires the maintenance of a efficient active fleet to provide enough seamen to h'an, with ipe dilution of untrained labour, a larger Wartime fleet, part of which is kept inactive in re- erve m time of peace. The size of the total merchant ee{' oetive plus inactive vessels, is determined by hhticipated wartime needs while the proportion of oettve to inactive vessels is set by the rate at which ruined seamen can safely be replaced by untrained rrten. Part 0j total fleet ^ however, registered Under Panholib flags, a course which makes eco- hornic sense only if fewer American seamen are em- P °yed on each ship than would be the case if the
ships were registered under the American flag. This could be secured by smaller but all-American, crews than American flag ships carry, or by crews of any size made up of non-American nationals. However achieved, the result is that the Panholib ships cannot be regarded as available fully manned to America in time of war. This being so, given the rate at which untrained seamen can be substituted for trained seamen, the active part of the American-owned fleet must be larger, and the inactive part correspondingly smaller, if some of the active ships are under Panholib registry than if all the active ships were under American registry and were subsidized. Given, therefore, the American intention to be in a position to have a given tonnage of shipping available for defense purposes, it would be better for other maritime countries if the active part of the fleet was subsidized under the American flag than that part of it should be unsubsidized under Panholib flags.
Read in full context, Sturmey’s statement implies that the Pentagon fixes the’ size of the active merchant fleet, and calculates the number of ships in the National Defense Reserve Fleet that can be manned in an emergency. The American-owned ships under Liberian and Panamanian registry, according to Sturmey’s view, would be requisitioned without crews, or with only cadres around which to build a ship’s company of relatively untrained American seamen.
Careful review of Sturmey’s statement and concurrent study of Pentagon pronouncements on the merchant marine, as well as examination of the number of ships that will be available in the NDRF, do not support the thesis that the Pentagon is planning its sealift support in this way. A reserve fleet of about 167 antique ships, none faster than 16.5 knots and all over 24 years old, does not suggest that the thesis advanced by Sturmey is based on fact. Certainly Dr. Clark should have more precise knowledge of the American merchant fleet and its capabilities, and not have to rely upon a British commentator who wrote in 1962.
A recent bona fide test of the availability of flags of convenience ships was made by the Military Sea Transportation Service. Following the 1967 closing of the Suez Canal, it solicited offers of tankers from the American owners of ships registered in Panama and Liberia. Out of a total of about 130 ships tentatively presented, only two were found to be really responsive by reason of geographical
examination. The composition of the Amefl' can-owned fleets under these flags of con' venience is itself significant. There are, as of 31 December 1968, these ships in these fleets:
abated with the passage of time.
Much is said by the theoreticians and academicians about offsetting the American operating costs with “ways and means of synthesizing managerial effectiveness and technological innovation to enhance pro' ductivity,” but no practical proposals on ho'v to accomplish these goals have been seem Automation was the magic word a decade ago, and some proposals were made to automate American ships to offset the cost of manpower vis-a-vis foreign ships. This dream was shattered when the foreign merchant fleets adopted automation completely, even to the extent of engine room requirements
location, size, cargo tank configuration, or material condition. It must be said, in fairness to these owners, that there was no hint of compulsion in the request for offers of ships, and there was no change in the national policy of maintaining an atmosphere of “business as usual.” This being said, it remains on the record that only a very few ships really were available to carry military cargoes.
In the planning for potential use of ships under registry of Panama and Liberia, it always has been assumed by the military that these ships would be fully manned and ready to go. At no time has any consideration been given to finding American seamen to operate these ships. It has been a Herculean task consistently to provide American seafarers for all American-flag ships during the Vietnam operation. It would be an impossible task, given present manpower resources, to staff a larger fleet than is in operation right now under U. S. registry.
