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ery was a cause for worldwide rejoicing er months-long anxiety.
Across the full width of El Alcazar's front &e was an unprecedented photograph of a
The awful aftermath of the collision that occurred in the skies over southern Spain in January 1966 can be simply summarized: a nuclear device was lost, located, and safely retrieved. The USS Petrel and her capable captain and crew were part of the team that took the meat from the sleeping tiger while the world held its breath.
When, on 9 April 1966, Madrid’s El Alcazar triumphantly announced “/.He 11Ul La Bomba"—Here is the Bomb!—few Peoplc in Spain or anywhere else in the civil, e<f World were moved to ask, “Which 10rnb?” There was only one. Like the Biblical °st sheep, it had been missing, and its re-
U. S. hydrogen bomb. The huge, cigarshaped weapon was being examined by some 25 American and Spanish military men, on board, the caption said, the USS Petrel. The over-all operational aspects of the recovery effort have already been presented on these pages, in two earlier discussions.* Captain
* See L. B. Melson, “Contact 261,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 1967, pp. 26-39; and W. F. Searle, “Palomares—Exercise in Ocean Engineering,” ibid., pp. 128-131.
65
The Petrel was assigned to Task Force
for 83 days; 79 of these days were in transit or search. The actual recovery covered a perio of only four days. These days of search were long and a true test of the American Blue" jacket’s capacity for hard work. Some of the
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and buoyed off with 4,700 feet of line, line load strength of 10,000 lbs. was more sufficient to lift the weapon. However.
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a positive assurance of success. Three
L. B. Melson’s excellent report examined, literally, miles of Spanish water and mountains of facts and statistics. Captain W. F. Searle’s Professional Note on the ocean engineering factors involved in the bomb recovery, neatly complemented Captain Melson’s article. Understandably, neither paper would ever have been completed had the authors digressed to discuss the details of every facet of the operation.
Still, certain consequential things happened, before, during and after the period bridged by the words, “The Petrel began the lift . . .” and “. . . the weapon was on board the Petrel . . While in no sense comprising a story in themselves, these events also demand recording as a small footnote to the history of a critically significant operation—as an example of what happens after the planning ends, when the order to “execute” is given, and the success of the outcome becomes dependent largely upon the efforts of people.
It was my good fortune to be executive officer of the USS Petrel (ASR-14), prime recovery ship of Task Force 65, whose after deck with the weapon on display became a front page photograph the world over. How the hydrogen bomb was fished out of the depths and landed on our deck happened about as follows:
On 17 January 1966, an Air Force B-52 bomber, with four nuclear weapons on board, collided with a KC-135 tanker aircraft. Some wreckage and the fourth nuclear weapon vanished in the depths of the Mediterranean Sea—although this was not known at the time. Extensive search on land, eyewitness accounts and deductive reasoning suggested there was a possibility the fourth nuclear weapon could be in the water. Task Force 65 was formed with Rear Admiral William S. Guest as commander.
The USS Petrel, Lieutenant Commander Max A. Harrell commanding, had departed New London, Connecticut, on 8 January en route to Holy Loch, Scotland, with a YTB in tow. As it had been for the 20 years since her commissioning, the Petrel's primary mission was to train and employ deep-sea divers, salvage personnel, and equipment for rescue of men entrapped in sunken submarines. But, she could perform, and had acted, as target ship, submarine escort, and as a retriever of torpedoes or other weaponry.
On 25 January 1966, midway in her Atlantic crossing, the Petrel was ordered to proceed to Rota, Spain, to participate in the search for the missing nuclear weapon. For Lieutenant Commander Harrell, who had become the ship’s eleventh skipper in August 1963, the unexpected was becoming commonplace. The Petrel's 1964 cruise, which also had included calls at both Holy Loch and Rota, had been interrupted to help recover the wreckage and personnel killed in a two- plane, mid-air collision over Bermuda.
Two days were spent at Rota where we transferred the YTB, made voyage repairs; replenished, and loaded additional helium and oxygen in anticipation of extended deep diving operations. The Petrel arrived at Palomares and reported for duty to the Com' mander, Task Force 65, on 1 February 1966 tasks included in the search phase were hours of diving, extensive underwater sea using television, providing services to the deep submersibles Aluminaut and Alvin, and the planting of mooring and navigational buo),s'
The nuclear weapon was first located 0} the Alvin on 15 March. An unsuccessful at tempt at recovery by USNS Mizar took pla<Jj on 24 March. The weapon was relocated on April.
