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,leutenant Commander Bennet S. SimonS. Navy—The rising exodus of the A- 0rnier, the low status of an officer as
as emphasized the status and material well' lng of their executives with the realization
lVlen in the Middle”
(>y
Pk M. Purtell, pp. 61-69, August 1969 ceedings)
\u
Via.
"'ed by the public, the decadence of our race navy, the low enlisted “ship-over” es> the Pueblos of the past, all reflect poorly the Navy’s ability to retain, develop and tivate enough A-performers to meet the hs of the service.
lv1 submit that the emphasis must be on the j °rd “motivate.” The civilian community 9s long since recognized that hiring good J e°ple is a far cry from motivating them to 4*imum output. While the Navy has con- j. r*ted itself primarily with uplifting the en- ■'Su-d man (a worthy goal), private industry
b,
lbat well-paid, well-cared for managers will l?Aimize profits, i.e., the company can expect y0rc from the manager. Meanwhile, the avy has ignored these lessons in the belief lat promotions serve the same end. A promotion to lieutenant commander (nine years service) presently carries with it a monetary emolument of $28.80 per month, while lbe ten-year “fogey” is $65.70. If all that is l,ieant to be a measure of his increased worth *o the service, I can only reflect that the Navy °ften gets exactly what it pays for.
The lack of objective analysis and treatment of this crisis stems mainly from three 'therent service realities:
* The fast turnover of top echelon commanders and their staffs—change requires tlrtie and only men can effect them, but the men move to new areas of responsibility well before substantial results can be achieved and reliefs are not readily convinced to keep the ball rolling.
• Senior officers view juniors as having better pay and benefits than what they, the seniors, enjoyed and the seniors managed to survive, so why shouldn’t the juniors? Seniors are thus often unmoved by stated needs of the
junior. .
• The military counterpart to proht maximization in the business community is not quite so obvious nor so easily measured.
These three realities have paved the road to stop-gap measures and a multitude of directives, career-counseling drives, and the like. The only other in-use remedy has been to ignore the problem and cease mentioning
;t_ perhaps even through disbelief. This is
quite possibly more prevalent among the wives, a group which has somehow managed silent acceptance of their second-rate position. Unfortunately, even this only serves to prolong the agony and pass it on to those who follow.
The solution to any problem must begin with an understanding of the problem itself. A Navy captain assumes responsibilities commensurate to those of a senior vice-president and yet his ability to provide education for his children, a home for his family, medical care, and the like are far inferior. He is barely a member of the middle-class of society by any standard, much less so when long family separations and frequent moves are added. Can you imagine attempting to recruit a vice-president into the Navy with the rank of captain using the words “. . . our people are accustomed to such sacrifice.”
If it is enough that we induce our officers
or the financial security desired.
inflate
are
we
3i Pe‘
,15;oo0'2°oao^
in*'
tand31^ °
cates that for today’s prices and s living, a $50,000.00 coverage is necC
Had I purchased ordinary life coverage
that amount in my early commissioned )e
vs
saying that the average officer cannot ^ the protection he needs in the form of 311
ordinary life would cost a lieutenant . over 20 per cent of his base pay. I feel sa ,
an°
dinary life policy.
have
terminal date has a lesser premium?
creasing term policy more nearly fits the ^ quirements of the individual and his fa3' ' responsibilities?
to “live through” the difficult years to retirement on 20 or more years, and thus be more interested in preparing for that eventuality than improving present performance, the Navy has been eminently successful. As Commander Purtell points out, the Navy must not only retain superior personnel for top management, but must care for them along the route in such a way as to enhance their ability and desire to achieve superior results when they arrive.
"A Plan For All Seasons”
(See H. N. Lyon, pp. 35-43, July 1969 Proceedings)
Captain M. B. Williams, U. S. Coast Guard—How I wish that l had been able to read General Lyon’s article 27 years ago! However, it is misleading in one area. He recommends immediate establishment of a ready fund of $1,000 to put the young officer on a pay-as-you-go basis, eliminating the horrendous interest-carrying charges, and to establish his credit standing.
If the young officer follows this literally and pays cash for everything, he will be sadly surprised to find that he has no credit rating. Insofar as credit organizations are concerned, he simply will not exist. They will have no record of accounts, prompt payments, and the other acts that make up a credit history, which is the basis for a credit rating.
Nevertheless, the young officer can follow General Lyon’s advice to avoid carrying charges, and still build a sound credit rating by the simple method of establishing charge accounts in local stores and with the major oil and credit card companies. By paying his bills completely within 30 days, he will incur no carrying charges other than the annual “maintenance charge” for a national credit card, and he will have established his credit rating.
★ ★ ★
Commander W. L. Buckingham, U. S. Navy—I nodded with agreement as I read the comments on inflation, solvency, and the need for life insurance. However, I could only stare with horror at the remainder of the article which proposes a plan that does not satisfy the requirements. I am perhaps especially sensitive to this subject, since I accepted similar advice 20 years ago and have
hat
discovered in the intervening years tna ^ a plan cannot provide the retirement t>
The prime villain is, of course, in According to our leading economists, committed to an inflation of about cent per year. In 1969, a was required to buy what a come bought in 1949. General Lyon *,
■ssatV
for
'f
it would have cost over 25 per cent o base pay, an amount I am sure all 'v agree is prohibitive. If we assume ia3[(r will continue for the next 20 years, theI1 ^ day’s young officer should be thinking ^ terms of $100,000.00 coverage, which
Many financial planning authorities pointed out that the true purpose of li^1t surance is to provide protection in the of premature death, which the article & cates is needed for a period of 20 to 30 i ^ depending upon the retirement status 3(lj family of the individual. Why pay f°r „ term policy which can be continued as 1 j as desired,” when a term policy with a st3^
why pay for a level term policy when 3
S'
Rear Admiral Frank P. Mitchell, tL ^ Navy (Retired)—The article recommeI1 “straight life” in a mutual company as 16 basis of an estate plan for a career y officer. The mutual type of life insurance co3^ pany was recommended on the theory that has the “best net cost” results. This net c°s theory is a fallacy that has been so proved * many modern estate planning books such ‘ What's Wrong With Tour Life Insurance h) Dacey, Tour Financial Guide For Living by L01 raine Blair, and Mortality Merchants, I havef°r gotten by whom it was written.
fcuc*1 n^1
ion- am per
|ofl>c if ndi- id of
a- for
lOfSi
x»y ufd tio" to- ln for ■}) in
1
or-
1,111 in a stock company than in a mutual
Pany. The mutual company after two rs usually, then pays a “dividend” of about
M. ^er cent of this original 20 per cent over- narge.
Sti
31 a,lce with growing cash values at 2, 3, or ' Per cent. It is a
\dSe
if
oen1
ndi'
:arSi
and . “a I of? ited
do-
re-
iiiy
the,erm insurance is the most insurance for he ^ast dollar. The young man can buy de-
able
th°ney’ buY straight hfe. He can then take e difference in premiums and invest in
Mutual
leeci;
^Uli
an annual premium of $1,535.50 or more ari five times the premium of the term
tcy. The difference of $1,240.10 can be ested in a conservative investment pro- ^Srn, from savings banks at 5 per cent to Mutual funds or “blue chip” stock. Many I Or-tors are taking this road to estate plan- ^ltlg as advocated by the periodical Medical gnomics; also sophisticated executives in the Usiness world.
