In the past two years, the political temperature in the South China Sea has changed sharply. This distant body of water, once considered on the periphery of U.S. interests, has become a focal point in U.S.-China relations. How did this remote area gain such importance? What is the significance of this region in the emerging U.S.-China strategic rivalry? Short of war, how can the U.S. Navy contribute to national interests in this contentious region?
The South China Sea possesses enormous economic significance. Nearly $1.2 trillion of U.S. trade and half of all Indian trade flow through this area. Routes through these waters account for half of the global merchant fleet by tonnage and one third of crude oil transits. For China, 90 percent of its foreign trade is seaborne, and the high energy demands of its developing economy cause heavy dependence on oil imports. Since China’s top threat to regime survival is domestic instability, maintaining this energy lifeline is critical to the Communist Party’s survival. In addition to these important sea lanes, the South China Sea is marked by extensive natural resource potential. Proven oil reserves reach nearly 8 billion barrels, and the seafloor could contain more than 22 billion barrels of crude oil and 290 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.1
The economic importance of the South China Sea, however, belies its strategic significance. With as many as six countries vying for any given land feature, China’s unilateral policies to seize territorial control from its neighbors, build military facilities to defend its imposed sovereignty, and set a precedent that the rule of force supersedes the rule of law push the region swiftly toward disorder.
Disputes, Reclamation, and Militarization
Two characteristics highlight the political complexity of these territorial disputes. First, the South China Sea is most prominently distinguished by its water-area-to-land ratio. The water area is exceptionally large, and the land features are acutely small. Nearly 1.5 million square miles of water are dotted by bottom features that cumulatively make up six square miles of land. Second, even inhabitable islands do not sustain indigenous populations. Some islands feature sparse settlements, but most of these developments are indicative of unilateral policies designed to reinforce Chinese territorial claims. For example, China established the prefecture of Sansha on Woody Island in the Paracel Islands in response to Vietnamese claims over this territory. Beijing subsequently invested more than $1.5 billion in infrastructure development, rapidly constructing a town to establish de facto administrative control over the island and the region.2
Disputed land features in the South China Sea exist in four groups that are variously claimed by Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, Brunei, and China. Relative to Macclesfield Bank, a completely submerged feature near the center of the South China Sea, the Paracel Islands lie in the west, the Pratas Islands in the northeast, Scarborough Shoal in the east, and the Spratly Islands in the south. Vietnam claims the Paracel and Spratly Islands; the Philippines claims Scarborough Shoal and part of the Spratly Islands; Malaysia and Brunei claim smaller portions of the Spratly Islands; Taiwan claims the Pratas Islands; and China claims every land feature in all four groups. These claims are further complicated by sporadic military occupations—the Paracel Islands by China, the Pratas Islands by Taiwan, and the Spratly Islands variously by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia.
China’s claim over the entirety of the South China Sea originates from its so-called nine-dash line, which first appeared on Republic of China maps in 1947. These maps were adopted by the ruling Communist Party following Mao Zedong’s 1949 revolution, and China has since referenced historical rights to claim undisputed sovereignty over all land features in the South China Sea. Complicating the legality of this claim, Beijing’s nine-dash line appears to claim sovereignty over the vast water space as well, which has no basis in international law. The other regional claimants have rejected the nine-dash line’s validity, referencing more widely recognized guidelines for maritime claims established in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and placing international law more clearly on their side. UNCLOS does not permit any state to claim historic rights for any body of water other than bays along its immediate coastline, as these guidelines prioritize continental-shelf limits over occupation or political proclamations. The Philippines challenged China’s claims in 2012 using UNCLOS-established procedures, and despite China refusing to recognize the body’s authority, an arbitral tribunal ruled in July 2016 that there is no legal basis for China to claim historical rights within the nine-dash line.3
China generally did not enforce these claims during the 20th century, but the territorial disputes have grown more intense in the past few years, marked by Chinese policies to assert sovereignty. After the Philippine Navy responded in April 2012 to reports of Chinese fishing at the disputed Scarborough Shoal, for example, the Chinese Navy dispatched two ships that maneuvered between the Philippine vessel and the fishing boats. Although both sides negotiated a peaceful withdrawal, China subsequently seized de facto control of Scarborough Shoal by deploying additional ships to establish a persistent presence and block further Philippine access.4
Since December 2013, the political-military atmosphere has been distinguished most notably by Chinese reclamation projects in the Spratly Islands. China transformed Johnson South Reef into an artificial island amounting to more than 1 million square feet, and Gaven Reef gained an additional 1.2 million square feet of territory. Fiery Cross Reef gained 9.5 million square feet of land, which equates to more than 160 football fields. Fiery Cross Reef is now more than three times larger than Itu Aba, previously the largest island in the Spratlys.5 Overall, China has reclaimed more than 3,000 acres of land, increasing the collective land area in the South China Sea by 25 percent.
