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Crisis in
Leadership Training
The Navy justifiably has spent much time and effort exalting the virtues of leadership. Superior leadership is the decisive factor which makes one division, ship, or navy rise above those which are equivalent in all other respects. Today, we are faced with increasing challenges from the civilian community, within the Navy, and on the high seas. Our ability to provide effective, reliable national defense is questioned by citizens and the Congress. We are faced with an ever threatening drug problem, increased use of alcohol at all levels, continuing pressures of racial strife, and a new generation of sailors who are not willing to accept discipline and authority as absolutes.
The direction of men and the accomplishment of missions has become an increasingly difficult task, especially at the division and department levels. It is at these levels that junior officers and petty officers must deal directly with the vocal, independent sailor. These middle management levels have by far the greatest direct control over sailors and their performance. Therefore, the middle manager has assumed an increasingly important role in the battle readiness of the fleet, and in the training, inspiration, and career aspirations of our younger sailors. Ineffective leadership at these levels will result in a unit and a fleet which are ill prepared to meet the challenges of modern warfare.
The importance of the noncommissioned officer in the armed forces has been immortalized in Rudyard Kip' ling’s, "The backbone of the Army is the noncommissioned man!” Are we still producing petty officers who will serve as the strong backs of the Navy? The advancement process and the service school structure ensure that our petty officers are capable of assuming their technological responsibilities, but are they sufficiently trained to accept the leadership responsibilities commensurate with their rates? The prevalent conditions in the Navy •prompted Albert Johnson, former Master Chief Petty Officer of the At' lantic Fleet, to say, “You used to hear it all the time—people would say. 'the Chiefs run the Navy', but you don’t hear it much anymore, especially
r°m the Chiefs.”1 Yes, it is time to analyze the leadership capabilities and training of our petty officers and to take measures to rectify our problems.
This crisis in petty officer leadership has been caused by numerous fac- t°rs: the increased importance attached to special interest programs, 1 e recruitment and advancement of tnen not motivated toward leadership, t e increased usurpation of petty offi- ^er responsibilities, and the lack of ef- ective leadership training programs. Colonel Robert D. Heinl, Jr., U.S. arine Corps (Retired), has depicted vividly the plight of the NCO in to- ay s armed forces by stating, “Today,
1 e NCOs—the lifers—have been made strangers in their own home, the re8ular service. . . ,”2 The current trend in human relations programs, while commendable in motive, has made it possible for young seamen to evelop and initiate unit policy and 'instructions. Ships and squadrons currently participate in an extensive one-week program sponsored by the uman Resources Management Cen- er- I have participated in one such Program, entitled Human Relations 3 vailability. Participating ships send r° 40 members to the center for ne week. The standard part of the Program is the development of a “we ^"nt list by the representative mem- efs of the ship’s company. This was Urther developed into a command induction which governed the proce- Ures for numerous command func- °ns including commanding officer’s mast, the control of liberty, and the Improvement of military smartness, in 6 p0^'cies and procedures set forth n these programs are often necessary are effective in eliminating minor ^'tants, but they are also effective in 0pkr‘lding the importance of the chain c°mmand and the prestige of senior Pe«y officers.
c master chief petty officer of the mmand, who is the command’s ^JU°r enlisted person, is delegated the th ^'eS servin8 as a liaison between enlisted personnel and the com. ' As the commanding officer’s
V i,tant’ 1S primarily concerned ere t^le morale and welfare of the reja With the advent of the human ‘ t'°ns councils, his position is in
danger of being relegated to a mere figurehead. His importance and prestige are diminished by the ease with which lower-rated enlisted men and women can bypass him and influence the establishment of policies which will meet their desires.
Every division officer has been faced with the problem of the malcontent sailor, the man who feels that his recruiter lied to him. This individual can have a plague-like effect on a division, spreading his discontent and frustration throughout, devastating existing morale.
It is evident that the all-volunteer armed forces concept has not rid the Navy of this type of man.
Part of the problem is the current recruiting philosophies and directives which permit the recruitment of persons who are predicted to be low achievers. The remaining portion of the problem is brought about by poor leadership turning men and women of good potential into disinterested, discontented, bad-mouthing sailors. The widely read and respected Division Officer’s Guide speaks of this problem when it states, “New men, usually the young ones, will often attach themselves to, and attempt to follow, the non-regulation troublesome ‘old hands’ in the mistaken belief that these reprobates are admirable and salty.”3
Many naval officers measure professional success through promotion, selection for a desired school, or appointment to a particular position. The competition is keen and the officer’s fitness report carries the greatest amount of weight in determining who will be promoted, selected, or appointed.4 The importance of this subjective report has brought about a situation where junior officers have become more aggressive and more involved in divisional functions. Ultimately, this leads to the usurping of senior petty officers’ responsibilities and authorities. This deplorable condition prompted one senior enlisted man to say, “There used to be a time when the senior NCO was, well, a god. . . . Then they took all his authority away and gave it to the officers.”5
The usurping of petty officer responsibility and authority detracts from the "trust and confidence” which should be accorded to senior petty officers and ultimately drives them to the coffee mess to wait on retirement. To properly motivate our petty officers and to increase the retention rate of quality men, we must delegate responsibility to the lowest possible level and give that individual the authority required to accomplish his mission.
