Bound up in a defense-of-homeland strategy, Canadian Maritime forces appear equally ill-suited to meet seaborne threats or to demonstrate naval presence in “show-the-flag” appearances.
In a recent Soviet maritime exercise, there were almost ten times as many Soviet surface ships involved as there are in all of Canada’s maritime force. There were more than twice as many Russian submarines involved as Canada has naval surface ships. The number of Soviet maritime aircraft sorties was in four figures. The successful centralized command and control of the world-wide operation was an indication of the level of proficiency that has been reached by the Soviet Navy.
Today an examination of the make-up and armament of the new Soviet navy with its low-flying “cruise” missiles; its missile-packed destroyers and cruisers armed to operate outside the range of their own air cover; the helicopter carriers, amphibious vessels, and fast support and repair ships, clearly indicates that the Soviet naval mentality has “gone global.”
Much has been said in the past of the need for allied navies to “show the flag” in the ports of the world and “maintain sea lines of communication.” Nothing has changed except that Russia has also learned of the potential value of these activities. Despite the fantastic advances of space travel and computers, bulk and essential cargoes must still be transported by sea. Merchant ships have become bigger and bigger and hence more restricted in their choice of off-loading ports. Their traffic pattern becomes more regular and also more rigid. The presence of Soviet naval vessels along their sea routes is an indication of Soviet awareness of this fact. The current ability of ships of the Soviet fleet to deploy and remain on station in all oceans of the world gives them an enviable flexibility.
With what object? Why are these Soviet ships in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, the South Atlantic, the Caribbean, and the Pacific? What do they achieve?
They achieve a number of things all of which strengthen the position of the Soviet Union and at the same time constitute collectively a growing problem for the Western Allies. For example:
► Soviet naval units give the Soviet politician the ability to demonstrate physically a Soviet presence in an area in which he currently considers such a presence to be useful to his strategy;
► These forays provide a tremendous amount of naval training in all areas of the world and at the same time provide the Soviet supply and communication support services with valuable experience in maintaining this effort.
► Soviet units are able to maintain very alert electronic listening posts which gather information on the activities of allied military and space activities both in exercises and trials of new techniques and equipment;
► By the close shadowing of allied naval formations, they are able to observe our tactics and hamper our exercises and thus impose a restriction on the activities of our ships and aircraft in exercising realistic situations;
► By the constant deployment and redeployment of their forces between overseas and home bases they are able to build up a movement and communication pattern that could lull the allies into a false sense of security and cover any real strategic deployment made as a pre-positioning of their forces for hostile purposes.
► Finally, by their very presence in the many different parts of the world, they create a wide-spread dilution in allied maritime formations owing to the geographical dissipation of these forces in response to the Soviet presence.
With these thoughts in mind and knowing what the construction, maintenance, and operation of such a huge and sophisticated fleet entails financially, it becomes clear that this fleet has become the main tool in the hands of the Soviet strategist, a tool for which they are prepared to pay enormous sums of money.
When viewed from the sidelines, one sees the two superpowers with nuclear deterrents poised, each equally reluctant to make any major move which would call for the release of these missiles and consequently the destruction of his own country. Under the umbrella of this nuclear peace, the forces of change and revolution still thrive and the self-proclaimed need of Communism and Soviet policy to expand and control the rest of the world continues. It is no secret and has been declaimed continuously from Marx through Brezhnev that, to the Communist, “the end justifies the means.” The Soviet Union, having reached a military stalemate on land in Europe, thanks to the existence of the NATO defensive alliance, continues its offensive in Europe by subversion. In other parts of the world, however, the way lies open for more overt maneuvers.
The present huge force of “advisors” in the Arab countries, the rapid rebuilding of the Egyptian Army and Air Force capability by Russia after the Six-Day War, the rapid buildup of the Soviet Mediterranean fleet, and the supplies of Soviet material in support of air and naval bases on the southern littoral of the Mediterranean are all logical and classical extensions of her use of naval and air power to expand her spheres of interest. Available evidence indicates that the Indian Ocean is the next target, and soon thereafter it will be the Caribbean in turn. The recently reported American attempts to have the Indian Ocean declared a “neutral ocean” indicate U. S. apprehension at the Soviet naval presence in that ocean.
Despite the Soviet “Understanding” with the United States, resulting from the Cuban Crisis of 1962, there now exists a Soviet missile threat in the Caribbean in the form of Soviet nuclear submarines capable of being supported from bases in Cuba. And the threat is far worse than that which confronted President Kennedy since those Cuban missile sites were visible; today, submarines can be maintained continuously and invisibly on station off North America without the need for the long transit from the homeland.