Dr. Clark’s proposals to bring the ships now under Panamanian, Honduran, and Liberian registry under the American flag need careful
Liberty ships 16
Old C-3 cargo ship 1
Old C-2 cargo ships 2
Old Cl-B cargo ships 2
Bulk cargo carriers 92
Refrigerated cargo ships Coastal cargo ships 2
Passenger-cargo ships 8
Major tankers (177 of which are modern 16 knot or more in speed) 246
Tankers (8 of the T-2 and T-3 design, and over 23 years old, and 6 with speeds under 14 knots) 69
Coastal tankers 8
Special product liquid carriers 12
Ships Total 467
In effect, the fleet that would add to the strength of the American merchant marine consists of the bulk cargo carriers and the modern tankers. Owners of these ships cannot reasonably be expected to transfer theh ships to American registry unless they are assured of financial returns at least equal to what they are now earning under the present foreign registration.
Dr. Clark is unrealistic, in the political environment in which the American mer' chant marine operates (and has operated for a generation), to assume that any proposals to build ships abroad will receive approval. The unanimous opposition of the American marl' time industry, American labor, and the Congress to the recommendations of the 1965 Inter-Agency Maritime Task Force has not
I'hich necessitated no watch-standing for 16 ° 24 hours a day. Automation for American ^'Ps is essential if the position between the nited States and foreign merchant marines not to deteriorate further than it already as' Perhaps the infusion of massive sums of ^search and development money, and a w‘de-ranging program of untrammelled and ’’•'conventional exploration of new ideas "•Quid give the United States the break-
°ugh it must find. Merely saying, as Dr.
thn
. ar^ does, that “ways and means of syncsizing managerial effectiveness and tech- °logical innovation to enhance productivity” j?^tributes nothing toward overcoming the aifnculty.
di^ ^ark’s dual approach to solving the ernma of the flags of convenience issue is ready outmoded. The Inter-Agency Mari- tie Task Force Report was repudiated portly after it was promulgated, and is not . ely to be revitalized so long as the present adership of the shipping and shipbuilding CornPanies and the maritime trades unions r.erriains substantially what it is today. It is ^§nificant that Joseph Curran, president of ^ e National Maritime Union, declared that ls union would not support further efforts to ^educe the sizes of ship crews until there was a shipbuilding program which would guaran- ,e*- his members at least the same number of J°hs they now hold. The reality of life must be af'C('pted; ivory tower theories fall before the ugh bargaining position of the maritime d shipbuilding labor unions. ur. Clark writes dogmatically, in one of his osmg paragraphs, that “the case for subsiP Zation rests primarily on the national de- ^Use posture.” The terminology of the Mer- ant Marine Act, 1936, does not support this Categorical statement. Rather, it indicates at the will of the Congress was that the osidy be used to permit American ships to |°’nPete with lower-cost foreign ships on ade routes determined to be essential to the ^c°nomic life of the United States. The ^ ministration of the law may have leaned eavily on the national defense posture to 'Miniate the size of the required fleet, but the Policy set forth in the law is clear that the ’"erican merchant marine was to be made c°rnpetitive with the foreign-flag carriers Participating in our national foreign trade.
It is worth recalling that the Pentagon has consistently avoided any involvement in planning the size of the merchant marine.
Professor Clark is to be commended for his plea that all American carriers enjoy the same privileges of tax-free (or tax-deferred) reserve funds. He also shows appreciation of a basic flaw in our maritime development in urging that adequate funds be allocated to research and development.
It would be helpful if the academicians and theorists were to study the merchant marine and make definite, very specific, suggestions as to how to survive in a competitive industry rather than to utter vague generalities about achieving lower costs through “synthesizing managerial effectiveness” and looking to technology “as the key to offset labor costs.”
The dilemma of the American merchant marine is easy to describe. To find solutions that are practical, attainable, and economically acceptable to the United States is a task of monumental proportions.
"Welcome to the War”
(See R. D. Heinl, pp. 58-62, March 1969 Proceedings)
Bruce K. Myers, News Editor, Corvallis (Oregon) Gazette-Times—Last fall I was privileged to take my first cruise in a Navy ship, the USS New Jersey, (BB-62) from Long Beach to Pearl Harbor on her way to her Southeast Asian deployment.
I was most interested to note that the right gun of Turret Two fired the first round in anger, for on the voyage to Pearl Harbor, I stood behind that gun during a firing exercise en route. The gun captain particularly intrigued me. He was a young, blond sailor with a southern accent, sweat dripping off his brow as he explained “right out of the book to the civilian guests just how things worked. He must have done his job well.
