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Learning the wrong lesson from Jutland, Germany’s Grand Admiral Erich Raeder set about building a balanced battle fleet. Admiral Karl Doenitz foresaw the strategic value of U-boats—the right lesson— but did not become the Grand Admiral until naval victory was beyond Germany’s grasp.
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voys and laying the North Sea mine barrage, s ^p. passing interest in both aviation and submarine jj ment, but decided to place continued faith and bu ^ the battle line. When the advent of World War (ed obvious, the first capital ship the United States c°nSr0fa was the USS North Carolina (BB-55), the forerunn new fleet of fast battleships.
The various theories on the future of naval war' tested in combat during the early 1940s. During ^ a riod, the Germans realized too late that Doe.nltZgaeder
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Proceedings
After World War I—the first extended conflict in which submarines played an important role—the victorious British Navy came to the conclusion that the Grand Fleet action at Jutland had been the key to naval success. Consequently, British Navy tactics and fleet exercises studied and re-created this battle in the postwar years, preparing to meet the Nazi surface forces at the next decisive engagement. Forgotten in the bliss of victory were the desperate resupply battles, the convoy controversy, and the main reason for laying an 80,000-mine barrier across the North Sea in an effort to prevent a limited number of technically simple submarines from reaching the shipping lanes. Besides, had not a group of Allied scientists—the Antisubmarine Detection Investigation Committee—perfected submarine detection devices and rendered the ocean depths transparent, thereby eliminating the U-boat as an effective threat?
Across the English Channel, the vanquished were learning two entirely different lessons. One group of German naval officers, represented by Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, essentially reached the same conclusion the British had and formulated Plan-Z, convinced that without a balanced battle fleet, Germany could not engage the Royal Navy and expect to win. The second cadre of the Kriegsmarine, trained and led by Admiral Karl Doenitz, took an entirely different approach to seeking out and severing Britain’s Achilles tendon. To the dismay of both factions, Germany’s political leadership had no appreciation for sea power, or its effect on the conduct of military operations in Continental Europe, and started the return engagement six years before strategists could complete Plan-Z.
Other observers and participants in World War I learned different lessons. In the Pacific, the Imperial Japanese Navy stressed aviation in its plans, exercises, and operations against China. The United States, whose actual naval participation in World War I consisted of escorting con-
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better grasp of sea power and strategy than either ^ or the majority of the High Command. The Thir ^ rewarded Doenitz by appointing him Grand Adm a„j a naval victory was no longer possible for Gerrn ’ ^ designated him the head of government six days b (j. surrender. As for Britain, while its Home Fleet & pjit- cally useless in Scapa Flow, the navy had to beg slltr ish Air Force for patrol aircraft. The British were sistence rationing for the entire war. aViat>011’
The Japanese proved their theories about naval c0n- although the British had previously demonstrate ^not cept of air strikes against fleet anchorages at sC|e Italy. The Americans flexed a surprising industna ^ and quickly made up for the massive losses of [ifle 1942. U. S. shipyards’ ability to create an aSS^s jot1?” for cargo ships and destroyer escorts, as well ^ range antisubmarine warfare (ASW) patrol aircr a(iJ the Atlantic battle. In the Pacific, the North flak
her nine sister ships spent most of the war as tl° batteries. spenl
American naval tacticians and exercise p the years after World War II reviewing the gre ^ ^ ^ duels and fleet air actions in the Pacific, preparing vvil^ any potential adversaries in the same fashion i coU'ltr; them from the surface of the seas. The only oth jjffef that could match the U. S. Navy took home qulte S°v’e* ent lesson from World War II. In the late 1940s, t
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k°ePit? h-0 amo^ 'n the Eastern Pacific shipping lanes as f0rI(^ ‘n the Atlantic, would the U. S. Navy have nO flany6^ to abandon the Western Pacific? What would *fy of ^ ln8 data off California have done to the availabil- M0st f,Str°yers in the carrier engagements to follow? ■ S. Navy officers can relate some history about
exPerirneSeSfe^ ^otb tbc Battle of the Atlantic and the v'et Nav h WeaPons tbe Ax's built. Since then, the So- •he gre ^ "as built antiship missiles, ballistic rockets, and ^n°wn pSt Peacetime submarine fleet the world has ever SllPerio~‘^Utn*k locked the American sense of technical '•'en e*tei
cUrrent °Ur Harpoon and Tomahawk programs to their fece.t0-srf ’ 3^ter our 'n'baI “fix” of putting limited sur- "'arfarg t*A CC caPabilities into Tartar and Terrier antiair 'varnin„ weapons. Thus far, there have been no
^ku|a °1 the submarine battle ahead, except possibly
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^at Cajj .n,tecl States continues planning fleet scenarios aPd 0r three or four carrier battle groups to link up sPrfacee Ihe opposing forces from 70% of the planet’s ^a, hee envision the polar sea equivalent of Coral I'3'Va> vln or the furious antiair warfare off Oki- 8aiu he the Soviets practice Okean series exercises to
°f c0mPerience in worldwide interdiction of the sea lines fleet>s crnUn'cation (SLOCs)—antishipping. The Soviet hers with*7601°Perat‘ng doctrine is to target aircraft car- 'Pg antj nuclear-powered submarines capable of launch- It is .■ 'P missiles from subsurface positions.