Such a wide-ranging presence throughout the world permits the Soviets to exert pressure on smaller nations and to influence those that are wavering. At any time, should they decide to support a revolutionary movement in any part of the world, they have the naval and government-controlled merchant shipping available to provide concrete support in the form of personnel, weapons, and supplies—and the ability to apply naval power with little fear of opposition.
It is the Soviet capability rather than its assumed intent which should be giving the West cause for concern. At the present rate of increase in quantity and quality of the Soviet fleet vis-à-vis the rapidly shrinking NATO naval capability, we shall, within a couple of years, be helpless if at any time the Soviet should decide to use the Berlin Autobahn technique on the world’s ocean routes. We did not fight a war over the Berlin Blockade, but we were forced to bring to bear a tremendous air transport effort to beat it. But how would NATO react, for example, if the Soviet Union decided to employ similar tactics elsewhere in the world? What if Russia found it desirable to enforce sanctions against a country in order to topple an anti-Communist regime, or decided to prohibit the passage of ships of any particular nation through a vital strait? What would NATO do if the Soviet Union applied the Kennedy technique of the Cuban crisis and imposed a blockade in a vital ocean area? The Soviet Union suffered a strategic and moral defeat in Cuba because of the presence of the U. S. fleet. The United States demonstrated the value of the timely application of seapower and it was a lesson the Russians were quick to learn.
People dismiss such possibilities as being unrealistic but such eventualities grow more plausible and more possible as the days go by. The Russian technique of probing for weak spots in Western determination and either withdrawing or advancing depending upon the Western reaction has been clearly demonstrated in Cuba and the Middle East. In 1962, it met firm resistance and withdrew but, in 1972, it has now been permitted to deploy its own operational aircraft to Egypt in opposition to the Israeli air force.
The fear of nuclear war continues to overshadow the thinking of governments to such an extent that war has become “unthinkable” and therefore “unlikely” in the minds of the politician and the general public. What is not generally appreciated is the fact that, the more unlikely nuclear war becomes, the more probable some other kind of action becomes.
There is no retaliation or defense against maritime “interference” except by the existence of naval force to counter naval force—and it is herein that NATO’s weakness lies. The belief in the minds of the public in many NATO countries that war is no longer possible, with the consequent rationalization that, this being the case, national defense budgets are too high, has led to a general and natural disinclination to increase or even maintain NATO defense spending. Furthermore, while European nations accept the need for air and land forces in defense of Europe, because of their historical experiences and their proximity to the threat, they are less prone to believe in the need for maritime forces.
It has been stated that the first priority for the Canadian Forces is defense of the homeland. But this, of course, is the first priority for any country, since all external, financial, and military policy is governed by the desire of a country to remain in existence. Consequently, nations project their diplomatic defenses as far as possible in an attempt to ensure that events taking place in other parts of the world do not have adverse effects upon the economic status of the homeland. Support of this foreign policy governs the composition, deployment, and employment of a nation’s forces.
What does the recent upsurge in the capability and deployment of the Soviet naval, merchant, and fishing fleets mean in real terms to Canada? It means, to start with, that we must continue to expect off our coasts, all the year round, a large, well organized, and disciplined fishing fleet. This fleet is not composed of a collection of individualistic and hardy “salt”-skippered small trawlers. It is, rather, a well-equipped collection of large ships with smaller “work boat” support which moves around, in a well-explored and well-researched fishing pattern, those areas of the Atlantic which Canadians have hitherto regarded as their own. This Soviet fishing fleet is supported by factory ships, which can process the catch from the net to the can, and logistic support ships which freely enter Canadian harbors to purchase supplies and fresh water. Furthermore, Canadian shipyards have been only too happy to accept ships of the Soviet fishing fleet on their slips for repair—even occasionally to the extent of delaying work on Canadian naval ships.
Within this fishing fleet, of course, are the “spy” ships whose sole role is to gather electronic intelligence. Whilst the presence of these ships can be established visually, it is almost impossible to keep track of them by radar or at night by air surveillance when they shelter in the midst of a large group of trawlers. In addition to these Elint ships, there are the oceanographic survey ships, ostensibly charting fishing grounds and studying the environmental conditions for pure research. These ships are welcomed into our ports in the name of the brotherhood of science, but it is not beyond the realm of possibility that their primary role is to study the potential fighting ground for their submarines. The oceanographic survey effort of the NATO navies is infinitesimal compared to the research carried out by the magnificently equipped and widely-deployed Soviet survey ships.
