The geostrategic situation in the South China Sea at the turn of the century was conditioned by the discovery of huge gas and oil fields in 1999. These discoveries heated up an already simmering dispute among China, Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines over drilling and ownership rights. Tense negotiations among the parties yielded a compromise in which specific drilling areas were allotted to each claimant based on a complex formula that included development costs and the estimated production capacity of the field. Following intense development, by 2005 the South China Sea was providing one-third of the region’s oil.
Yet hostilities were just beneath the surface. New oil and gas discoveries were being made continually, each requiring negotiations that were becoming increasingly difficult. In addition, certain Vietnamese and Philippine areas were producing much less than anticipated—apparently, the Chinese had paid certain companies to falsify production capacity information in exchange for drilling rights, and the Chinese used this (mis)information to their advantage during the negotiations.
The trouble started in April 2006, when Vietnamese guerrillas launched a series of piracy and terrorist attacks in the South China Sea, most aimed against Chinese merchant shipping and oil rigs. The Chinese responded in kind, and by the end of June, hostilities had reached the point that neutral merchant shipping was in serious danger. Japan, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Australia, and South Korea petitioned the United States to provide security for their shipping.
Thus began U.S. involvement in the Spratly War. Under Operation Fast Convoy, the U.S. Navy moved the USS John C. Stennis (CVN-74) and USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) carrier battle groups into the South China Sea and began escorting reflagged merchants.
The Chinese reacted with mixed signals. On one hand, the Chinese “hoped that the United States would help restore order in the South China Sea.” On the other hand, they repeatedly warned that the United States was in a “dangerous situation” and that they could not be held responsible for any damages the U.S. Navy might suffer.
These damages were not long in coming. On 10 July 2006, a Chinese Liz/m-class guided-missile destroyer in the company of several junks and ragtag merchants approached a convoy escorted by the USS Lake Erie (CG-70) and USS Curtis Wilbur (DDG-54). The Chinese forces demanded to board and search all vessels on the ground that some were harboring Vietnamese naval insurgents. The task group commander refused, claiming that all members of the convoy had been properly scrutinized.' After several similar exchanges, the Chinese destroyer and its “convoy” withdrew to just over the horizon and launched a ferocious cruise missile attack. Eight ships were hit, including the Lake Erie, which eventually had to return to Pearl Harbor for extensive repairs. The hasty U.S. counterattack was uncoordinated and ineffective. By the time the Curtis Wilbur could sort out the situation, the Chinese cruiser had left the scene and the Chinese “convoy” had dispersed and was indistinguishable from the rest of the merchant shipping.
U.S. naval leadership attempted to downplay the incident. They urged that naval tactics and policy were sound, and that the captains of the Lake Erie and Curtis Wilbur were derelict in their duties. Chinese attacks on U.S.-led convoys continued, however, sometimes coming from disguised merchants within the convoy itself. By August, with the failure of the U.N. Security Council to censure the Chinese and a steadily worsening tactical situation, the U.S. Navy was forced to act.
Operation Clean Sweep began on 16 August, establishing a no-fly zone from the Strait of Malacca to the Taiwan Straits and a no-sail zone 200 miles either side of the convoy routes (see figure 2). The plan depended heavily on the U.S. Air Force operating out of Guam, Taiwan, Japan, and the Philippines, and required the deployment of two additional carrier battle groups to the South China Sea—which forced the United States to relinquish commitments in the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf. Permission to use bases in Taiwan and the Philippines, granted on 13 August, was abruptly and nearly simultaneously withdrawn three days later, substantially overloading the bases on Guam and in Japan. That same day, the Chinese reiterated their position, maintaining that they had the right to stop and search U.S.-led convoys, and warned that continued refusals would result in grave consequences.
Operation Clean Sweep was in trouble from the beginning. With hostilities more or less open, U.S. naval commanders were extremely concerned over Chinese submarines. The Chinese fanned this fear by placing thousands of decoys along the convoy routes. The ruse was so effective that U.S. forces had expended 70% of their air-launched torpedoes by the end of August. Attacks on Chinese surface ships were equally ineffective. Although U.S. forces maintained almost total air superiority throughout the war, target identification was extremely difficult because of the large numbers of decoys and high false target rates. Analysts calculated that the United States was spending $2.6 million for each $10,000 of enemy shipping sunk and that the entire operation was costing the United States $1.2 billion a day. The consumption rate for precision-guided munitions was four times higher than anticipated.
There were also problems with logistics. The new Global Tracking Network was being corrupted and kept sending packages to the wrong places. This resulted in a huge logistical bottleneck because every container had to be opened and inventoried at each transshipment point. The net effect was that replacement munitions were slow in coming, exacerbating the munition shortage in theater and resulting in severe restrictions on rules of engagement.
One bright spot in the campaign was the use of Special Forces, Rangers, and Marines. Launched from submarines and stealth ships, these forces approached their targets at night, undetected, using inflatable outboard-powered boats. Once on board, they would sabotage the ship or capture its crew and return the ship to U.S. hands. Unfortunately, only a handful of these special units were available, limited by the capacity and number of submarines and stealth ships.
The Battle of the Kepulauan Shoals began on 6 September with the United States escorting a 65-ship convoy out of the Malacca Strait en-route to Japan. Intelligence sources indicated that a major Chinese task force was enroute to intercept the convoy Northeast of the Natuna Islands. A two-carrier battle force, led by the Abraham Lincoln, set out from west of the Spratly Islands to intercept the Chinese forces.
