There are many differences between the “Drill-Hall Navy” and the operating Fleet, but most of them come down to a single, four-letter word: ship. And, unless the Surface Naval Reserve is given ships to operate from its coastal and river towns, and on the Great Lakes, this atrophied arm will continue to wither.
A memorable article of the early 1960s applauded the ready-responsiveness of the Groups I and II destroyer and mine warfare units.[*] Still, these were and are elite Reserve units which account for only a small Percentage of the Naval Reserve Surface Program. In Commander Thompson’s words “The largest component of the selected reserve—65% of the personnel—is the Active Fleet Augmentation Component, which provides trained personnel for immediate, active duty to raise the manning level.”
The bulk of this relatively silent majority that is spread throughout 400-plus Reserve training centers has long been neglected by the Navy. It has been the private domain of the Naval Reserve “empire,” with little relevance to unit readiness. Because it was mainly a paper and propaganda set-up, it offered the post-active duty enlisted man little or no motivation and became a sieve through which CADRE (completed active duty requirements, enlisted) passed, lost to the naval service forever. It has not been a Reserve nor has it been ready, and to this day its segments known as Naval Reserve Surface divisions, have never been and are not now rational units ready to answer special sea and anchor detail, let alone G.Q.
In view of defense economies since 1969, with attendant loss to the Navy of men and hardware, in view of the current emphasis on volunteer forces, and in view of the avowed reliance on Reserve forces for the future, it is high time to review the mismanagement of our Naval Reserve.
Today, we read and hear speeches about placing increased reliance on the Naval Reserve—the “integral part of the Navy.” The Secretary of Defense has proposed a carrier or two for the inactive reservists. There are promises of coastal and riverine units located on the Great Lakes and in river towns. The Commander of Naval Reserve Training (ComNavResTra) seems to be giving substance to these hopes and promises. No doubt he shocked Reserve naval officers (inactive and TARS) with his order to the Naval District Commandants, in June 1971, to designate Fleet Expansion Units within each of the surface divisions. (Each FEU would be organized rate-wise to provide a fourth watch section on board a particular type ship.) At first glance, this order seems incapable of implementation, but this judgment may be too hasty. ComNavResTra has allowed sufficient lead time, and he has already revised his estimates based on lack of available ships. Whether this program is successful or not, it is a signal event in that it points the surface Naval Reserve toward sea-oriented functions.
ComNavResTra’s actions have encouraged inactive officers and enlisted men who have had their fill of the let’s pretend/show-and-tell/drill-hall Navy. He seeks, in fact, to make the Reserve an integral part of the Navy and realizes the past failures and follies of the drill-hall. He would, in fact, drop the word “training” from his title.
It would appear that he has a two-fold task, selling the surface Reserve to the regulars—as presently constituted, the product is not very salable—and overcoming the lethargy and the apparently inbred prejudice on the part of the Naval Reserve bureaucracy toward the manning of surface ships by inactive naval reservists.
The moves taken by ComNavResTra should be given impetus. The Navy should insist that “ship,” in the lexicon of senior TARS and inactive reserve officers, is a respectable four-letter word. The surgeons of surface Naval Reserve reorganization should wield a meat-axe and not a scalpel to cut out any and every program that is not geared to actual shipboard functions. The matter of ships for the Naval Reserve—and adequate filling of billets—should be given first priority. Inactive reservists should junk the jargon of the past and substitute a new motto: “Think ships.”
To ask for a workable system for the Surface Naval Reserve or to ask for functional units is to presuppose that the function of the Naval Reserve Surface Program is to provide integral back-up crews and units for the regular operating forces. Regular Navy officers, who have not been initiated to the mysteries of Naval Reserve programs, might contemplate mobilization day with visions of well-trained organized Reserve crews commissioning ships or providing nucleus crews. With terms such as “Ready Reserve” and “Selected Reserve” and other deceptive nomenclature thrown out by Naval Reserve administrators, it is understandable that many are visionaries. Young Reserve officers and men, recently arrived from active duty, share these visions, but they quickly become disillusioned and disaffiliate. A few stay on and accept the “shore-duty mentality.” When comparing their active service to what is offered in the drill-hall, however, they realize that the surface Naval Reserve is a fiction.
