This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
•/ _ ** ■ , '
cruiser since the early 1960s to carry surface-to-surface missiles?
thus
nated efforts of units from several naval force arms
World
small and probability of hitting a target slight. In
Major innovations have changed the shape of Soviet military doctrine during the past decade. Their effects on the Soviet Navy’s strategy have been discussed at length in the West for several years. That the Soviet Navy’s views on the tactical aspects of warfare at sea have also undergone major changes, however, is less appreciated—despite the development of new tactical scenarios and force employment principles by Soviet naval theorists, despite the large body of Soviet writings discussing these changes, and despite the impact they have had on contemporary Soviet warship design. As a result, the emergence of several new classes of Soviet warships has puzzled our naval experts as to why these new designs are so different from the old ones. Why, for example, do the “Oscar”-class nuclear-powered guided missile submarines (SSGNs) and the Kirov nuclear-powered guided missile cruiser (CGN) both carry many more missiles than their predecessors? Why is the Kirov the first cruiser since the early 1960s to carry surface-to-surface missiles? Placing any of these weapon platforms on an evolutionary continuum of Soviet warship design is difficult because of the many sharp departures they reflect. We must look elsewhere to explain their significance. Many of the answers to these questions can be found in Soviet writings on naval tactical theory.*
The Great Tactical Debate, 1961-64: The Soviet Union exploded its first fission bomb in 1949, its first thermonuclear device four years later, and by the mid-1950s, had developed missiles for their delivery. The “revolution in military affairs” these achievements heralded was slow in developing, for “some military theorists still thought that nuclear weapons could not change the basic principles of warfare and would not bring any serious qualitative changes to existing methods of warfare.”1 But by 1959, the General Staff agreed that Soviet military doctrine needed revising and that nuclear missile weapons must dictate the shape of future Soviet military strategy. Shortly thereafter, according to the testimony of Colonel General N. Lomov, a debate began on “the character of a possible world war, the methods of warfare should nuclear-missile weapons be employed, the missions of the Armed Forces as a whole and of their individual services and force arms . . . , [and] the further improvement of [its] organization and equipment . . . ,”2
In January 1961, Rear Admiral K. A. Stalbo fired the opening broadside of a debate on naval tactics sponsored by Morskoy Sbornik, the Soviet Navy’s closest equivalent to the Proceedings.3
“One of the important tasks of contemporary military theory [boi] . . . is to develop new methods of fighting engagements . . . when nuclear-missile weapons are used .... As weapons and military equipment develop, the forms of warfare at sea also continually change. It is natural that . . . some force employment concepts and principles should change along with them .... Some concepts and principles die off and are replaced by new ones, and others change only in importance.
*A longer version of this article is available by contacting the author in care of the U. S. Naval Institute.
“That is why an examination of various categories [principles] of the art of naval warfare as manifeste today is advisable.”
Stalbo proceeded to question the relevance in the nu clear missile era of two of the major principles of Sovi naval tactics: “massed action” (massirovanie)—concen tration or massing of forces when engaging an enemy-'' and “combined action” (vzaimodeystvie raznorodn} sil)—defeating that enemy only by the combined, coor i compensating for the individual weaknesses of each urU and enhancing their overall effectiveness. These principle had matured during World War II, when the Soviet Navy was forced to fight an oceangoing enemy navy with forces that could not operate beyond offshore waters.