. The approach to an estate plan outlined is lr°nically enough now being advocated to s°rne extent by the insurance companies, as
frrief, a mutual company’s premiums ^ ab°ut 20 per cent more than the same fjtL arr>ount policy in a stock company. In Pj Cr Vv°rds, the policy holder can obtain 20 ^nt more insurance for the same pre-
. raight life insurance is cash value in- ance and combines decreasing term in-
—.... .... .o o. poor savings program. tf,,t6 tbe purpose of life insurance is to pro- ijj dependents in the event of death, the vijr,llfe insurance for the least dollar is pro- th ^ bY term insurance. A young man needs -nt ^reatest: protection to protect his depend- 5 j at the earlier ages. As he grows older, . Sser face amount is required to meet his
^irements.
Using term insurance or five-year renewed convertible insurance in much
ater amounts than he can, for the same
funds or stocks. As his insurance s decline with advancing age, he can drop ee of his term policies as appropriate. For 5 aiUple, one stock company I checked will ^ a S100,000 policy, 30-year reducing term, ,,^'Participating premium-paying period 24 |Cars and convertible for the premium-pay- 5 period to a 25-year-old male for an an. Ual premium of $295.40. The same company j sell a preferred risk straight life participating policy to the 25-year-old, also for $100,000
th;
Pol
ttlVi
evidenced by the fact they are buying mutual fund companies and combining insurance and mutual funds. Unfortunately, it is ordinary or straight life insurance that the companies plug the most, because that is where the greatest commissions and profits are.
* ★ ★
Lieutenant Commander James W. Corey, Jr., U. S. Navy—General Lyon makes a short argument for mutual companies and against term insurance. While devoting much more of his life in the insurance field than I, there are some serious faults in his reasoning. Completely forgotten is why one needs life insurance. As an investment, it pays a small return; roughly 2.5 per cent.
For the average military officer, we need life insurance to provide security for our family—nothing more. This occurs principally during the time we have dependent children. After this, our security needs are markedly less. As an investment toward retirement, life insurance offers relatively little in comparison to other savings programs.
Therefore, one must consider not only mutual companies but term insurance as well. However, not all mutual companies are the same. Some must pay dividends not only to their policy holders, but also to their stockholders. Companies, such as the Navy Mutual Aid Society, are devoted to the exclusive interests of their policy holders. Operating with a lower overhead, such companies offer unparalleled service to military members.
Term insurance is designed to provide maximum coverage at minimum premiums when most needed. Some companies such as the Armed Forces Relief and Benefit Association offer reduced term insurance (i.e., a steady premium, but reduced benefits after age 50). Simply investing the difference in premiums between term insurance and general life insurance in a savings account at 5 per cent interest will provide not only greater protection, but also a greater cash value. What is particularly galling when one uses the loan value of an insurance policy, is that one must pay 5 per cent for borrowing what is essentially their own money.
Combined with Serviceman’s Group Life Insurance (SGLl), the Retired Serviceman’s Family Protection Plan, term insurance, and
SA
SMALL CRAFT
Down the Ages
Drawings and Text by Edgar L. Bloomster
Sailing and Small Craft Down the Ages has served as an encyclopedic reference for sailing and rowing craft since the first edition was published in 1940. Now, as then, it contains descriptions and definitions of more than 500 different sailing and rowing vessels and about 300 silhouette drawings. The text and drawings have been regrouped since the first edition, and now appear side by side to permit immediate identification. Covers craft of all ages and from all over the world—from the ancient rowing galleys to the great clipper ships of the midnineteenth century.
Written and illustrated by the late Edgar L. Bloomster, this book should find its way to the bookshelf of every sea-minded reader.
104 pages. 300 drawings.
$12.50, List Price. >10.00, Member’s Price.
GaHtiiss 16Ji C
('jrr.uk
A United States Naval Institute Book
(Please use order form in book list section)
:rage
insurance of mutual companies, the a'e , .
nvide 1
service member can adequately prow— ^ the future care and education of his dePen . ent children and the support of his surv'i' ^
wife. Preparing for one’s own death is
•-ores'
sen1
a pleasant task and there is the ever-p human tendency of putting it off—the Prgiy
ration, that is. If nothing else, however,
•very
eral Lyon’s article should encourage reader to review his current “survivors pia to ensure that it adequately covers vivors’ anticipated needs.
his sur‘
"Bomber Navigation—The Blind Led £he Blind”
(See N. W. Emmott, pp. 35-49, May; and pp- 116, August 1969 Proceedings)
Dr. F. K. DeVos—In what struck me
Vu<
Sir ] Stej Sou UP by
Sh
Sc
Vr
V:
Vc] Vra
;sp<
ttin
115'
as
an
outstanding contribution, Mr. Emmott sp cifically made the following points:
On balance, the [strategic bombing] at tacks had cost the Allies more in men an planes and money than it cost the Germ*11’ in war potential. In fact, German war pr°' duction reached an all-time peak in SeptclT1' ber, 1944. The really effective part of du' bombing was not the attack on cities, but o" German transportation and oil supplies • • ’ bombers were only grudgingly allotted t0 pounding the transport system, which later proved to have been decisive; instead the) were sent against German cities at every °P” portunity.
As an economist who happened to do p1
I OSb
graduate work at Cologne University’s Tr®11^ portation Institute between March 1941 February 1944, and as such, experiencCt several so-called “Terror-Attacks” on logne, I can fully confirm the validity of ' | Emmott’s judgments. Although I manage to spend a considerable portion of those tv* eventful years in my home town of Antwerp; stayed in that area long enough to notice d)l
seemingly haphazard and desultory way
which Germany’s vital Rhine Valley ra' links were attacked.
Time and time again, passenger and freigb1 trains would be detoured past track destrur tions simply by switching them to the othe' bank of the Rhine, an expedient which only possible at the bridges situated in C° logne, Remagen, and Koblenz. The bornbep never attempted to interdict all rail inoSe'
Goei
t"an
V:
H
Mm
Mol
Pho>
Sh
Vi
hfi
C
the
Par
hat
hot
V
Mr
Ms
(P
to
5r
b,
\v
jL
.Jo<
M'
Ivin?
|e'c:
Leu’
|epa‘
Jen-
vd!
_ i>
llan | sur-
115'
is a" spe'
it-
id
ns
he
in
to
:er
ey
P'
os1'
in*'
ifld
zed
>
ft-
ed
tto
I
he
in
u'l
r banks of the same sector, nor did the
eS*c Remagen bridge ever receive any attention until it was belatedly blown
'3n had
already crossed it in 1945.
lQrts
Vl,
into believing that in destroying de- ess Jews and political martyrs in con-
Ration camps, they could still win their
c»vilia
ns concerned with foreign policy and
11 effectively by cutting the tracks on both
itrati
"Ss ;
Ijp b ✓
V the Germans themselves after Patton’s
hs,. °reover> it is my opinion as a neutral i|)0rVer of the scene in the Rhineland during 3t(6 tvvo years that the way in which these dctCks against cities were conducted not only _!^racted from the vital efforts which were £ Perately required in the Atlantic—as Mr. G°tt points out—but in effect, helped iri. bels convince the many doubting Ger- ! ^ that they had nothing to gain from jJJlng their backs on Hitler.