Regular officers should be aware, and inactive Reserve officers should admit, that the drill-hall surface Reserve program is sick. It is not realistically oriented toward functional seagoing activities. The only similarity between regulars and reserves is the uniform. The program has not and does not serve the Navy, nor is it capable of providing effective units in an emergency. Its history has shown that it provides very little non-pecuniary motivation other than glib pronouncements to encourage the enlisted men to ship over.
Before the Reserve community gets bent out of shape at this heresy, it is emphasized that this paper is critical only of the Surface Naval Reserve and none of these critical comments or subsequent ones apply to the Combat Unit Components: DD/DE Reserve Crews (Blue), Mine Craft Reserve Crews (Blue), Construction Battalions, Naval Air Reserve Force Squadrons, etc., nor to the Gold Crews or former seagoing Fleet Divisions of the Surface Programs. In short, the criticism is directed to the surface division program, the largest paid drilling Reserve manpower pool.
The purpose is to give an insight to the naval surface division from a grass roots level, pointing out its inadequacies over the past dozen years; the fiction that it was up to strength and ready, and to illustrate by examples how the Navy and the Naval Reserve have lost good people through the back door because it offered the citizen-sailor very little motivation or challenge in seagoing activities. This critique is an appeal to regular Navy officers and inactive reservists to argue for ships for the Naval Reserve or, in the alternative where units are completely land locked, to argue for appropriate air-lift capabilities as soon as possible—in short, to make the Reserve units into functional units such as the SelRes Crews so that they will attain some semblance of readiness for call-up. It is an appeal to the conscience of inactive reserve officers and TARS to admit that the Reserve exists for the needs of the Navy—whose business it is hoped is still at sea—that while they examine them consciences in light of all the enlisted men they have lost, they may pinpoint the reasons: lack of motivation or poor leadership? If the reason ascribed is that of poor leadership, then by our lack of re-enlistments we are the poorest military leaders in history. [(]Nor should they fall into the semantic trap—“leadership,” after “training,” is the most abused word in the Naval Reserve). If the conclusion is that there is “lack of motivation,” then it is submitted that it could be equated with lack of ships.
This discussion is also intended to be a challenge to the Navy, to choose between a Reserve or no Reserve; to demand that the surface division Reserve earn its keep and use shrinking Navy assets in more productive manner. The time for action is now. With influx of 2x6s, the implementation of the 4x10 program, and talk of volunteer forces, the Naval Reserve can be a real attribute to its big brother, but only if it is provided with ships and is re-oriented toward sea-training.
Excepting the aforementioned SelRes Crews, and functional type units, the Surface Programs have been dedicated to shielding its seagoing people from the water. “Sailors belong on ships” is a truism with the regulars, but senior reservists, including TARS, seem to hold a contrary view. The latter groups will argue that post-active duty people will retain and improve their skills through correspondence courses, military counseling and guidance, and “practical training” and “team training” in the rarified atmosphere of the Reserve Training Center.
The so-called training available is a far cry from the activity of shipboard life which keeps the ex-seagoing reservist motivated, interested and proficient. There is no comparison between simulating preparations getting the USS Drill-Hall underway and the reality of performing similar evolutions on board ship. Simulation after simulation does not give the reservist the feeling of accomplishment—of doing a job essential for the Navy or for himself—and one day, providing he does not have much time invested, he simulates attending drill. With this type of training, the mobilization potential of a Naval Reserve surface division is nil. A few surface divisions in and near seaport towns are fortunate enough to have reserve training ships available and occasionally will drill on board, but this is mainly the result of the initiative and enthusiasm of its own inactive Reserve officers rather than from conscious order, directive, or encouragement from above. There are no doubt COs of surface divisions who have unofficially arranged for airlift, with some reserve Air Force unit, to some ship for the weekend. But generally this does not merit praise from the district office since it upsets the quarterly training schedule and perhaps causes embarrassment in front of a sister service. To make these arrangements requires far more hours than the three required per week, or a weekend. While some inactive Reserve COs, XOs and training officers may be in the fortunate position of having an understanding employer, or are self-employed so that they devote non-drill hours to the Naval Reserve, for most, time is also precious in civilian life.