Massed Action: This principle, argued Stalbo, belonged to the age of shells and torpedoes, whose lethal force was
War II, defense forces were more than a match for offen sive capabilities; only a mass of forces could defeat an enemy and only by repetitive firing. ,
But, according to Stalbo, the situation had changed- The great destructive force of modem weapons had elmU nated the need to fire again and again at the enemy in naval engagement. One nuclear-tipped torpedo or miss1 ^ could destroy not only one major ship, but several, alone with their screening forces. Moreover, the hit probabil'/ of the new weapons had “increased considerably and,in some conditions, approaches 100%.” Finally, missile could be fired from standoff ranges. Missile-armed a*r craft, for example, could fire at surface targets “wn1 remaining beyond reach of [their] most formidable opP° nents’ . . . surface-to-air missiles,” and the gap betwee the ranges of antiship and antiaircraft missiles was like) to grow even larger in the future. In view of this, planner for large losses of weapon platforms was no longer neceS sary when determining the size of a force needed to pef form a given combat mission. For all these reasons, Stale concluded, “the concentration of a large number of pla forms in a modem naval engagement—their massing-"1 ceasing to be a basic principle of naval force ernpl°^ ment.” An assigned task could be performed “with aS1 gle powerful shot against the enemy . . . with a relative j limited number of weapon platforms.”
Combined Action: This principle, Stalbo argued, vva also better suited to bygone days, when a mixture of p'al, form types, mutual fire support, and concentration 0 forces was needed to perform tactical missions. The1}; combined action was “not just important, but essential and entailed “large expenditures of time.”
Given the lethality of nuclear missile weapons, hoW ever, “the problem of seizing the initiative and of decl sively defeating the enemy before he fires his own weap ons” was “especially acute,” for “losing the opportune to be the first to open fire will frequently mean also losing the engagement.” ,
The need to strike first was not the only factor that rule out the possibility of combined action. The range an power of nuclear missiles demanded that formations be
'spersed that launch platforms would have to operate , e>'ond visual and electronic reach of each other,” pos- n§ extraordinarily great technical difficulties” for com- iand and control of a coordinated effort.
he properties of nuclear missile weapons that made ombined action impossible also made it unnecessary. The °dern means of warfare freed the attacker’s striking othU^>> ^r°m ^e'n8 “completely dependent on each er’. enabling ‘‘a homogeneous force to carry out an aj ac^ independently.” The capabilities of submarines and ■rcraft were “incommensurable” with those of surface °f “the forces and means for combating mis- es- Thus, ‘‘the creation of mixed groups to fight an ^§agement at sea has ceased to be the sole possible way cl ^er^orm'ng combat missions.” As a result, Stalbo con- to h com*:,'ne(i action was ‘ ‘ceasing to be essential 0 the execution of combat missions.”
talbo’s assault on these once unquestioned principles voked a controversy whose like has rarely been aired
nal’ 6 ^a^es 0* Morskoy Sbornik, then or since. The jour- the S CC^t0rs 'ntcrvened later that year but failed to quell Da ?r®Ument- It resurfaced the next year, its scope ex- ^ ed and its vigor undiminished, ch || °'s opponents, arguing in three main directions,
Sea enged the notion that massed action could no longer th tV“ a *3as’c Pr'nc*P*e °f naval tactics. Some warned Wo n neW weaPons’ formidable though they now were, cj u ^ eventually and inevitably be countered. Others lrr>ed that defense against nuclear missile weapons was
already possible, namely through the capabilities of antiaircraft and antisubmarine weapons. Still others, though conceding that modem launch platforms could stand off from their targets, argued that the missiles themselves were vulnerable to enemy fire.
A similar cacophony of objections greeted Stalbo’s demotion of combined action. ‘‘It allows the strengths of some forces to compensate for the weaknesses of others [enabling] them overall to perform a combat mission more completely and reliably [and] with fewer . . . losses,” said one critic.4 “The employment of mixed forces as well as of forces with different weapons and combat equipment allows the strengths of some forces to make up for the weaknesses of others,” said another.5 And a third, though agreeing on the whole with Stalbo, argued that “one must not completely reject the need for mutual fire support.”6
Emergence of a Consensus: Despite the uproar that Stalbo’s article provoked, the conservatives were fighting a losing battle. For one thing, Stalbo’s views received
ment was the main, and the only, form of naval warfare- But with nuclear missile weapons in widespread use, tactical assignments could be implemented “with one or a few salvos, often even without the attacker entering the ene my’s zone of defense.” Today, the enemy could be “defeated and even crushed by means of a nuclear- missile strike”—an action “by no means unfailing^
considerable support.7 More important, these views accorded well with the Soviet military leadership’s push to “rework the theory of the military art” and “reeducate [armed forces] personnel, especially officers and generals.”8 And finally, Stalbo’s opponents either did not acknowledge or did not challenge many of his key assumptions and arguments.