JPg the ^or a balanced appraisal of naval history dur- ^ hah tP century to determine the impact technology ^ritiSh M>n strategy and tactics of sea power. Did the ^0yrnentaV->/ boats lack suitable targets, or did their em- ^Use nas ^eet auxiliaries limit their effectiveness and "fcg tr,e^?iess sacrifice? If Japan had detached an I-boat
October 1987
Admiral Chester Nimitz or Admiral William Halsey, but how many are familiar with Admiral Adolphus Andrews? Why did Admiral Ernest King hold the Atlantic destroyer squadrons in port at Norfolk while U-boats were sinking tankers off Cape Henry and mining the approaches to Baltimore? What caused Winston Churchill to send some of his precious armed trawlers to help patrol Cape Hatteras during the bleakest months of the Battle of the Atlantic?
The historical need for a navy is first and foremost to protect the sea lines of communications and merchant shipping. Political and military developments have added the additional task of power projection ashore, either by amphibious forces or carrier-based aircraft. In comparatively recent years, the fleet ballistic missile submarine’s strategic nuclear mission has gained importance. How each of these missions is perceived appears to depend on the global or theater situation at the time. Because of the political nature of power projection and the nuclear balance considerations, the tendency seems to be for a reduced emphasis on the protection of merchant shipping. Some professionals are once again suggesting that convoys are not a proper tactic. Such thinking is not new. It prevailed in the British Navy until unacceptable losses forced the issue halfway into World War I. The same thinking prevailed in the U. S. Navy until a handful of German U-boats began surface gunnery practice along the East Coast in the spring of 1942.
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exercisf^^ an<^ scenar'° are the necessary elements of fleet assessmS fn<^ ^uc^§et requests. In the currently popular balancedn,S ?* ^e.next sea war> a 600-ship force appears and deal ^ex'hle enough to meet the surface threat ballistic Wlt^ l^C strate8'c nuclear submarine-launched lance w rniss^e threat. When including NATO’s assis- Pact j'n6 111 ay even be able to take on the whole Warsaw in conv°niC S'tUat'ons- The most serious problem may lie script ;lncin" the adversary to play according to our disasternStea^ ^ ^1S P*an- Short of an all-out nuclear SuPport ’f6Very conceivable conflict will require logistics tricrQhan,01',30 un(tctermined amount of time. This means
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..,s Cun . not as a Navy, but as a maritime nation, ’he Co . e seen in our dwindling Merchant Marine, and
1S’ be it f6 must be prepared to fight where the battlefield Points °” °Ur continental shelf, in mid-ocean, at choke Piclcin’o^L Unc^er the ice. We will not have the luxury of
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a^id n an overwhelming percentage of Allied naval l’’’U(jeassets- Had the I-boat threat been of the same mag- Wuij ’he West Coast, it may well have been all we () ’o maintain a presence at Pearl Harbor, much less
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not ^ sh‘Pping, and plenty of it. NATO naval forces stmultanaVe numhers to conduct all possible missions forcese°Us^- ^ the decision is made to land amphibious a‘r'land°b l° fifCfiect naval air power on the flanks of the Seid°n a ^.p2, as weh as maintain the security of the Po- to guard0 ,^r'^ent boats, there will not be enough escorts War li 1 e merchant logistics convoys. During World Etchant ^'ng concluded that it was best to sail
ing ga||£Sa'Ps independently along the coast; that shoot- tankers ^ S'tuat’on proved a disaster, especially for the
an island ^ 'ast^ years, the United States has become l0sUpportnat'°n’ t*ePen<Jent on the influx of raw material lanes arancl maintain its advanced technology. The sea- "'ere t ° 3s cr>tical to the United States now as they ever Seenafat Britai"’ Japan, or Western Europe. There BveIiho Continues to be a real threat to our economic tans ro]r Possibilities other than the mechanized eche- AchiiiP,,,n8 across the North German plain. We have an troleUmlnaec* dependence on imported materials and pe- Achj|]es ^ an antagonist should choose to strike at our °ur f01tend°n, we would have no choice but to commit °ceans f,s.to fighting the battle of the sea-lanes in both . the I t' Scenario- St w , nitecl States is forced to conduct convoy opera-
aflies c*w‘de, with or without NATO and our Pacific dent battfre W'B be too few of any ships to form indepen- bOO-sjjj 2 groups. The critical shortage may not be in our ’he pfoj’ Navy, but in our 300-ship Merchant Marine, and ’hep] ess,onal mariners who would be needed to crew
?a’ the t°r'Ca* v'ew °’ the Battle of the Atlantic discloses f aUie turnecf ’n niid-1943. After this, U-boat losses !ailUre to 6 ^r'm reality of the German High Command’s fbe stli appreciate the impact of sea power on Europe. Ve c P~’°'Submarine exchange rate rose to 1:1, and the 0%. sa;ualty rate of the valiant Kriegsmarine reached *'ed h,,.1 ’be U-boats sailed, because their very existence 'n8sI October 1987 muster the forces to hold the line at Coral Sea and to turn the tables at Midway. The British experience of the Maltese convoys demonstrated that in some scenarios tankers are the high-value units while aircraft carriers and battleships are just larger, more expensive escorts.