A criticism of the surface division program is not criticism of its many dedicated officers and men.
Regular officers, observing the skill and abilities of individual reservists during two weeks AcDuTra, have been known to persuade these people to abandon civilian life and to extend on board their ship. But reservists who are in demand have occupations that were parallel with their rate; e.g., SFC, civilian metal worker and air-conditioning man; GMCS, hydraulic technician; ENI, diesel engine mechanic. And their proficiency is not the result of their Reserve training. Originally, they were trained by the regular Navy and spent all their civilian years at that work. Some have remained invested in the Navy despite the frustrations of the Reserve program. An example of dedication and patriotism is the Reserve Chief World War II type, family man who, having sufficient seniority with his civilian employer, took a one-year leave of absence to go on active duty. He could not get a ship; was assigned to a Seabee Unit; spent nine months in the DMZ, after which he reaffiliated with his seagoing unit. When his seagoing reserve unit was disbanded, he quit, and now commutes 275 miles, one weekend a month, to get shipboard training. This is an example of leadership and dedication which is unrecognized by the Reserve administrators. Surface Division people are caught in frustrating situation of being sailors without ships. The majority would gladly abandon their drill-halls for ships, but over the years they have concluded that the Navy does not really care or expect much of them.
Despite statements regarding a “ready reserve” by Naval Reserve spokesman [sic], Naval Reserve type-training, under inadequate and artificial conditions, has become an end in itself and not a means to an end. Too long has the Naval Reserve looked inward with little concern for the operating forces. For example, COs of undermanned Reserve destroyers are all too familiar with the experience of receiving a draft of two-week reservists and, of a group of 60 men, finding that only 10 or 15 are rated, the others being SRs and FRs. Indeed, it became embarrassing and frustrating for embarked Reserve officers to attempt an explanation, and it was only in the past year that ComNavResTra took action to stop the practice.
The motivation offered the land-locked surface division reservist is his monthly pay check and the opportunity for retirement at 20. Granted, there is much lip service given to the Navy, to seapower and to training. Much propaganda is circulated about “being twice a citizen” and, lest the regulars forget, we and they are frequently reminded that the Naval Reserve won the last great war. Perhaps some puffing is needed to induce men to join, but it appears that many of the senior TARS actually believe it. Naval Reserve administrators do not seem to realize, or have lost sight of the fact, that originally, perhaps, a man put on Navy blue instead of khaki, because somehow he had an interest in the sea or ships. They fail to stimulate and cultivate this interest; they fail to pursue a course which would convince inactive Reserve officers and men that, in fact, the whole reason for the existence for the Reserve is to be prepared to serve the Navy.
In the early and mid-1960s, while our regular brothers proudly sailed the world’s oceans representing the world’s greatest power, little did they know that their back-up force, the Naval Reserve, was in a sad state of readiness. Certainly, the post-active duty drilling reserve numbered over 120,000, but this was only on paper. The surface Naval Reserve has always looked good on paper because, through various fictions, the Reserve administrators make it so.
As an example of this era, there was, in the Midwest—a Naval Reserve medium surface division. Most likely duplicates exist in many land-locked areas. This unit had an allowance of 120 men, and drilled three hours a night per week. The division was broken down into three or four departments organizationally: deck, operations, engineering, and, possibly, administrative-yeomen, PNs, hospitalmen, and supporting rates. But the structure of the departments was not established along any job lines. The rates for the departments were unbalanced, e.g., the deck department might have three BMs, six GMs, and two TMs. It would be mere coincidence if the surface division had the right bodies, in the right pay grade, to fill out a watch, quarter, and station bill. So, in an organizational sense, the surface division was incapable of providing an integral shipboard work group. But the big problem was attendance. Of the 120 allowed, the unit carried only 70 or 80 men on its muster and pay lists, yet on a drill night could physically muster only 30 to 35 enlisted men. A correct and accurate muster in the surface Reserve was a major operation. How were the 30 or 40 absentees accounted for? Very conveniently, they were called “ghosts,” and in some cases absentees were placed on a special muster card called the “ghost department” or “X” department. Obviously, the junior officers and men could not understand why non-drilling bodies should be carried for months or a year at a time. The only way “ghosts” could be transferred off the muster and pay list was by express directive of the Naval District Commandant. Senior POs, searching their job experiences, could not relate any civilian practice to this weird personnel accounting adapted by the Naval Reserve. Of course, the “ghosts” did not draw Reserve pay. To this writer’s knowledge, in fairness to the Reserve administrators, there was no official word on “ghost ships,” although these might have been closely guarded secret weapons.
