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The young, new 2nd lieutenant seeking black and white answers to his many questions at the Marine Officer Basic School is frustrated by the salty tactics instructor’s repeated single response: “Lieutenant, it all depends on the situation.”
Webster’s painting of a bureaucracy is not a pleasing picture. It is, he says, an organization that is formal, rigid, and narrow—dependent upon precedent—and in general, lacking in initiative and resourcefulness. Unfortunately, bureaucracy 'is a commonly associated characteristic of our government: big, inefficient, detached, and authoritarian—oblivious to the needs and wants of people. And, of government agencies, the military is often a prime target of bureaucratic critics because it is almost a pure bureaucracy by definition.
Perhaps the German sociologist, Max Weber, has had the single greatest impact in molding society’s image of bureaucracy. His classic analysis of bureaucracy focused primarily on the authority relationship in formal organizations. In bureaucratic structures he prescribed four essential characteristics: a specialized division of labor; a hierarchy of authority; a system of rules and regulations; and an atmosphere of impersonality.
Weber contended that in order for an organization to function efficiently it must set norms and standards and rigidly enforce them through power and authority. In doing so, it was neither necessary nor essential for the individual to agree with the rules—so long as he complied with them. Important too for Weber was the fact that bureaucracy was characterized by impersonal relationships formed among officers and between officers and subordinates. For only with the impersonal would rationality always prevail.
Perhaps in no U.S. military service is the traditional concept of authority and authoritarian domination more widely employed and accepted than it is in the Marine Corps. It has been the military bastion of rigid discipline with tremendous reliance on adherence to rules, regularity, and subordination. Even in today’s atmosphere of dynamic social change the Marine Corps’ view remains steadfast. At a time when the other services offer “modern” recruiting ads—"Find Yourself in the U.S. Air Force;” “Sailors Have More Fun;” and “Today’s Army Wants to Join You”—the Marine Corps has responded with,
“We Don’t Promise You a Rose Garden.”
Undoubtedly, the basis f°r c. Marine approach is past success combat. And Marines pride them selves on their highly distinguis e combat record. Therefore, the foll°'v ing quote from The Marine Guide (Naval Institute Press, 19^ ^ partially representing the Mar ^ concept of discipline, offers no suf prises. .
“Effective performance by men 1 combat is the direct result and pr mary object of military discipl*0^ Discipline may be defined
prompt and willing responsive
to orders and unhesitating c0^
pliance with regulations. Since
ultimate objective of disciphne^
efficient performance in battle,
cipline may in a very real se
spell the difference between hfe a^e
death (or, more important to
Marine, between victory and
feat). . .ine
“To many persons, discip
simply means punishment, that
something to be afraid of. 1° ^
discipline is a matter of Pe°P
working well together and get ^
along well together—and, even
there be a lack of harmony an]0f,
them, discipline is a means o
r -ani
in
menting them as a fighting °rS .
zation. In the Marine Corps.
as
any other military organization- is necessary for people to do ce ^ things in prescribed ways at £ times. If they do so, we say t^l£^jiey well disciplined; if not, we say are badly disciplined.” . j5
Emphasis on military discip|)n£^j ingrained in the Marine recruit the officer candidate from the oU^t, in basic training—a heavily com oriented training. It is based °n ^ theory that until men are sever j tried, there is no conclusive teSt^j their discipline. Thus, the officet^^ recruit are submitted to extreme its of mental and physical con ^^eir ing in an attempt to evaluate j abilities to withstand unU ^e exertion—conditions which Marine Corps believes best simu
the trials of combat.
How much longer the Corps, or other services, can coi
ine
nti°
despite the vastly improved sVst innovations of weapon
de authority and discipline is
aric)tt|t'0ns of “boot camp” authority •sciphne as leadership basics and
0 justify its reasoning based on the '8°rs to which men are submitted in *s being questioned by more more writers. Kurt Lang in his j?ntribution, “Technology and Career “na8ement in the Military Estab- fon rnent’ ' t0 ^eu’ Military (Nor- Q^n’ 1969) argues against the validity ta position when he notes that j^C n°l°gical advances have resulted S1gnificant changes in the military ^Ccupational structure. He claims the a r|CtUre ^as become s0 specialized sk'll S^'^"or‘ented that many military the S ten<^ t0 over*aP required in ^ ClVlban population. As a result, is fUt^or*tar‘an military organization c P aced in the position of having to ^ Pete with the more permissive highly paid) civilian sector for selection and retention of its manpower.