5dn °VV °Pten did I hear non-Nazis talk in \j", lring terms of such daring exploits as the PE ne an(J Eder dam burstings, whereas the rj ^Phorus-cum-blockbusters on cities—
t ay, now it appears—struck them as con-
H'Wible because they held them to be mili- ineffective.
^ °uld it be perhaps that hate was blinding Pa High Command into making this
l lcular mistake, while at the same time k e was deluding Hitler, Himmler, and co-
Cent:
g War?
r°ceedings, August 1969
fl^bmiral Robert B. Carney, U. S. Navy c^et*red)—The August issue was excellent, a ,er to cover, but the authors of four of the teles commanded my special interest. t^leutenant Parnell's “Sever” bespoke good ^ earch and perceptive analysis. It would . a good subject for Naval War College "^kshops.
vj ^ear Admiral Cagle's “The Most Silent Ser- Ce ’ stamps him as an articulate man of . °fal courage. He lays on the table degrad- lustrations that have threatened the fibre °ur military leadership. He will never be Poached by the face in the mirror.
Simpson’s “The Guerrilla and His Orld” is disturbing, but gives a realistic Rght into the mentality of human beings s fight as guerrillas. It should be compul- 0rV reading for all military men, and for all
civilian control of the military.
Commander Pur tell’s “Men in the Middle may bring tears to the eyes of old timers who attached overriding importance to command as the attribute most important for progress up the military ladder, with self-sacrificing dedication a close second. However, he tells it like it is” in today’s Navy, and every midshipman and commissioned officer would do well to consider the article carefully as a part of his self-analysis and career objective planning.
I should like to see my comment published —as a “well done” for the authors, and a good tip for the Navy.
The Prinz Eugen
(See P. S. Schmalenbach and J. E. Wise, Jr., pp. 87102; and G. L. Dickey, Jr., pp. 148 151, August 1969 Proceedings)
Anthony E. Sokol,- Professor of International Security Affairs, Emeritus, Stanford University—While the German Prinz Eugen was the last ship by that name, she was by no means the first. In fact, Prinz Eugen is the only historical person whose name has been given to ships of five different navies, and those ships have served under at least eight national flags.
Duplication of personal names by different navies is not common, but it does occur occasionally. Don Juan cTAustria was the name of an Austrian and also an American vessel, possibly also one of Spain; Garibaldi was used for a ship by Italy, Argentina, and Russia; Fulton occurs in the U. S., French, and also the Argentine navies; Volta was used by Italy and France; de Grasse by France and the United States; Bolivar in several of the navies of South American countries: Blikher in Germany and Russia. There may be more, but certainly not many.
But Prinz Eugen has the distinction of being used as a ship’s name by Austria, Great Britain, Russia, Italy, and Germany. Ships of that name have also served under the French, the American, and the Greek flag.
What was the reason for such popularity? Prince Eugene was born in 1663 as the son of Prince Eugene Maurice de Soissons, of the House of Savoy-Carignano, and Olympe Mancini, the niece of Cardinal Mazarin of France. Although he wanted to become a
Austrians and Germans called him ately—was also a wise statesman and a tinguished patron of the arts and sctf3^
W
soldier, he was refused a commission by Louis XIV because of his slight build, and became an abbe instead.
But disregarding the king’s wishes, this scion of the future royal family of Italy went to Austria in 1683, where the Emperor, hard pressed by the Turks, needed and accepted all the help he could get. The young prince proved himself such an excellent soldier and leader that he quickly climbed the ladder of advancement, to become imperial field marshal within ten years.
His first great triumph came in 1697, when he defeated the Turks at the Battle of Zenta, thereby ending all danger of another Turkish attack on Vienna. During the War of the Spanish Succession, when the Austrian Emperor, England, and Holland were allied against France and Bavaria, Eugene won a number of victories, the greatest at Turin, Italy, in 1706, when with 30,000 men he defeated a heavily entrenched French army of 80,000. Louis XIV promptly offered him a generalship in the French army, but Eugene refused it.
His next victories were won in close collaboration with the Duke of Marlborough, with whom he had established a cordial friendship. Their co-operation resulted in the splendid victories of Blenheim or Hoch- stadt, in 1704, Oudenaarde, in 1708, and Malplaquet, in 1709.
In 1716, he again beat the Turks at Peter- wardein, and a year later he defeated a Turkish army of 230,000 men with only 40,000 troops, at Belgrade, which freed all of Hungary from Turkish rule. Never again did the Turks become the menace to Europe which they had been between 1526 and 1683.
Prince Eugene was not only a great military leader, but the “noble knight”—as
ENTER THE FORUM
Regular and Associate Members are invited to write brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also to write brief discussions on any topic of naval interest for possible publication in these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Navy can be exchanged. The U. S. Naval Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion published, at the rate of $45.00 per printed page in the Proceedings.
affec«f
His palaces in Vienna, for instance
among the most beautiful anywhere- tainly one of the most prominent Europ ^ in history, he was admired everywhere o'1 ^ continent and acclaimed as the libera10^ Europe from the Turkish yoke. No won ^ then, that several nations claim him aS ^ own. and that others wished to honor h1’11 naming ships after him.
The first ship that was to bear the nanlC. Prince Eugene was a privateer outfits ,£ England to prey on Spanish shipping 111£ Pacific; she was to carry letters of from Austria, which by that time was at' with Spain, but she was to be commanded . English officers. She had an armament o ^ guns and a crew of 180. Before the ship c°Uj|1 begin operations, however, England joineC the new coalition, took over the ship, ana named her Success. £|
It may seem strange that the next v'e^]] named after the Prince was a 50-gun, RllsS1^tl ship-of-the-line, which Peter the Great, admirer of Prince Eugene, was building Holland for his war against the Swedes- j reached Russia in 1721, a year after the e ^ of the Northern War, and never particip3’1 in any action. .,
It is probable that Austria also used j name for one of its ships. Emperor Charles had built a navy of considerable size, st^ tioned in his Italian provinces, as well as ^ sizable merchant fleet to be based at Oste'1 in the Austrian Netherlands. But there is 1 ^ record of any vessel of that name, and bo the Austrian navy and the Ostend Comp3'1 soon withered away under the strong pr°tc' of the established naval powers. ^
When Austria reorganized and revitalize its navy after 1848, the name of its fll05| successful general was the first to be adopte for one of its new ships. She was a padd wheel steamer of 560 tons, launched in 183 ’ in Venice (which at that time still belongs to Austria). But in 1861, she was rename Andreas Hufer, after the leader of the TyroleSf peasant, who, with his Bavarian allies, led 3,1 uprising against Napoleon in 1809. The nanlC Prinz Eugen was transferred to a new arm0r' clad frigate of 3,500 tons, carrying 16
,2
jate"
as;
:efl“
and 1877, she was modernized and
=quii
. nt of shore installations. The class was ^toed ’’’On
of ?ltors was called Prince Eugene in memory Per’^ glorious co-operation between the im-
’he
nderS) ancj 24-pounders. Launched in J3 !Ce ’n 1862, she took active part in the e °f Lissa, in 1866, with an honorable In jg1101 especially distinguished record.
