Since the Summer of 1965, when the U. S. government began reactivating ships from the reserve fleet to participate in the Vietnam sealift, the demand for seagoing manpower has been unusually high.
This sudden increased demand for seagoing manpower has provoked the government, as well as the unions representing the commercial offshore work force, to analyze seriously the present and future manpower requirements and resources of the U. S. Merchant Marine.
Officials of the U. S. Coast Guard, U. S. Department of Commerce, U. S. Department of Labor, the National Research Council and various maritime unions were consulted to gather current data to confirm or disprove the widely publicized engineering officer shortage that has allegedly resulted from one or more of the three following causes: high net attrition rates of many of the younger men within the first two years of their entry into the merchant marine; high net attrition rates of many men who entered the industry during World War II and are presently eligible for pension benefits; and the emergency Vietnam sealift.
This study was undertaken in an attempt to shed more light on the current labor market situation in an attempt to determine: whether the Vietnam sealift created an engineering officer shortage; whether the steps being taken by several Unions to meet the apparent demand are sound, and whether future requirements for engineering officers will be affected by automation, by a decrease in Federal Merchant Marine building programs; the dwindling size of the U. S. merchant marine and eventual reduction in the Vietnam sealift if peace negotiations are successful?
Although the largest single source of data is the U. S. Coast Guard, there is no single place in the United States where one can obtain information about the total supply of seagoing personnel.
The only means of determining the availability of engineering officers is by studying individual license files compiled by the U. S. Coast Guard. These files reflect the original license granted, any upgrading he has achieved, and an identification number. In addition to this personal license file, the Coast Guard also maintains a renewal record of licenses. A license must be renewed after a five-year period and the renewal application thus reflects the individual’s employment record during that time.
The National Academy of Sciences recently appointed a research team to study the files maintained by the U. S. Coast Guard to determine the average annual net attrition rates, by number of years since receiving original license. Figure 1 portrays the findings of the NAS survey and indicates that the annual net attrition rate for engineering officers holding their license for one year or less is high, in excess of 40% and, for those holding their license between two and three years, the attrition rate is approximately 18%—similar to the rates for men in the four-to-five and five-to-six year intervals. The reason for the high rates in the latter time intervals is difficult to explain, but the high attrition of newly licensed individuals from the federal and state maritime academies can be explained when one examines existing conditions.
For example, today, a man graduating from one of the half-dozen maritime academies can go to work either in a ship or ashore because the degrees conferred by these institutions and the license issued by the U. S. Coast Guard are well regarded by many different industries. This widespread acceptance provides an attractive alternative and in many cases attracts the recent graduate into shoreside industry. Marine engineering graduates from the maritime academies have been offered positions with federal, state, and city engineering departments, as well as with private maritime-oriented industries in the areas of research, development, production, application, sales, construction, and management.
Too, history records many hasty merchant marine buildups that have been followed by drastic cutbacks. It is important to note that ships can be stockpiled in reserve fleets for an extended period of time, but trained engineering officers cannot be expected to assume this same status unless they have the professional ability to transfer to a shoreside position when their talents are no longer needed by the offshore maritime industry. Inadequate employment opportunities and consequent job insecurity, then, inhibits the constant influx and advance of maritime academy graduates which is essential for the future of the industry.
Moreover, the working and living conditions on board many vessels, are unattractive and certainly do not encourage employment stability.
“Group shipping” is still another reason for the high attrition of newly licensed individuals. As of 1 April 1968, the National Marine Engineer’s Beneficial Association, which provides engineering officers for more than 90% of all U. S. merchant vessels, divided the membership into the following groups:
Group I | All members in good standing. |
Group II | Members having either 180 days seatime on board a union contracted vessel(s) or initiation fee paid in full. |
Group III | All new members. |
Group shipping undoubtedly will discourage new members even during a period of intense employment therefore encouraging a shift to shoreside employment where there is a future, employment security, comparable pay, and an opportunity to increase one’s formal education.
The federal and state academies have been criticized by both labor and management because of the small percentage of graduates who make a career serving as merchant marine officers. These criticisms are not completely justified because the mission of the academies is to educate and prepare qualified young men for careers in the maritime industry not only afloat, but also ashore.
If labor and management are of the opinion that these academy graduates should pursue only a seagoing professional career, then they must assume the responsibility of inducing and encouraging young officers not to shift to shoreside employment where there is a definite future.
Until labor and management accept this reality and until the federal government adopts a progressive maritime policy, the attrition rate of the younger men within the industry will continue to be high.
