The U.S. Naval Reserve is ripe for realignment. The 60-year-old Cold War model on which the U.S. military reserve system was built assumes that reserve combat and combat-support forces are aligned with their active-duty counterparts and are designed to deploy en masse overseas in support of a war plan. In recent years, however, the Navy in particular has mobilized individual reservists more often than entire reserve units. It is time to transform the Naval Reserve to meet the needs of today's and tomorrow's Navy. Through decisive action, these goals can be achieved:
- Significantly reduce technical and administrative overhead by exploiting modern technologies and processes
- Reduce reserve full-time support personnel coupled with billet reinvestment toward direct Navy mission execution
- Reduce reserve personnel costs, with increased reserve man-days applied to mission accomplishment
- Make better use of the strengths and capabilities of individual reservists in support of the active component
Transformation of the Naval Reserve could resolve some other prickly problems in the Navy's sea enterprise that have existed for years—and dispel a few myths in the process.
Myths to Debunk
Myth 1: The Naval Reserve has missions. The Naval Reserve's two missions—mobilization readiness for war and contributory support in peacetime—were concocted largely by Commander, Naval Reserve Force, to justify the separate existence of the Naval Reserve—in particular the attendant bureaucracy through six echelons of command. The Navy has missions clearly articulated by Congress, the Secretary of Defense, and the President. Naval reservists exist exclusively to augment active-duty Navy and joint organizations in the execution of active-duty missions. They should be viewed and managed in the same manner as active-duty personnel.
Myth 2: The Naval Reserve needs to be managed and resourced as a separate organization because the active component cannot manage it. Most active-duty personnel know nothing about the reserve-only euphemisms, constructs, acronyms, systems, and administrative processes that have been created over the years to manage reservists. The Byzantine culture of the reserves has led many to believe that a separate bureaucracy is needed to manage reservists, when the core management functions could be performed easily within the active Navy's lifelines.
There are two types of reservists: those who directly augment active-duty Navy or, in a few instances, joint commands, and those who are assigned to commissioned naval units manned primarily by reservists but who directly support the active component. Management of reservists entails the these functions: orders (weekend training, annual training, and mobilization), travel, pay, medical and dental, and training. All these functions also are performed by active-duty commands for active-duty personnel. Active-duty systems, support organizations, and processes should be used to manage reservists, too.
That is how some but not most reservists are managed today (although even these reservists must keep one foot in active and the other in reserve management systems). For example, Commander, Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command reservists are managed directly out of a military personnel shop aided by a Web-based virtual program office. The rudimentary virtual program office could be expanded to accommodate those administrative support functions still performed by parent reserve centers. Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command reservists are scheduled directly to support command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance system installation and training. A commissioned unit example is the naval coastal warfare community which was apportioned administratively and operationally to the amphibious groups and surface type commanders in 1998. These reservists are managed by active-duty personnel assigned to the units; oversight of the units themselves is maintained through normal active-duty processes.
Myth 4: Naval Reserve Echelon IV and V commands serve a useful purpose. Reserve readiness commands (Echelon IV) and reserve centers (Echelon V) were stood up during the Cold War era, when the Department of the Navy's pockets were deep and the benefits from today's information technology advancements were unforeseen. Reserve readiness commands are geographic commands that provide immediate-superior-in-command functions over 18 to 23 geographically dispersed reserve centers. Reserve centers conduct oversight of and provide administrative support for reservists in augmentation and commissioned units alike; they also provide a venue for local reservists to conduct classroom training without having to travel to a distant parent active command. This administrative bureaucracy accounts for almost 80% of the Naval Reserve budget.
Reserve Echelon IV and V commands are an unneeded layer of bureaucracy that perpetuates the artificial separation of reservists from their parent active-duty commands. They should be disestablished and a subset of their personnel reassigned to active commands. All reserve man-days should be expended exclusively at active-duty commands, whether for receiving training or providing mission support.