Bearing in mind that drilling Reserves were volunteers, it was difficult to recruit the returning, trained, 2x6. Once he got off duty, he was a free civilian. Through cajolery, salesmanship, financial inducement, and misrepresentation as to his remaining obligation, some were fished in, but, because of disinterest, lack of motivation, artificial training and just plain disgust, eventually men stopped attending and became transformed into “ghosts.”
During these years, the surface division physically mustered 30 to 50% of its on-board strength, and the majority of these faithful drillers were World War II, Korean War, and eight-year obligors, whose obligation had been fulfilled. Few were the 2x6s who served their full terms. There was no force or legal threat invoked to require attendance, nor could we send out the shore patrol to pick them up when they stopped drilling. And, meanwhile, you regular officers were under the impression that the 2x6 you trained, and whom you sorely missed when he left your ship, was to be well used in the Reserve program. If you think there was, and is, personnel mismanagement in the Navy, look to the history of Naval Reserve mismanagement of the 1960s.
The Reserve administrators must have known that the “ghost” body count was unrealistic because they sought recruitment of Army reserve personnel whose units were being disestablished, and who had comparable Navy job descriptions and who were offered comparable pay classifications, provided that within a year of becoming naval reservists, could complete the applicable correspondence courses.
The past decade was also the great era of “Reserve Retention Teams,” another effort to keep the volunteer reservists from slipping out the back door. Such a team was comprised of an officer and two or three enlisted men whose efforts were supposed to result in shipping over those whose enlistment expired. A monthly report was required to be made to the District Commandants, and negative reports (no losses) were also required. Losses were described as “avoidable” or “unavoidable,” and qualification for the latter category was more difficult than passing a camel through the eye of a needle. In fairness, however, a report describing death of a reservist as the reason for not attending was accepted as an unavoidable loss. If there are a hundred reasons why a man leaves the regular Navy, there must be at least that many for leaving the drilling Reserve. Naval Districts made surveys as to motivations for men affiliating and drilling and came up with varied responses ranging from, “could use the extra money,” to “good group of guys,” and “interesting program,” in hope of keeping some semblance of a drilling Reserve. But they kept skirting the crucial issue of motivation—or lack of it—no ships.
So, while simulating the unsimulatable, the surface divisions struggled on without sufficient personnel and without purpose. Simultaneously, there existed in the Great Lakes region hybrid organizations known as Fleet divisions. They each numbered five officers and 50 men; there were eight divisions in all—four of them in the Lake Michigan area and four in the Lake Erie area. The former manned the PCEs, USS Ely (PCE-880), USS Havre (PCE-877) and USS Portage (PCE-902). The USS Amherst (PCER-853) and USS Whitehall (PCER-856) operated in Lake Erie. These Fleet division crews could be likened to the present-day SelRes crews and, together with a destroyer type, were affectionately known as the “Corn-Belt Fleet.” The PCEs were in commission and variously manned by two to four regular officers and ten to 15 enlisted regulars.
Toledo, Ohio, on the Maumee River, which empties into Lake Erie, was the home of USS Hollidaysburg (PCS-1385), the last of her type in our Navy. She effectively served over a 12-year period on alternating weekends, under the Fleet divisions of Toledo, Lorain, and Cleveland. She was an in-service, wooden-hulled weapons system measuring 136 feet x 25 feet, powered by two GMC 8-268s, with a main battery of two 20-mm. and hedgehogs. No regular underway crew was assigned, except for two enlisted representatives of the training center CO and when dockside, she had one caretaker on board. Routinely, she was signed for by the Fleet division CO on early Saturday morning and returned to the Training Center late Sunday afternoon. After all these years, and many, many drills, under 15 different Reserve COs, she was always returned to the Training Center in one piece.