Because of the demands of Southeast Asia, National Defense Reserve vessels were reactivated and the U. S. merchant fleet expanded from a total of 935 active ships in 1964 to as many as 1,079 ships. Many of the engineers filling the berths on board the reactivated vessels made themselves available for assignment only by foregoing vacation leaves or by coming out of retirement. The withdrawal of these ships from the sealift has prompted many to resume their retirement and return to shoreside industry, from which they are on temporary leave.
During an emergency sealift situation, the merchant marine serves as the “fourth arm of defense.” In this role it is vital that ships sail and move on schedule. Before sailing is permitted, the U. S. Coast Guard requires at least one engineering officer in each of the following grades for “safe operation and navigation” of each Victory ship, the type reactivated from the National Defense Reserve fleet to participate in the Vietnam operation: chief engineer; 1st assistant engineer; 2nd assistant engineer; and 3rd assistant engineer.
Collective bargaining contracts require aboard each Victory ship, not just one 3rd assistant engineer, but three.
There is an average of 5.2 engineering officers pet American flag vessel presently in operation. Based on the minimum complement requirements prescribed by the U. S. Coast Guard and the national manning average, the Vietnam sealift in reality increased the demand for engineering officer personnel by a total of 5.76, or by 12%. This certainly represents a substantial increase but does not completely justify the extensive and long-term programs that have been promoted by several maritime unions.
As early as 1965, a number of maritime unions began programs to train unlicensed men to become licensed engineers. Upgrading programs were developed and instituted by the Brotherhood of Marine Officers, the Seafarers International Union, and the Marine Engineers Beneficial Association, District No. 2. The officials of these unions claim that their respective programs enroll experienced unlicensed men, who have sailed at least 18 months as fireman, oiler, deck engine mechanic, junior engineer, or engine man, and provide training to meet Coast Guard license examination requirements. In this way, the increased demand for seagoing engineering officers properly could be met and when the emergency demand decreased, these men could return to the unlicensed positions they previously held.
The obvious advantage of this type of a program is that seasoned engine room personnel are trained to meet license requirements set by the Coast Guard and, upon successfully passing a license examination, can adapt rapidly to their increased, but not entirely new, watchstanding responsibilities.
This type of program has several inherent disadvantages which account for the general lack of acceptance it has encountered from engineering officers. First, it is impractical to think that a newly-licensed officer from such an upgrading program could adapt to the management responsibilities related to the job of marine engineer as readily as he would to the operating responsibilities. This transition is made even more complicated because such an individual will find himself in a position supervising men with whom he formerly lived and worked in the “fo’c’s’le.” Also, by absorbing unlicensed personnel into upgrading programs, shortages are crewed in the unlicensed force. Finally, when the level of employment returns to normal, the newly licensed officer is not likely to step down willingly to an unlicensed billet where both the salary and the prestige are substantially less.
The Marine Engineers’ Beneficial Association, District No. 1, initiated a two-year Licensed Marine Engineer’s Apprenticeship Program in 1966, presumably to meet the emergency demands for engineers created by the Vietnam sealift, with little regard for the status of these individuals and the entire M.E.B.A. membership when the crisis period is over.
Jesse M. Calhoon, President of the National Marine Engineers’ Beneficial Association, related his position, both on the apparent maritime manpower shortage and on the subject of maritime education and training, before the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries of the House of Representatives on 28 April 1966 in the following words:
In my opinion, the maritime academies are overtraining for the job. By the time a kid finishes the 4-year accredited college he can make equal or more money ashore than he can on a ship . . . . We are now in the process of developing a program with the employers that we hope to work out; it will come out of the existing marine engineers’ salary to set up an apprenticeship program . . . . Instead of going to C.E.E.B. to look for the brightest, smartest kids in the U. S., we would look for someone else less intelligent that would be willing to use his hands and to get his hands dirty . . . . We need people who want to work, not people who want to be scientists and professors.
Mr. Calhoon’s comment is unsound and unrealistic because both technology and automation have placed additional requirements upon the training of engineers. Today, new ships being placed in service represent an investment of approximately 12 million dollars each and the cargo may be worth more than one million dollars. Management cannot accept engineering officers who are not the “brightest or the smartest” to represent them when their multimillion-dollar investment is far removed from home port. Management must become selective and this selection process must start in the hiring halls. If demands for superior individuals are placed upon the collective bargaining agency providing the engineers, mediocrity would not long exist. Management and labor must begin to think in more professional terms in order to attract and retain professionals who can do a job effectively and expertly.