The need for effective, formal leadership training programs was never as apparent as in the latter part of 1972 when four separate cases of mutiny broke out in Navy ships. These cases raised serious questions about the Navy’s discipline, professionalism, and leadership—attributes which had traditionally characterized the U.S. Navy. A congressional subcommittee, chaired by Representative Floyd V. Hicks (Democrat, Washington), was convened to investigate the causes of this breach in discipline. The resulting report stated, "It became apparent that while junior officers, chief petty officers and senior petty officers were performing their technical duties in a proficient manner, there was a lack of leadership in dealing with seamen.”6 The ever-increasing complexity of weapon systems, propulsion plants, and electrical gear requires competent technicians; otherwise, our fighting capabilities will be drastically diminished. But, unless we produce competent leaders, we will never develop our vast potential.
Advancement within the Navy is based on a competitive system of examinations. A multiple system, based on knowledge, performance, time in the service, time in present pay grade, and awards and medals received, is used in an attempt to ensure a fair and impartial opportunity for advancement.
Forty percent of the advancement multiple is based on technical competence as measured by the advancement examinations. Twenty-five percent of the multiple is based on professional performance.7
Technical knowledge rather than leadership ability and previous performance remains the major criterion for advancement. “Undoubtedly, one
of the primary factors is that as the Navy becomes more technical, grade or rank is obtained on the basis of technical skills rather than leadership ability. There are insufficient ongoing formal programs within the Navy to provide adequate training for petty officers, chief petty officers, and junior officers with respect to the basic elements of leadership.”8 This was one of the many conclusions drawn by the Hicks subcommittee.
Today, more than five years after this need for effective leadership training was so vividly brought to our attention, there are numerous courses which deal with leadership in one aspect or another. Most of these are splinter courses, fragments of a course whose primary purpose is another subject. Some flourish for a brief time; others quickly fall by the wayside. There is not a cognizant command evaluating the usefulness and effectiveness of these courses.
The Navy has only one leadership program which has been funded for the primary purpose of providing leadership and management training for petty officers. The course is currently taught on both coasts and is sponsored by Chief of Naval Technical Training. It is entitled, “Leadership and Management Training for Petty Officers, Open to Personnel E-6 through E-9.”
The mission of the course is to provide first class and chief petty officers with pertinent information in leadership and managerial methods in order that they may perform their duties more effectively.
The two-week course emphasizes communications and interpersonal relations, management and motivational methods, and principles of military order and discipline. The course teaches theories of leadership and management with an emphasis on practical application.9
The efforts of this course are commendable but insufficient if we are to dose the leadership gap within the fleet. The course remains relatively obscure and underemphasized. Ships, already facing serious manning problems, can ill afford to send their petty officers to the course. Perhaps the most serious drawback is that it fails to reach the third and second class petty officers, the levels where leadership skills are being formulated and developed.
Up to this point, this essay has briefly discussed the need for improved leadership, inherent problems, and the present status of training. Improvements must be made, but the complete development of an effective program is beyond the scope of this paper. The suggestions which follow can only be considered a starting point.
Special interest groups and human relations programs should be placed in the proper perspective. They can be valuable, useful management tools, but they must be used to advise the command, to supplement the command’s resources. These groups must emphasize the chain of command, instead of threatening its existence. Sailors must once again be encouraged to resolve grievances by going through their immediate supervisors.
The problem of the disgruntled non-rated man is a difficult one to solve under existing regulations. It is difficult to administratively discharge a man unless he has committed several violations against the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and it is equally difficult for the disenchanted sailor to get out before the end of his obligated service. The Navy invariably is stuck with a man who will make few positive contributions, but instead will spread his frustrations and undesirable attitude.