Her crews operated her for over a decade, fired her guns and hedgehogs, conducted multiship exercises with PCEs and ASW exercises with Reserve S-2s, made goodwill visits to the Canadian shore, conducted dependents’ cruises, made two-week cruises, cooperated with the Coast Guard, pre-AcDuTra cruises, and Sea-Scout cruises, all without a collision, grounding, or major casualty to equipment or minor or major physical injury to embarked guests and personnel. Although she was old and slow, her crews were proud of her and treated her lovingly, and the Toledo crew, who thought they owned her, was especially jealous and ever-watchful of the other groups. Her local Reserve crew spent many non-drill hours maintaining her equipment; the esprit de corps of the Hollidaysburg crews was reflected in such important non-drill activities as a yearly picnic for dependents, a Christmas party, and the organization of a blood bank.
At the end of a weekend drill, the crews felt that they had done something “Navy,” and, although on Sunday at 1700, those from Cleveland and Lorain were tired and still faced a 100-mile return journey home, the officers knew that the men could be depended on to get underway the following month. These people received no mileage allowance for their 200-mile round-trip, and they knew that their survivors would not be entitled to death benefits if they were wiped out on the turnpike, yet they drilled. But what about the important Reserve paper work? That was also done, and more. Correspondence courses were done at home, quarterly training schedules and watch, quarter, and station bills were mostly done and kept up to date on non-drill time. Before leaving the ship, the officers and key men were required to write their logs, engineering logs, and other reports. It is estimated that the Fleet division sailor put in at least 17 productive hours on a weekend drill if he did not have duty on Saturday night, and this did not include travel time. If he had a watch, in addition to the duty, the figure would be 21 hours. Taking travel time into consideration he might well give the Naval Reserve 25 hours. Contrast this with the drill-hall sailor who received the same financial remuneration for only 14 or 15 hours. But what about advancement in rate? Very important to the Naval Reserve administration. Despite the unusual demands, the Fleet division sailors did better percentage-wise than their drill-hall colleagues. Still, the lesson of the Fleet divisions has been lost on the administrators, who must dismiss the seagoing types as migratory masochists, and who can’t understand why they can’t draw people who live within the shadows of the drill hall. The answer is simple; sailors are mainly motivated by ships.
During the bleak 1960s, the Fleet divisions seldom missed an underway commitment for lack of men; their attendance ran between 75% to 90% of allowance—that is allowance, not on-board strength. Yes, they also had an occasional ghost, but the rule was laid down—“No make-up drills; you’re no good to us if you’re not on board ship.” The Fleet divisions percentage-wise, attracted and kept more non-mandatory 2x6s than the other group, yet the recruiter on order of the training center COs would shunt new returnees to fill the sagging rolls of the surface divisions.
It is submitted that these seagoing Reserve crews were competent to man an MSC-type vessel or to form a nucleus for an MSO and, with a little shaping up, they would do the most demanding regular officer proud.
By Fleet standards, the exercises, maneuvers and operations of these crews were not very sophisticated, but the critics of afloat weekend training must agree that ships are gotten underway by people who have some rudimentary skills, and phoney body counts avail the commanding officer little if there are no men at the throttle, on the lines and at the helm.
The Fleet divisions in the Great Lakes area were disestablished in November-December 1970 because they lost their ships. On 26 May 1970 the Corn-Belt Fleet rendezvoused, manned by their loyal Reserve crews and left the Great Lakes forever, we were told. They were delivered to the East Coast shipbreakers and designated for gunnery practice. The reasons given for their demise include “budgetary cut-backs,” “pollution of the lakes,” “unrealistic training in obsolete ships,” and “reservists will receive adequate up-to-date training on annual two weeks’ duty.” The seagoing reservist can understand the first reason, might agree with the second, but would vigorously dispute the last two. Ironically, these reasons were advanced by a senior regular officer closely associated with the Reserve Forces Manpower Study. Is there an inactive Reserve officer, lieutenant or above, or TAR officer at a Naval District Headquarters who is unaware that some seagoing Reserve rates marked for two weeks AcDuTra are ordered to District Headquarters to perform maintenance on buildings and to panel office rooms? Of what rate training value is this for the individual or for the Navy? Perhaps it could be labeled “Reserve training.” One might conclude that, in the event of mobilization, these men might be of great help with the strip-ship bill.
