The Communist tactical doctrine as applied in Vietnam has never been more forcibly—or accurately—summarized than in John Mecklin’s Mission in Torment: “To exploit the fermenting political mash of such countries as Vietnam, the Communists created a new tactical weapon: the direct application of political, economic and psychological action, backed up by military operations, to destroy an enemy government by stealing its people.”
As with all sound tactical doctrines, it is tailored to the strategic objective which it serves—and that objective is political rather than military in character. It is the replacement of the present non- Communist regime in Saigon by a Communist regime subservient to Hanoi. To achieve this objective, it is necessary to convince the people of South Vietnam that there is no hope of any other outcome. Once all confidence in their government has been drained from them, they have been effectually stolen from that government’s control and transferred to Communist control.
For the military role in this very special brand of larceny, the Communists developed a very special formula. It was also a very simple formula. It did not (at least until the late autumn of 1965) aim at a spectacular full-scale military victory, for such an aim contains an unavoidable element of risk. It aimed at creating an image of invincibility. The heart of it was this: Fight only when you are sure of a local success—either under circumstances of your own creation, or when the enemy makes you a present of a good opportunity. When you are not sure of success avoid combat. Your wins will be visible—and remembered. Your evasions will be hidden from public view—except when the other side has made boastful predictions which do not pay off: this will add to your prestige. You will almost always have sufficient forewarning to avoid fighting under unfavorable conditions, because your local sources of intelligence will multiply as the conviction of your ultimate victory grows stronger, while those of your opponent will progressively dry up. If you suffer casualties, always carry off both your dead and your wounded so that the enemy will never be able to prove that you sustained any losses at all. Thus, you will build up an unbroken record of military success, and the other side will be burdened by an unbroken record of military failure.
In substance, that was the military picture in Vietnam in the spring of 1965. The conviction that the Viet Cong (V.C.) were certain winners had virtually extinguished confidence in any other outcome throughout the countryside and to some degree even in Saigon.
This deterioration was checked during the summer and autumn of 1965 by the decision of the President of the United States to intervene in Vietnam with American military power, changing the role of the United States from that of a mere advisor to the government and armed forces of South Vietnam to that of an active participant in combat operations.* The emerging results of this change are affording visible proof to the people of South Vietnam that the Viet Cong and their allies of the North are not, after all, invincible warriors whose trumpets will never call retreat. Visible proof is also being presented on an increasing scale that the United States has at its command forces, weapons, and methods of warfare which can make a highly effective contribution to the battle for South Vietnam and to the ultimate security of the people of that country. Confidence is reviving, though much indeed remains to be accomplished.
It is of particular and promising significance that the first major ground action of the war in South Vietnam in which a hard-core Viet Cong combat unit of substantial size has been attacked, fixed, and decisively smashed should have taken place on the edge of the sea, and have been carried out by a sea- based, sea-supported envelopment. Operation STARLITE—in which a main-force Viet Cong regiment of some 2,000 men was virtually destroyed near Chu Lai by elements of the III Marine Amphibious Force during five days of fighting and mopping up, 18-22 August 1965 —was a clear-cut, unmistakable American victory. Its pattern and circumstances will bear careful examination, since they present a strong suggestion that U. S. sea-based power possesses built-in advantages which, if fully implemented and exploited, can well explode the neat and simple Communist formula for military success in Vietnam.
Applied to an over-all situation in which— as Colonel E. B. Wheeler, U. S. Marine Corps, points out in the Marine Corps Gazette for November 1965—“the ultimate objective of our operations is the people,” continued success of our sea-based tactics should bring about a steady growth of popular confidence in the sea as a reliable base for extending U. S. combat power ashore: a concept so thoroughly established in American military thinking by our national experience as to be almost instinctive, but which will have to be demonstrated to the Vietnamese. Once that very large percentage of the Vietnamese people who live in coastal regions come to realize that the sea, after all, is controlled by America, that we can use it for our purposes, and that we can deny its use to any enemy, once they understand that the bases of American fighting power are not far away in unknown places like California or Hawaii, but afloat right off their own coasts because of our mastery of the sea, the result should be a new birth of confidence upon which substantial and permanent achievements both military and political can be founded. For the sea will stay put, and American sea power will continue to reign.
