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Cruise missiles offer long offensive reach and a potentially lethal payload. They give surface ships, submarines, or aircraft firepower against ships at sea or targets on land. And they can be integrated into the war-fighting doctrine of our aircraft carrier and battleship battle groups and amphibious task forces as adjunct weapons as well as being significant force multipliers for surface action groups and attack submarines. These qualities make for a successful U. S. Navy cruise missile program.
During their short but highly impressive time at sea, cruise missile weapons have continuously evolved. They have undergone technical refinements in their propulsion systems, control surfaces, radar cross-section, seeker system, and warheads. And we have had to make tradeoffs among speed, cruise altitude, maneuverability, and maximum weapon range. For example, speed is constrained in favor of fuel-efficient turbofan engines which enable longer operational range.
Several related issues make realistic assessment of cost and mission effectiveness in this continuum of technological modifications difficult: the choice of delivery systems, tradeoffs between alternate and economically competitive weapons, and the political and diplomatic ramifications of arms control agreements. Clearly, within the polemics of the ongoing cruise missile debate, neither the capabilities nor the limitations of cruise missiles are as simple to quantify as originally believed.
Opinion is not unanimous regarding the employment and future direction of cruise missile programs within the joint arena of the three services. Even within the Navy, a healthy debate continues in an effort to influence cruise missile technical development and employment doctrine. This diversity of opinion stems largely from cruise missiles’ inherent flexibility and their promising war-fighting potential.
These factors—and the evolutionary rather than revolutionary nature of cruise missile technological developments—have led to the prototyping of several sea- launched cruise missile variants (see Table 1). Although the U. S. Air Force is pursuing other prototypes, such as the air-launched cruise missile and ground-launched cruise missile, this article is limited to the Navy variants. In addition to the already widely deployed Harpoon, the Navy is
procuring three variants of the Tomahawk, and one tional variant is being developed. The Tomahawk an ^ and land-attack missiles share a common airframe propulsion system; however, they differ in guidan terns, fuel capacity, and warhead type. t0
There are many proponents of and many oppone^e(j the surface-launched, air-launched, ground- au ^ cruise missile variants, not only in the military bu ^ political and diplomatic circles. Given the economi _ ity of finite resources and tradeoffs with other we^oUi(l not all of the possible cruise missile variants can or ^ jS be exploited to their full potentials. Consequent y. important that the Navy clearly delineates the three cruise missile program should take in order to derive imum effectiveness from this technology.
Antiship Cruise Missile’s Initial Operational ^ ties: The antiship cruise missile’s introduction tj,e U. S. Navy represented a quantum improvemen air- offensive strike capability of ships, submarines, ^ craft. First came the Harpoon, which provided a je. range strike weapon and encouraged the researc ^ velopment that led to production of the TomahaW ship missile (TASM). ^ jts
A principal argument against the Harpoon was ^ 70-nautical-mile range constrained its tactical use’eneIny dally in carrier battle group operations. Either tn ^(en had to close within the Harpoon’s range (an °Ptl0surface viewed as an unacceptable calculated risk) °ragg action groups had to be formed and dispatched to jfl, the enemy far from the main body. This, in turn, ished overall antiair and antisubmarine defense ca[. main body and again portended an often unaccep culated risk. jgnifi-
The TASM, currently making its debut at se^’conven- cantly exceeds the Harpoon’s delivery range o naUtjCal tional antiship ordnance by approximately 200 ^jlity miles. Concomitantly, TASM increases the surV1tandoff of its launching platform by enabling it to conduct s attacks beyond the ranges of the enemy’s orSanlC^sM sensors and defensive weapon systems. Finally. 0ffen- serves as an adjunct weapon to close partially t execu<e sive firepower gap inherent in a requirement to
Type
Table 1 Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles Description Warhead Operational Range
Guidance System
Harpoon
Tomahawk
Tomahawk
(TLAM-C)
Short- and medium-range conven- 500 lbs.
tionally armed antiship missile Medium-range conventionally armed 1,000 lbs. antiship missile
Long-range conventionally armed 1,000 lbs. land-attack missile conventional
Tomahawk Long-range nuclear-armed Nuclear
(TLAM-N) land-attack missile
70-85 nm. Active radar seeker
250 nm. Active radar seeker
700 nm. Inertial guidance with
terrain contour hjng
and digital scene mate area correlator
1,400 nm. Inertial guidance with
terrain contour ma
[tchiuS
Source: Combat Fleets of the World 1986187
Al, niar*t*rne commitments. atjn ■ ou£h TASM-equipped ships and submarines operas (f lnc^ePendently cannot—and should not—be counted lar„ ne~f°r-one replacements for the strike capability of a f°rce l e°k a'rcra^ carrier’s aircraft, they do boost the total Veil! evel- This then causes the enemy to adjust his sur- larpanCe’ tracking, and defensive systems to counter a 'iitieT an(* *Droader based threat. TASM is a necessary and mod ^ at^'l'on to the Navy’s arsenal given the growing shj ern surface threat projected by the Soviet Navy with take ffUC^ as tbeKirov cruisers and Kiev vertical short Win° an<^ landing (V/STOL) aircraft carriers. This threat vem.§row when the Soviets begin introducing their con- lhe '0rla' takeoff and landing (CTOL) aircraft carriers by _^cnd of this decade.