Myth 5: Naval reservists require and deserve career paths (especially "prairie sailors," who live hundreds of miles from the sea). When someone transitions from active duty to the reserves, he makes a clear choice: to leave the active Navy to pursue another career. "Reserve career interests" is an oxymoron. What reserve flag officer possibly could have become experienced enough or built sufficient professional credibility during a reserve "career" to serve as a carrier battle group commander? Reservists should serve based on the needs of the active-duty Navy and should be promoted based on their direct contributions to active-duty organizations. They should be assigned to billets through the active-duty detailing process based on billet requirements, individual qualifications, and the needs of the Navy.
Senior reservists are promoted based on their ability to support the existing reserve bureaucracy, rather than on their contributions to the active component. Reserve flag officers typically are assigned reserve administrative billets (for example, commanders of readiness commands); so-called mobilization billets (billets in direct support of operational commanders) are assigned almost as a secondary consideration. This is not how active-duty flags are promoted and assigned. Reserve flag officers should focus on supporting the active component and be assigned directly as deputy commanders of major active-duty commands as determined by the needs of the active component. Further, selection as a reserve flag officer should be contingent on an officer's commitment to be recalled to active duty for 90–180 days based on the needs of the Navy.
Myth 6: Homesteading, the past practice of reservists remaining within a community or specialty area for many years, is bad. At the core of the homesteading conundrum is the fact that the average reservist spends 34 days per year in uniform, which includes two days per month and two weeks per year on active duty. The Navy gets value from experienced reservists who understand the proper active-duty operational, technical, organizational, and administrative contexts within which they must operate. This knowledge and experience can come only through many successive years of assignment to reserve billets associated with a particular active-duty command or community. It is through homesteading that reservists become valuable personnel resources for their active-duty commands and communities.
Myth 7: The Training and Administration of Reservists community is needed. The senior officer and flag Training and Administration of Reservists (TAR) community has built the fence that exists today between active-duty commands and their reservists. The TAR community consists of so-called full-time support personnel who left active duty and then returned to provide administrative oversight for selected reservists (the bulk of the Naval Reserve). TARs make up the vast majority of the billets in reserve Echelons I through V and command almost 80% of the annual Naval Reserve budget. (This is the shoreside reserve infrastructure whose functions are summarized in Myths 3 and 4.) Maintaining the reserve administrative infrastructure is used to justify and perpetuate the existence of the TAR community. Reservists can be better managed through active-duty support systems and processes.
Another area in which the TAR community dominates is related to what is commonly called "265 recall," which refers to Congress's creation of a special category of billets at multiple operational and staff echelons within the Navy for recalled selected reservists under Title 10. The intent was to provide selected reservists opportunities to contribute to and learn about key Navy commands, processes, and decision making firsthand to broaden their experience, benefiting the Navy through the infusion of commercial practices and methodologies from the selected reservists filling those billets. For years, more than 99% of these billets have been filled by TARs; they are in effect used as a career management tool by and for the TAR community.
Myth 8: Reserve liaison officers are assigned to active-duty staffs to support access to the reserves, and thus serve a useful purpose. Reserve liaison officers were put in place in recent years in part because the Selected Reserve was bypassing the reserve shore bureaucracy to find innovative ways to support the fleet. It was imperative to the TAR community that TAR officers be inserted at major fleet commands to "facilitate access to reservists." Reserve liaison officers serve a useful purpose only because of the complex and inefficient reserve bureaucracy discussed in Myths 2, 3, and 4. They perpetuate the wall of separation between the performers (Selected Reserve) who are motivated to serve and the customers (the fleet) who require the service. Reserve liaison officers should be eliminated as soon as five transformation actions are taken.
Transformation Actions
The Naval Reserve has not taken advantage of the lessons learned from the first Gulf War and other crises. The myths detailed here can be dispelled by taking transformational actions that would result in total force integration, better use of assets at all Navy echelons, truly requirements-based force structures, reduction of the tooth-to-tail ratio and attendant manpower cost savings, more streamlined surge capacity in crises, and a better understanding by active-component personnel of reserve issues affecting Navy mission execution. Taking these actions would contribute significantly to implementing the Chief of Naval Operations fiscal year 2003 guidance on realigning the Naval Reserve to better support the Navy's warfighting missions.