Th
^ e noted sociologist and military
er> Morris Janowitz, takes the
0a steP further in his book, Sociol-
^\.and the Military Establishment (Rus-
^age Foundation, 1965). He
Warfr'2eS r^at ahs°iute conventional
Th 116 IS n° h)nger a valid doctrine.
0tremendous technological devel-
teCnts 'n weapon and computer sys-
hayS ^ave made the military seem “to
almost been converted into a
thfnt eng*neering establishment.” The
c nuclear war, he contends, has
, Sed political and social—rather cnan m r
'Oate ary—considerations to dom-
st national security and planning e8y. He foresees an evolving for- the \y 3 nat*°nal standby defense with Pot arme<^ forces as no more than ^ntial United Nations units. Adless of such speculation, the Co °e ^orPs mission, as provided by f]g^.ress> establishes it as a small 8ro ln^ harce designed to spearhead ** combat assignments (with air ^nd rt ^°r sh°rt durations of time.
Systhenol°8ical .
rifles for Marine infantrymen see *mproved only so much. Con- leav. ntly. for new officers and recruits Pa 'n^ cheir basic training, the im- d C 0f
P*y mgrained. And, perhaps all too refle •they tahe their deeply-molded
enter new, different, and dynamic kinds of situations.
Like the other services, the Marine Corps teaches its officers and enlisted men the trait approach to leadership. A philosophy originating with the idea that aristocracy and nobility possessed innate qualities of leadership, the “great man” theory has had a dramatic impact on Marine leadership training. With the downfall of aristocratic feudalism and the advent of democracy, it became evident that leaders often emerged from the masses and leadership skills could indeed be developed by training and experience.
As a result, social scientists have attempted to isolate the personality traits associated with the great leaders of the past. The lists of identifiable personality traits are widely recognized: knowledge, decisiveness, initiative, tact, manner, bearing, courage, endurance, dependability, enthusiasm, and justice—to name a few. Junior officers and non-commissioned officers are required to fully comprehend and understand each of them, and they even are quizzed on the subject in schools and before promotion boards. In addition, each is rated on how well he exhibits many of those characteristics on his semi-annual fitness report.
In Military Management for National Defense (Prentice-Hall, 1950), John R. Beishline states that all the services place a great deal of reliance on the importance of these traits through continued emphasis on leadership by example.” One problem with this approach, he contends, is that listing desirable leadership traits sheds little light on the traits of followership. Nor does such an approach offer any suggestion how leaders and followers can be molded into an effective team.
Ralph Stodgill, well-known for his research efforts on leadership, was led to conclude as early as 1950 in a Psychological Bulletin article, ‘ Leadership, Membership and the Organization, that efforts to identify the personality traits invariably associated with leadership behavior had been relatively unproductive. The message therein, he says, is that personality traits should be regarded as only one component of the complex interactional relationship between leaders and followers in a particular social group or social system operating in a variety of social systems.
While the Marine Corps has not deemphasized the importance of the trait approach to leadership, it has undertaken a new approach, called human relations, in recent years. Instituted in 1971—and admittedly arising from the several racial crises which faced the military in the late 1960s and early 1970s—the human relations approach focuses on revitalizing and identifying values to facilitate behavioral changes in intra- and inter-group relationships.
A group approach to leadership is not without some empirical basis to support its use. Leadership studies of World War II action revealed that loyalty to others in the military group was often the most compelling factor which kept men functioning in the harsh conditions of battlefield stress. The studies show that many soldiers fought well and bravely, not so much because of inspirational leadership, but because of their desire “not to let their buddies down.” (Military Sociology: A Study of American Military Institutions and Military Life, The Social Science Press, 1965.)
The Marine Corps’ attempt to instill a feeling of belongingness to, and understanding of, the social group is basically an effort to concentrate on the social interactions between leaders and followers, and among followers themselves, rather than on the personal characteristics of leaders.
The human relations approach was not an internal innovation of the Marine Corps. Instead, it was initiated by crisis, and the present mandatory human relations seminars are the directed implementation of policy established by the Department of Defense. The turmoil facing all the armed services during the end of the Vietnam era is well documented. Much of the trouble has been attributed to the “unpopular” and “immoral” war. Whatever the cause, the cure was evasive.