In anticipation of a second attempt at covery, the Petrel had been ordered to Car tagena, Spain, for installation of the Na'a Ordnance Test Station device CURV (Cab e controlled Underwater Recovery Vehicle)-
After the installation of the CURV a ^ operational test to a depth of 1,050 feet made to demonstrate its full potential- On April, the first 5/8-inch nylon rope was tached to the weapon parachute shroud h cause of the position of the weapon on a i and the previously unsuccessful attempt ^ recovery, more lines were required to pr°v l "'ere to be used. The second line was attached and buoyed off on 6 April. On the n*ght of 6-7 April, during the attempt to connect the third and last recovery line, °URV became entangled in the weapon Parachute. The original plan had been to recover the CURV prior to lifting the weapon. ^ most challenging problem now had to be kced, i.e., how to lift a load using two lines, ~>800 feet long, attached at virtually the same Point with an equal strain on each. This situa- Pon was further complicated by the CURV, 'vhich for all practical purposes was also attached.
CURV is a neutrally buoyant device and, therefore, was not a lift problem other than |he weight of its control cable. It did have to ^ raised at the same speed as the weapon so that it would represent neither a load nor a hfting force. A unique rigging and control Astern that had been devised by Lieutenant Commander Harrell was brought into play.
An even strain on each line was maintained by balancing two blocks attached to a short strap reeved through another block attached to a dynamometer. The dynamometer in this situation indicates double the weight being lifted on each line. The lift lines were led to the same waist capstan. Adjustment, to even the strain on each lift line, was made by hand surging the desired line on the rotating capstan. CURV was recovered at the stern, using the fantail capstan.
To ensure positive command control, the deck division personnel had been formed into two teams, each under the control of a chief boatswain’s mate.
Chief Boatswain’s Mate Thomas Swindler was in charge of the CURV recovery team and Chief Boatswain’s Mate William Behymer was in charge of the weapon recovery team. These two teams were both under my direct control.
Lieutenant (j.g.) J. E. Leamean was as-
Lieutenant Commander Max A. Harrell
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signed the task of roving safety officer, to keep a constant check on rigging and the performance of each team. This organization allowed the commanding officer the flexibility and freedom required to devote his full attention to keeping the Petrel positioned directly over the load being lifted. A sound-powered communications link, from the starboard waist to the bridge, was used to keep the commanding officer informed regarding the direction lines were tending and the distance of the weapon from the surface. Lift lines had been previously marked at 50-foot intervals.
A variance in the load, as indicated on the dynamometer, from the previously determined dynamic load, was used in synchronizing the lifting speed of the weapon and CURV. As the situation dictated, I could direct a speed adjustment to be made by either group.
The lift operation was stopped only once to resynchronize the two team efforts. One hour and 40 minutes after commencing the bomb lift, the two grapnels attached to the weapon parachute were at the water’s edge. It was then discovered that one of the grapnel’s extension, used to connect the grapnel to the CURV control mechanism, had engaged the line attached to the second grapnel, thereby acting as a spreader, preventing rotation of the weapon and causing a twisting of the lift lines. Fortunately, planned corrective action for this problem was never required.
With the weapon at 50 feet, a determination was made that the grapnels had sufficient purchase to provide adequate diver safety. Permission was granted for EOD divers to attach a hoisting line to the weapon itself. Upon completion of this connection, the CURV was disengaged from the parachute and maneuvered astern of the Petrel. The weapon’s weight was then transferred to the hoisting line, rigged as a single whip to the Petrels main boom. Control was then passed to the
A 1960 OCS graduate, Lien- tenant Goode had prior enlisted experience as an electronics technician serving 111 the submarines USS Gudgeon (SS-567) and USS Sarg« (SSN-583). He has served i» the USS Greenfish (SS-35U and on the staff of Comw3*' der Submarine Division From 1964 to 1966, he Executive Officer, USS Petrel (ASR-14), and, frorI1 1966 to 1967, he commanded NRTC, Salem, MasS' with additional duty as Officer in Charge, Reset''® Training Submarine USS Sea Dog (AGSS-401)- present, he is the Diver Training Program Manager in the Bureau of Naval Personnel.