Only one of them dared question the idea that the principal means of tactical warfare would now be nuclear missiles. None disputed the enormous lethality of these weapons; some even conceded their present superiority over defensive systems. And no one challenged the assertion that nuclear missiles’ probability of hitting a target approaches, under certain circumstances, “unity.”9 All these premises were central to Stalbo’s contention that concentrating weapon platforms to perform missions was no longer necessary.
The critics found it even more difficult to refute Stalbo’s position on combined action. Although they insisted that it remained “the sine qua non of successful performance of a combat mission,” they did not deny that it posed extraordinarily difficult and time-consuming com- mand-and-control problems at a time when preemptive action was essential.
Thus, by early 1964, when Morskoy Sbornik's editors interceded for the second and final time to wrap up the debate, Stalbo’s views had made considerable headway and had been taken in directions that even Stalbo had not foreseen.
On the question of combined action, the editors found his arguments persuasive. “On the ocean expanses at long •distances from home bases,” they wrote in the February 1964 issue, “it is quite difficult to organize combined action between force arms such as . . . submarines and aircraft. ... To delay in striking at an enemy grouping [is] fraught with grave consequences, [therefore, it is] advisable to strike . . . immediately, as soon as weapon range allows.” If plans for a combined air-submarine strike blocked this requirement, the plans must be abandoned. If the submarines delayed firing their missiles to await the arrival of aircraft or vice versa, the enemy would be able “either to evade their [attempted combined] strike, or defeat them as they concentrate [together], or both. ...” Consequently, “combined action between groups from different force arms in forward areas must not be considered, in all cases the sine qua non of organizing combat.”
Moreover, by asserting that enemy forces could be destroyed preemptively from standoff ranges, Stalbo set the stage for an assault on yet another theoretical sacred cow: the naval engagement is “the only way to [tactical] victory.” For, as participants pointed out later in the debate, if “engagement” meant “an organized bilateral struggle,” an action, such as a preemptive strike, where no exchange of fire took place could scarcely be called by that name.
The editors of Morskoy Sbornik agreed with this notion also. “Before the arrival of long-range weapons,” they reasoned, “an attacker was forced to close with the target . . . while under enemy fire.” In those days, the engageassociated with a prolonged exchange of fire. . •
The concept of the strike as a “basic form of warfare was dismissing the view that beating an enemy inevitab y entailed engaging him. The engagement remained an 1111 portant” form of naval warfare, but usually only w^en conventional weapons were employed. .
The editorial board members disagreed with Stalbo on y on the principle of massed action. Like him, they believe that the launch platforms of the day were less vulnerable to enemy defenses, but not the missiles they carried. A sing cruise missile, they argued, could be shot down easily aS could an entire salvo if its size did not exceed a certain minimum. Thus, massing of “forces and fire” was necessary—even if nuclear weapons were used—in order to “increase the assurance that the missiles will reach the target when there is strong opposition from enenf defenses.”
The Consensus: By the eve of the Twenty-third Sovte Communist Party Congress, even this argument aga|IlS massed action had been overcome, capping the debate with a total victory for the views of Stalbo and his supp0^' ers. Admiral N. M. Kharlamov, then a member of the navy’s Main Staff and former commander of the Bah'c Sea Fleet, wrote in Morskoy Sbornik in January 19° ’ “The main concern ... in warfare at sea is today coming to be not the massing of forces with a view to attaining the largest possible number of direct bomb, shell, or torpec>° hits on enemy ships, but the organization of a small number of nuclear-missile strikes by comparatively sina groups and even by single [launch] platforms.” “The notion of ‘massed use of forces’ has gained new content, wrote Admiral Yu. A. Panteleev, then-head of the So vie Naval Academy and former commander of the Paci'lC Fleet, a month later. “Now, there is no need to concern trate a large number of surface ships, submarines, an aircraft in a limited area. . . . [The] power of a [strike] ... is determined not by the number of missiles fired, bu by the power of the warheads.”