ASW in the U. S. Navy is like a hydra. The submariners know they do it best, but there are too few of them to be spared for fleet staffs. ASW aviators are top-notch but are generally so tied to the fan jet, tail rotor, or turbo-prop method of ASW that they need to learn as much about coordinated operations as the surface warfare officers who have been forced to exercise with whatever air support they could find. Congress does not even allow the best Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) officers in ASW combat units. The intelligence community is a mystery to most of the fleet. The only people who know anything about convoys and shipping control are either reservists, or will be soon. And last, but not least, the mine warfare specialists, who have a nice array of self-contained submarine disposal devices, are avoided by all the “main line” specialists, historically, until a war has been going on for a few years.
In an address to a recent Naval Institute mine warfare/ ASW seminar in Charleston, South Carolina, a call was made for warfare specialists (ASW, AAW, and ASUW [antisurface warfare]) rather than platform specialists. Such thinking is not revolutionary—just impossible under current policies. Before the start of World War II, newly commissioned officers were sent to the fleet for a tour
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before they were allowed to apply for submarine or aviation duty. This policy, thought to give future specialists a fleet perspective, was dropped because of the pressing need for aviators following the rapid change in fleet tactics after 7 December 1941. The nuclear power pipeline of the submarine training program is as extensive as any of the aviation tracks. For an officer even to consider voluntarily switching communities after initial qualifications is a career disaster. That officer will not only lose step with peers of the first community but will be behind the power curve when evaluated against contemporaries of the second community. In short, the budding ASW specialist will not successfully screen for promotion in either field. As a consequence, the only cross-community specialists in the Total Force Navy are likely to be reservists—if they are still affiliated with the Naval Reserve program.
To break from platform parochialism will be the true revolution in ASW and in the U. S. Navy, but it must come from the top. Junior officers neither decide the service’s future needs, nor do they second-guess promotion boards. If we are to develop a truly antisubmarine warfare community, reestablish either the Tenth Fleet or find an appropriate officer designator code. There are numerous potential career paths in such a community. After initial platform qualifications, an officer may apply for this community and be screened for both acceptance and second community training. During an established grace period, in which the officer is in a designated training status, evaluated on an individual basis, and does not have to accept the financial losses that switching from some designators entails, there would be no promotion board screening. Considering submarines, patrol squadrons, SOSUS, surface warfare officers, helicopter antisubmarine squadrons,
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air antisubmarine squadrons, intelligence, ana the major ASW communities gives more than 5 P career paths to lieutenant commanders. 0ffkerS
With dual qualifications, the special designator ^ can then revert to the initial community, switch to ^ community, or stay on a coordinated ASW track’ ^ through a variety of afloat and ashore ASW bil e Tuate staffs, and the ASW curriculum at the Naval ^oS^.(Ceft' School. The key is not the career path, but the g? riod in which competent, screened, and selecte ^ jo can develop ASW expertise without being PoU their fitness reports and dumped by the promoting ^
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This option may delay promotion in some cases
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appropriate evaluation after the qualification P^.^tltf
since competition will be within the ASW comm "'c'ali>t Navy’s long-term needs, as well as those of the sp cjal can be met. Such a community requires n°^c
schools, no expensive platforms or weapon syst? jgtai^ no separate budget, except perhaps a designate and a screening board. caa^
Learning the wrong lessons from naval history
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fatal to the future fleet. The enemy will choose v"‘~e6i how to fight the battle, and we must prepare to
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possibilities with our 600 ships. There are no qtj1 once major budget expenditures have establishe ^
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composition for the next century. There are, revolutions in thinking, training, tactics, and st*.a will enable the Navy to meet any threat, including ^<j\V the submarine. I propose the establishment ot designator as a first step. ^
1971
Commander Blanton graduated from the Naval Academy *A initially served on the USS Vogelgesang (DD-862) and the a( s (DD-944). He was then assigned to the SOSUS system in gyst^L Facility Grand Turk and later at Commander Oceanograp Atlantic. After completion of Department Head Class 60.
Blanton reported to the USS Hoel (DDG-13). He detache lr-,1L't^ _
duty in 1981. As a Naval Reserve officer, he served as an 1^ the Royal Saudi Naval Forces School in Jubail from 1985 to ^ fi° . currently the operations officer for M1UWU 211 in Chttf^graP Carolina, while completing a master’s degree in Physical c at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.
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Proceedings
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