The region in which Operation STARLITE took place is the northernmost of the four military Corps Areas (also major political subdivisions) into which South Vietnam is divided. This I Corps Area comprises five provinces—from north to south, Quang Tri (adjoining North Vietnam along the military demarcation zone at the 17th Parallel), Thua Thien, Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai. This is, on the average, the narrowest part of South Vietnam. All five provinces have extensive coastlines fronting the South China Sea; the western borders of all except Quang Ngai adjoin southern Laos and the mountains through which wind the system of jungle paths known as the Ho Chi Minh trail. The only continuous route of north- south land communications within I Corps Area is Highway No. 1, which, with its paralleling railroad, runs along the coast. This route has for years been subject to interruption by various pockets of Viet Cong control. Consequently most local commercial traffic moves by junk and sampan between seaport towns and villages.
But the most significant fact about the I Corps Area for the purposes of this discussion is that fully 90 per cent of the population of its five provinces live on the narrow coastal strip between the Annamite Mountains and the sea. Here in the deltas of several little rivers are the rice fields, and here also along the coast and in bays and inlets are the busy fishing fleets. These sources provide the two main food staples of the people. An area more favorably conditioned for a demonstration of what sea-based power can do to protect simple folk in their homes and livelihoods can hardly be imagined.
In May 1965, command of all U. S. military operations in the I Corps Area became the responsibility of III Marine Amphibious Force under Marine Major General William R. Collins; in June, command of this force was transferred to Marine Major General Lewis W. Walt. By August, III MAF had established three base areas (the Marine term is Tactical Areas of Responsibility— TAORs) of American control along the coast. The two larger of these are at Danang, where the principal American air base complex in South Vietnam is located, and at Chu Lai, south of Danang, where there is an expeditionary airfield. Each of these TAORs contains 150-200 square miles of territory, including many towns and hamlets which are the homes of tens of thousands of Vietnamese civilians. North of Danang, standing guard over the important city of Hue, is the smaller (50 square miles) TAOR of Phu Bai.
Operation STARLITE had its origin in intelligence reports furnished by ARVN and local civilian sources, to the effect that a Viet Cong main-force regiment had established itself in the area of the Van Tuong and Phuoc Thuan peninsulas, on the seacoast just beyond the southern face of the Chu Lai TAOR. The civilian input to this intelligence was an early product of increased confidence arising from the presence of the Marines at Chu Lai, the success of their vigorous patrolling (especially night patrols, which proved a considerable shock to the V.C., unaccustomed as they were to being interfered with during the hours of darkness), and also to the first effects of the carefully planned Marine civic action program among the local residents. After thorough evaluation, it was decided that to find an enemy regiment dug in on the edge of the sea and also on the edge of a Marine- occupied TAOR was an opportunity for instructing the enemy in the imprudence of such venturesome conduct that should not be let slip.
STARLITE was proposed to General W. C. Westmoreland, U. S. Army, commanding all U. S. forces in Vietnam, by Major General Walt on 15 August, for execution as a U. S.- initiated offensive operation on 18 August. Originally its principal tactical elements were to be one Marine battalion landing team (BLT) from Chu Lai, and another BLT from the Special Landing Force (SLF) afloat with the Seventh Fleet. Doubt as to whether the SLF (then at Subic) could arrive off the objective area in time resulted in the decision to use a second BLT from Chu Lai instead. While this involved a considerable temporary reduction in the available defensive strength in Chu Lai TAOR, this was considered a preferable risk to a 24-hour delay in execution, since too many examples were on record of V.C. forces escaping traps as a result of being pre-warned after initial dispositions had been set in motion. The V.C. intelligence net was and is known to be widespread and very sensitive to local indications.
Troop assignments included the 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines (less I Company) to be helicopter-lifted to blocking positions west of the objective area, while the 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines (less M Company) landed from amtracs on the beaches south of the objective area. The northern limits of the area were covered by a Marine company (M Company, 3rd Marines) holding the Chu Lai perimeter defenses. The Viet Cong regiment was thus to be enveloped on three sides, the fourth or eastern face of the area being the sea. The SLF (3rd Battalion, 7th Marines) was used as a floating reserve. The attacking battalions were supported by two tank platoons (with M-48 tanks and three flame tanks), two ONTOS platoons (105-mm. anti-tank weapons), and artillery emplaced in the Chu Lai TAOR (five 155-mm. howitzers, two 155-mm. guns and six 107-mm. howtars).
