Technical Expertise Requires Its Own Career Path
(See J. W. D. Kurtz, p. 12, December 2015 Proceedings)
Colonel Todd R. Fredricks, U.S. Army—I feel compelled to comment on Commander Kurtz’s observations. Not only does technical expertise require its own career path, but in light of budgetary pressures and our obligation to the U.S. taxpayers to manage their funds with fiscal discipline, it also requires looking for better options.
Why the U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Marines continue to avoid the wide adoption of warrant officer pilots and aviators befuddles me. The U.S. Army successfully uses warrant officers in all aspects of aviation, both fixed-wing and rotary. I won’t delve into the use of warrants as ship’s masters as that might just be too controversial for the Sea Services. Warrant officers are cheaper to maintain over their careers. A CW4 is simply less expensive to pay, provide allowances, and finance retirement for than is an O-5 or O-6.
Warrant officers do not come with the burden of a college education that has to be completed prior to being qualified to fly. Non-Army aviators and pilots first have to endure ever-growing debt burdens just to satisfy some peculiar notion that a college degree is necessary to successfully operate an aircraft. This has an impact in the long term for retention, especially as the commercial airlines demand more pilots to fill their rolls with the promise of significantly greater salaries than those of the services.
The appeal to a qualified high school graduate to be able to enter into a technical field with superior-quality training without the need to first get what in many cases is an expensive, and often unusable, degree in the private sector cannot be underestimated. Providing a high school–to–flight school pathway would not only engender greater loyalty to the respective service but also achieve Commander Kurtz’s end state of developing and strengthening technical-expertise career paths without the overhead of nonessential education as a prerequisite.
It is long past time to end the antiquated and costly model of creating an ensign or lieutenant prior to training them to fly. Establishing warrants as the primary aviators and pilots across all services would further unburden the services with the need to provide command billets for promotion consideration. It would save the taxpayers significant sums in the reduction of life-cycle and retirement costs of each aviator or pilot. All of these things are desirable and would show civilian leadership and politicians that the military was serious about balancing the nation’s ends with its means while providing a proven group of world-class specialists to operate U.S. combat aircraft.
Captain Grant Carson, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Commander Kurtz argues that aviators who prefer to continue flying rather than take command should be allowed to do what they prefer. I wholeheartedly support that contention, from a surprising direction—that of a surface warfare officer. Let the aviators who wish to do so continue to fly rather than displacing able SWOs who desperately wish to command.
Let me explain. The law requires the commanding officer of a carrier to be an aviator. Naval Personnel requires a large pool of aviators qualified for command of carriers. Naval Personnel, understandably, prefers an aviator with a tour of ship command. Thus, Naval Personnel assigns aviators, too many in my opinion, with precious little experience in running ships, to command service-force and amphibious ships.
Here are examples. I was the 23rd commanding officer of the oldest amphibious ship in the Navy. The first 20 COs were aviator captains, commanding one year each, “getting their punch” to possibly command a carrier. They were taught how to run ships by their executive officers, SWOs who largely ran the ship but could not aspire to command it. (I, then a commander, captained the ship when it had become too decrepit to be appropriate for an aviator captain and was downgraded for a SWO commander.)
Second example. I had a friend who was a maritime-patrol aviator commander selected for captain. He was assigned to command an LPD. He had never stood a watch as ship’s company. I’m sure he was a very good leader, but in his place might have been a surface warfare officer who was not only a very good leader also, but knew how to run a ship.
Third example. While I was captain of the LSD, I had three squadron commanders, a surfaced diesel submariner, a surface warfare officer with amphibious experience, and a fighter pilot aviator. The SWO was, no surprise, by far the best. By all means let the aviators who wish to fly continue to do so. But, please, don’t send to ship commands so many aviators who don’t aspire to the task, aren’t well qualified for it, and may not even enjoy it.
Leading Outside Command
(See J. Shell, pp. 52–57, December 2015 Proceedings)
Captain David L. Teska, U.S. Coast Guard Reserve (Retired)—Lieutenant Commander Shell hit the mark with his piece. He made a convincing case, using the example of Major General Fox Connor and his influence on several officers who, in positions of command, played key roles in preparing the U.S. Army and leading it to victory in Europe in World War II. Connor’s story illustrates how our military culture needs to refocus on leadership outside command. The author effectively closed the “leadership loop” (my term) by recognizing that leadership comes in many shapes and sizes and not just when in command, and that mentoring and study as preparation have a place in the development of future leaders.