The ‘Great Wall of Sand’
China’s militarization of these newly built islands has increased considerably its strategic leverage over the other South China Sea claimants. Gaven Reef now features an antiaircraft tower, dock, gun emplacements, and radar and communications equipment. Fiery Cross, Mischief, and Subi Reefs each will have a nearly 10,000-foot runway, long enough to land any aircraft in China’s air force, and deep-water ports are under construction that will accommodate any combatant in its navy. The U.S. State Department has characterized China’s strategy as attempting to “militarize outposts on disputed land,” and Pacific Command Commander Admiral Harry Harris described Chinese actions as “creating a Great Wall of Sand.” During testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 17 September 2015, Admiral Harris noted, “And if you look at all the facilities, then you can imagine a network of missile sites, runways for their fifth-generation fighters and surveillance sites. . . . It creates a mechanism by which China would have de facto control over the South China Sea in any scenario short of war. . . . It poses a threat against all other countries in the region.”6
While not all aggression warrants a U.S. response, what is it about this behavior that makes it strategically significant? American interests in the South China Sea reflect the evolving U.S.-China strategic rivalry. As noted by national security scholar Hugh White, the United States and China are not strategic rivals because they have differences in the South China Sea; but, rather, they have differences in the South China Sea because they are strategic rivals.7 We may be able to control the speed of this emerging relationship, but an ongoing relative power transition and opposing perspectives on international order are pushing the United States and China toward this rivalry.
Beware the Thucydides Trap
Much like the movement of ships and aircraft, power between nations can be measured in real or relative terms. American power is not in real decline, but China’s power is increasing in real terms faster than that of the United States. While the U.S. power advantage will continue for many years to come, the relative power gap is closing. An increase in China’s real power causes concern; a decrease in the United States’ relative power advantage causes fear.
This dynamic is known as the “Thucydides Trap.” Thucydides famously observed, “The growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Sparta, made war inevitable.”8 We often characterize military threats as a combination of capability and intent, but intentions become moot in the Thucydides Trap; it is the rising capability that causes fear. In the tragic realm of perception and misperception in international politics, the rising capabilities of a potential adversary increase the likelihood of inferring malicious intentions—well founded or not.9 Chinese armed forces designed to deter external attack only draw greater suspicion, and even if Beijing intended every new weapon system to be purely defensive, it often is impossible to distinguish between defensive and offensive weapons. New capabilities simply will serve as proof of offensive intentions.
This emerging rivalry, however, does not necessarily condemn the United States and China to war. In explaining the Thucydides Trap, Graham Allison observed that “the only thing that is inevitable is severe structural stress,” referring to the pressure placed on the international system.10 War may not be certain, but this emerging strategic rivalry will feature an intrinsically uncomfortable relationship between China and the United States.
Opposing perspectives on international order are compounding the difficulty of this relative power transition. The United States has an interest in maintaining order because disorder can have profound effects on the global economic system. The United States has defended an international rules-based system, which provides the stability that underwrites prosperity for all nations. Any state that threatens to bypass these rules threatens the stability of the system. Nations in the system benefit by constraining any power-maximizing state from doing whatever it will.