inCOrnparative advantages which originally weighed Wea0r °f antiship cruise missiles rather than competing and P°n systems were their relative long range, flexibility, ceptj^rce*ved low unit cost. However, these original per- eXjStj ns must be carefully analyzed when contrasted with rfuise^ WeaPon systems. In terms of cost-effectiveness, pro • missiles first appeared to be cheap; but at an ap- arp „ln?ate un*1 c°st now of $1.5 million per missile, they £ClU|te costly.
craft 1Se missiles should not be viewed as unmanned air- aircr? rePlace or be a substitute for carrier-based strike limit h delivers a smaller payload; it has only a
auto 6 abilityt0 identify and discriminate between targets sttuajfy; b cannot shift missions or adjust for target- ber1C countermeasures; and, more important, it cannot pr0vjjro8rarnmed in flight. In addition, TASM can neither seque reai"bme battle damage assessment to correct sub- folloent 'auncbes, nor be recovered and rearmed for \yarfW~on strikes. However, against heavily armed antiair are (AAW) units, they may be the weapons of choice
The medium-range Harpoon stimulated research and development that led to the Tomahawk, with nearly four times its predecessor’s range. But the Harpoon’s relatively short legs can be offset by teaming the missile with naval aviation’s long legs.
to suppress the defensive systems prior to tactical aircraft strikes and thus minimize aircraft attrition.
Thus, although TASM’s deployment serves as a force multiplier for antisurface warfare, it is not an effective surrogate for naval aviation, and it does not antiquate the concept of aircraft carrier battle groups. Instead of begin- ing a paradigm in naval warfare, the TASM is the logical next step in the technological evolution and operational maturity of ongoing weapons development and acquisition programs.
Conventional Land-Attack Cruise Missile’s Initial Operational Capabilities: From a naval perspective, the turbofan-driven Tomahawk airframe provides the flexibility and versatility that are well suited for the land-attack mission. The recent introduction of the Tomahawk land-attack missile with conventional warhead (TLAM-C) provides a major addition to the fleet’s existing strike warfare capability against enemy targets many hundreds of miles inland. Before the TLAM-C’s development, successful naval strikes against such targets could only be achieved by prudent use of carrier-based aircraft.
Currently, TLAM-C may be launched from ships and submarines; and, with proper modification, a TLAM-C variant could be adapted for use by aircraft. Thus, the Navy has the potential to distribute a portion of its strike warfare capability among many different platforms. However, as is the case for the TASM variant, the TLAM-C cannot be objectively viewed as a replacement for manned aircraft. The TLAM-C is a potent adjunct weapon which, if employed properly, can complement and enhance naval aviation’s effectiveness. Since TLAM-Cs must be programmed for specific, fixed targets prior to launch, they are of little use at long range against mobile targets.
On the other hand, TLAM-Cs seem to be the obvious weapons to precede naval aviation into the vicinity of heavily defended land targets. TLAM-Cs will compound the land-based air defense problem for the enemy and will heavily tax fixed air-defense weapons and their associated command and control systems, thereby reducing attrition of the follow-on attack aircraft.
The deployment of TLAM-C could enhance the land- strike capability of battleship battle groups and would also complement the land-attack mission of V/STOL aircraft in amphibious task forces, especially in a Third World conflict in which maritime air superiority is not as significant a consideration. In this role, TLAM-C extends the Navy’s global strike capability without requiring continual redirection and tasking of its aircraft carrier battle groups. This degree of flexibility and versatility, especially in a non-Soviet confrontation, allows attack aircraft to be held in reserve for more important missions.
51
lngs / August 1986
Nuclear Land-Attack Cruise Missile’s Initial Operational Capabilities: Currently, the Navy possesses powerfully effective strategic and theater nuclear deterrent and strike capabilities. The addition of TLAM-N provides a significant increase in these nuclear capabilities and serves as a great force multiplier.
Further Development: Weapons, and therefore strategy and tactics, become ineffective and often obsolete in a short time if they are not modified for improvements in enemy countermeasures. Thus, it is important to ensure that cruise missile technology and employment doctrine continue to evolve at a pace and in a direction that enemy defensive systems find difficult to counter.
