The President’s Book of Secrets: The Untold Story of Intelligence Briefings to America’s Presidents from Kennedy to Obama
David Priess. New York: Perseus Books, 2016. 369 pp. Index. Notes. Illus. $29.99.
Reviewed by Captain Mike Studeman, U.S. Navy
One of the most frequent inquiries at the Library of Congress is the location of the President’s book of secrets, a fictional document popularized in the 2007 film National Treasure. Soon that book will be available. Instead of uncovering hidden facts about the JFK assassination, Area 51, and Watergate, however, David Priess’ nonfiction work reveals the ground truth regarding how intelligence has supported presidents and their closest advisers since World War II.
Dr. Priess’ research focuses on the evolution of the “most tightly guarded daily publication on the face of the earth,” or the President’s Daily Brief (PDB). Insiders simply call it “the book.” Produced by the CIA for most of the last 50 years, the PDB is delivered and briefed five to six days a week for only the President and his senior-most national security officials. It provides insights into global threats, foreign leaders’ actions, and international opportunities. Drawn from diplomatic cables, clandestine reports from spies, intercepts of foreign communications, and any other relevant input, the PDB’s ultimate purpose is to give the President a decisive advantage in making informed choices about world affairs.
While this might have turned into a dry review of the raw mechanics of producing a premier intelligence document for our nation’s leaders, the author brings insights into the personalities and relationships among top officials. Glimpses into the lives and times of presidents and their trusted circle of advisers animate this work. Colorful anecdotes, many of them not covered in any other presidential and senior official biographies or memoirs, highlight the all-important human dimension that plays into national decision-making. Priess does not shy away from describing the sometimes testy relationship among presidents, national security advisers, and Directors of Central Intelligence (and since 2005, Directors of National Intelligence).
Similarly, the author pulls no punches regarding how intelligence was viewed by certain presidents. As President Richard M. Nixon flew over CIA headquarters en route to Camp David he reportedly muttered, “Look at them, what the hell are they all doing?” President Jimmy Carter’s national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, called the PDB “informative specifically, but not enlightening generally.” President Bill Clinton’s national security adviser, Sandy Berger, described the book as “more snapshots than movies.”
These criticisms were contrasted with praise from a string of presidents and vice presidents, who deemed PDBs and associated briefings excellent, informative, and detailed. President George W. Bush called intelligence personnel “true American heroes” for providing “accurate, timely, and objective information from all sources to help top decision-makers defend the United States and protect its interests abroad.” Vice President Al Gore called his PDB briefers “the single smartest collection of men and women that live and work in the government.”
Priess derived these insights from interviews with all living former presidents and vice presidents, along with more than 100 senior U.S. policymakers and intelligence officials who enjoyed access to or helped produce the PDB over time. As one might expect, richer detail exists for the last five presidential administrations, so more fulsome behind-the-scenes stories are described from the 1980s onward.
As a former CIA intelligence briefer, Priess might have been tempted to shade his work as an apologist for the intelligence community. In fact, he does review putative intelligence “failures” prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union and 9/11. The author clarifies that accurate intelligence was delivered to presidents, though these findings provided more general strategic warning than specific tactical warning. On other world events, such as the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the Iranian Revolution of 1978–79, and Iraq weapons of mass destruction, the author admits intelligence missed the boat. Here readers learn the importance of developing reliable sources of intelligence, clearly articulating confidence levels in analytic assessments, the problem of overly restrictive policies regarding intelligence collection, and the difficulty of predicting improbable, unlikely, and unreasonable choices of foreign leaders.
The President’s Book of Secrets is an important addition to the body of academic works on national security. It offers a unique look into the people and processes that impacted and continue to shape the course of history. In lifting the veil, Priess gives readers not just a close look at a key product that influences the choices of those in the White House, but the inner workings of government itself.
Devotion: An Epic Story of Heroism, Friendship, and Sacrifice
Adam Makos. New York: Ballantine Books, 2015. 443 pp. Photos. Biblio. Index. Notes. Maps. $28.00.