One would expect Beijing to share this interest in maintaining order, but there is another side to this term “order” that complicates the matter. Preventing disorder also requires an adherence to an existing international ordinal structure. Today’s system is the product of American global leadership since World War II that pursued U.S. interests in its development. A rising China that seeks to reorder the system in its favor expectedly threatens U.S. interests. China is willing to endure the cost of disorder in pursuit of a new system that serves its national interests.
‘Disorder over Stability’
In this context, the South China Sea’s strategic importance becomes clear. China’s interactions with its neighbors, marked by an aggressive land reclamation and militarization campaign, demonstrate its preference to settle territorial disputes through power rather than within the constraints of existing international norms. This approach is not exceptional for a traditional power-maximizing state, but it demonstrates a choice of disorder over stability in pursuit of national interests. China has used military strength to win control over territory disputed with Vietnam and the Philippines in the South China Sea, so we should expect the same treatment of the other claimants as China’s relative power grows.
Should Beijing gain control over the South China Sea at little cost, it could have considerable implications for the future of China’s rise. The strategic vision of any state changes with past outcomes, so it is important to consider how China’s approach might evolve over time. Beijing currently may not have designs outside the nine-dash line, but if seizing the South China Sea becomes an inexpensive transaction, then the question is not why would it seek more, but rather, why wouldn’t it?
From this perspective, U.S. interests in the South China Sea are less about territorial disputes than about the disruption that results from territorial conflict. Without credible U.S. presence, the trajectory of Chinese foreign policy portends sustained regional destabilization. The United States has tightened its alliance with the Philippines and reaffirmed its growing partnerships with Vietnam and Malaysia to prevent conditions that entice Chinese expansion. Increasing bilateral defense cooperation and joint military exercises have provided assurance that the United States remains a Pacific power with an interest in maintaining regional peace and stability.
The South China Sea is significant in managing China’s rise, and the U.S. Navy has an important role to play. As the nation’s forward instrument of military diplomacy, the U.S. Navy is on the front lines in the South China Sea. Through presence operations and routine engagements with Chinese counterparts, the Navy’s warrior-diplomats should be guided by three principles in the military-diplomatic mission. Most officers and enlisted share a characteristic that makes these three principles challenging—an eagerness to be hospitable. This motivates us to make others feel comfortable, offer assistance when possible, and couch our language out of concern over being disrespectful. While these behaviors are virtuous at home or with close allies, they are less appropriate in the context of a strategic rivalry.
Diplomatic Principles Going Forward
First, we must become comfortable with an uncomfortable relationship. Chinese President Xi Jinping noted in a recent interview, “Naturally, we have some differences, even family members don’t always see eye to eye with each other.”11 The U.S. Navy could learn from this approach to foreign policy. The United States and China are going to disagree in certain areas, and accepting the feelings that accompany disagreement is an important part of managing a strategic rivalry.
Second, we must accept that “engagement” and “capacity-building” are not synonymous. Naval units frequently perform engagements with emerging militaries worldwide, simultaneously building their capacity to improve their ability to provide security. This combined effort is so common that these two distinct missions can seem inseparable, particularly given that few things during an engagement convey goodwill as effectively as helping another military fight better. Engagement with China, however, normally does not entail capacity building, and any decision to do so should be deliberate and strategically driven. The U.S. naval advantage is borne from years of modern warfighting experience and must be guarded prudently.
Third, we must appreciate that respect and resolve are not mutually exclusive. Because engagements are customarily friendly environments, it is difficult to imagine saying anything that might be received unfavorably. In an evolving competitive relationship that often will be uncomfortable, military diplomacy requires skillfully striking a tone that demonstrates resolve while remaining respectful. U.S. power is not intrinsically disrespectful, and when applied judiciously, can communicate military credibility while respecting China’s right to grow peacefully.
Suspicions between the United States and China go back many decades, and this emerging strategic rivalry will test restraint on both sides. Engagement with China is a critical component of managing this relationship, because these interactions play an important role in reducing misperception and even may prevent strategic miscalculation.