Action 1: Revert the direct responsibility for managing reservists to the active component.
- Transfer administrative and operational control of all reserve commissioned naval units to the active component.
- Transfer administrative control of all augmentation units to their parent active-duty commands.
- Disestablish the Director of the Naval Reserve (OpNav 095) staff and transfer functions to other codes. For example, all manpower and manning responsibilities should be shifted to OpNav N1, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower and Personnel.
- Aggregate all reserve training days into a single pot managed by active commands to meet their support requirements throughout the range of needs.
- Fully exploit modern information technologies to manage reservists through a "virtual private network" at each parent active-duty command.
- Make pay and benefits the same for active and reserve personnel, with reserve pay and benefits prorated based on active-duty days served.
- Conduct a top-down reserve manpower analysis consistent with "Sea Power 21" and associated Navy missions to identify reserve support requirements over all echelons.
- Reassess the current mix of reserve commissioned naval units versus projected requirements; convert to active, decommission obsolete, or commission new as appropriate.
- Develop a continuum of service options that will allow an individual reservist to serve on active duty from a few days each year to nearly full time based on the needs of the active-duty command supported.
- Ensure that active-component claimancies complete Department of Defense planning, programming, and budgeting system actions for their reservists.
- Ensure active-component commanders at all echelons are held accountable for the training readiness of their reservists and factor reserve readiness into existing end strength and readiness reporting procedures.
- Decommission Naval Reserve Force ships and reassign personnel to more cost-effective use.
Action 2: Disestablish the Naval Reserve administrative structure (Echelons I-V) and apportion some full-time support billets to active-component commands.
- Reassign all OpNav 095 functions to other Chief of Naval Operations staff claimants.
- Transfer flag billets at reserve Echelons II and III to the fleet immediately, including disestablishing headquarters staffs and readiness commands.
- Immediately reassign and relocate 50% of TAR billets to active-component locations and reassign others after administrative transfer of selected reservists to parent active-component commands or type commanders.
- Decommission reserve readiness commands and reserve centers immediately on transfer of Selected Reserve administrative control to the active component.
Action 3: Convert all TAR billets to regular Navy billets.
Action 4: Detail reservists within assigned communities throughout their Naval Reserve service.
- Assign reservists to communities and units that best match the experience and talent of the individual reservist and the needs of the Navy.
- Promote reservists based on their potential for continued service to the Navy, with emphasis on those who seek jobs of increasing responsibility and challenge within assigned communities or units.
- Eliminate reserve national billet selection boards; develop and implement reserve detailing policies and processes for active-component detailers.
- Establish Selected Reserve detailers at Navy Personnel Command and begin detailing reservists consistent with the needs of the Navy.
- Ensure henceforth that only selected reservists are detailed to fill 265-recall billets.
Action 5: Promote reservists through promotion boards comprised primarily of active-component personnel.
- Decouple reserve officers from their active-duty running mates. Reduce senior reserve officer ceilings and increase midgrade officer ceilings. Develop policies that promote reserve specialization and homesteading over generalization, coupled with a slower promotion path to senior rank.
- Ensure all Selected Reserve fitness reports and evaluations are written and signed exclusively by active-component commanding officers.
- Ensure that reserve promotion boards use the same procedures as active-duty promotion boards.
- Promote reservists based on potential for continued service to the Navy.
Taking these actions would transform the Naval Reserve—and the total force—into a leaner and more responsive, mission-focused, and effective force for the 21st century.
Captain Cvrk is the former commodore of Naval Inshore Undersea Warfare Group One. He recently completed a 19-month globalization tour at Commander, Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command. Captain Robey is the past commodore of Naval Coastal Warfare Group One. He is now serving on active duty, assigned to the U.S. European Command Office of Defense Cooperation Turkey.