Reviewed by Vice Admiral Robert F. Dunn, U.S. Navy (Retired)
Devotion: An Epic Story of Heroism, Friendship, and Sacrifice describes how U.S. Marines fought their way out of the Chosin Reservoir and how the Navy and Marine Corsairs and Skyraiders supported them. It culminates with the story of naval aviators Tom Hudner and Jesse Brown flying close-air support to those Marines, which ends with enemy fire striking down Brown’s plane and Hudner being awarded the Medal of Honor for his attempt to rescue him.
The story begins with Brown and Hudner shorebased in 1949 at Quonset Point in Strike Fighter Squadron 32 (VF-32) flying F4U Corsairs. Hudner was assigned as Brown’s wingman, and they became great friends despite their differences: Brown was married while Hudner was not; Brown was from Mississippi by way of Ohio State, and Hudner hailed from Massachusetts by way of the Naval Academy. Moreover, Brown was the U.S. Navy’s first black pilot.
In the spring of 1950, Brown and Hudner were embarked in the USS Leyte (CV-32) on a Mediterranean cruise. While they were on a port visit to Beirut, the Korean War broke out. The aircraft carrier, along with an air group and battalion of Marines, hastily transferred from the 6th Fleet Amphibious Force and sailed to the Sea of Japan. Soon after arriving in the Western Pacific, the Marines disembarked and soon found themselves fighting in North Korea. Meanwhile, the Leyte air group flew strikes, armed reconnaissance, and close-air support for some of those Marines.
At around the time that winter weather and snowfall began, the Chinese entered the fray. Their overwhelming numbers pushed the Marines and Army—indeed, all United Nations forces—back south. The story of the Marines’ heroic “advance to the rear” to embark in the port of Hungnam has been told many times. But this book tells the rest of the story, namely what Navy and Marine air contributed to that incredible campaign.
Central to that effort were the Corsairs and Skyraiders from the Leyte air group. During an armed reconnaissance mission, a vital system of Brown’s plane took a round from the enemy. Losing power and unable to climb out of danger, the pilot elected to land wheels-up on the snow in a small valley. Circling overhead, Hudner could see that his leader was struggling to open his canopy and get out of the aircraft. Suggestions by radio were to no avail, so he made the extraordinary decision to land his own plane wheels-up as close to Brown as possible in order to help. After exiting his aircraft, he found Brown’s canopy wedged shut by damage. With a rescue helo approaching and unable to assist without tools, he promised Brown that he would return to free him. Other air group pilots patrolled overhead but soon observed Brown go limp inside the cockpit, all agreeing he was now beyond help.
Several months later, President Harry S Truman presented Hudner with the Medal of Honor and said, “Lieutenant Hudner’s exceptionally valiant action and selfless devotion to a shipmate sustain and enhance the highest traditions of the U.S. Naval Service.” Then he added, “You earned this.” Indeed he had.
Unfortunately for readers who know anything about the Navy—and particularly those who know anything about aircraft carriers, much of Makos’ language may turn them off. The author obviously failed to engage a knowledgeable naval person to review his words. He calls the 6th Fleet “The Dancing Fleet”; catwalks along the edge of a carrier flight deck are termed “trenches”; the carrier’s island is a “tower”; the deck is the “floor”; pilots carry notebooks instead of knee pads, eat in the dining room instead of the wardroom, and play backgammon instead of acey-deucy. Officers wear “tan slacks,” “tan” jackets, and “Tent Caps.” Worse, they respond to “as you were,” instead of “carry on.”
Overall, Devotion is well worth the read. If the reader can ignore the terminology, he or she will wonder yet again: “Where do we get such men?”
American Sea Power and the Obsolescence of Capital Ship Theory
Captain R. B. Watts. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 2016. 222 pp. Index. Biblio. Notes. $45.00.
Reviewed by Lieutenant Commander Rachael Gosnell, U.S. Navy
Captain R. B. Watts, a retired U.S. Coast Guard officer who has written extensively on sea power, presents a thought-provoking book challenging the tenets of Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan’s concept of sea power. American Sea Power and the Obsolescence of Capital Ship Theory offers an informative, well-researched historical overview of Mahan’s foundational theories. Watts further explores their application from 1914 to the present, offering his view on the feasibility of capital ship theory given the domination of irregular warfare, especially in the aftermath of 9/11.