I was in Beijing in October 2015 when the USS Lassen (DDG-82) conducted the first U.S. freedom-of-navigation transit to challenge a Chinese claimed feature. During talks that evening at the Ministry of Defense, I sat across the table from People’s Liberation Army Senior Colonel Lu Zhongling, the head of the Americas Division in the Foreign Affairs Office. She demanded that U.S. forces cease operations in Chinese sovereign waters. I, along with my fellow delegation members, reaffirmed the excessive nature of China’s maritime claims and firmly asserted our rights under international law to operate in those waters. The exchange was uncomfortable to be sure, but 90 minutes later, we adjourned and shared dinner together. Despite firm representation on both sides, the U.S.-China relationship was not broken.
We had traveled to China knowing the Lassen operation might occur while we were there, and the delegation was prepared for Beijing to terminate our visit. Senior Colonel Lu noted that the visit’s continuation marked an evolution of the relationship, in that we could weather these differences in the interest of stability. The visit continued unabated, allowing us to deliver a respectful message of resolve. While the maturity of the U.S.-China relationship has improved our ability to manage this friction, our differences will become more profound and intense as the strategic rivalry deepens. Our Navy’s warrior-diplomats will be critical in carefully navigating this progressively uncomfortable relationship with respect and resolve.
1. U.S. Energy Information Administration, “South China Sea,” www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/South_China_Sea/south_china_sea.pdf. David Rosenberg and Christopher Chung, “Maritime Security in the South China Sea: Coordinating Coastal and User State Priorities,” Ocean Development International Law, vol. 39, no. 1 (2008). David Michel and Ricky Passarelli, “Sea Change: Evolving Maritime Geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific Region,” Stimson Center, www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/SEA-CHANGE-WEB.pdf.
2. Linda Jakobson, “China’s Unpredictable Maritime Security Actors, ” Lowy Institute, www.lowyinstitute.org/files/chinas-unpredictable-maritime-security-actors_3.pdf.
3. Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, “Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS): Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf Beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the Baselines,” United Nations, www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_mysvnm_33_2009.htm. “The South China Sea Arbitration” (The Republic of the Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China),” Permanent Court of Arbitration press release, https://pca-cpa.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/175/2016/07/PH-CN-20160712-Press-Release-No-11-English.pdf.
4. Floyd Whaley, “U.S. Reaffirms Defense of Philippines in Standoff with China,” The New York Times, 1 May 2012. Floyd Whaley, “Philippines and China in a Standoff at Sea,” The New York Times, 11 April 2012. Mark Rosen, “Philippine Claims in the South China Sea: A Legal Analysis,” Center for Naval Analyses, www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/IOP-2014-U-008435.pdf.
5. Mira Rapp-Hooper, “Before and After: The South China Sea Transformed,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, http://amti.csis.org/before-and-after-the-south-china-sea-transformed.
6. Simon Denyer, “U.S. Navy alarmed at Beijing’s ‘Great Wall of Sand’ in South China Sea,” The Washington Post, 1 April 2015. ADM Harry B. Harris, Jr., USN, “Maritime Security Strategy in the Asia-Pacific Region,” U.S. Senate, www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/15-09-17-maritime-security-strategy-in-the-asia-pacific-region.
7. Hugh White, “Time to Decide: Contain China or Accommodate It?” in Sino-U.S. Colloquium VIII, “Beyond the Current Distrust,” George Washington University, Elliot School of International Affairs, 2015.
8. Thucydides (Robert B. Strassler, ed.), The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War (New York: Free Press, 1996), 16.
9. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 310–11.
10. Graham T. Allison, “Avoiding the Thucydides Trap,” in Sino-U.S. Colloquium VIII, “Beyond the Current Distrust,” George Washington University, Elliot School of International Affairs, 2015.
11. “Full Transcript: Interview with Chinese President Xi Jinping,” The Wall Street Journal, 22 September 2015.