Thus, after the Soviet Navy reviewed its postwar tad1 cal theory, it concluded the theory’s principles were no very relevant in the nuclear missile era of warfare. Victor would belong not to the side that massed its forces of coordinated its strike, but to the side that struck first win1 whatever forces were at hand. Preemption, indeed, was the key not only to victory, but to survival itself. In past, according to Panteleev, the first salvo, though in]' portant, was “almost never decisive.” But, today. 1 meant ‘“to be or not to be’; for from a failed first salvo, one must expect an answering enemy strike with a decisive result.” And according to Kharlamov, naval engagements must not be allowed to take place at all, for engaging the enemy presupposed exchanging strikes with hina.
°tces participating in an engagement.” Seven months ater, an article in the same journal discussing the trends in e development of naval forces stated that “the methods °Perational-tactical employment of naval forces in war- are at sea are changing,” pointing to the “increasingly n°ticeable determination abroad to employ them jointly in a tactically coordinated way.” And in May 1972, Admiral
n an exchange of fire would inevitably prove fatal.
hus was Soviet naval theory “freed,” as Admiral Ser- §e> Gorshkov, commander in chief of the Soviet Navy, r°te a year later in the February 1967 Morskoy Sbornik, r°m manifestly outdated ideas [and the] gap between 6 Cornbat capabilities of [nuclear missile] weapons and e tactics for their employment” eliminated.
Although the new tactical doctrine did not take formal . ect until shortly before the Twenty-third Party Congress 966, some of its elements appear to have been imple- ented operationally several years earlier. In April 1963, °r example, one of the participants in the debate proposed tat the Soviet Navy abolish its traditional distinction be- Ween “force arm tactics” and “general naval tactics,” or e tactics of combined action. The term “general tac- 'c?’ _ he wrote, should be abandoned since “the basic Principles of the combined employment of naval forces re dictated not by one or another principle of general c['cs, but by the tactics of whatever force arm is the atn one when performing a given concrete task.”10 ls suggests that as early as 1963, the importance of utubined actions had sharply diminished in the Soviet avy’s everyday tactical practice, while that of independent action had risen.
Resurrection of the Outdated Ideas: But the formal con- eusus against massed and combined action lasted only a Cvv years, barely surviving the close of the decade. In the ?arIy 1970s, the same outdated ideas the Soviet Navy had °ug fought to repudiate were revived.
The first hint that a theoretical volte-face was under ay. or had already occurred, appeared in June 1971, hen N. P. V’yunenko observed in a Morskoy Sbornik article on Soviet naval theory on the eve of World War II at the Soviet Navy’s 1937 Combat Manual had “recommended that [tactical] missions be performed by the prin- 0lPle of combined action and massed action for . . . the UUest exploitation of the firepower and mobility of the
Despite a temporary fall from favor, combined action has been revived as a principle of Soviet naval warfare. In addition to the missile-firing surface combatants and submarines, the Soviet Navy relies on air-launched strikes—by aircraft such as the new “Blackjack,” left, and the “Backfire”—to round out its combined action tactics.
Gorshkov wrote that “the First World War clearly showed that combined action of forces and means had become the sine qua non of warfare at sea.” By 1974, however, the Soviets no longer found it necessary to defend this volte- face with allusions to historical or foreign practice.
Massed Action: In December 1974, Admiral Gorshkov wrote in Morskoy Sbornik that because of the range and power of today’s weapons, massed action would “no longer necessarily have to be realized in the form of participation of a large number of ships and aircraft.” This was not, it would seem, a new formulation, were it not for what Gorshkov added to it. Although massed action would involve only a small number of platforms, it would “take the form of concentration of . . . the weapons necessary to perform a combat mission.” He spoke not of “massing of forces,” as had been the practice in the previous decade, but of “massing of forces and means.” This expression and, alternatively, “massing of forces and weapons” is found in most treatments of this subject since 1974.