^.PPed wit;h eight 8j-inch guns. She re- ;i ^ed in active service until 1904, when she renamed Vulkan and turned into a repair tin? was st*d serving in that capacity ' World War I.
fjy y next and last ship of the Austrian or, gj ”a’ time, Austro-Hungarian Navy, to be ,L.en that name was a dreadnought battle- f^P of 20,000 tons, launched in 1912, and typing 12 12-inch guns, that took part in ^ak ^ar At the disintegration of the j(j sburg Monarchy and the dissolution of d navy, the ship, now carrying the Yugoslav 3Vvas turned over to France to be used as l,p rSet ship and eventually to be broken b ' ^he thus served for a while under the >* flag.
Sj. Uring the same war, the British built a tQ *es °f shallow-draft monitors of about 6,000 ^S’ to carry heavy guns for the bombard- after famous generals, and one of the ^r‘al field marshal and the Duke of Marl- \yr°ugh. Thus it happened that during J°rld War I, two ships named after the h116 man faced each other as potential op- ^nents.
]5
a ut even after that war, the end of the jjtotrian Navy, and the scrapping of the i(rit‘sh monitor in 1921, the name of the ofn°ble knight” did not vanish from the list ^ mips of war. In 1935, the Italians, remem- |, rtog the Prince’s ancestry, named one of , e'r cruisers, of 7,250 tons, Eugenio di Savoia. C ter World War II, that ship was trans- to Greece and named Helli.
.finally, when Germany annexed Austria in jy and Hitler was rebuilding the German ^avy, he named the first large warship Prinz J\^eni in honor of the great general who had £S° been field marshal of the Holy Roman
^Pire of the German nation.
As the “Prinz Eugen Album” states, origi- y the heavy cruiser was to bear the name ’•he Austrian Admiral Wilhelm Tegetthoff, victor of the Battle of Lissa. But that
name was too intimately connected with Austrian history rather than with German, and would not serve the Pan-German cause that Hitler tried to promote. Besides, “Prinz Eugen” was also a popular name in Hungary, and at that moment Hitler was courting that country. So the name Prinz Eugen was chosen for the new ship, in order to please the Germans, the Austrians, and the Hungarians. The former Austrian Rear Admiral Miklos Hor- thy, at that time Regent of Hungary, who as a captain had commanded the Austro- Hungarian dreadnought Prinz Eugen, was invited to the christening in 1939, as were also many other dignitaries from all over Europe.
The stories in the Proceedings cover the fate of the German cruiser, and tell of her rather inglorious end. It seems a strange twist of fate that the ships bearing the name of this great military genius have, on the whole, had a somewhat undistinguished career. However, none of them have dishonored their illustrious namesake.
"Tombstone Promotions”
{Set M. S. Prince, pp. 115-116, February; and p. 109, July 1969 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Lloyd F. Kerr, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—Our present promotion system may have “inequities,” but it is certain that reporting seniors do a soul-searching job with fitness reports. By the same token, selection boards have a similar task—that of selecting the best few from the many reviewed.
For the Regular naval officers, who have devoted a full career to the service of their country, promotion at retirement to the next higher rank seems to me most equitable, and monitarily an economic necessity. Most senior captains, particularly those who have been division commodores, must certainly be professionally qualified. Monetary reward of this last promotion is far more important than prestige, sometimes illusory.
The retired Reserves usually have had a career, and in some cases, their retired Navy pay may compensate some of the loss in their civilian pensions, lowered by leaves of absence for three or four years of their active naval duty. Reserves who were away for several years, were replaced in civilian
achieving those goals, and then to
chie'
occupations by their juniors, and rarely ever caught up again. After all, somebody had to mind the store, and those who stayed and waited also served.
In view of recent enclosures with our monthly pay checks, inviting names of possible candidates to the U. S. Naval Academy, I believe retirees should be permitted to request two weeks of active duty training, at no cost to the government, to bring them up to date on our changing Navy, to enable knowledgeable conversation with likely candidates.
"The Most Silent Service”
(iSee M. W. Cagle, pp. 37-41, August 1969 Proceedings)
Commander James E. Nesworthy, U. S. Navy—Admiral Cagle’s article is the voice crying in the wilderness that so many of us have strained our ears to hear. Flooded as we are with facts, technical papers, and reports of the growth of Russia’s domination of every area that has to do with sea power, we are overwhelmed by the many reports on our aging ships, lack of a merchant marine, and the inability to match on any material terms the plans that are in full swing by the Soviets to control the seas.
We have stood by in silent obedience, fearing to state a case for a crash program to save our country’s future security, because if we offend anyone, we will lose the “half-a- loaf’ to keep body and soul together until we are again looking down the muzzles of the aggressor’s planned war.
Today, the spirit and vigor is being eroded by frustration and a sense of helplessness on the middle and lower strata of officers. While the competitive aspect of the various services may be a healthy thing, it has had the Machiavellian twist that they are no way equal except in plans and hope. The materialistic realities of getting the tools to do the job has escaped the Navy’s share in the budget to do what has to be done today, so that America will have a tomorrow on the seas.
Throughout the world, we are feeling the effects of the “Prussian Hound Dog Kick- Out” by those whom we had come to rely upon as partners for their security and ours. The time is here and now for a re-evaluation of our position in this world, what our goals must be, the kind of a Navy that will assist in
bend e'er;
effort to build our total Navy to al those ends.
The Navy’s position as an instrum1 our foreign and domestic policy needs { than wardroom talk. It needs that P ^ factor of leadership by those men amofj’ whose word has meaning and the ear ol _
that to speak up now is mongering, and a takeover by the mil‘ta '
■rfl#
for the future of our country. There lS^.,
to fulfill, no enemy we will not meet, beca this is our job.
in a little fresh air. We need to stand up man, on every level, make his contribud.j let it not be for the lack of effort or cou
to disaster for our country and the LltU role of our Navy.
Commander John J. Dougherty,
fession has simply been undergoing a drawn-out “crisis of self-identity?”
dressed in 1956 by Colonel Heinl, throU? Admiral Cagle and Commander Purtell not exist? Does any concurrent change policy correlate with the reduction in syntP toms?
I would suggest that there are a lar7 number of men who suffer none of these crd1
of Vice Admiral H. G. Rickover, U. S. Na''
significant number of naval officers achievi success outside the Department of Defense^ not a single one of whom has ever had H deep draft command; all of whose tours 0 duties are measurable in decades or a near
decade! ,
7 or Jny o i’fessio tltagoi
H”
of
neid
, lon?
who must listen. We have been silent so - insubordination, jingoism, saber-rattling'
lr0i
at
to be confused "
Pick your term.