Another bonus from the trip was my being put on the mailing list to receive the New Jersey's “familygram” editions. Among the interesting items included in the latest issue was a report that the center gun of Turret Two had the first misfire of the deployment, successfully handled with no problem, while the ship’s company went to general quarters to minimize any difficulty that might have occurred during the operation.
The familygram also reported that on one Marine emergency night fire support mission, the battlewagon fired 1,710 rounds of 5- and 16-inch proj ectiles in a six-hour period, the gun crews ending up knee-deep in expended brass and with the guns so hot the paint had burned off the barrels.
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Lieutenant Albert H. Robbins, U. S. Navy —Colonel Heinl repeats the frequently quoted $21.5-million figure. Whether this includes only the fitting out and overhaul expenses, or whether it adds the cost of locating, refurbishing, and repositioning spares and supplies to support the USS New Jersey (BB-62) is begging the question. In her third incarnation, she is still one of the world’s greatest military bargains.
By comparison, the feature article in the 1 March Armed Forces Journal predicts that an “austere” LFS, no frills allowed, will cost from 60 to 100-million dollars. The Amphibious Fire Support ship (LFS) will be limited to bombardment/fire support missions. She will have a speed of approximately 20 knots, 15 to 20-foot draft, and 8 to 10,000-ton displacement. Supposedly, according to Rear Admiral T. R. Weschler, U. S. Navy, Director, Ship’s Characteristics Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, nuclear propulsion is not being considered.
The in-house concept formulation phase of the LFS is expected to take until late 1970. Present estimates, including research and development, are that the program will cost approximately $750 million, spread over the next five-to-seven years. The entire program rests firmly on a new long-range family of guns—lightweight, nearly automatic guns designed to fire rocket assisted projectiles (RAP).
The LFS’s main battery will consist of three or four of the experimental MCLWGs (major- caliber, lightweight guns), 8-inch guns. Secondary battery will be two-to-four twin- mount mark 66 (rapid-firing, dual-purpose 5-inch, 54-caliber). These guns will be designed for RAP, with ranges routinely in excess of 30 miles.
On repeat readings, the LFS begins to
sound like the “monitors” so frequently advocated in these pages; stripped destroyed , —all ASW and most AAW capabilities sacri' ficed in order to carry heavy-caliber, light' weight guns. Rear Admiral Weschler lS quoted as saying “the time is ripe for ne"'; replacement ships. We might be able to get five or ten years out of the existing hulls, but nothing more than that.” The article didn’t ; explain whether he was talking about battle' ship, cruiser, or destroyer hulls. Neither did it clarify whether the ten years were to be counted from now, or from some time in the mid-70s when the first LFS will be ready f°r launching.
In ten months, the New Jersey was brought back to life. She was sent into combat with a 1,600-man crew, roughly half of her World War II and Korean War complement. Ne"' lightweight guns would reduce crewing requirements on board a battleship as much aS an LFS (reduction of 19 men per mount for each of the present ten 5-inch mounts decreases crew requirements by an additional 12 per cent). Increased range and accuracy ' the Journal article mentions possible 100-mile range, 8-inch RAP—combined with the U>- inchers would make a formidable weapon.
Elimination of the Number Three turret would further reduce manpower requirements. Removing this turret and its magazines, and replacing it with a large helicopter flight deck, hangar, shops, and berthing spaces, as per the old “commando ship’ proposal, would greatly increase the cost of recommissioning the USS Iowa (BB-61), USS Missouri (BB-63), and USS Wisconsin (BB-64)-
However, converting the Iowa class to the commando ship—or super-Moscow class, would give us a real command ship, an amphibious fire support ship, a ship with 3 force lift capability equal to that of an LPH- (The lightly armed, 20-plus knot LPH Is designed to deliver and support 1,000 Marines, in the vertical envelopment role.) Subsequent modifications to incorporate the new guns, when they become operational, would give the Navy four proud ships of the line for roughly the price of one small, loW speed, lightly armored, lightweight, singlepurpose LFS.
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