Tactical command of the operation was the responsibility of regimental headquarters, 7th Marines. Air support came from two fighter and attack squadrons of the 1st Marine Air Wing, supported by armed Army helicopters, and Air Force planes for flare drop and medical evacuation. Naval gunfire support was provided by the cruiser USS Galveston (CLG-3) and the destroyers USS Orleck (DD-886) and Prichett (DD-561), with 6-inch and 5-inch guns. Finally, ARVN regular and regional force units took up blocking positions west of the objective area to cut off the escape of fugitive Viet Cong and to act as security units against any V.C. attempt to reinforce from the west.
Artillery and air preparation of the landing zones began at 0615H, 18 August. At 0645H, three companies of BLT 2/4 were set down simultaneously in their assigned landing zones (RED, WHITE, and BLUE), and promptly encountered small arms fire as they moved out. At 0650H, three companies of BLT 3/3 came ashore in amtracs over Beach GREEN to link up with 2/4. Hostile fire from well fortified defensive positions in the objective area rose swiftly in intensity as the Marines advanced; artillery, naval gunfire and air strikes were directed against these centers of resistance by both ground and airborne controllers. The Viet Cong were using small arms, automatic weapons, 81-mm. mortars and 57-mm. and 75-mm. recoilless rifles. It soon became evident that the objective area was defended by a thoroughly organized system of strong points, connected by trenches and tunnels and effectively fitted into the terrain features of the area such as hills, woods, hedgerows, and paddy fields. These terrain compartments had to be cleared of the enemy one by one. “It was like fighting your way from room to room,” one report noted.
Resistance was stiffest opposite the junction between the two BLTs. There were indications that an especially strong defensive complex of concrete bunkers existed in this locality, where a salient began to develop. Two tanks were reported disabled by small-arms fire; these were back in action a little more than an hour later (1231H), but the intensity of hostile mortar fire was increasing and so were Marine casualties. The floating reserve (3/7) arrived offshore in the USS Iwo Jima (LPH-2) and the USS Talladega (APA-208) at 1300H. At 1458H, on the basis of front line reports, III MAF requested that two companies of 3/7 be landed by helicopter from the Iwo Jima to reinforce this sector. The Marines continued to work their way through the enemy defenses until nightfall, aided by gallantly maintained helicopter resupply flights—which evacuated casualties on the return trip. In one squadron of 18 helicopters, 16 took small- arms damage while evacuating wounded to the expeditionary (SATS) airfield at Chu Lai. The more serious cases were moved from Chu Lai to hospital facilities at Danang by Air Force C-130S, and later that night more than 60 casualties were flown from Danang to Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines.
Contact with the enemy was maintained throughout the night, greatly aided by Air Force C-123s continuously on station for flare drops, and by naval star-shell, which invaded the Viet Cong’s accustomed nighttime security. Star-shell was notably effective in helping 2/4 to throw back two strong Viet Cong attempts to break out, neither of which enjoyed success. I Company of 3/3 was also heavily engaged during the night.
On the morning of the 19th, after intensive preparation fires, Marines of 2/4 and 3/3 crossed their lines of departure at 0700H to renew the attack, with air, artillery, and naval gunfire support again ready on call. Gains of 800 to 1,000 yards were made before enemy resistance stiffened; when it did, it soon rose in intensity, which suggests that most of the Viet Cong who had been in the fortified complex originally and had not yet become casualties were still there. Some of the enemy, however, was again seeking to escape. At 1015H, for one example, a number of Viet Cong tried to get down to the shoreline over almost sheer cliffs, possibly hoping to get away in sampans. These fugitives were wiped out on the beach by naval gunfire.
By 1400H, Marines held two-thirds of the objective area: the enemy was compressed into a narrow stretch of rocky beach a little less than two miles long. BLT 3/7 was now in the line; M Company of 3/3, with the howtar battery, was moving up on the left; and units of 2/4 were sweeping the rugged Phuoc Thuan peninsula. By 1645H, after a second day-long battle against stubborn resistance, all Marine units had reached their final objectives along the sea. Organized enemy resistance had ended, and the Marines were mopping up and destroying enemy defensive installations.
This was a most instructive operation. It illustrates with stark clarity the advantages of the striking power of the Navy-Marine Corps amphibious team operating from a secure base adjacent to the sea. The casualty figures really tell the story. Of some 4,000 Marines engaged on the ground, the casualty toll was 45 killed in action and 203 wounded in action—about 25 per cent of the latter being serious cases. Viet Cong losses were 641 killed in action by U. S. body count after the battle; how many dead or wounded bodies remained in bunkers, caves and tunnels blown in by bombs, gunfire, and explosive charges may never be definitely established, but subsequent estimates supported by as thorough an examination of the battlefield as can be made indicate that the total Viet Cong deaths may have reached the 1,500 mark.