I just retired from 31 years of active and reserve service in the U.S. Army and Coast Guard. In all, my command time came to a total of two weeks when, as a first lieutenant, I commanded an Army National Guard headquarters company in an aviation battalion during a field-training exercise. I was fortunate to make it to captain in the Coast Guard Reserve without ever having held formal command. In fact, after 1995, it became very difficult to get command in the Coast Guard Reserve when the Coast Guard folded most reserve units and merged the bulk of its reservists into active-duty units, reducing reserve command opportunities to port-security units (O-5) and Coast Guard detachments at Department of Defense combatant commands (O-6). Did I ever find myself in positions of leadership outside of command where I served as a mentor and had a direct influence over the careers and professional development of junior officers and enlisted members? Absolutely.
Case in point: I spent two years as the senior reserve officer at Coast Guard Sector San Diego and had those responsibilities (and more) for 135-plus reservists. While I wasn’t their commanding officer and didn’t have those authorities (no non-judicial punishment authority, for example), I did apply the leadership and mentoring skills I had learned during the preceding years; it was one of my most fulfilling reserve assignments and I’m still in touch with several former members from that unit. I came to that assignment having gained experience as a practitioner and recipient of solid (and not so solid, for bad examples can also prove instructive) leadership and mentoring.
The services should take heed of Lieutenant Commander Shell’s example and recognize that leaders, along with leadership and mentoring opportunities, exist outside the traditional paradigm of command, and that officers in leadership positions (such as on a staff) as well as senior enlisted members need those very same skills and experiences to succeed. And leaders at all levels should endeavor to pursue serving as a mentor to those below them who show promise. The example of Fox Connor—a highly complicated and sophisticated one in terms of whom he chose, how he chose them, and how he nurtured their careers over long periods of time—can still serve as an excellent model today.
Two is One, One is None
(See M. E. Clark, pp. 24–31, November 2015, and L. E. Napoli, pp. 8–9, December 2015 Proceedings)
Captain Thomas Pinney, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Major Clark’s article presented a strong case that to be able to deal with asymmetric, low-end threats, the Marine Corps as well as the rest of the U.S. armed forces need to have economical systems, specifically the A-29 Super Tucano. His research is sound and his conclusions entirely reasonable. We do need a low-end and affordable aircraft to deal with hybrid and guerrilla threats. What use is it to have a highly capable and stealthy aircraft when the enemy does not even possess radar? The A-29 he recommends to fill this need is being used all around the world, and it is indeed a very capable aircraft, especially for the money.
Major Clark’s analysis has two substantial failings. He does not address how these A-29s will get to the conflict. The Marine Corps has a global reach, and the places where they are likely to be engaged are far from the United States. With only a 1,500-mile ferry range and no air-to-air refueling capability, the aircraft would have to be partially disassembled for transportation and then put back together at a base closer to the fight. Although an A-29 might be able to take off and land from a carrier with enough wind over the deck, it is decidedly not qualified for carrier operations. If we are going to use A-29s in combat they will have to be forward-deployed to an area that will enable them to reach a land base near the conflict zone without the need for transport by other means.
The second failing with Major Clark’s proposal is his underestimation of unmanned aerial vehicles. UAVs are far more capable today than they were even ten years ago, and that capability is continuing to expand. Not only are most UAVs cheaper to operate than even the thrifty A-29, many of them are operating from ships right now. Although Major Clark is correct in asserting that a manned system is more flexible than UAVs, that gap is closing. Even in the near term, inexpensive UAVs can accomplish a wide variety of missions that once required a pilot in the aircraft.
The A-29 is a neat little aircraft, and Major Clark has an excellent point that we need to have low-end systems to deal with the small wars and conflicts in the coming days. But adding another manned aircraft at this point is probably not the most productive solution to this problem.
Captain Thomas Pinard, U.S. Navy (Retired)—At last, a sane article on the need for close-in air-support aircraft for our Marines. But will it fall on deaf ears? Our planners in the Navy, Marines, and Air Force seem barely able to bring themselves to consider what is needed, only thinking of what is “cool” to fly.
While Major Clark proposes the A-29 Super Tucano as a close-in support aircraft, is it a realistic platform? What is needed is the Air Tractor, a tried-and-true utility aircraft that can give the ground forces what they truly need: a support aircraft in the field that can get in and out of the roughest landing zones and really do the job for our Marines and soldiers.