Perhaps the most provocative solution to this problem was submitted by Lieutenant (junior grade) M. W. Mel- lor in a Proceedings "Nobody asked me, but ...” feature. He proposed that every recruit upon completion of his initial training be sent to a six-month sea tour. Upon completion of this six-month tour, the seaman would have the opportunity of mustering out of the Navy if he so desired. At the same time, the Navy would have the option of terminating the contracts 01 the less desirable sailors.10
If the proposal to send all recruits to six-month sea tours is found not to be a viable solution, then we should consider the possibility of having selectees for E-4 serve one-year apprenticeships before being designated petty officers. A plan similar to this is currently being implemented in the A*r Force. This system would allow f°r the evaluation of each selectee’s ability
to assume greater responsibilities.
It would be particularly valuable in the man who is promoted to E-4 upon graduation from Class A School. This man—the “push-button third”—now comes to the fleet with little knowledge of shipboard life or the responsibilities of a petty officer. This apprenticeship program would allow him to obtain this knowledge before requiring him to assume the responsibilities of his rate. He would be eligible for advancement after: (1) completing his one-year apprenticeship; (2) passing required personal qualifica- tl0n system; and (3) gaining his commanding officer’s approval.
Junior officers once again should be encouraged to delegate responsibility t0 their petty officers and to hold rhern accountable for performance of those duties. In this manner, we can Set this valuable group out of the cofee mess and back into the work spaces where their expertise and experience Can be used. Given the responsibilities and the authorities that they once had, the senior petty officers will be more Motivated, their enthusiasm will in- ctease, and their lost prestige will be
testored.
The Navy should consider con- s°lidating the numerous one- and tWo-week courses which cover leader- "'P. management, human relations, ar>d communications into two schools ev°ted entirely to the subjects of adership and management.
The first school should be open to k'[1][2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] through E-9 personnel and should e aPproximately four to six weeks long. The school sites should be conveniently located on both coasts, or possibly established within each major command. Furthermore, they should remain under the cognizance of one command responsible for preparing selected petty officers to accept positions of greater responsibility, broadening their perspectives of the military, and expanding their knowledge of leadership and managerial techniques. The graduate would gain insight into the role of the petty officer, improve his self-confidence, and possess a greater understanding of the requisite for high standards of military behavior, bearing, and performance. Commands should be encouraged to send selected petty officers to the schools during permanent duty change when the man could concentrate on the academics without being concerned about his regular job.
It is equally important to provide formal leadership training to personnel who are in the formative stages of development, the second and third class petty officers. This course should be short in duration, conducted at numerous locations and widely used.
The benefits derived from these courses would be apparent by improved leadership, increased job satisfaction, more comradeship, and increased pride. The quality sailor seeing these attributes would be more inclined to stay in the Navy.
The U.S. Navy is now at the turning point in the struggle for control of the seas. The Navy has the fewest number of ships since before World
War II, and many of these ships are over 30-years old. While the Soviet Navy continues to grow at an alarming rate, we have maintained our advantage only through our superiority in aircraft carriers and the quality and training of our sailors. If we are to maintain this edge, we must retain our quality personnel. They must be motivated and inspired to use and improve their skills and knowledge.
Effective leadership at the middle management levels is the beam which will light the way through these troubled times.
One Ringy Dingy_______________________________________________
As part of the underway training program, an eager young lieutenant (junior grade) issued an instruction of proper telephone etiquette.
Late one night he dialed what he thought was the chart house. Expecting a squared-away, Chart house, Quartermaster Doe speaking, Sir,” he was surprised when he was greeted a sleepy, and un-military “Yeah? What is it?” Testily, the young officer launched into a brief lecture, then, repeating the proper way to answer a telephone said, “Now let’s start a8ain and pretend that your phone just rang.” “Very well,” replied the voice. “Captain’s Cabin. Captain speaking, Sir.”
Captain W. F. Foster, USN (Retired)
(hT'I
e Naval Institute will pay $25.00 for each anecdote published in the Proceedings.)
’Robert D. Heinl, Jr., ‘‘The Collapse of the Armed Forces,” Armed Forces Journal, 7 June 1971, p. 38.
Hhid.
[3]John V. Noel, Jr., and Frank E. Bassett, Division Officer's Guide. 7th ed. (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1976), p. 31.
[4]James H. Carrington, Command, Control, Compromise (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press,
1973), p. 61.
“Stewart H. Loory, Defeated: Inside America's Military Machine (New York: Random House, 1973), p. 372.
’’Report by the Special Subcommittee on Disciplinary Problems in the U.S. Navy, H.A.S.C. No. 92-81, 2 January 1973, p. 17689.
[7]Manual of Advancement, Bureau of Personnel Instruction 1430.16, 18 October 1973, pp. 1-4.
“Disciplinary Problems, p. 17689.
“Dennis Neuman, “Leadership Management: Filling the Vacuum," AH Hands, February 1975, p. 21.
,0M. W. Mellor, “Breaking in Our ‘Boot’s,’ " U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1976, p. 78.