U.S. Air Force joint strategic targeting acquisition radar system (JS- TARS) aircraft quickly located the Chinese task force and started to provide targeting information to the U.S. joint task force (JTF). By midnight on the 7th, the JTF commander had what he believed to be a coherent tactical picture and, despite a report of four of the carrier escorts having engine trouble,2 felt that his forces were ready to start the turkey shoot. By 0130, the first strike was launched from the Carl Vinson and met with U.S. Air Force jets launched from bases in Guam and Japan. Almost immediately, all JSTARS information was lost.’ The Navy and Air Force reacted by quickly launching backup aircraft, but they arrived too late to reconstitute the lost information. The U.S. strike aircraft found a dispersed and confusing tactical picture when they arrived over the Chinese task force.
Nevertheless, the JTF commander concluded that possession of air superiority would allow his forces to continue the attack with minimum risk, and the attack began as scheduled at 0210. The air crews had a difficult time identifying and tracking legitimate targets because decoys, infrared flares, and jamming produced a 40% false-contact rate. Despite these problems, the attack was a qualified success, with 2 major Chinese combatants (1 destroyer and 1 cruiser) hit and 17 smaller privateers sunk or out of action. U.S. losses were surprisingly light—only two downed aircraft.
What the Americans had attacked, however, was only a portion of the Chinese force. By 0230 the remainder of the Chinese force was in position to attack the lead elements of the U.S. task force and, although the backup JSTARS and Navy Hawkeye aircraft had just located this force, there was nothing that could stop the counterattack. The simultaneous launch of more than 50 cruise missiles quickly overwhelmed the defenses of the USS Cushing (DD-985) and USS Shiloh (CG-67), and both ships were put out of action.4
The U.S. forces launched their second strike at 0300 as planned. This time, U.S. air forces had their full capabilities, and although the Chinese deception tactics blunted the attack somewhat, the results were very painful for the Chinese. Five major Chinese combatants (destroyers, frigates, and cruisers) and more than 60 privateers were either sunk or placed out of action. U.S. losses were still comparatively light at six downed aircraft, and the U.S. forces were preparing to roll up the resistance and consolidate their gains with a third air strike scheduled for 0430.
In contrast to the air strikes, the antisubmarine war was going badly. The USS Topeka (SSN-754) was four hours late in reporting,5 and enemy submarines were strongly suspected in the JSTARS shoot- down. The antisubmarine warfare commander was flooded with possible contacts, and prosecution of these contacts was difficult because the severe shortage of air-launched torpedoes mandated very restrictive rules of engagement. Despite more than 30 attacks, at least two Chinese submarines slipped through and were in position to attack just as the third air strike was ready for launch.
The timing for the United States proved devastating. At 0440, while recovering the second strike, the Abraham Lincoln was hit with two wake-homing torpedoes. The resultant flooding and fires caused the ship to go dead in the water and suspend aircraft recovery. The Carl Vinson did not have a ready deck as she was launching the third strike, so the returning aircraft were vectored to U.S. Air Force tankers. A few minutes later, however, two of four tankers were hit with heat-seeking missiles that apparently came from a third enemy submarine. With the heart of the U.S. task force under attack, and Air Force and Navy aircraft unable to refuel, the JTF commander called off the third strike and turned the force north to deeper, presumably safer, waters.
From both a strategic and a military standpoint, the U.S. Navy clearly dominated the Battle of the Kepulauan Shoals. Even though the final attack was called off, the Chinese forces were in no position to counterattack and were not able to interdict the U.S.-led convoy that passed through the next day. From a political standpoint, however, the battle was a disaster. Video clips showing the burning and helpless U.S. ships appeared on the Internet and were shown on all the evening newscasts. Of particular horror were U.S. sailors in life rafts being attacked by sharks, bringing to mind the scenes on the streets of Mogadishu more than a decade ago.6
As more details of the battle became known, congressional and civilian leaders expressed their outrage, and public opinion was so negative and vocal that the President had little choice but to call off Operation Clean Sweep and order U.S. naval forces out of the South China Sea. Operation Fast Convoy was modified to follow routes outside the South China Sea, but fewer and fewer countries participated because of the circuitous routing and because of China’s offer to provide security for neutral merchants.
China was, in fact, winning the Spratly War against Vietnam. By the end of October, incidents of piracy and terrorism had diminished significantly and the Vietnamese and Chinese were back at the negotiating table. On 24 October, Japan withdrew U.S. Air Force basing rights and diplomatic intelligence disclosed that Japan had been involved in a secret trilateral negotiation with China and Vietnam since 14 October. The Unites States terminated Operation Fast Convoy on 1 November, ending U.S. involvement in the Spratly War and the U.S. Navy’s dominance in the South China Sea, at least for the time being.
1 Recently declassified documents show that the Chinese had good reason for their actions; Vietnamese insurgents were, indeed, using U.S.-flagged convoys to conceal their movements and to resupply.
2 Subsequent investigation found large tangles of kevlar rope and stainless steel wire in their screws.
3 Both airborne JSTARS aircraft were shot down by missiles, presumably from Chinese submarines.
4 The Shiloh sustained primarily electronics damage and was able to make port under her own power. The Cushing suffered a major fire in the engineering and berthing spaces and required towing.
5 The Topeka was lost at sea with all hands at approximately midnight on 7 September. Survey efforts found the ship entangled in a carbon fiber net, with explosion damage near the engineroom.
6 Analysis of the clips showed that they were taken by periscopes and that the periscope cross-hairs were depixelated, apparently in real time. There is also some evidence that the clips were graphically enhanced prior to their appearance on the Internet.