So, approximately 575 seagoing Great Lakes citizen-sailors were left dry on the beach. As early as March, the word had filtered down to the troops that the ships must leave. During this limbo period, speculation ran high, scuttlebut [sic] had it that: “We’re getting riverine-type craft;” “There will be a consolidation of units and we’ll get a Claud Jones-type destroyer;” and “Well, those PBMs are nice even if they take out the turbines.” The ex-gators were even looking for an old LST. There was no official word or action in one naval district and the thought of no ships and the specter of the training center hung heavy on morale. Some men were trying to make arrangements with Seabee units, others considered chucking their six, seven, or 10 years. The retention team had a difficult time. In one naval district, very little was done to maintain and ensure afloat-type training for inland sailors.
In another district either on the initiative of the Commandant, or through grass root appeals by the seagoing types, action and recommendation as to disposition of the Fleet divisions personnel was prompt in the form of a letter to Chief of Naval Personnel, via Commander Naval Reserve Training. Omaha endorsed the proposal, but BuPers turned it down. The original recommendation:
“(a) Replacement of existing Great Lakes Naval Reserve Training ships with newer ships having the same or greater ASW capabilities.
“(b) Replacement of existing Great Lakes Naval Reserve training ships with newer ships having a different capability/mission such as mine warfare ships vice ASW.
“(c) Introduction of Mobile Riverine Force Craft into . . . ND [Naval District] rivers/lakes.
“(d) Utilization of East Coast Naval Reserve training ships by . . . ND Res crews (Gold). This will be an iterim [sic] measure until . . . ND replacement ships are in place . . . .”
This letter explained how the old Fleet divisions would be consolidated, based on metropolitan districts and mated with ships on the East Coast. As to airlift, he suggested naval air and, in the event of nonavailability of government aircraft, stated that the cost would be $175,000 per year for quarterly flights.
After almost two months of consideration, BuPers disapproved this pilot program request because of “inadequate Regular Navy and Naval Air Reserve airlift assets,” and “the current budgetary climate,” and requested the Commandant to make further recommendations concerning disposition of the Fleet divisions.
Undaunted by this rebuff, the Commandant, within 18 days wrote directly to BuPers citing the urgency of maintaining the organized structure of the old Fleet division (which had not as then been disestablished) and took issue with the Bureau over its misunderstanding and confusion of airlift surface divisions vice “functional units like Fleet Divisions, which would be the basis of the proposed (Gold Crews).” He assured the Bureau that the airlift would involve “no additional cost,” and stated further:
“. . . On the basis of planning which is being accomplished by . . . in consultation with Commander, Reserve Destroyer Squadron THIRTY, a potential for creating strong, motivated, destroyer-oriented functional units in the . . . Naval District is evident. The thrust of training is shore-based preparation for ship-based performance and evaluation of those Battle Efficiency Competition prerequisite and validation exercises prescribed for NRT destroyers which may be accomplished in a practical manner during the trial period. Certain flexibility in the timing and numbers of weekend underway periods has been considered in the planning process.”
The Bureau’s reply to this second request is unknown to the writer, but ComNavResTra fully concurred and urged favorable consideration.
Initially, there were three Midwestern “Gold Crews.” Two additional ones were to be formed. They have their airlift capability provided by the U. S. Air Force from a base in Florida. ComNavResTra took particular interest in this pilot program and it could be ventured that this was the beginning of the Fleet Expansion Unit concept. The eager seagoing reservists who cannot wait for implementation in their District are crossing Naval District lines so that they can be part of the program. This pilot program must be expanded to other Naval Districts. The surface divisions must be restructured along functional lines and airlifted, at least quarterly, to parent ships. Eventually, perhaps, there functional units should be taken from the jurisdiction of the Naval Reserve and should be assigned to the type commanders, who, ultimately, are the operational commanders who will be held accountable for their performance, and who should direct their training because they are in a better position to appreciate operational requirements than are the Naval Reserve administrators. More regular career officers recently off sea duty, who understand shipboard personnel shortages and problems, might be assigned to monitor the Reserve units to ensure that the type commanders have ready back-up forces; in turn, TARS should be sent to sea more frequently so that, as they become senior officers with authority they will be sea-oriented. With the influx of returning 2x6s, the time for action is now, before the lid blows and the Reserve becomes an embarrassing encumbrance to the Navy.