The truth is, we of the Navy are conce
red eral , r°ugh 'iX-oac 'Ugh it of iers *) is Hoi uav
!>, ws ■
is
He
Ho
we
sacrifice we will not make, no place
not go, no task we will not cheerfully strUjjw'
Id
Admiral Cagle has opened the ports to *
ai>°
be counted with constructive ideas. Let e
yet)
to the total effort beginning now. If vve
ra?e
to speak up on what is now perilously
ror
U.
Navy (Retired)—Is it possible that the P
Ion?
Is there any evidence of any situations ^ which a large number of the symptoms 3 ^
cal symptoms. At the very least, they com
sis1
F
'•Oty
, Hi
s<
s
Vl
Hi
S'
■ubli
St
s,
V
H
Hr
C;
th,
sai
tit
5
Pi
a
C
ta
S:
si
is
that
(Retired), the Navy astronauts, and
in?
Not a single one of these men lacks cred1
e\-e
of
ore
ifle
us
lOSe
/itt>
iti-
ad
no
kvill
;g>e
,u*
Id
jod
■ery
ion
fail-
age
lose
ufe
s.
>ro*
oflg
5 if ad' jg11
do
in
nr
irge
riti'
isist
avy
ha‘
Jug
t''
f)is
i of
;af'
»(ji^
^ or visibility. Each addresses Congress other seat of power without successfu Dr^sion from the “civilian censors > m the ^agon. For them, Admiral Cagle s n JW” opportunity (to speak his well-con- Cred opinions) is wide enough to dnv Val dozen Polaris and Apollo programs *°Ugh. None must revert to the shotgun broach of “influence by remote control , ugh PTAs and Garden Clubs.
Is it then even remotely possib e that the Jt of these professional difficulties, (and hs that Admiral Rickover often points ) is a compulsive adherence to a rapid «ion policy, one that attempts to make naval officers equally experienced in all ftgs, to an equal level of mediocrity,
%s none ever to find, or remain in, a billet
H^has^he authority to direct that this fction policy be most carefully re-exa particularly for its ill effects? Will he.
Tide at Hampton Roads”
"E Rouse, Jr., pp. 79-86, July 1969 Proceedings)
Robert Norling-A letter from Captain
V Cassin, to Secretary of the Navy WiUiam S, dated 23 June 1813, from the Navy
at Gosport, adds some substance to th Very of men from the Constellation,J Rising the British attack on Craney Island
V £,‘rac, of Captain Coin’s letter wa
pithed in Abel Bowen's S (1816) a volume Bowen dedicated
• S. naval officers who, in .he*-•(«« Atl in Bowen’s words, “by their y
y skill have exalted the America
V secured the applause of their count y, Nd excited the admiration of the world-
Captain Cassin’s letter reads as follows.
I have the honour to inform you, that on the 20th the enemy got under way, in all m sail, and dropped up to the mouth of James dver, one ship bearing a flag at rxnzzen. At 5 p m they were discovered making g preparation^ with troops for Ending, having a number of boats for the purpose. Finding Craney Island rather weakly manned, Cap tain Tarbell directed Lieutenants >
Shubrick, and Sanders, with 100 seaman o *ore, at 11 p.m. to a small battery on the
N.W. side of the island.
w. .i'i.
SEA & AIR
The Naval Environment
by Assoc. Prof. Jerome Williams, U,S- £®vald Academy. LiCdr. John J. H.ggmaon, USN. and LtCdr. John D. Rohrbough, USM.
. J t'tr. the study of oceanography A new intro^C;i0"senting an integrated approach and meteorology, present^ with the
uniquely suitable t covers the
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salient features o W" ^atm, P ^ ^ the oceans, treating each may readily be
various characteris books Jn
compared and contrasted. Uni. ^ ^ these closely rela e • environ-
the atmosphere and phenomena of .
' rewofluidsmgether whenever possible. Winds and the two nui 5 discussed in one chapter,
r^S“ght and sound energy through
both media in another. 329 pages. Over 200 illustrations. List price $11.50. Member s price $9.00.
A U.S. Naval Institute Publication.
Tuesday 22nd, at dawn, the enemy
wait about ten minutes. However, this
could be reduced with an emergency eIlp -
Navy—What’s the Uniform? A bewi^^ Royal Navy acquaintance asked me ^ question while we were in Norfolk, anu
fall and U. S. officers were wearing trop
having uniform options, there are also 111 disadvantages. At most bases where seV1 uniforms can be worn, there are also reg11
an)
ing
discovered landing round the point of Nanse- mond river; at 8 a.m. the barges attempted to land in front of the island, out of reach of the shot from the gun-boats, when Lieutenants Neal, Shubrick, and Sanders with the sailors, and Lieutenant Breckenridge with the Marines of the Constellation, 150 in number opened the fire, which was so well directed, that the enemy were glad to get off, after sinking three of their largest boats. One of them, called the Centipede, Admiral Warren’s boat, fifty feet in length, carried 75 men, the greater part of whom were lost by her sinking. Twenty soldiers and sailors were saved, and the boat hauled up.
The officers of the Constellation fired their 18 pounder more like riflemen than artillerists.
I never saw such shooting, and seriously believe they saved the island.
"The High Cost of Saving Oscar”
(See A. H. Robbins, pp. 60-67, July 1969 Proceedings)
Commander Claude L. J. Verdier, French Navy—I do not agree with Lieutenant Robbins’ conclusions, although I am quite confident about the future roles of AGVs, but not in this specific case. I do not agree because of the following reasons:
One of the major points about lowering a boat in heavy seas is the way she is dropped, and when. I do not see many differences between a boat and an ACV. If this problem is solved, some types of boats have more seaworthiness than ACVs. The main advantage of ACVs is their amphibious capabilities (no need for piers, harbors—a beach is enough), and they are of no use in this case.
The only advantage left to the ACV would be the speed, which is less than that of a helicopter. On the other hand, I believe that helicopters are currently—and for a while— the most efficient and versatile utility craft for ships able to operate them.
What is more interesting in Lieutenant Robbins’ study is the possible improvements of means and procedures for putting a boat at sea rapidly and safely.
I am personally pleased with having a rubber boat, fitted with an outboard motor, carrying two men, a coxswain and a frogman, and hanging overboard under a mast electrically operated. Of course, the ship has to turn and stop, and sometime Oscar has to
maneuvering procedure—which is not us3 ^ for exercise purposes—and with imp* ^j. ments to the equipment (power and reh3 ity of the outboard motor, rigging’s gaug ^ winch control, for instance). The use 01 ^ helicopter “Alouette,” if already airboi‘llC ready to take off, also saves time.
What Shall We Wear?
Commander Robert H. Schulze, u• ,
• j
white long, tropical khaki long, service 0 khaki, and some transients even wore set' dress blue. Norfolk is by no means uniff^ j this respect; many bases have several optl0 uniforms all year long. ^
Although there are obvious advantage
&
tions as to when and where they can be V011.. For example, when tropical khaki long , authorized, service dress khaki or trop1 white long may be required for staff briefi11^. or standing the duty. At many comma11 where greens or tropical khaki long are 31 thorized, off-base stops on the way home work are not permitted.
Diversity also has its costs. A short tn ago, I counted 36 shirts that I wear just V1 ^ uniforms. If this seems to be an exaggera11 to prove a point, readers should count the*1-.