Since then, a number of authors have elaborated on this theme. The emphasis has shifted to a saturation of enemy defenses, overwhelming them with large numbers of missiles, if not necessarily with large numbers of platforms.
Combined Action: In the February 1974 Morskoy Sbornik, Captain First Rank (now Rear Admiral) G. Kostev stated in “Combined Action—A Paramount Principle of Force Employment” that at the tactical level, combined action “is designed to eliminate mutual interference” between units deploying, maneuvering, and firing their main weapons, “as well as to intensify pressure on the enemy [such that] the results of this pressure are greater than the sum of strikes [attacks] made by individual ships, aircraft, and groups participating in an engage-
of a strike. But because their theoretical accuracy somewhat overrated, the measure of weapons nee
ment.” Combined action, if correctly organized, “enables a mixed force to attack the enemy . . . from different directions with a variety of means and hampers his evasion of strikes.” Thus, the enemy “sustains maximum damage and the attackers a minimum of losses.” In short, “combined action of all forces plays a decisive role in the modem naval engagement.” It “is one of the basic principles of waging combat in modem conditions, [without which] not one of the missions of the armed struggle can be executed.”
A host of theorists have echoed these thoughts since then, including Admiral Gorshkov. “Combined action ... is one of the most important categories of the art of naval warfare,” he wrote in both editions of his book Sea Power of the State.
Forms of Tactical Warfare: The naval engagement has once again become the principal form (scenario) of warfare at sea at the tactical level. The engagement, wrote Gorshkov in December 1974 in Morskoy Sbornik, “has always been and remains fundamental for the execution of tactical missions”—a judgment he repeats in both editions of his book. In fact, the term “naval tactics” itself is defined in the Soviet Military Encyclopedia as “the study and development of methods of preparing for and fighting the naval engagement.” Moreover, according to the encyclopedia, the “modem naval engagement” entails the participation of “mixed forces” and is characterized by “combined tactical action” and “massing of forces and means.”
“With the advent of nuclear-missile weapons,” according to a naval officer writing in 1977, “the role of naval tactics [as opposed to force-arm tactics] was somewhat reduced.” The advancement in the capabilities of force arms such as submarines and aircraft engendered “a tendency to enhance the role of independent action by them, especially in forward areas.” The strike became the “basic form” of tactical action for the Soviet Navy’s missile forces, with the engagement remaining important only in “offshore areas.” The role of “naval tactics” was degraded as a result, and “attempts were even made to eliminate [naval tactics] as such from the art of naval warfare.” But the “further development of the methods of waging warfare at sea” and the “experience of operational and tactical training,” concluded this officer, “have changed this point of view.”11
Neither massed action nor combined action have regained the status they once enjoyed as “categorical imperatives” of the art of naval warfare. Departures from combined action, according to Gorshkov, are sometimes possible, and massing of forces and means does not, despite its name, actually imply that forces should be massed. And the strike, though no longer the basic form of tactical action in forward areas,12 remains important enough for Gorshkov to imply that its effect on the outcome of naval engagements can in certain conditions be decisive.
All the same, the 1970s had witnessed a counterrevolution in Soviet naval tactical doctrine. Although the revolution in tactical thought has not quite come full circle, it has come most of the way. The conservative views of Stalbo’s opponents, discarded only after long and contentious argument in the mid-1960s, had returned to the fore in the 1970s, as firmly entrenched as ever. Why were these conservatives wrong then, but right today? What happened at the turn of the decade? What were the factors that made for this change?
Causes of the Volte-Face: At least two, and possibly three, factors played a role in the about-face in Soviet tactical thought.