Since January 1971, drill attendance for returning 2x6s has been mandatory, not only for brand-new returnees but also for those who left active duty in the late 1960s and whose time, unfortunately had not expired. These people are really shocked. It is indeed strange that when the military services are thinking about volunteer forces, making accommodations to keep people, and studying ways to increase enlistments, Naval Reserve attendance becomes mandatory. Ninety per cent attendance is required—the threat to the 2x6s is 45 days active duty and for the non-mandatory volunteer, dismissal. Yet, with the exception of new terminology, the drill-hall business has not changed materially. The challenge of realistic functional seagoing training is not offered as motivation or to maintain interest. Talk about frustration factors—the present 2x6 is an unwilling inmate of the drill halls.
But the Reserve administrators and senior inactive Reserve officers rejoice at the influx, the surface divisions are coming up to allowance. In fact, some drill halls have more men than they can accommodate and these officers congratulate themselves on increased recruiting.
At last it would appear that the paper Naval Reserve is no more, that the “ghosts” have either vanished or taken on flesh in the form of mandatory 2 x6s. But take warning, regulars! Do not feel secure at these reincarnations nor should you believe that the Surface divisions are ready to take their place in the real world of sea duty. Consider the mobilization potential of these units functionally still to be zero, and know, too, that the individual young returnees are proficient only because they were trained on active duty.
Again, the Naval Reserve is playing the body count game, with a new twist. Rather than rejoicing, the surface division CO should feel shame when he looks at the ranks and sees that, of the total on-board count, only 30% represent non-mandatory career reservists; he should acknowledge that if the new 2x6s were released tomorrow, the following week his muster would be down 70%. Yet, this unfortunate CO should not be the butt of criticism and be accused of poor leadership; it is the program which is unattractive.
Many of the seagoing returnees have served in Vietnam waters; they have seen the world and are street wise; most are E-4s, and not a few are enrolled in night colleges or are taking some specialized courses. Some are newly married and have recent additions to then families. They seem intelligent and, with few exceptions, have had interesting active duty tours and bear no illwill [sic] toward the Navy. Those who have been “recalled” to the training centers are resentful and reluctant but, for the most part, are willing to give it a second try.
If their induction procedure is proper, they will meet the training officer, the XO, and the CO and eventually be assigned to their military counselor. The XO or CO will interview the new man, welcome him and explain that “We want to make the program interesting for you. We are glad you are aboard and that you chose our unit (as if he had a choice). We are here to answer any of your questions and to help you advance in rate. As you make E-5 or E-6 you will learn to appreciate the reserve program because at the end of 20 years you will have acquired sufficient points for retirement at age 60. (As if the most important immediate problems of the young man were his twilight years.) You an important member of the Navy’s Ready Reserve.” No explanation is given that other than two weeks AcDuTra, he will not see a ship for a year. No one tells him that he and his unit will be on call for the USS Blank. He will listen respectfully to the CO and quietly nod his head.
He will be issued his correspondence courses, he will participate in “team training” and “practical training.” He will learn, or relearn, the operation of the P-250 or P-500 and act as back-up man or nozzle man or he will light off a 6-71 and will learn the proper use of the OBA with or without beard, but soon he will feel that he is losing his grip on his rate. He might well become bored, and question the relevancy of the Reserve to the Navy as he knew it. It is submitted that he and his colleagues, from sheer frustration, vent their disgust at the Naval Reserve and the Navy. Some have been vocal already and have expressed their criticism in letters to editors.
If the Reserve administrators hope that at shipping-over time, they can convert their prisoner 2x6s into eager volunteers, without offering them some purposeful training, and some reason for existence, then they are mistaken and are on the road to another decade of self-deception.