- Antiship Missiles: Naval aviation should continue to plan to use the Harpoon, which is already capable of being fired from attack and patrol aircraft. The Harpoon’s short legs are offset by naval aircraft’s long legs. The Harpoon provides a new dimension to a carrier air wing’s surface strike capability; and, most important, it is ready, available, and proven. We should simultaneously accelerate ongoing efforts to adapt TASM-like weapons for air launch. The projected deployment of Soviet CTOL aircraft carriers in 1990 will complicate the use of the Harpoon by placing the launching aircraft in possible jeopardy. An air-launched cruise missile would, once again, shift the advantage in favor of U. S. naval aviation. Likewise, the Harpoon still offers a big antisurface punch to low-mix combatants, open-ocean escorts, and amphibious forces. Thus, efforts to arm these platforms with the Harpoon should continue to be a top-level requirement.
The Navy should vigorously pursue efforts to acquire and deploy TASMs in large numbers on board attack submarines and large combatants, such as destroyers, cruisers, and battleships. At the same time, we need to recognize that TASM, as it now appears on the waterfront, is not the end product. The Tomahawk family—and, to a lesser extent, the Harpoon’s—is far from being operationally mature. Numerous technological innovations are on the drawing board; some will make it to the fleet, and some will not. But the end users—the warriors at sea— must get involved in defining which technological developments should be pursued and in which priority. They should address the following issues:
- Speed: The subsonic speeds of the Harpoon and all Tomahawk variants increase their vulnerability to antiship missile defense systems. However, significant speed improvements will likely necessitate dramatic changes in the missiles’ overall sizes, weights, airframes, control surfaces, and guidance systems. Thus, any significant improvements in speed will probably be gained only by changing the design concepts, essentially creating a new missile with its own separate but inherent flaws.
In an April 1986 test, a submarine-launched Tomahawk land-attack missile with conventional warhead detonated directly over a revetted RA-5C more than 400 miles inland. This cruise missile variant shows considerable promise as an adjunct to tactical aviation—especially over heavily defended territory.
One possibility consistent with the use of turbo an V' pulsion would be to test the feasibility of adding a ^ ^ thrust booster to be ignited during the terminal staj* ^ TASM’s flight. It is not yet necessary for the T01113^ jts to cruise at high supersonic speeds for the duration ^ flight, only during the final stage when under fire y ern Soviet anti-cruise missile defense systems.
► Seeker System: In the absence of a discrimin^ ^ seeker, large, potentially exhaustive salvos may quired to engage multiship formations. Thus, sma ^ ers are desirable for several reasons: tactically, ttl6|niarter victory; economically, a more expensive but s . seeker would significantly reduce the number ot ^ required in a salvo and accrue a net cost advantage, ^ politically and diplomatically, smart seekers (w en jng mature) diminish the probability of inadvertently eng neutral or allied shipping. . ejn
Although artificial intelligence is beginning t0 eV°torjes theory as various universities and research lab° ^ delve into robotics, pattern recognition, interactive ^ puting, and signal processing, it is still a long wa^targgt initial operational capability in terms of automatic ^ identification. The sophisticated algorithms now ^ evaluated require massive computational circm order to obtain ultimately a seeker smart enoug et criminate between a high-priority and low-priorlty ^ at sea, and small enough to be accommodated by ^
1
that
can discern shipping from background landmass;
can dis- finally, the
du h lncremental improvements must first be intro- thaf l° tke ^eet' This means initially developing a seeker
(i^n’.^e seeker would have to be improved so it seekU'S^ friendly shipping from hostile; and, finaiiy, m> ula ev°lve into one capable of discerning partic
L sb‘P classes from one another. w> -U/Tent*y> TASM is equipped with a passive system de *C 'mProves target selection. But its passive nature e(Y ands a cooperative opponent. We should accelerate syns to improve the Tomahawk’s passive identification tec.ern while simultaneously funding research to exploit nologies integral to identification by active sensors. tesiT lnc*ude high-resolution, electronic countermeasures thg.. ant’ millimeter wavelength radar systems and syn- >nn *C a?er*ure radar systems. Both of these technological aPPear t0 °hfcr the degree of high-resolution 0„n fretUrn necessary for processing by a waveform rec- high 10n a^orhhm. In addition, ongoing efforts in very ti0n ~SPeed integrated circuitry design must come to frui- in .u"1 “rder t0 embed the necessary recognition circuitry
► Siy°mahawk'
like ' nead lethality: Improvements in warhead design, ■aptovements in seeker smartness, will ultimately desiCC s'zes the salvos. Over time, existing warhead the fn C3n Probab'y be improved while still conforming to °nlv Prna.hawk’s dimensions. Research efforts should not t0 ee directed to increase the yield of warheads, but also getsance mission kill capabilities against specific tartest . ra§mentation warheads, such as those recently of a ’ web be suitable for destruction or degradation systgenna and wave guides of sensors and fire control stru-’ °r cornmunications equipment carried on super- eneUres °f surface units. Other concepts which exploit fcasiM Sensor receiver vulnerabilities might also prove doer 6 ^°r USe wdb cruise missiles. As warhead variants Conc8e’ b may be desirable to evolve toward a modular varicyPt tbat enables the launch operators to select from a Woul fof. Warhcad types. The actual warhead selected
- ^ be installed just prior to launch.
