For nearly three decades the U.S. Navy was unchallenged in its mastery of the air, expeditionary, sea, undersea, and information domains, but the present age sees the return to great power competition and the rise of near-peer competitors. The next war will be fought with navies operating with reduced, masked, or nonexistent electromagnetic signatures. They will employ innovative deception tactics and cyber operations to confuse adversary decision-making, and seek to detect and target opposing forces with long-range kinetic and non-kinetic attacks. In this battle, victory at sea will go to the side better able to use integrated information warfare (IW) capabilities, specifically operational intelligence (OPINTEL), as the essential advantage over adversaries.
OPINTEL has been defined as, “The art of providing near-real-time information concerning the location, activity, and likely intentions of . . . adversaries.”1 It remains naval intelligence’s core mission, and it should be the deciding factor in modern naval warfare—the force first able to locate and engage an enemy has an overwhelming advantage. The criticality of OPINTEL means the Navy can never cede this edge to the adversary, or consider its current state of advantage to be sufficient and enduring.
Since the end of the Cold War, OPINTEL proficiency and structured training arguably declined. Deploying strike groups use a handful of team trainers and the pre-deployment cycle to achieve a minimum level of competency during deployment, with all OPINTEL ceasing at the conclusion. Numbered fleet maritime intelligence operations centers (MIOCs) have instituted OPINTEL-based approaches, but they vary heavily in scope and skill. The establishment of the Fleet Intelligence Detachment (FID), Fleet Intelligence Support Team (FIST), Information Warfare Doctrine Command (IWDC), and Center for Information Warfare Training (CIWT) are great initiatives, but they have yet to fully mature.
It is time to address the OPINTEL core competency across naval intelligence—to take our current decisive advantage, improve it, and make the investments that will perpetuate and extend our capabilities over any potential adversary.
Some starting points for a discussion on how naval intelligence can expand its OPINTEL advantage are:
- Increase basic competency of Naval Intelligence Officer Basic Course (NIOBC) graduates by focusing every aspect of the course on integrated OPINTEL. Elements of the three fleet-based intelligence team trainers (ITTs) should be incorporated into NIOBC as a baseline. When possible, senior fleet IW and unrestricted line officers should be mentors to ensure transfer of critical knowledge. Classroom courses and practical examinations, such as battle simulations and watches, should be moved to training laboratories, preferably at sea.
- The intelligence officer PQS should integrate OPINTEL throughout. It should include evaluated OPINTEL duties that must occur in an afloat environment, and the IW warfare qualification should be earned at sea. To a lesser degree the IW PQS should familiarize all IW officers, not just intelligence officers, with OPINTEL. Both the intelligence officer PQS and the broader IW warfare PQS should demand better competency on knowing adversary militaries, and oversight of both programs should be managed at the fleet level for quality control. Signatories should be certified to ensure program harmony.
- Reinvigorate and expand OPINTEL warrant and limited duty officer programs. A better OPINTEL warrant/limited duty officer track would allow the Navy to rapidly expand its cadre of OPINTEL masters. A corresponding OPINTEL-specific warrant and limited duty officer billet structure focused on sea duty and the MIOCs would ensure standardization and utilization of these critical skills.
- Reimagine the OPINTEL approach at both the IWDC and the CIWT. The intelligence weapons tactics instructor (WTI) was a strong step forward, but pairing the IWDC with the Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center (NMITC) could yield even greater benefits in advancing OPINTEL skills. As the engine behind OPINTEL doctrine development, IWDC should maintain subject-matter expertise at all rates and ranks, and become the repository of high-velocity OPINTEL learning. Fleet OPINTEL experts should evaluate and integrate training in conjunction with WTIs. The IWDC should develop out-of-cycle war gaming, conduct experimentation, and identify and disseminate innovations and best practices throughout the fleet.
- Develop 1830 OPINTEL apprentice/journeyman/master training, possibly managed by NMITC or IWDC/CIWT. Completion would be a prerequisite for O4 and O5 milestone screening. These courses should include self-study, graded simulations, and practical tests that integrate officer and enlisted for key evaluations. The courses should be managed apart from strict curriculum controls to drive dynamic learning that paces fleet operations. Visiting senior instructors would increase the transition of learned skills.
- Navy Information Forces (NAVIFOR) should study the prospect of giving senior afloat intelligence officers more control of augmentee management and rebalancing OPINTEL specialization between MIOCs and deploying forces. Assignment O4 and O5 intelligence officers to leadership and command billets should emphasize demonstrated OPINTEL proficiency. Commander command opportunities focused on OPINTEL must be increased.
Current OPINTEL proficiency remains a decisive advantage to Navy commanders, but without attention, this advantage will erode. Focusing on structured OPINTEL development will ensure the Navy maintains its edge and actually increases the gap between our OPINTEL mastery and the capabilities of any adversary. Doing so not only improves our core capability but will be a vital element in ensuring victory in future naval battles.
1. RADM Lowelly Jacoby, USN, United States Navy, “Operational Intelligence: Lessons from the Cold War,” Proceedings, U.S. Naval Institute, September 1999, Vol 125/9.