Recognizing the problem, the Bureau Naval Personnel sends out questionna11^ from time to time, to determine what pe°P really want in uniforms. Since there ha' been few changes in Navy uniforms in rec^ years, it would appear that the surveys ha' been inconclusive or that there is a gene13 resistance to change.
This apparent result may be mislead111'' The lack of a clear concensus to change ma)
be more a result of the failure of survey1 agencies to provide attractive alternatee" than a general desire among officers to ma111 tain dozens of different uniforms. The pr0^ lem, I believe, is to find reasonable alte*
■inf
tin1' 1 ®9ti'
^es to present uniforms, particularly out- aat Would reduce the amount of uniforms accessories. Let us look at what alter-
is
,Qrm
Nth,
fing* an^ . aU' fro'”
J.ves may be available. lrst consider the problem of maintaining i similar summer uniforms, tropical white jn 5 an<^ tropical khaki long. Anyone going :!1;i)temPorary additional duty (TAD) in the tttv" r must carrY both. He must travel in lh ICC ^ress blues or khaki, or civilian clothes, itttt ^Umber of shirts required, makes pack- ty^. 'moult. If an officer carries just tropical tyh!te ^0ng, the problem here is having enough C4r|te trousers. To look sharp, white trousers Dr k 6 Worn one bay only. They are also a !?blem for laundries.
tj be solution to this problem would be the Ho .Pment of a universal summer uniform, tnvolving white trousers, acceptable for trQ .VP6 duty. Why not wear the present bj b|cal white shirt and shoulder boards, with tropical worsted trousers, and black and socks. This uniform would have ty. ®ral advantages. An officer could travel ty b 0r*e pair of shoes and two pair of trousers | °uld serve him far better than several white °users. It seems reasonable that this uni-
Would be comfortable and serviceable, ls(| n?ut: lbe white trousers and shoes. Tropical aki l°ttg could then be required for ship- °ard situations only.
'ow consider the rather larger and older js °blem of service dress khaki. Although this I definitely a summer uniform, the blouse, ^"g-sleeved shirt, and tie rule it out for hot ather. We could reduce the number of i 'torms and accessories by wearing tropical bes instead.
d * believe that most officers prefer service ess khaki because it is a more comfortable 'form. The single-breasted blouse with a ^ 11 m the back is much more comfortable van the double-breasted blue blouse with no J^bt. To counteract this situation, why not ^ ange the cut of the present blue blouse? f b,s could make it an acceptable substitute °r khakis.
. The present basic style of blue uniform,
. tr°duced in 1919, was patterned after the ..man clothes of that period. Since that . ''e, styles in men’s clothing have changed Ppreciably. The high, tight blouse has been aanged to a garment that is cut lower in the front and fits loosely. Fifty years have passed since our present blues became uniform, so it may well be time for some sort of a change.
One possibility would be to change to a single-breasted blue jacket, vented in the back, but still maintaining the basic distinctive cut that is characteristic of our present blues. Another possibility could be to change the cut of our double-breasted jacket to make it more comfortable. To allow more room to move, the three buttons could be moved down and much closer together, or the jacket could be changed to a two-button double-breasted style. But most important, a vent should be put in the back of the blouse. This could either be a single, short vent in the center, or one on each side like the British uniform. The blue service blouse could be designed to be comfortable. If it were, we would have a reasonable alternate for the service dress khaki uniform.
Incidentally, the double-vented blouse is not without precedent in the U. S. Navy. Rear Admiral Henry B. Wilson, U. S. Navy, Superintendent of the Naval Academy in 1921, is shown on page 185 of the September 1967 Proceedings, wearing a double-vented blue blouse.
Another problem with blues is that when the blouse is removed, no one knows your rank. This could be corrected by wearing a cloth epaulet on the white shirt with stripes of black ribbon showing rank in the same way it is displayed on the sleeve.
If adopted, these two proposals could eliminate the service dress khaki uniform and greatly reduce the need for the tropical khaki. Black shoes and two kinds of white shirts could put an officer in the proper uniform during any season.
Although proposals like these may easily develop a storm of protest, I believe that we should continue to search for some reasonable alternatives to present uniforms.
Vietnam Rebuttal
Colonel Gailon M. McHaney, U. S. Army (Retired)—It is one thing to quarrel and debate over the tactics and strategy employed in the prosecution of the war; it is quite another thing to become a public skeptic about our morality and our objective. To argue that we should get on with it and
1970
put it mildly. But to assert that our part^,(
apply better methods, more power, Sre^,, skill, wider pressures, or more finesse s to be altogether fitting. ,p
The war is tiresome and inconvenient •
pation in the war is ignoble and base, th”1...
terest in the outcome, nor any real °bjeCt!, but also a gross disservice to all American allied servicemen who have gone to Viet” in our behalf, not a few to stay forever. ' over, it is suggested that these public tions tend not only to take the hearts our fighting men but also to foster the
among the bewildered youth who fac” duction, and to encourage hostility sue that encountered by the Pueblo and
sue-
cesses in some of the halls of ivy and r forums of debate are somewhat distress”’^ The objective in Vietnam is to preC l World War III. The United States kn^j full well that it is engaged in a great con ^ with the Soviet Union and Red China
or as unrelated to the larger and more serl°0( contest requires an incredible degree tunnel vision. Both of these major Comm1”’ countries have a record of expansionism no one can truthfully deny. Red China, particular, sorely needs more resources sustain itself and the most appealing av””^. to these is through conquest, euphemistic” .. called “war of national liberation.” CW ^ enough, America is frequently accused imperialism, yet in comparison to the U-S--5, j and Red China, we are like Girl ScoutssC^ ing cookies. We have no territorial obj tives. On the otherhand, it is quite ob'”” that the opposition has such objectives
Korea, Quemoy, Tibet, Greece, and pe elsewhere.
What we know about the opposition s
lrJ3 l rJ3 '93 '93 193 193
Desk-calendar engagement book. Illustrated with an exciting collection of photographs and engravings
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Julian dates included.
$2.50
Please use book order form in booklist section.
For Maryland delivery orders please add 4% tax.
(no discount)
The United States Naval Institute Annapolis, Maryland 21402
no
have no justification for being there.
linked to national security is not only un
filin’:
i a”'
asser',
out°f
19;
19;
19-
: I-,
the
"eal
"Us
and
''■er
*°ge
"ss
str\
I
<Jtie
N
sbi
untf’1
moil in our colleges, to engender
n’-
ch*5
0”
EC-121. Our enemies may not be winning
the battlefields of Vietnam, but their
otf>ef
look at the Vietnam war as an isolated c3
,ll5
eve”
ver
kit
k
Wq
eff
kn
ha
V,
b,
fa
c!
v
t
Lao5’
now in Vietnam and not so long ago in
rhaP5
tfia”
11-
hav’e
the
tent and method is much more clear now in the events leading up to World War This is hard to believe since, in retrospe<^ the road to World War II can be seen to been well marked with milestones as following partial list shows.
|re-:;
I-
Inti ,rtP iat io if |ect'Vi' jttin- [nafll :tnaI" ioif |asser'f
lilt tUT'
Imre5' ■e if |ch
th«
a 0^
sue- 0ther jsin?' clu dc no"'5 >nteSl To
stall any one or all of these events. Quite
'-ontrary, this country was both blind and • Japan and Germany were contemptu- U. S. resolution, perception of danger, Capability to wage a good defense. They
Wrong, of course, but their wrongness, t!eet‘ler with our blindness and squeamish- Ssi cost the lives of over 405,000 American
Vemen.
difference is a costly luxury. Of course,
■rio'
:e
uni
that a, ifl s t0 snne
;all)
0.