First Lieutenant for hoisting and placing l^c weapon on deck. Emergency weapon-safety
Funston, Operations Officer, EODU-2, CharleS' ton. CURV was recovered and secured 011 deck, completing the operation. _
Throughout the recovery operation, *n eluding the attaching phase, Lieutenan1 Commander Harrell controlled the posithj)1 of his ship to within 50 yards of a point o rectly over the weapon, using two LCM-8’S aS tow craft. Experimentation had proven tn the most practical method of using craft was by making them up to the P(tre bow and stern, using 100-foot towlineS' LCMs are particularly poor towing craft) their deck configuration prevents the toWh from being connected forward of their rudder With the tow point aft of the rudder, t ^ rudder has no steering effect. Extend ^ maneuvering on the part of each boat c°^ swain was required in order to change dire^ tion of tow. During the first line attaching both craft became simultaneously fouled their own tow lines. Quick action on the p of the LCM boat crews and the Petrel di'ty succeeded in freeing the towing lines, ther preventing disaster, should the Petrel n ^ drifted out of position. The Petrel's own pulsion could not be used throughout operation, as the CURV lines were hel1 tended in close proximity to the ship s P
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was able to hold the Petrel's position within a Clrcle of 50 yards in diameter for totals, respectively, of 31.7 hours, 10.6 hours and 9.9 hours, during the connection phase—and 11.2 hours during the recovery.
But feats of seamanship skill were no surprise to those of us who knew Lieutenant Commander Harrell. He had been personally Clted for his part in rescue operations of survivors of the sunken yacht Judy only three 'Uonths after assuming the Petrel's command, ^is citation confirmed that he had “. . . commenced a search pattern during the height of a raging storm.. . . Your efforts resulted in ocating two survivors and maneuvering your sh'p to a position where recovery operations 'Vere conducted successfully. . .”
Although April 7 was a beautiful spring day, with little breeze and a calm sea, these 'heal weather conditions proved in this situa- tlQn to be less than optimum from the stand- P°int of ship control. The absence of a breeze °r surface current, to give the ship some force to constantly work against, greatly compli- Jated ship positioning. Every application of °rce had to be in exactly the required amount °r the ship would overshoot the desired posi- tlQn, thereby requiring a repositioning of tow ^ft and application of force in another lrection. Lieutenant Commander Harrell r<;huced these complicated maneuvers to what
might be considered a fine art.
To silence any suggestion that the U. S. Navy was perpetrating a hoax in claiming a recovery of the weapon, an unprecedented display to the world press was arranged. With the submersibles Alvin, Aluminaut and Cubmarine as a background, the Petrel, with the weapon on deck, in full view, passed in review with representatives of the press manning the rail of the USS Albany (CG-10). Later, the weapon was packed for shipment and transferred to the USS Cascade (AD-16) for its return to the United States.
The Petrel was detached from Task Force 65 on 10 April 1966. Following one week in port at Palma, Majorca, she proceeded directly to her home port of Charleston, South Carolina, arriving on 1 May 1966. Coincidentally, this was the same date as had been originally scheduled for return from deployment.
It has not been the intention here to diminish the roles of any of the 16 other ships of Task Force 65, for each ship has its own story to tell.
When Is a Language Not Foreign?
In 1948, I was on a tour of duty, together with other South American naval officers, in the USS Harold J. Ellison (DD-864). Soon after reporting on board, I was sent to the ship’s office for an interview. I pointed out to the Yeoman that my last name was Silva, not “da Silva,” and explained that “da” was just a preposition often used between family
names in Brazil. .
The Yeoman stated firmly that in the United States, it should be Da Silva, and went on with his business of filling out the forms as I answered his questions.
When he asked which foreign languages I could speak, I replied, Spanish, French, some German, and English, as I am now speaking.”
He started to write it down, and then, stopping suddenly, he crossed out the word
“English.” _ _
“No, not English,” he said reproachfully, “English is not a foreign language.
----------------------- Contributed by Captain Paulo Bracy Gama da Silva, Brazilian Navy
(The Naval Institute will pay $10.00 for each anecdote published in the Proceedings.)
★
The success of Aircraft Salvage Operations Mediterranean by Task Force 65 is now a page of naval history and a tribute to the skill and determination of the men of the U. S. Navy. The Petrel's part in this tremendous operation, though significant, was only part of an outstanding team effort.