In addition to certifying and endorsing the maritime union upgrading and apprenticeship programs, the U. S. Coast Guard set forth emergency qualifications for men to serve as engineers in merchant vessels to alleviate the shortage of available assistant engineers.
In 1966, the Coast Guard began to grant endorsements for temporary service to eligible engineering officers. This endorsement is attached on a regular license and authorizes the holder to serve in a temporary capacity in the next higher grade than the grade of the regular license.
This official action enabled many third and second assistant engineers to serve temporarily in the next higher license grade and effectively filled the need for these senior positions created by the Vietnam sealift.
It is interesting to note that this emergency policy was not needed during the Korean conflict.
The economic and military potential of the U. S. merchant marine is decaying—70% of all U. S. flag ships presently in operation are more than 20 years old. Unless a revolutionary rebuilding program is endorsed by Congress, U. S. flag ships will be dropping out of service in greater numbers than they are being replaced as the years go by.
If this situation is permitted to continue, how can anyone criticize a young, ambitious academy graduate who is unwilling to start a career in a decaying industry which is being flooded with engineers from union schools even though the long range demand for their services is decreasing?
The recently built ships, although each has the cargo-transporting ability of two to five times that of a conventional World War II ship, carry the same number of licensed engineering officers as the World War II-built Victory, C1, C2, and C3 types which they replace. The automation-mechanization concept embodied in the newer type ships provides no reduction in the required number of engineering officers.
Therefore, by retiring the present fleet and replacing it with fewer ships, the overall need for engineers will decrease.
Most steamship companies have realized that the only way they can afford to pay a high operating overhead is to decrease crew size and simultaneously increase productivity. Naval architects and marine engineers have proposed and in some cases implemented advanced automation-mechanization techniques in order to improve the competitive position of U. S. steamship operators.
Work rationalization techniques have been developed to reduce the need for shipboard repairs by designing a ship with more reliable equipment than is now in use.
Devices are presently being used on board several U. S. vessels to control from the bridge the speed of the engines and the steam generating rate of the boiler(s) simultaneously. It is conceivable that bridge control will one day be replaced by computer control, thereby reducing the need for watchstanding engineering officers. A fully computerized engine room would increase the scope of activity and intellectual requirements of the engineering officers because the dull, non-demanding task of watchstanding would be performed continuously and automatically.
American steamship companies must defend their investments and solidify their proposal to reduce crew sizes. The maritime unions must be oriented to think in terms of automation and nuclear power instead of manual labor and Scotch boilers.
Let us summarize. The shipping buildup in mid-1965 resulted in the establishment of several union training schools, as well as the return of many retirees to the maritime industry in order to meet a 12% increase in demand for licensed engineers. This, complicated by the unpredictable federal shipbuilding subsidy program and the reluctance of union officials to divulge any information concerning membership and attrition statistics, makes it difficult to appraise the present engineering officer manpower resources of the U. S. Merchant Marine.
The resulting increase in the number of licensed engineers, combined with a decrease in the number of billets to be filled, created a seemingly insurmountable problem.
This situation cannot continue. The U. S. government should compile all current and past data concerning manpower requirements and resources in order to evaluate the labor market and predict the effects of automation, military demands, and normal attrition. The main sources of this detailed information are the U. S. Coast Guard and the various maritime unions.
A Merchant Marine Reserve Officer Corps should be established to meet the demands dictated by the volatile world situation and also to protect the rights of those participating. If such a Corps were organized, the civilian jobs of the reserve officers would automatically be protected by law if they were activated during an emergency.
The U. S. government must adopt a well-defined maritime program to halt the decay of the entire industry before it is too late.
Plans to build completely automated ships must be enacted immediately in order to reduce operating costs, and manning requirements and increase productivity. This action would diminish the possibility of any future manpower shortages and would provide a challenging work situation for maritime academy graduates.
Maritime union upgrading and apprentice programs must be disbanded to prevent the number of availably men who are licensed to serve as engineering office from growing too large.
The human needs of the mariners must be considered in an attempt to create a pleasant working environment for them on board ship.
It must be obvious, then, that the U. S. government, maritime labor, and management must work together to find a common solution before the problems confronting the entire industry become too large to solve.
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A graduate of the State University of New York Maritime College in 1966, Lieutenant Locetta served as a Third and Second Engineering on board various freighters and passenger vessels from June 1966 to September 1967. He then returned to the maritime college as an Assistant Instructor of Engineering until May 1968 when he returned to sea to serve as an engineering officer in various merchant vessels. Since May 1969, he has been employed by a leading international tanker fleet organization.