1 °f >.*■ sell' jec' ot's ^en
lOS)
3ps
in-
an
li
st,
ve
ie
denying that the price of that vigilance jj determination to resist aggression would ^\’e been dear. But can anyone believe it °uld have been comparable to what was Ij UaUy paid? Surely, too, there would have |J'Ct> then, as there are now, the doubters, the g/^I-hearted, the moralists, and the arm- ^ a*t strategists to undermine the national (J , to deter forthright defense of freedom, argue in the name of logic that the fate of 11 Ethiopia is meaningless to American se-
I931 T .
Igor Japan invaded Manchuria Iq„ "Mussolini conquered Ethiopia lg„ Hitler militarized the Rhineland Iq "Japan attacked China ,q “"Germany occupied Austria
“ Germany appeased at Munich and Ig "'on the Sudetenland lq Germany invaded Poland Iq y Italy occupied Albania
' Japan pushed into Indo-China
Th
1)5(1ne §*reat wonder is that the United States frj|, neither the wisdom nor the power to
r
«re
UI only speculate about the magnitude . de savings in lives and treasure which i( dt have accrued from a determined U. S. u at each successive milestone. tlll, there would have been costs asso- ' with redirecting the course of events at h milestone. It would have been incon- ^ lent; civilian careers would have been 1 r.errupted; men would have died in far-off, ^ erable places, and innocent bystanders have suffered from the immoral side- eGs that accompany every war. There is 0J*rity, and to refuse to serve for any number j. trumped-up reasons. How fortunate it was ^ that type of person that our country, as a dole, failed to present them with the oppor- nity to demonstrate and protest.
*''ow again, we have traveled a road ITlarked with milestones not unlike those of the ^dier years as this partial list shows:
1947— Communists provoked civil war in Greece
1948— Berlin Blockade
1948—Reds seized power in Czechoslovakia
1948—Communist insurrection in Malaya
1950—South Korea invaded by North Korea
1950— Red China rescued North Korea
1951— Tibet conquered by Red China
1954— Viet Minh defeated French in IndoChina
1955— Polish riots and Hungarian revolution
1957— Chinese-Indian border wars
1958— Lebanon crisis
1959— Pathet Lao overran Laos
1959— Viet Cong initiated guerrilla war in South Vietnam
1960— War in Congo
1962—Cuban missile crisis
1955—u. S. escalated participation in Vietnamese war
1967— Second Arab-Israeli war
1968— Pueblo incident
1959—EC-121 incident-
However, there is a new concept in U. S. response to these milestones when compared with our responses prior to Pearl Harbor. Now we have elected not to stand idly by while others viciously rape the weak and propel the world into an uncontrollable frenzy of death and destruction. Is this altogether foolish, as the scoffers would have us believe?
Indeed it is not foolish. In round numbers U. S. security operations (or lack of them) during the period 1918-1945 cost an average of 15,000 American military dead per year. The average for the period 1946-1969 has been about 4,000 military dead per year.
This is not to say that 4,000 war dead per year is a trivial number and should be lightly disregarded. No one can deny that an alternative to war which would successfully prevent erosion of U. S. security would not be better, but no one as yet has discovered a completely satisfactory alternative. Aside from appeasement, which experience has shown to be completely unsatisfactory, what can one do when an enemy persists, despite all other inducements and pressures, on a hostile course? One can only show through word and deed that he will not tolerate it, and this is what has been done in Greece, and in Korea, and is being done in Vietnam.
Of course, one may disagree with the
‘Wq
tJf er
Jate
have
these
ticle.
n
J'Pon ti. c
the
rath
alf°
Mde
Err lhe P
'3ve
H t
l^sio]
!he Si,
b'beri
S ]
tps)
shi'
a f
S'00
‘here status, Twc •°tee)
V
of
m
and reaction. It leads not just to the Si'.
I hi
of action, when he makes his choice.
kind must include those of American so'
lOf'
tef
policy for the United States; that is, a
dency by the protagonists to discount P
volv:
ci$e
carr|
if'
assertion that U. S. military actions have forestalled a great war or that the situation in Vietnam is related, in any way, to U. S. security. Unfortunately, history cannot be rerun like a sophisticated war game to see how different plays and maneuvers might have affected the outcome, nor can anyone foresee with exactitude the significance of a South Vietnamese acquisition by North Vietnam. It is therefore easy for the disenchanted to pontificate in the face of uncertainty, to decry the baseness of war, and to challenge the significance of a far-away outpost, for no one can prove them to be wrong.
On the other hand, the scales of wisdom are not so evenly balanced as the critics of the Vietnamese war appear to believe. The pattern of conflict since 1945 has been overwhelmingly Communist-inspired. Had the Reds opted for peace, most of the disturbances would have been stillborn. Even now, they can have peace in Vietnam, and every critic knows this to be true. There has to be a pressingly urgent Red goal underlying all this unrest. If Vietnam is not important to the United States, it also is not important to the U.S.S.R. and Red China. But it is important to them, else they would dampen out the conflagration. What is that purpose which so induces the Reds to shed so much blood in South Vietnam? Is it a natural hunger for reunification of a divided land, which once was thought to be the case for Adolph Hitler and the Sudetenland, or is it to be an astute addition to the Red portfolio of growth stocks, an acquisition needed to sustain secret plans for a colossal conglomerate?
U. S. security interests demand that South Vietnam remain free. It would be grossly imprudent not to make a stand in behalf of South Vietnam. The price, while high, is surely less than it will be if we wait until the Reds are on our doorstep.
Still there is the matter of morality. The ends do not always justify the means. It is indeed ignoble and hypocritical to use violence in the name of peace, to struggle for freedom through repression, and to fight for sanity with the tools of unreason. War is hell, whether it be generated by greed or hunger, the infamy of a Pearl Harbor, or the grandness of a crusade. Despite all intentions to cling to a code of chivalry, few warriors are able to keep their swords completely 1 tarnished. The business of modern wan3 not very discriminating.
The concept of morality is not apphc‘1. to the question of war alone. The do°r, morality opens on the whole world of aC'
doctrine of “to fight is immoral—not to is moral.” One’s conscience must enw . the consequences of inaction as well as 1
concern for the hopes and dreams of 1’>.
on the battlefield and in their graves, aS as all the rest caught up in the maelst1'1. One’s judgment of morality must ahvays elude the fate of the conquered if thev are saved from defeat.
"Flags of Whose Convenience?”
(See J. J. Clark, pp. 50-59, October 1968; pp 109, January; pp. 109-110, April; pp. 103-105, Ju and pp. 116-119, July 1969 Proceedings)
Dr. John J. Clark, Dean, College of ness Administration, St. John’s UniveP1', New York—The comments on my ar° afford an insight into the quality of the deb3 on the question of devising a viable maritl!