It is suspected, but not positively confirmed, that a good many Viet Cong wounded may have been entombed in a blown-in underground dressing station, as happened a month or so later in Operation PIRANHA a little farther to the south. What is certain is that during the two days of Operation STARLITE a Viet Cong main-force regiment of some 2,000 men ceased to exist as a combat organization. Many Viet Cong undoubtedly escaped as individual fugitives or in small groups; there was no breakout by units such as platoons or companies, despite the suggestion of Dr. Bernard B. Fall in The New York Times Magazine that the Viet Cong lost heavily but “withdrew in good order.”
How was this brought about when such a thing had never happened to a major Viet Cong unit before during the whole course of the fighting in South Vietnam? There were two main reasons.
First, complete surprise was achieved, made possible by (a) the superior tactical mobility of airborne and seaborne forces, enabling them to engage and fix the enemy almost before he had time to realize he was under attack; (b) the fact that preparatory actions could take place either within a U. S.-controlled area where security was relatively satisfactory or on board ships at sea.
Second, the combination of vertical and surface envelopment enabled the Marines to compel the enemy to stand and fight under highly unfavorable circumstances—the latter including decisive inferiority in firepower.
The validity of the concept of establishing operational base areas along the edge of the sea seems to be irrefutably established by this experience. The further development of such a base system might well include linking the bases together as the original landing zones of a beachhead are linked. Control of whole coastal sectors would not only provide a secure position from which U. S. combat power and civil affairs efforts could be extended inland as conditions or enemy action might require, but would also—in the five northern provinces for which III MAF is responsible—represent a firm tactical and logistic position within the major population area of the region, denying the Viet Cong a lodgment among the people.
To do just that is, of course, “the object of the exercise” in the American military effort in South Vietnam. It is not, of course, suggested that enough U. S. ground forces can be provided to establish a continuous U. S. “military presence” in every populated center, but that is where the exceptional flexibility and fast reaction time of amphibious power comes in. The end of the line for guerrillas has been reached when villagers, given arms and some degree of training by the counter-guerrilla forces, can be relied on to pick up their weapons and start shooting when the guerrillas try a comeback. Villagers will do this only when they have learned by demonstration that they can rely on the prompt arrival of a relieving force adequate to deal with the situation. A well-organized coastal zone of defense, backed by seaborne forces, should present ideal conditions for establishing local security on this basis—including the indispensable rock-bottom factor of willing participation in self-defense by the so-called “popular forces” or village militia. The experience of guerrilla campaigns in Greece and Malaya emphasize this point— that the guerrillas are done for when the villagers are willing to fight for their homes, motivated by self-interest and encouraged by the certainty that help will arrive in time. This is the local objective toward which the current activities and efforts of III MAF is directed within the area of its assigned responsibility.
It all gets back to the question of confidence, generated by experience and demonstrated by accomplishment. Just for one grass-roots example—in the fall of 1965, the III MAF was able to protect the greater part of the rice crop in the vicinity of their TAORs from the annual tax of 50 per cent levied by the Viet Cong in previous years, preserving for the people of the area the product of their labor. It is expected that this operation— entitled GOLDEN FLEECE—can be considerably extended in scope this year, which will cramp the Communist style both on material and morale planes. Tactical operations in support of this program will of course be tailored to produce a military bonus where possible, and will further emphasize the point that the sea really is a dependable base for the projection of military power inland from shoreline. Such demonstrations need not be confined to the I Corps Area; for example, there is the great rice bowl of the Mekong Delta, where the all-but-forgotten success enjoyed by the French in using armored river gunboats to support land operations along the rivers of the north might be revived in the south by web-footed Americans.
The principal strategic dividend to be expected from the growth of confidence in the sea among the village populations and the armed forces of South Vietnam will be the product of an increased effectiveness in local defense throughout the vital coastal zone—not only by home guard or militia forces, but by the use of regional forces (similar to our National Guard) for relieving endangered localities and for highway security. To the extent that U. S. troops and those of the South Vietnamese regular army can be used in the field rather than tied down—as many now are—to local security missions, our freedom of action to deal with enemy initiatives or to launch large-scale operations of our own devising will be materially increased.
* See Bryce F. Denno, “New War in Vietnam,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, March 1966, pp.