Still another threat to Canadian security from the Soviet fishing fleet lies in their “accidental” cutting of undersea cables whilst trawling. The danger to transoceanic communications and long-range early warning systems is ever-present, since these ships are free to move up and down our coasts in pursuit of their legitimate business. In a time of crisis, they could be well placed to cut vital communications.
Still another problem posed by these fishermen is their ability to shelter and camouflage the movement of their submarines. In an area sweep, a maritime aircraft’s antisubmarine surveillance capability is drastically reduced when, at any one time, there are up to 100 trawler contacts present in the immediate search area.
By the very diversity of their movements, these trawlers can screen the deployment of their submarines into, for example, the Davis Strait and even into Hudson Bay. It does not take much geographical knowledge to appreciate that, from that area, the submarine-launched ballistic missile can reach the heart of Canada and the industrial centers of the United States.
There is, however, a less obvious effect which the Soviet Fleet expansion has upon Canada and that is the growing need to increase Canada’s share in the defense of North America—particularly at sea. Since we are a small nation in terms of population and defense expenditure and since we are able, by reason of our geographical location, to enjoy the benefits of a North American way of life and at the same time not be faced with the ever-present threat of the invader’s foot upon our territory, we are inevitably bound up in a Canada-U. S. “defense of homeland” strategy.
Our military relations with the United States are excellent. In fact, it is a constant source of amazement to Canadian officers who deal with the United States in joint planning, how much the Canadian point of view is respected despite the gross disparity both in the number of forces involved and the relative percentage of national budgets allocated to defense.
The Americans, despite the continuing Mansfield lobby in the Senate for a reduction in European commitments, seem generally to be appreciating the growing threat and are increasing their naval response to the Soviet expansion in the Mediterranean. This increase in the Sixth Fleet can only be made at the expense of forces elsewhere, and it is not difficult to imagine the depletion caused to the U. S. Atlantic Fleet by this new commitment. This depletion will dilute even further the ability of the U. S. Navy to protect our Canadian coast. Bearing in mind the very high level of activity called for by Canadian Maritime forces in the Atlantic to fill the gaps caused by the U. S. Fleet redeployment during the Cuban crisis, it is obvious that our friends to the south will have an increasing need for reinforcement by Canadian Maritime Forces in the Western Atlantic simply to meet normal peacetime surveillance requirements. In the event of a crisis, the Atlantic coast of North America will be pitifully exposed unless drastic action is taken now.
We cannot continue indefinitely to avoid this issue, and it is to be hoped that the current review of Canadian defense policy is taking these facts into consideration.
Membership in NATO is not just “insurance” which can be paid, like foreign aid, to keep our conscience clear and then forgotten, it requires positive and continuing action which involves flesh and blood Canadians in the forces—men who are prepared to dedicate their lives to Canada in defense of the peace we enjoy. But these Canadians can do nothing to help turn away the threat and reduce the temptations open to the Soviets unless they are given the necessary support by the Canadian public.
Canada must face reality and rebuild its capability within the military alliance of NATO. We have a dedicated nucleus of well-trained professionals in the forces now who would eagerly welcome such a challenge, a nucleus which, today, performs its tasks with an uncomfortable suspicion, bordering on belief, that their fellow countrymen do not acknowledge—or care about—the need for the very forces in which they serve.
What form should a rebuilding of our forces take? This, of course, is the subject of detailed and classified study which has frequently been made by the military staff at Canadian Fleet Headquarters. Such studies unfortunately are inevitably emasculated by financial constraints which cause real operational requirements to be subordinated to political expediency. Bearing in mind, however, that defense expenditure must bar a realistic relation to the needs of the nation, priorities must relate to Canada’s economic capability and not to a general military mail-order catalog. (It should be noted here that since we are at the moment considering the effect of the Soviet fleet expansion on our maritime forces, this article makes no attempt to examine the role of the air and land elements in the overall defense structure but deals solely with the maritime problem.)
It is evident that, in this expanding game of worldwide chess, the Western world must be prepared to counter strategic move with strategic move. If one works back from disaster—i.e., the nuclear exchange—through to the ideal of a worldwide peace, it becomes obvious that our maritime forces must be capable of responding to any one of a wide spectrum of situations. At the lowest level, the demonstration of our interests is our own waters, be they Arctic, Pacific, or Atlantic, calls for a vehicle that can quickly be deployed to the problem area and also remain in that area for a reasonable length of time. The reaction to a “cable cutting” or a “fisherman-bullying” incident calls for the quick arrival in the area of an appropriately equipped naval vessel in order to thwart any Soviet tendency to employ “strong arm” measures. This appears to make a good case for a squadron of about eight hydrofoils whose primary role would be ASW, but which would be equipped with sufficient surface-to-surface armament to demonstrate our determination and ability to protect our interests. For their main role, these hydrofoils should be capable of operating, suitably supported, 200 or 300 miles out into the ocean in order to be able to locate and pursue or track any submarines which enter the area. For the effective deployment of these hydrofoils there is a need for an over-and-under-ocean surveillance system capable of alerting us to the existence of such submarines in our area.