0rrn
maturely any proposal for reform with0,, offering a substitute for the present polic'f which manifestly do not work. Thus, *' commentators read into the article n30
^ov
Ms!
c9tn
the
. J
\
Win
^Oi
the
the
Mi
tio]
he
shi
%
Ul
Er
than is there and they exaggerate those
pects which conflict with accepted or tr33' tional practices. The boat is sinking, but1 catchword is: “Don’t rock the boat.” Colonel Kendall, for example, protests the one-paragraph comment in the article' the reserve fleet gives the “clear implicate . . . that there are 1,300 ships in the resed fleet which are fit to be reactivated sho1'! the need for them arise.” The article, contra1' wise, specifically points out (p. 51) that U reserve ships have “small commercial valuV but might be a “significant military assd in time of emergency. The reserve fleet d'f play a role in the Vietnam buildup, ^ World War II experience attests that id severe crisis almost anything that floats rP3' have value. However, no analysis of reser' fleet ready status was attempted since th1'
If
lie*1' b or
M
kirf , 6 f fl# | ih
f 0»(
i#
yd*? hs"
|stro,:
Vs
kre
are no “clear implications” on the
sht,
•j.ls °1 any category of reserve ships.
Ur'V? t^le commentators (Kendall and !>ra.
:ct
set'1'
se
tra1
it*
J<
-B*"
*sK
art*
rib" a trf t
legal position. He also points out that °uld necessitate a Presidential declaration
'th°!lI C"' declaration of war. This grey area in- 1 hs hmited hostilities and/or the exer- o, , °f economic and diplomatic pressure, p r*es the germ of serious dispute, if the 'He, ^ ^ates should attempt to manage the • ''Criient of these ships contrary to the es of the flag state. In fact, Admiral Land
s tW
le.J p. Possibility of operating convenience ship- at* Under the U. S. flag. Table IV (pages
^55)
uses data provided by the American
to1*!1 T&
t tV
U&,
;se'
d*
ai" n } na! ;r'1 th"
^'Umittee for Flags of Necessity to establish Point. In this connection, the purpose of article (page 57) was to suggest that,
..^He the nation was debating the formula
n
Iher °l re^evant to purpose of the article.
criticize the article for citing an ab,, b;gal principle (the pre-eminent right '^in state t0 control movements of its when Liberia and Panama palpably tjj,. wherewithal to enforce such pre- l°ns to control. On page 56 of the text, lib Sltuat*on is directly admitted. Although H ria and Panama in a particular case ^ave ^9Ve fight on their side, they do not the might. All the same, this seems W aer Unf°rtunate thesis to put forth on be- a nation which regards itself as an up- j, er of international law on the high seas. t|)ettlery correctly notes that the validity of t|j 'hective control agreements rests upon ijpo Maritime regulations of Liberia and not n a treaty which would enhance the e,nergency to activate the control agree- nts. Of course, in the event of war (so i efl on page 55), the United States would e a legal position in taking control of " e vessels. The questions raised in the are> however, relate to conditions short of a
lv'sh,
l^eedes that it would be preferable to have ^Vessels under the U. S. banner, he article fully recognizes the economic
lhe
hil
non c ... .
a new maritime policy, consideration
j^.StVen to ways and means of enabling these
„ 'Ps to operate profitably under the Ameri-
flag. The article nowhere advocated that
, /se ships simply be forced or taxed off the
|: "ctian registry. If that were the case, as
rtlery notes, they would simply transfer to
another flag, not to U. S. registry.
I do not know that proposals to permit the building and repair of ships abroad are any more unrealistic than the hope for some across-the-board subsidy to gloss over the financial liabilities of American registry. I see no indication that Congress will advance the necessary funds. Nor is it likely that we shall encounter a crisis of a magnitude to trigger a World War II building program. (Unfortunately, we do not even appear unduly perturbed by the emergence in our own backyard of Soviet naval and maritime power The latter do not eschew the advantages of foreign build in accomplishing their objective.) To allow the right of foreign build and repair at least has the virtue of reducing the need for subsidy and in that sense seems more realistic. Admiral Land’s comment that we should keep the money at home to conserve our foreign exchange is a sort of reductio ad absurdum: the principle makes good argument for putting an end to all international
ARISTIDES
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Commerce (23 June 1969) to feel the
States may have in its grasp the technology advances to exploit the biggest mantl^ ^ breakthrough since the “clipper ship’ 0 century ago. In any event, the closing P‘ 3 graphs of the article (page 59) constiWte strong caveat against looking upon tech11^ ogy as a “wonder-drug.” Much will depe^( upon the attitudes of labor and manage^ toward technological innovations and tri willingness to accept changes in “the str1 . ture of industry and the pattern of indus11
trade. In that sense, it solves the problem of the merchant marine.
Kendall finds fault that the “case for subsidization rests primarily on the national defense posture.” He contends that the terminology of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 does not support such a categorical statement. The reader will note the wording, primarily, not exclusively. The preamble to the Act actually states:
It is necessary for the national defense and the development of its foreign and domestic commerce that the United States have a merchant marine (a) sufficient to carry its domestic water-borne commerce and a substantial portion of the water-borne export and import foreign commerce . . . (b) capable of serving as a naval and military auxiliary .... (c) owned and operated under the United States flag by citizens of the United States . . . (d) composed of the best-equipped, safest and most suitable types of vessels, constructed in the United States and manned with a trained and efficient citizen personnel.
Congressional debate over the Act of 1936 and its revision today stresses the defense potential of the merchant marine. Indeed, were it not in the interest of national security, the industry would probably not merit sufficient political support to win any kind of subsidy. So vital is the defense factor that, should the industry collapse of its ills, merchant shipping would probably be merged into some national authority and run as a public utility.
Although major developments in marine technology are more or less available to all competitors, it does not follow that technology offers no relief to the problem of higher operating costs of American shipping. The crux of the matter centers on the availability of capital to finance the application of new technical knowledge. The United
States, as the world’s leading industrial P0"^ is well endowed with capital resources; , the maritime industry (perhaps undets | ably considering the lack of incentive u£l present legislation and the prevailing tions to labor-saving devices) has not overly aggressive in the application 0f ®1 technology. Representative John J. R°° ^ Chairman of the House Appropriations j committee, recently expressed the vie"' 4 the results of the research and develop1IlC work sponsored by the MA amounts ^ “exactly nothing” in furthering plans ‘° | better merchant marine. (The Journo J Commerce, 16 July 1969.) On the other Andrew E. Gibson, the new Maritime 1 ministrator, is reported in The Journo ^
relations.” ^
I completely agree with Admiral La'1 call for unity. The merchant marine has o . studied to death and too many of the re(e surveys only rehash old arguments. It is b to end the talk and come to decisions. ' it is our practical men who cannot ag1 among themselves on a policy to stabflU their industry. On the record, their discor have driven the industry to the point of lution. If the proposals of academicians soU^ idealistic to Kendall, they cannot be blame for the present state of the industry.
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