Reassessment of Enemy Defenses: The first factor was a newfound respect for the strength of enemy defenses. An engagement, as defined in the Soviet Military Encyclope' dia, is a bilateral contest, consisting of “reciprocal attacks, counterattacks, and their repulsion.” Hence, the Soviet Navy’s revival of the naval engagement implies a loss of confidence in its ability to destroy enemy f°rceS with a preemptive strike before they can have the opportu” nity to effectively respond. „
“With the expansion of surveillance capabilities». wrote A. Gontaev, a Soviet flag officer, in March 1973 t-1 Morskoy Sbornik, “the possibility of preempting m® enemy in combat is becoming more and more difficult. Admiral V. N. Chernavin, currently the Chief of Mal.^ Navy Staff, stated in the January 1982 Morskoy ShornP that massed action has become “even more important than it previously was because of the “increased . • • ca’ pabilities of aircraft-carrier task-force antimissile, antiaircraft and antisubmarine defenses.” In Sea Power °f,Hj State, Gorshkov suggests that the principle of combine action was revived for similar reasons. “The striking [power] and defensive capabilities of naval forces are con tinually increasing, which gives grounds for asserting th* in the future combined tactical action will be required in order to overpower the enemy’s organized and deeply' echeloned defense in an engagement.”
Reassessment of Soviet Capabilities: The second factor involved a reassessment of Soviet capabilities themselves- Rear Admiral N. B. Pavlovich, a Soviet naval theorist an historian, wrote in an article published posthumously <n Joenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal in December 1974:
“The effectiveness of the new types of weapons- evinced in their increased lethal radius and accuracy- changed the estimate of the quantity of weapons an
[launch] platforms needed to achieve the results desire
was
:ded
to achieve decisive results was set too low. This inturl1 affected the formation of views on the methods of elT1' ploying forces delivering and supporting strikes.’
The “views” to which Pavlovich referred, of course- where those voiced by Stalbo in 1961 and by Panteleev and Kharlamov five years later, which stated that masse action could no longer be considered a basic guide to force employment.
The principle of combined action, according to Pavl°" vich, suffered because of the same blithe approach to the new weapons:
“With the advent of nuclear-missile weapons, the ac-
celerating development of the forces and weapons for a strike made the latter so powerful that successful delivery of it foreordained the further course of events. One would have thought, thanks to the high speed of [launch] platforms and weapons for a strike, that carry- jn§ h °ut had become simpler. In actual fact this is a far from simple task. Performing it requires thorough support. The efforts of mixed forces acting ... in the mterests of the forces delivering the strike are needed.”
ncreased Tactical Importance of Conventional Weap- ns- The third cause of the volte-face is not as certain a actor as the previous two. Since the early 1970s, Soviet e°rists have called attention to the growing role of con- entional weapons in warfare at sea at both the operational (.n ,tactical levels. In 1973, for example, B. Bannikov, a °viet theorist, stated in Voennaya mysl’ that modem aval operations would involve the ‘‘mass use” of both wclear and conventional weaponry. According to V.S. ^anichits, writing four years later in the April 1977 orskoy Sbornik, ‘‘a combination of nuclear and conventual strikes” would also characterize modem naval en- Wgements. Conventional weapons have become more an simply the auxiliary means of warfare that they were ln the 1960s.
a result, force employment principles originally for- ulated with their use in mind probably would be revived. 1 the Soviets conclude, for example, that nuclear weapons were not always appropriate in tactical situations—too lrty>” perhaps, for employment outside the strategic ntext? Considering naval theorists’ references to com- ued use of nuclear and conventional weapons, this s °uld not appear so. Did the Soviets decide some mis- ns could be performed better with conventional muni- 0j.ns- This, too, is unlikely, considering the main purpose warfare at sea is to destroy the enemy or at least render 01 *mPotent. Or did the Soviets decide some missions °u d be performed well enough, and more cheaply, with nventional weapons? Perhaps so; fissile materials are Pensive to process and nuclear warheads expensive to bu|'d and maintain.
eo Ttbe renewed importance of conventional weapons is 9ually plausible as an effect, especially of the require- larnt ^°r massed action. In allowing for the possibility of j j?e losses of missiles to enemy fire, saturation of enemy ef enses with massed all-nuclear strikes is hardly cost- seect*v.e- Diluting the defensive effort is just as well ved if some of the missiles have less expensive, more Pendable conventional warheads.