Fortunately for the Marine Corps, it did not experience a high degree of discipline difficulties within the combat zone. Perhaps the reason was be-
DIRECTIVE PARTICIPATIVE FREE-REIN
Highly Routine Tasks Low Technical Level Untrained People Low Skill Level Little Time for Decisions
----------------- X
— X
While
fully :d -d
the unit may be—and hope- is—well-trained in marksmanship an
independent variables describe such a situation would, accot Carlisle’s theory, call for a
However, given a typical peace'
tirne
.any-
cause its combat mission in Vietnam for the most part terminated in 1969- The relatively few Marines remaining in Vietnam beyond that period were mostly volunteer advisors or security personnel in Saigon. During most of the time Marine combat units were in Vietnam the action was hot and heavy, and they occupied positions throughout the northernmost sector of South Vietnam where the majority of “conventional” warfare took place— artillery and infantry battles with North Vietnamese regular forces, and even World War 11-style combat in cities (i.e., the Battle of Hue). Unfortunately, the Marine casualty rates— the highest killed-in-action and wounded-in-action ratio ofU.S. forces serving in the conflict—attest the furor of combat which faced them. Marines in Vietnam simply did not have time to become complacent or bored by inactivity—a condition some say led to the “in country” turmoil during the war’s later stages.
While the Marine Corps’ disciplinary record was comparatively good in Vietnam, the same cannot be said for its immediate post-combat record. Racial strife ripped through camps in North Carolina, California, Hawaii, and Okinawa. The drug problem soared nearly out of sight. Desertion and AWOL rates skyrocketed. Marine brigs were filled to such a capacity that the question of treatment of the prisoners caused serious public relations problems at Camp Pendleton in 1969. While the problems are no longer of the magnitude of the Vietnam era, they have not disappeared, as evidenced by the recent racial friction between black and white Marines at Camp Pendleton.
The Marine junior officers and non-commissioned officers at the company level continue to face real
problems each day.
Historically, the vast majority of serious leadership problems in the Marine Corps arise outside of combat. The Marine Corps—like all military services—must operate in two generally polar kinds of situations: wartime and peacetime.
The Marine Corps’ emphasis on an aggressive, authoritarian leadership, based on rigid discipline and unquestioning obedience, has no doubt proved successful in every armed conflict its been in for 200 years. Perhaps, however, it is becoming increasingly evident that such an approach does not best suit the other situation—peacetime.
In his book, Situational Management A Contingency Approach to Leadership (AMACOM, 1973), Howard Carlisle analyzes the situational approach to leadership in terms of a leadership continuum, which he sees as a dependent variable consisting of directive (authoritarian), participative (democratic), and free-rein (laissez faire) leadership styles. Acting as independent variables are what he classifies as five sets of the most significant polar situations:
V highly routine tasks or highly variable tasks
V low technical level operations or high technical level operations
y technically untrained people or highly technically trained people ^ low technical skill level or high technical skill level ^ little time for decisions or ample time for decisions
The following representation presents his situational analysis graphically. Beneath the leadership, continuum are horizontal continuums representing the five sets of independent variables. The five dimensions of situations can obviously call for a
Highly Variable Tasks High Technical Level Highly Trained People High Skill Level Ample Time for Decisions
broad range of leadership styles. In re ality, however, Carlisle contends that the various dimensions can be e3C pected to fall within a relatively nar row vertical band beneath the leader ship continuum: their sum genera y indicating a preferred leadership sty based on the predominant variabe within that particular situation.
Depending upon the combinations of independent variables, says Carus ’ the choice of a leadership style ^ comes evident. A brief analysis of t e model in a military atmosphere Pre sents some interesting observations-
Take, for example, a convention* defensive combat situation f°r Marine rifle company. Based on aj- cepted tactics, the task is hig routine (for a combat situation). Ther is a low level of technical operation involved in the task—i.e., digg‘n^ in, preparing weapon positions, laf'0^ wire for communications, etc.
tactics, it certainly is not well-tra‘ne in the “technical” sense that Car i addresses (i.e., an aviation rnaint® nance unit). The same rati°na applies to the skill level. It may t>e highly-skilled fighting force, but ^ rifle company possesses a low leve technical skill. Obviously, as in 1110£ dynamic combat situations, little n is normally available to make cr^tlCgf decisions. Thus, the combination
to • they directive leadership style since
amass at the “directive” end of c
continuum.
setting with the same rifle compa ■ • • , TvP1'
the situation appears to change- '
cally, when Marine rifle compameS not engaged in combat, they are tra^ ing for combat. The training inv0 different approaches at differentt!rn. f and any competent small unit le tries to make the training setting fluid, interesting, and challenging possible. This is not only intende ^ increase proficiency in various s’ tions, but also to counteract corn^.eS cency and boredom. Thus, he ma . every effort within reason to a highly routine tasks through dyna
tec^ lnn°vative training. The low able -lC'^ ^CVe^ °Perat'ons *s a vari- not
c°Utse
time available for making is quite ample for the
dei
c*sion-
Part.