If this paper seems to be an indictment of the majority of senior inactive Naval Reserve officers and TARS, it is late in coming because the verdict itself had been returned many years ago. Our most valuable asset—the returning 2x6—has been squandered despite the well-meaning motions, words, and efforts by our seniors. It has been estimated that 75% of the enlisted naval reservists had been draft-motivated, and the reenlistment rate of the Fleet-trained petty officers in the Naval Reserve is only 5%. Why could not we retain the other 20% with our wonderful drill-hall games? Did it ever occur to our seniors that we could make inroads on the draft-motivated 75% if we promised ships and delivered on that promise? If the Reserves are to continue their drill-hall games, if the U. S. Naval Reserve is to continue mainly as a “career haven” for senior TARS and inactive officers, then we will repeat the mistakes of the past and the surface Naval Reserve will be as useless and undermanned as it was in the 1960s.
With the advent of the recent defense economies the total force concept is upon us. Reality is forcing a marriage of the Reserve with the Navy. The wonderland of the Reserve Training Centers is coming to an end—the luxuries of various senior inactive Reserve billets must come under close scrutiny. To make this concept viable, it is mandatory that the Navy and Naval Reserve retain its returning 2x6s. The administration of the Naval Reserve surface program requires that it be wrested from control of the “business administrator-educator” and placed in the hands of sailors. In planning for the 1970s and considering various initiatives for the Naval Reserve, let us not be too quick to promulgate information and directives on Fleet Support Units—a euphemism for drill-hall units—as a concession to the antiship groups. The first order of business should be ships for the Naval Reserve. Let us get down to basic functional units first—the frills can follow later if there is enough money available.
A final word of appeal to the U. S. Navy. We exist only by your grace and the grace of Congress. You provide us with fresh young trained men. Our hard-core World War II and Korean War CADRE are retiring. We seek to inculcate in the new returnees—Reserve and former regulars—a continuing dedication, devotion, inspiration and enthusiasm. But our words must be fulfilled; we must give them a reason for existence. We turn to you, Navy, and say “The Naval Reserve wants to join you.” Provide us with ships in coastal and river towns and on the Great Lakes. We have demonstrated, although it was obscured by the Reserve Administrators, what civilian-sailors can do with ships. We won’t be as sharp as you are, but then neither are you as sharp as the “Air Barons,” the “Blue Angels.” You need not in the very near future dangle Reserve shipping-over bonus, tuition aid, pro-pay, deep selection, and the like, before us. In brief, we ask a “Vietnamization” of the surface Naval Reserve.
Give us your cast-off ships; you might need them some day, and, if that day comes, you’ll get them back with trained crews.
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An NROTC graduate of Miami University, Oxford, Ohio, in 1955, Lieutenant Commander Balunek was commissioned as an ensign in the Supply Corps and served in the USS Yorktown (CVA-10) from 1955 to 1957. Transferring to inactive service in 1958, he became affiliated with Naval Reserve Fleet Division 4-7D, Lorain, Ohio, from 1959 until 1970. He is now a member of NRSD 4-105M (FEU-LSD). A graduate of Cleveland-Marshall Law School, Lieutenant Commander Balunek is engaged in the private practice of law in Avon, Ohio.
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A Southerner Goes South
On board the CGC Eastwind (WAGB-279), a warrant machinist ventured up to the bridge deck for a look-see. The ship was well into the higher southern latitudes, as her course was set from Port Lyttleton, N. Z., to McMurdo Sound, Antarctica, for Deepfreeze duty. The machinist, a slow-drawling South Carolinian, zipped up his foul weather jacket, tugged down his cap, and stepped out onto the wintry wing. Having made his tour and checked the thermometer, he reentered the wheelhouse and said to the captain:
“Sir, I never thought I would be so far south I’d want to go north again.”
—Contributed by Lieutenant Commander A. K. Brier, U. S. Coast Guard Reserve
(The U. S. Naval Institute will pay $10.00 for each anecdote published in the Proceedings.)
[*] See W. Thompson, “The Selected Reserve: Ready for the First G.Q.,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1962, pp. 69-77.