I grew up in my father’s “Stearman Shop” after World War II, introducing the Stearman to crop-dusting. I know what works in the field. The A-29 looks so good, almost like a P-51 from the 1940s but with tricycle gear. Boy, our aviators really wouldn’t mind downsizing into that. But if we really care to support our Marines, then buy the off-the-shelf Air Tractor 802 for a fraction of the price and let’s get on with rebuilding our defenses.
Vincent Truba—I cannot understand why the armed services of the United States have such a love for the Brazilian Super Tucano. The U.S. Marine Corps has ordered approximately 353 F-35 fighters that will likely not reach their full operating potential until about 2025. The Marines’ F-35 order will probably be over a ten-plus-year period, depending on available funding by Congress. That we should prematurely abort part of that very important order is not justified by the facts. The Marines will need every one of those 353 F-35s.
Also, the Boeing OV-10 Bronco is already a proven amphibious carrier performer. It needs no tail-hook equipment, can carry offensive ordnance, can carry light freight to a battle zone, and during the Vietnam War, a light turbojet engine was installed on its back to improve its performance. Without the turbojet, it has a speed of just under 300 miles per hour.
Further, Boeing has considered reopening the OV-10 production line and has inquiries from overseas about purchases if this occurs. If the Marine Corps ordered 100 OV-10s, that would anchor the production line, and the overseas buyers may purchase another 100 aircraft or more. This might cut the unit cost for all the buyers and put U.S. tax dollars to work, giving the American workers the jobs insead of sending our money to Brazil.
Admirals (and Generals) for Life
(See D. Crowder, p. 10, November 2015, and L. S. Smith, p. 8, December 2015 Proceedings)
Commander Steve Shatynski, U.S. Navy (Retired)—I agree wholeheartedly with Vice Admiral Crowder that retired flag officers have special obligations as private citizens. Primary among these would be to use measured and good judgment in word and deed. Particularly, they must avoid revealing classified information or acting as military analysts in the media while speaking irresponsibly about topics on which they may not have accurate or current information.
At the same time, retired flags do our country a disservice if they will not, if they desire, share their vast experience and unique perspective by weighing in on vital political discussions. Citizens need good information to make informed political decisions, particularly in areas such as national defense, where they likely have little expertise.
There is far too much to be lost if former flag officers do not contribute to political debate in their retirement, if they desire to do so.
The C-2 Greyhound: A Multi-Mission Workhorse?
(See D. Reimers, pp. 80–82, November 2015 Proceedings)
Commander Howard A. Brown, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Having had the unpleasant task of trying to run a detachment of C-2A aircraft during a period of maximum operational-support requirement in the 1971–72 time frame, I am amazed to see them still in service. I can’t imagine the huge amounts of my tax dollars that have gone into keeping that monster going. In my opinion, it should have been sent to the boneyard years ago. It is slow, altitude-limited, range-limited, load-limited, and requires excessive maintenance. Over the years, many advanced ideas for improved multi-mission aircraft have been proposed; I wonder why they have not been accepted? To think of the C-2 as a tanker or a gunship or of it being replaced by another slow machine makes me disgusted. As long as the DOD is spending big bucks on the F-35, why not a few more for a halfway decent and capable support aircraft?
If I am not mistaken, the C-2 is about to celebrate its 50th birthday. Time to retire it and find a real replacement.
Closing the Presence Gap
(See W. M. Beasley Jr., pp. 52–58, November 2015 Proceedings)
Federico De Los Rios—Using the rules of a board game like wei qi to guide real-world foreign policy is dangerous, because independent countries are not pieces on a board. China seems to forget that its economic prosperity depends on having a stable and friendly relationship with its neighbors surrounding the South China Sea; its recent aggressive and bullying behavior toward them has put that relationship in danger. Now countries like the Philippines and Vietnam are turning toward the United States for security. China’s behavior has awoken serious concerns as well in Japan, which is now starting to increase its defense spending and trying to change its constitution so it can take a more active role in foreign affairs.
China must understand that its present bullying of its neighbors in the South China Sea is going to undermine the great economic prosperity it has reached in the last few years, prosperity made possible by the stability, freedom of navigation, and commerce enjoyed by all the nations surrounding this very important area.