Watts divides the book into three main parts: an examination irregular warfare and the role of maritime power; an appraisal of historical Navy culture, particularly Mahan’s theories and writings; and an exploration of modern-day irregular warfare and the way ahead for developing naval theory to meet this threat. The book is logically organized and provides a thorough foundation from which to analyze his thesis.
In discussing the trend of global irregular warfare, Watts highlights that while it has certainly received significant attention since 9/11, irregular warfare has indeed been a constant in military history. Yet the military profession has generally focused on great-power conflict over the unconventional fight. Indeed, the United States has engaged in irregular warfare on both sides—from the wars of colonial America to more recent conflicts that Watts describes as “irregular” wars: Vietnam, Lebanon, Somalia, Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. An extensive analysis of irregular warfare—and its relevance to naval forces—leads to the presentation of his thesis.
To support his argument that the U.S. Navy has failed to adapt to the challenges of the irregular-warfare threat by modifying traditional missions—focusing instead, he claims, on capital ship theory—Watts turns to the history of U.S. sea power theory and its impact on naval culture. He presents an extensive overview of the influence of Mahan and the theories he developed, while questioning the efficacy of applying Mahanian principles to modern-day challenges.
Watts then examines the ascendancy of capital ship theory in the 20th century. Providing insightful arguments, he evaluates the impact of Mahanian theory on the design and execution of naval forces through periods of both conflict and peace. He skillfully builds his argument by discussing the evolution of the U.S. Navy, pointing out when even Mahan questioned the effectiveness of his own theories. Highlighting the growing national security apparatus post–World War II, he points to resource competition as a key reason the Navy opted to defend its core theory, advocating for capital ships even at the expense of irregular-style operations.
While the 1980s allowed for a renaissance of capital ship theory under the Reagan administration, he notes the collapse of the Soviet Union led to adrift naval strategy in the following decade. Watts follows the evolution of theory and evaluates the deficiencies in applying a naval force built on capital ship theory to the emerging irregular conflicts. In doing so, he addresses both naval strategy and shipbuilding plans, criticizing what he perceives as the Navy’s lack of commitment to irregular warfare in favor of focusing on the rising potential peer rival, China. He concludes by exhorting the Navy to prepare for new global challenges with a modern theory of sea power that incorporates irregular warfare as a guiding pillar, rather than Mahan’s legacy.
While Captain Watts presents a thorough argument to support his thesis, one has the sense that his analysis lacks the most timely—and relevant—information. He highlights the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review and 2007 Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century, but there is a noticeable lack of mention or focus on their successors, the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review or the 2015 A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready (CS-21R). One is left to wonder if these omissions were oversights or reflect that the Navy is moving in a direction counter to his thesis.
When arguing the immense differences in the size and composition of China’s navy to downplay its potential as a peer competitor, he contrasts the single Chinese aircraft carrier with the U.S. Navy’s “twelve.” Following the decommissioning of the John F. Kennedy (CV-67) in March 2007, the Navy has dropped to ten aircraft carriers. Even counting the newest carrier under construction, Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78), notorious for being over budget and behind schedule, one cannot get to 12.
Perhaps even more disconcerting is his focus on “capital ships,” giving the impression that such ships are singularly focused on great-power conflict. Reality has demonstrated the usefulness of aircraft carriers in irregular warfare—one has only to look to air strikes being launched from carriers against ISIS forces or mobilizing air wing assets to provide humanitarian aid and disaster relief to prove their versatility. While Watts acknowledges some of these contributions, he tends to dismiss them in favor of smaller, mission-specific vessels designed for irregular-warfare endeavors. In a period of fiscal austerity, his argument fails to address the benefits of ships capable of multiple mission areas.
Regardless of whether one agrees with Watts’ assertion that the Navy needs to develop a new strategic paradigm focused on irregular warfare, his book offers an exceptional historical overview and assessment of trends in sea power. It is thought-provoking, insightful, and an interesting read, certain to stir debates on the future of naval power.