To operate beyond the extremity of the hydrofoil range, we need helicopters equally capable of locating 'tacking and, if necessary, killing any intruding submarines. To transport and support these helicopters, there is a need for an increase in the number and capability of surface ships, such as the new DDHs, to replace the ageing St. Laurent and Restigouche classes. In addition, there is a need for two or three small, high-speed transporters capable of carrying and maintaining about 12 helicopters. It should also be remembered that, because the tremendous increase in numbers of the ocean-going Soviet surface fleet has created an increased surface-to-surface threat in addition to the submarine threat, any police action could involve our forces, in concert with other allied ships, in a maritime confrontation with missile-equipped Soviet destroyers and cruisers. Our ships must not be expected to confront such vessels without a surface-to-surface capability at least equal to that of the Soviet ships, nor should they be expected to operate without an anti-missile capability.
As part of our surveillance force there is a need for a replacement for the Argus in the form of a modern, high-speed, long-range maritime aircraft fitted with sophisticated equipment which will permit it to search for and locate submerged submarines either with or without the assistance of our surface ships or submarines. It should have integrated data systems permitting it to exchange intelligence instantaneously cither with other units or maritime headquarters. To permit it to assist in the lower levels of escalation during a maritime confrontation with Soviet surface units, consideration should be given to providing this aircraft with a stand-off, air-to-surface missile capability.
To improve our underwater surveillance capability we need at least three more submarines to ensure a reasonable availability for deployment.
There is yet another threat to Canada, which has been studiously ignored for some years in the hope that it will go away, and that is the Soviet mining threat. The Soviets have a tremendous mining capability and most Soviet maritime units are known to be equipped for minelaying. Of these, the greatest threat to Canadian waters is the nuclear attack submarine, capable of very high-speed deployment during a crisis, which would be able to approach our harbors without fear of attack in the pre-shooting phase, and await the signal to lay ground and moored mines in our channels and thus paralyze our shipping movements for days or weeks. To meet this threat it is essential that we revive our nonexistent mine countermeasure capability. The reactivation of a minesweeping squadron to meet this threat, would also serve as an excellent training ground for young officers. Furthermore, the ships, between minesweeping exercises, could be used to assist in the surveillance of the Soviet fishing fleet.
In support of this program, we should increase our input into multinational research and development in order to benefit from the shared scientific and technological know-how and to reduce our R&D cost for the development of the most effective systems for our maritime forces.
Such a recovery program, even if started today, could not begin to make its effect felt until the early 1980s. It is, however, a program which reflects the recommendations made by the civilian and military staffs of all member nations last December in their report to the NATO Ministers on Allied Defense problems of the 1970s, as announced in the press release after that Ministerial meeting. Canada took part in the studies leading to this report and supported the unanimous NATO Ministerial statement acknowledging the threat to NATO security caused by our deficiencies.
The solution would be expensive, but that is the price of membership in an alliance such as NATO and, in today’s never-ending power struggle, membership in an alliance is the price nations must pay for mutual defense.
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Commander Kinsman is a graduate of the NATO Defence College and was a member of the Directing Staff of the Canadian Forces Staff College. His earlier career was spent, during World War II, in submarines with the Royal Navy, and subsequently in the Royal Canadian Navy as an ASW specialist. He has served in Canadian Forces Headquarters in the Directorate of Undersea Warfare, as Squadron Operations Officer in the Third Canadian Escort Squadron, Assistant Chief of Staff (Plans) to the Canadian Maritime Commander, Atlantic and as Commanding Officer of the HMC Ship Lauzon (FFE-322) and Gatineau (DDE-236).
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He Never Made Quartermaster
While serving on board the battleship Idaho in 1942, I was assigned to duty as helmsman. We were steaming along, when the captain stuck his head through one of the portholes from the open bridge and asked, “Helmsman, what are you steering?”
Proudly, I answered, “USS Idaho, Sir.”
—Contributed by Dave Graham
(The Naval Institute will pay $10.00 for each anecdote published in the Proceedings.)