and
which the small unit leader can trajriCOntrol- As time progresses in a ;nm« situation, the level of train- the '?Creases- Such is also true with S level. During training, of the 't'ost aloneUS' ^Ue t0 s*tuat*°nal differences sljp ’ several important variables have tbee iutther along the continuum: prenature °f the task, within certain gen^r'ked goals, is left to the in- tirrie r^e un't lea<Jer; available cceaor decision-making has in- situ6. dramatically over the combat timetl0n’ anc^ over a Per‘°d °f training W0uldthe skill level and training level a8ain a^S° kave increased (though Car,. ’not in the strict technical sense ckao > 1 described). But with the situ ■S C^at have transpired in the leacj tl0n described, the small unit Can slide further along the lead- giVeP COnfinuum and, by doing so, ticiu S men a greater degree of par- sions *°n ’n shaping some of the deci- Q^Which will impact upon them. tary ^ Vl°usly, ;n no smau unjt mili- kwtj1 tLlat'°n can the pendulum be al- the t0 swing to the free-rein end of can a military tpajoj. CVer Put UP f°r vote” the many thef decisions which do not lend ruaj_. e*ves to group decision- dijtvni’ i-e., “Do we stand guard that ^°n'8ht?” or “Should we take pertr.- * ^ But when the situation of jtS’ based on the leader’s analysis ersh'' 3 ^ore open, participatory lead- Ur)ir'ofStyle may help to mold that sivelndividuals into a more cohe- ^,and synergistic group.
^ide f such an approach—
tive , 0rn providing a means of effec- iociivi?dership—is to instill in the k'Ogjjj Ua* members a feeling of be- & and importance to the group.
By active participation in helping to set the direction for the group, each individual will share the feeling that he is an integral, useful, and vital member of a team. To use Maslow’s terms, such an approach will hopefully lead men closer to fulfillment of the necessary esteem and selfactualization needs.
The model, as analyzed by Carlisle, appears to have a great deal of potential for Marine company level leaders. It applies not only in an infantry setting, where assuredly, even in peacetime, the need for a basically authoritarian approach is evident based on his analysis, but perhaps is even more useful to junior leaders in the more technical areas such as aviation, supply, motor transport, communications, and similar technical occupational specialities where the requirement for, or the usefulness of, a directive leadership style poses some serious questions.
Many behaviorists would question an individual leader’s flexibility to slide back and forth along such a continuum since they distinguish between leadership style and leadership behavior. Their contention is that leadership style represents the individual’s consistent leadership pattern over a long period of time. Leadership behavior, on the other hand, comprises the day-to-day specific acts of the individual and may deviate from the long-term pattern. According to the behaviorists, leadership style is analogous to personality in that it can be classified a certain way and most behavior will be consistent with that description. Thus, individuals tend to reflect a constant pattern in leading others and cannot fluctuate, day-today, from one leadership style to another.
While the contingency approach to leadership demands flexibility from leaders, it also represents a challenge to the young leader of Marines. To quote further from The Marine Officer’s Guide concerning discipline:
"The best discipline is selfdiscipline. Self-discipline amounts to the Marine having control of himself and of doing what is right because he wants to. To be really well disciplined, a unit must be made up of men who are self- disciplined. In the ultimate test of combat, the leader must be able to depend on his men to do their duty correctly and voluntarily whether anyone is checking on them or not. If time and the situation permit, you should make known to your men the reasons for a given order, since this knowledge will increase the desire of your people to do the job, and will enable them to do it intelligently. You must know what you want of your men, let them know, and then demand it of them. Their discipline in response to your leadership must be based on knowledge, reason, sense of duty, and loyalty.”
In the junior leader’s effort to develop a well-disciplined unit, he must, as the above statement reflects, mold self-disciplined men. The traditional Marine Corps approach, heavily directive, based on rational authority, and steeped in custom and tradition, has proven successful in every combat endeavor for 200 years. If required to be tested in future combat, hopefully it will prove true again. But with the dynamic and different conditions which face today’s leaders—during war and peace—perhaps a leadership style which is based on careful analysis of specific situations will prove similarly effective. A style, which, whenever possible, gets men involved in the process of participating as units and as individuals, will hopefully result in the self-disciplined Marine that each leader seeks.