and t °r Cross-Section: The vulnerability of the Harpoon fense °niahawk to modern Soviet anti-cruise missile de- tudeS^stems is a function of many variables: speed, alti- sure’.enerT1y ear^ warning (e.g., electronic support mea- miss i 3nC^tke radar cross-section of the incoming cruise desj fJ Although significant increases in speed may be chan2e’ are not likely to accnje without dramatic there^CS *n exisbng cruise missile design. In addition, ity tomay be.a tradeoff between faster speed and the abil- Peali ITIain!ain a "sea skimmer” approach. Thus, an ap- Centlv^ °^0n ’n beu of increasing speed is to pursue re- overgj]emer§ing “stealth” technologies which reduce the Whjie 'e^ected radar cross-section of the cruise missile n°t reducing the actual physical size.
Whic7ffac* Cruise Missiles: Many of the technologies Win al3 CCt tble antiship cruise missiles’ future evolution ressso^termine the land-attack cruise missiles’ prog- travel n"ke the TASM> TLAM-C and TLAM-N must over long distances of heavily defended enemy territory. Consequently, the tradeoffs among the missile’s speed, altitude, and physical size must be examined closely.
The selectable warhead concept should be pursued for TLAM-C in particular. Assuming that TLAM-C’s major employment will be as an adjunct to tactical air strikes, the warheads need to be selectable based on specific target configurations and characteristics. An incendiary payload would be extremely effective against targets consisting of fuel and ammunition storage/staging areas. Fragmentation warheads would prove more effective against sensors and lightly armored targets. Payloads capable of deploying decoys to confuse targeting and defensive missiles might prove highly effective against heavily defended targets for follow-on tactical aircraft.
Recent advances in Soviet “look-down, shoot-down” systems emphasize the need for a low cruise altitude and significantly reduced radar cross-section.
Remaining Intangibles: Separate from the issues surrounding cruise missile performance are the requirements to improve over-the-horizon detection, classification, and targeting. Finally, we need to address doctrinal concepts regarding the coordinated use of cruise missiles as an adjunct to naval aviation in the context of carrier battle groups and amphibious operations, and the cruise missile’s impact as a force multiplier in battleships and battle groups. Centralized versus decentralized control procedures must be wrung out; if we require centralized control, then we must consider communication links and feedback links from missiles in flight.
Much has already been accomplished; yet we need to do even more. Because the cruise missile is, in many ways, a compromise between many competing technologies, improvements can continue. We must not constrain future systems by limiting our vision to the first generations of the Harpoon and Tomahawk.
Captain Hura was graduated from the U. S. Naval Academy in 1966. He received a Fulbright Scholarship and studied economic development at the Universidad Catolica in Valparaiso, Chile. His service assignments have included material officer. Commander, Destroyer Squadron 26; operations officer, USS Benjamin Stoddert (DDG-22); executive officer, USS Semmes (DDG-18); chief staff officer, Commander Destroyer Squadron 36; and surface operations and plans officer, Commander Cruiser Destroyer Group Two. He has an MSE degree in water resources and a PhD in environmental science and engineering from the University of California, Los Angeles. Captain Hura was the commanding officer of the USS William V. Pratt (DDG-44). He is currently Branch Head for Antisurface Warfare in OpNav 054. He and Commander Miller coauthored “Cruise Missile Warfare,” which was published in the October 1985 Proceedings.
Commander Miller was graduated through the NESEP program from Purdue University in 1976. His past assignments included operations officer and executive officer, USS Pledge (MSO-492); combat information center officer, USS Richmond K. Turner (CG-20); and Navy tactical data systems/antiair warfare officer, Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group Two. He has a master’s degree in electrical engineering from the Naval Postgraduate School. Commander Miller is currently the weapons officer of the USS William V. Pratt (DDG-44). He was the Bronze Medal winner in the Naval Institute’s 1984 Vincent Astor Memorial Leadership Essay Contest.