s ^ow It May All Fit Together: The new generation of frace combatants and submarines embodies the counter- l^lmion in Soviet naval tactical thought of the early Us, particularly where massed action, or saturation, is
concerned. Among the many differences between the new platforms and their generational predecessors, none is so striking as the difference in number of missile launchers. The ‘‘Oscar”-class SSGN, for example, has 24 missile launchers—three times the number carried by the “Charlie” and “Echo-II” classes, and six times as many as the “Juliett”-class guided missile submarine. The Kirov has 20 surface-to-surface missile (SSM) launchers, or five times the number on the previous. SSM cruiser design, “Kresta-I.”13
The revival of combined action as a principle of naval warfare is not nearly as obvious in the new designs, since it is more relevant to how forces should be employed than to how they should be designed. Nevertheless, it may be a factor in the Soviet Navy’s renewed interest in building SSM-firing cruisers, perhaps for combined submarine-, surface ship-, and air-launched strikes against enemy high-value targets.14
Finally, the return of the naval engagement as the Soviet Navy’s basic tactical scenario is consistent with, and is likely reflected in, its current attempt to develop a conventional takeoff and landing aircraft carrier to improve, among other things, its fleet air defense capabilities.
'I. Korotov, Voenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal, April 1964, p. 44.
2N. Lomov, Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, May 1962, p. 11.
Tor a comparison of Morskoy Sbornik and Proceedings, see Captain R. W. Barnett and Dr. E. J. Lacey, "Their Professional Journal,” Proceedings, October 1982, pp. 95-101.
4V. s. Lisyutin, Morskoy Sbornik, March 1961, pp. 14-22.
5A. G. Svetlov, Morskoy Sbornik, December 1962, pp. 18-25.
6M. E. Krasnokutskiy, cited in Morskoy Sbornik, October 1961, p. 21.
7On massed action, see Yu. V. Kolesnikov, Morskoy Sbornik, November 1963, p. 23. On combined action, see V. S. Sysoev, Morskoy Sbornik, April 1961, p. 24; N. V. Sukhodol’skiy, Morskoy Sbornik, October 1962, p. 35.
“Speech by Defense Minister R. Ya. Malinovskiy at the Twenty-third CPSU Congress, 23 October 1961; text in Krasnaya zvezda, 24 October 1961, pp. 3—4. 9A belief in the fantastic accuracy of guided missiles pervaded Soviet writings of the time. References to hit probabilities of between 60% and 90% were common. 10L. A. Emel’yanov, Morskoy Sbornik. April 1963, pp. 24-25. Boldface in original.
"V. S. Mamchits, Morskoy Sbornik, April 1977, p. 24. Mamchits appears to be referring to the proposed elimination by one of the participants in the 1960s debate of the term “general naval tactics."
uOn page 305 of the Soviet Military Encyclopedia, the strike is listed as a form of warfare, but not as a basic form of warfare, either at the tactical, operational, or strategic level.
“John E. Moore, ed., Jane’s Fighting Ships 1982-1983 (London: Jane's Publishing Company, Ltd., 1982).
14An apparent "fly in the ointment” is the Kiev class, design work for which probably began in the first half of the 1960s, but which is equipped with eight SS-N-12 launchers. The launchers may have been added to the ship much later in the design phase. Unfortunately, this explanation is extremely difficult to confirm, given that a full history of Kiev’s design phase is unlikely to come to light.
Mr. Petersen received an MA degree in international affairs from George Washington University in 1972 and is now a professional staff member at the Center for Naval Analyses. He specializes in Soviet naval strategy and doctrine, and he has published a number of articles and book chapters during the past several years.
Down with the Ship . . . Temporarily
When a sailor in a Navy swimming class refused to dive from a 15-foot platform, the instructor asked witheringly, “What would you do if you were that high on a sinking ship?”
“Sir,” replied the sailor, “I’d wait for it to sink about ten feet more.”
Louis M. Starita